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I n t r o d u c t i o n
Russian Monarchy and the Symbolic Sphere
$
S ince 1967, my scholarly work has been devoted to the institutions and culture of the imperial Russian state. In that year, along with several of my 
American colleagues, I  had the good fortune to conduct my research under 
the guidance of the eminent Soviet historian, Petr Andreevich Zaionchkovskii. 
Professor Zaionchkovskii was more than generous in sharing in his learning 
and assisting us in gaining access to archival sources.1 Under the ideological 
and methodological constraints of the Soviet historical profession, he brought 
about  a  veritable recrudescence of Russian institutional history. His works 
on  the Great Reforms and later the personnel of the administration, his 
publication of memoirs of high governmental offi  cials, and his compilation of 
vital reference works revealed the signifi cance of what he called “the subjective 
factor” in Russian history, dismissed by the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy 
that relegated the state to the “superstructure” of historical development. 
My Development of a  Russian Legal Consciousness was one of a  number of 
his students’ works that, following his example, were devoted to the Great 
Reforms of the fi rst part of the reign of Alexander II. In it, I  examined the 
roots and realization of the Court Reform of 1864, focusing on the education, 
ideas, and mentality of a group of reformers that emerged during the reign of 
Nicholas I and emphasized their role in the draft ing of a reform that brought 
a modern liberal judiciary and legal profession to Russia. In the last sections, 
1 On the Zaionchkovskii American “school” see O. V. Bol’shakova, “P. A. Zaionch-
kovskii i  Amerikanskaia russistika, 1960-1980-kh gg,” in Petr Andreevich 
Zaionchkovskii: Sbornik statei i vospominanii k stoletiiu istorika ed. L.G. Zakharova, 
S.V. Mironenko, T. Emmons (Moscow: Rosspen, 2008).
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I  described the obstacles that arose to the functioning of the new system 
within the structure of an autocratic state that constrained the development 
of the independent judiciary over the following half-century. 
First among these obstacles were the high offi  cials of the state, those close 
to the tsar and court, determined to prevent further extension of the principle 
of legality into the space of the tsar’s authority. Th is was a realm unknown to 
me, except by what appeared to be their seemingly unreasoned resistance to 
institutional change. I  thus happened on a  new object of study, the symbolic 
sphere of Russian monarchy, comprising image, myth, and symbols, which 
had left  only faint marks in the historical literature. I perceived a sense of this 
sphere from the numerous memoirs published under aegis of Zaionchkovskii 
that revealed an offi  cial culture where offi  cials felt a  sense of belonging to 
the emotional and mental universe of the imperial family, a  universe that 
encompassed even offi  cials sympathetic to cause of legality in the Russian state. 
Th e symbolic sphere was a  dominating, one might say hegemonic presence 
in Russian government until the early twentieth century; its absence from 
the historical narrative bespoke the prevalence of a  teleological faith in its 
imminent demise among both liberal and revolutionary leaders and historians. 
I turned for guidance to works of cultural anthropology and literary criticism, 
particularly those of Cliff ord Geertz, Marshall Sahlins, and members of the 
Moscow-Tartu school of semiotics.2 I  began to approach Russian monarchy 
as an ongoing institution and political culture rather than a  succession of 
individual rulers with idiosyncratic personalities and political views that lacked 
a sense of the universe they inherited and inhabited. I endeavored to focus on 
how Russian monarchy functioned, its visual and literary manifestations, and 
to reveal its presence in Russian life.
* * *
In the historical literature it is common parlance to confl ate the Russian 
monarchy with the Russian state when referring to imperial Russian 
government. But in many respects they refer to diff erent entities with diff erent 
mentalities, goals, and life styles. Th e relationship between the two was 
never clearly defi ned, and the changes and oft en vexed interaction between 
the monarchy and the state administration was an ongoing process in the 
2 On these infl uences see my article, “Th ought, Culture, and Power: Refl ections of 
a Russianist,” Modern Intellectual History 5, No. 1 (April 2008): 130-35.
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exercise of power in Russia. Th e monarchy as I  conceive it signifi es the ruler 
and those personally close to him—members of the imperial family, of his 
suite, and those offi  cials in his chancellery and the court whom he invested 
with special confi dence and powers. Th e state, on the other hand, comprised 
the administrative-military apparatus and offi  cials who administered the empire 
and  the system of estates that ordered the diff erent groups of the monarchy’s 
subjects. Peter the Great introduced the concept of the state as an abstract, 
independent entity with an existence separate from the ruler operating according 
to regulation, and defi ned its purview. But at the same time, he identifi ed 
himself with the imperial state. Th e sense of Russian autocracy (samoderzhavie) 
as a  fusion of absolute monarch and imperial state persisted and received 
its explicit formulation in the reign of Nicholas I, who was regarded as the 
“embodiment of Russia.” Reforms during the reign of Alexander I and Nicholas I 
made court rank dependent on service and brought increasing numbers of 
high offi  cials into court ceremonies. Offi  cials with court ranks appeared in 
proximity to members of the imperial family for the major celebrations on 
the court calendar. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the imperial 
court had come to represent the epitome of the Russian monarchical state.3 
Th e Russian emperor identifi ed with the state as its “fi rst servant,” but he 
and his charismatic inner circle—family, favorites, prominent courtiers—also 
appeared as above and apart from the state in ceremonies, receptions, and 
balls and in the representation of the monarch in verse, ceremonial accounts, 
and visual imagery. Th e common formula oft en cited in the nineteenth 
century was that the emperor was bound by laws until he himself changed 
them. In fact, the charisma of autocracy emanated in part from the emperor’s 
superiority to law as well as from his personal sway over servitors who owed 
him deference. Th is ambiguity pervaded the tsarist system, which on the one 
hand relied on elaborate state laws and regulations guiding the administration 
of state, and on the other required that authority at any level be wielded with 
a  presumption of the personal favor of those above the law that permitted 
disregard of those constraints.4 
3 Richard Wortman, Scenarios of Power, 1; Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, 
Vol.  1, From Peter the Great to the Death of Nicholas I  (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), 322-32. Henceforth, Scenarios of Power, 1.
4 Th is ambiguity is the subject of Anatolii Remnev’s Samoderzhavnoe Pravitel’stvo: 
Komitet Ministrov v  sisteme vyschego upravlenia Rossiiskoi imperii (vtoraia polovina 
XIX—nachalo XX veka) discussed in chapter 3 of this volume.
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In the provinces, the monarch’s ethical supremacy dominated govern-
mental and social institutions, the religious services of the various confessions, 
and eventually the expressions of Russian nationality. As in the center, it 
operated as a  powerful deterrent to alternative forms of representation and 
activity, ensuring that primary loyalties were owed to the sovereign and his 
servitors, and precluding dialogue and innovation. Th e noble estate established 
by Catherine remained under the domination of the bureaucracy and posed 
no pluralistic infl uence to counter the domination of the throne.5 Th e sway 
of the ruler’s person discouraged the development of local institutions and 
bonds between social groups. Elise Kimerling Wirtschaft er has observed, “the 
ruler’s personal authority (and that of his or her appointed offi  cials) kept the 
system of governance malleable and dynamic, but once a  reigning sovereign, 
due to individual failings, was no longer free from responsibility, all formally 
constituted power was threatened.” Th is left  local institutions without offi  cial 
guidance, and “a chronic discrepancy between resources and intentions 
perpetuated personalized authority, even as explicit rules of administration 
promoted uniformity and delimited arbitrariness.” As a result “the state’s limited 
administrative capabilities and atomized institutional structures  . . . made it 
diffi  cult to secure linkages between society and government.”6 
I approach the monarchy as an institution set above the state, dominating 
and engulfi ng the organs of the state in the fi gure of the ruling emperor. 
Institutional and symbolic change took place within the parameters set by 
a political culture of personal rule. In the eighteenth century, such a culture 
was reinforced by an ideology and myth of enlightened absolutism, which 
5 Marc Raeff , “Russian Autocracy and Paradoxes of Modernization,” in Marc Raeff , 
Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1994), 122-23.
6 Elise Kimerling Wirtschaft er, Social Identity in Imperial Russia (De Kalb, IL: 
Northern Illinois University Press, 1997), 6-7. See also, 37-42, 169-73. Victor 
Zhivov has described the ecclesiastical counterpart to the prevalence of personal, 
charismatic feeling over institutional requirements in the confessional ministering of 
the Orthodox Church in medieval Russia. He concludes that his examples “clearly 
demonstrate that Russians did not rely on institutionalized penitential practices 
(regular confession, penance, contrition) in their hope for salvation. Th ey rather 
believed in the mercifulness of God, in the intercession of the saints, in the succor of 
wonder-working icons, in the benefi cial action of sacred wells, holy burial places and 
the like.” Victor Zhivov, “Institutionalized Soteriology in the Western and Eastern 
Churches,” in Slavic Ambrosiana, No. 10 (2010): 51-76. 
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made possible the adoption of western ideas, forms of literary and artistic 
expression, as well as philosophical and scientifi c inquiry. Once ideas of 
liberalism and popular sovereignty gained a  hold in European monarchies, 
the ideas and culture of the monarchy sustained an ethos of exclusivism—that 
Russian monarchy, autocracy, samoderzhavie, was presented as the highest 
form of western absolutism and therefore immune to political challenge—and 
later that the monarchy represented a  unique institution drawn from native 
sources that could justify absolute rule over both ethnically Russian provinces 
and the empire. 
Within this universe absolute power was the condition of legitimate 
rule. Th e prospect of confi ning the monarch to symbolic preeminence as in 
English or Japanese monarchy, or sharing responsibilities of rule with a Prime 
Minister, as in Prussian and Austrian monarchy—prospects contemplated 
by  reformers in the last century of tsarist rule—remained anathema. Th ere 
could be no Bismarck in the Russian state, directing the course of government 
in the name of the monarch. Many Russian offi  cials aspired to that role, but it 
was another fantasy of Russian life leading to infl ated hopes and pretentions, 
as suggested in Prince Vladimir Meshcherskii’s satirical novel, One of our 
Bismarcks.7 
Recent scholarship has documented that the emergence of a  nascent 
civil society came in early twentieth century Russia.8 However, the elements 
of a  civil society did not necessarily portend the emergence of a  pluralistic 
institutional system. Rather, the nascent civic pluralism only increased the 
confl ict and disconnect between Russia’s social system and institutions of the 
existing state still dominated by a monarchy not about to bow to concession. 
As I  have argued in the last chapters of Volume Two of Scenarios, the last 
decades of the monarchy witness a bitter attack on the reformed state not only 
by insurgent liberals and socialists, but by the monarch himself, which aft er 
the downfall of the monarchy left  a society in tumult and confl ict without the 
institutions and traditions that could take on the future tasks of governing 
Russia. 
7 Vladimir Meshcherskii, Odin iz nashikh Bismarkov: fantasticheskii roman v  trekh 
chastiakh (St. Petersburg: K. V. M., 1874).
8 Most convincingly in Joseph Bradley, Voluntary Associations in Tsarist Russia: 
Science, Patriotism, and Civil Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2009). For other works on the subject, see Martina Winkler, “Rulers and Ruled, 




I characterize the monarchy as an active agent in Russia’s political 
experience, rather than an institution merely reactive to pressures, economic, 
political, and military, whose dominant role was resisting change until the 
inevitable collapse facing all absolute monarchies. Th e central constitutive 
element of offi  cial representation from the reign of Peter the Great was a myth 
of conquest. Th e rule of the monarch found its principal grounds for sovereign 
power not in divine mandate or dynastic inheritance, though these principles 
were also invoked, but in his symbolic transcendence, the adoption of the persona 
of superordinate ruler fi gure from another realm, a  pagan god descendant, 
a Christ transfi gured, whether in ceremony, visual imagery or the printed word. 
In this framework, the separation between the person of the tsar and the 
Russian state, Rossiia, did not correspond to western patterns.9 Peter the Great 
tried to distinguish the state and its institutions from his personal authority, but 
failed to do so.10 Peter’s legitimacy as tsar was based on his performance of heroic 
acts of state, proving his transcendence by advancing the welfare of the realm. 
His successors too justifi ed their authority not by inherited rights to the throne 
but by performance—prodigies, whether real or evoked in representation, 
eff ected by the agency of the state for the benefi t of the state and nation. 
Th e model for representation from the late seventeenth century was the 
“culture of power” of Baroque Europe, exemplifi ed in the fi gure of Louis XIV 
as portrayed in the works of Jürgen Habermas and T. C. W. Blanning. Th e 
culture of power was an early stage of public representation addressed to the 
elite that set its members above and apart from the subjects of the monarch.11 
9 On the separation between the body natural and the body politic of the king, see 
the classic work, Ernst H. Kantorowicz, Th e King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval 
Political Th eology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 314-450.
10 Michael Cherniavsky, Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1961), 86. See also, Claudio Sergio Nun Ingerfl om, “‘Loyalty to the 
State’ under Peter the Great? Return to the Sources and the Historicity of Concepts,” 
in Loyalties and Solidarities in Russian Culture, Society and History, Forthcoming, 
Oxford University Press.
11 Jürgen Habermas, Th e Structural Transformation of Public Sphere: An Inquiry 
into a  category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989); T. C. W. 
Blanning, Th e Culture of Power and the Power of Culture: Old Regime Europe 1660-
1789 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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Festivities, Habermas writes, “served not so much the pleasure of the 
participants as the demonstration of grandeur, that is the grandeur of the host 
and guests.” Aristocratic society “served as a  vehicle for the representation of 
the monarch.”12 Blanning evokes the “representational culture” of seventeenth-
century courts comprising the use of art, architecture, music, and elaborate 
ceremonial as dynamics of power. Th us “the representational display expressed 
in palaces, academies, opera houses, hunting establishments, and the like was 
not pure self-indulgence, nor was it deception; it was a  constitutive element 
of power itself.”13
Representation in the Baroque enhanced and transformed the image of 
monarch: the very act of artistic rendering elevated him to a  diff erent loft y 
realm of the super-ordinate. It presented him as an “embodiment of a higher 
power” or “the represented presence of the divine itself.”14 Michel Foucault 
focused on a  modality of representation that superseded resemblance in 
seventeenth century Europe. Th e mirror refl ecting the image of Philip  IV 
in Velázquez’s masterpiece, “Las Meninas,” epitomized for him the device of 
representation, replacing the king himself as the artist’s principal subject.15 
Louis Marin, in Le portrait du roi, identifi ed a “doubling” eff ect that intensifi ed 
the presence of the subject of monarch. “Th e device of representation 
transforms force into might (puissance), force into power (pouvoir.)” “Th e king 
is only truly king, that is the monarch, in images.”16 
For Habermas and his followers, representational culture served as 
a  prelude  to the emergence of a  public sphere, the participation of bourgeois 
society in public discourse, which accompanied the diff erentiation and 
specialization of state institutions, the appearance of public organizations, 
and the emergence of pluralistic centers of infl uence and power. In Russia, 
monarchical representation as introduced by Peter the Great persisted 
and remained a  principal function of the monarchy. With Peter, the act of 
borrowing and displaying forms of western imagery became an attribute of 
power. It produced the “doubling eff ect” of representation, removing the 
12 Habermas, Structural Transformation of Public Sphere, 9-10.
13 Blanning, Culture of Power, 59.
14 Habermas, Structural Transformation of Public Sphere, 7, 252, note 10 where he cites 
H. G. Gadamer. 
15 Michel Foucault, Th e Order of Th ings: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New 
York: Vintage, 1970), 3-16.
16 Louis Marin, Le portrait du roi (Paris: Les éditions de minuit, 1981), 9-13.
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monarch from his local confi nes and situating him in a universe of irresistible 
and effi  cacious enlightened rule. Th e representation of the monarch became 
paramount, transcending considerations of law, prudence, or rational 
argument, and shaping the practices and attitudes of governmental offi  cials 
to accommodate a culture of power. As a result, rather than giving way to an 
embryonic public sphere, representational culture in Russia strove to dominate 
it and to deter its further development. While the representation of Russian 
monarchy elevated the ruler as the embodiment of the state, the representation 
of British monarchy separated the state from the monarch, divesting him of 
power, and making him an abiding symbol of the nation. 
It has been pointed out that most early modern monarchies borrowed 
symbols and imagery. Th at certainly was the case. But in Russia such 
borrowings perpetuated the “doubling” eff ect mentioned by Marin, enhancing 
the rulers’ stature by ongoing emulations of heroic foreign models. Th e 
requirement of demonstrative acts of borrowing as a precondition to absolute 
rule, I argue, distinguishes Russian monarchs from their European prototypes. 
To maintain the superordinate image demanded by the myth of conquest, 
Russian rulers enacted scenarios that identifi ed them with biblical, historical, 
or foreign fi gures; Peter the Great as Roman conqueror, or Christ and his 
disciples, or Pygmalion shaping Russia, Catherine II as Astraea and Minerva. 
Alexander I  was elevated as an angelic presence later, as an evangelical Vicar 
of Christ. Th ey assumed the dress and features of exemplary European 
monarchs: Peter III, and Paul I took on the semblance of Frederick the Great, 
Nicholas I, King Frederick William III of Prussia as family man, Alexander I, 
of Napoleon, Alexander II, Louis Napoleon as beloved popular monarch. For 
them the act of representation served as an elevating force, the image revealing 
a higher reality than that of a fl esh and blood human being. 
Th e principal audience for these representations was not the Russian 
people, but the entourage of the ruler and the elite of the Russian state, who 
shared the tsars’ scenarios and refl exively gave the aura and sway of truth to 
his prerogatives and pretensions. As Max Weber observed, elites performed 
their ceremonies and elaborated myths primarily to justify their domination 
to themselves, confi rming their own destiny as wielders of power. Weber 
understood myth in this context as a  way for rulers to make their rule 
acceptable by various forms of legitimation, i.e., to justify their domination. 
“He who is most favored feels the never ceasing need to look on his position 
as in some way ‘legitimate,’ upon his advantage as ‘deserved,’ and the 
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other’s disadvantage as being brought about by the latter’s ‘fault.’ Th at the 
purely accidental causes of the diff erence may be ever so obvious makes 
no diff erence.” Myth then is created to defi ne and explain this diff erence. 
“Every highly privileged group develops this myth of its natural, especially 
blood superiority. Under conditions of stable distribution of power and, 
consequently, of a  statist order, that myth is accepted by the negatively 
privileged orders.”17
Th e spread of the concepts of national distinctiveness and popular 
sovereign ty in nineteenth-century Europe introduced new forms of represen-
tation. Transcendence then was demonstrated by the appropriation of signs 
of nationality, elaborated in state ideology and then disclosed in images of 
Russianness. Th e narratives shift ed to refl ect diff erent conceptions of the 
relationship between the tsar and people. For Nicholas I  and Alexander II, 
they emphasized mutual bonds of feelings, evinced by the people in the form 
of absolute devotion and gratitude, which under Nicholas I indicated absolute 
obedience, and under Alexander II, mutual acts of sacrifi ce and gratitude that 
dramatized the Great Reforms. Th e scenarios of Alexander III and Nicholas II 
exalted the ethnic bonds that historically linked the monarchy with the people, 
endowing the regime with stature and power emanating from early Russia. 
Th e signs of transcendence were transmitted in a  variety of texts of 
representation that framed the narratives and pretentions of each ruler for the 
monarchy itself and the elite. Th e laws of the realm opened with preambles that 
set the provisions in the context of the myth, justifying the decree, statute, or 
rules in terms of the designs of the current reign. Ceremonial texts—program 
books, later accounts in newspapers and illustrated journals, presented the 
events in accounts that may or may not have corresponded to their actual 
performance and defi ned their meanings. Painting and architecture were called 
upon to evoke an imagined political landscape. For the historian, this complex 
of sources gives a  sense of the universe the monarchy constructed around 
itself, how its rulers envisioned the potentiality of the Russian state. Th ese 
artistic sources will be the subject of articles in the next volume of my articles: 
Ceremonial Texts, Visual Texts, Texts of Exploration.
17 Max Rheinstein, ed., Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (New York: Simon 
and Shuster, 1967), 335-36; Max Weber, Wirtschaft  und Gesellschaft : Die Wirtschaft  
und die gesellschaft lichen Ordnungen und Mächt: Nachlass, Teilband 4: Herrschaft  
(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 2005), MWG, 1/22-4, p. 147f.
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Th e essays in this volume address aspects of the representation of Russian 
monarchy that I  have examined at length in the two volumes of Scenarios of 
Power. Scenarios of Power dealt with the narratives of Russian monarchy as 
they evolved from Peter the Great to the 1917 revolution. Its organization was 
chronological and imagery and symbols fi gured as aspects of the stages of the 
evolution of tsarist imagery and government. Specifi c interpretations about 
the meaning and consequences of the forms of representation were set forth 
in the context of a particular reign. Th e articles in this volume rather focus on 
the eff ects over time of these representations on specifi c areas of state life, such 
as law, administrative practice, concepts of national and imperial identities. 
Except for chapter 9, “Nicholas II and the Revolution of 1905,” to which 
I added materials on t he Beilis case, and chapter 10, “Th e Russian Empire and 
Russian Monarchy: Th e Problem of Russian Nationalism,”18 I have introduced 
mainly editorial changes to the originals. Parts of several articles overlap 
or repeat sections but I  have included them, nonetheless, when they address 
specifi c historical issues such as the invention of tradition, the problem of 
political center, the metamorphoses of myth, and relate them to the governing 
culture of representation. Th ese articles bring to bear materials discussed 
elsewhere on key issues.
Essays in Section I  deal with the interrelationship of two central themes 
of my research on Russian monarchy: the demonstration of transcendence 
and absolute power and the aspiration to legality. I  see the tension between 
these two in principle incompatible strivings as a  central characteristic of 
Russian government in the imperial period, conditioning the mentality and 
the practices of both the emperors and the offi  cials who served them. Chapter 
1, “Russian Monarchy and the Rule of Law: New Considerations of the 
Court Reform of 1864,” a  revised version of the introduction to the Russian 
translation of Th e Development of a  Russian Legal Consciousness, discusses 
the literature and interpretations on court reform in the nineteenth century 
that appeared aft er its publication in 1976. Chapter 2, “Th e Representation 
of Dynasty and “Fundamental Laws” in the Evolution of Russian Monarchy” 
focuses on the law of succession in the light of the representations of 
Russian monarchy. It argues that the borrowing of a  European conception 
of a  fundamental law, realized fi rst in a  law of hereditary succession, proved 
18 Th e latter is a revised version of “Natsionalizm, narodnost’ i rossiiskoe gosudarstvo,” 
Neprikosnovennyi zapas 17, No. 3 (2001): 100-105.
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incompatible with the performative mode of Petrine representation, which 
dominated future eff orts to regularize the succession by establishing hereditary 
right to the throne. Chapter 3 is a review of Anatolii Remnev, Samoderzhavnoe 
pravitel’stvo: Komitet ministrov v  sisteme vysshego upravleniia Rossiiskoi 
imperii, vtoraia polovina XIX—nachalo XX veka, a  monograph that shows 
the pervasive presence of the tsar’s personal infl uence in the practices of the 
state administration as exemplifi ed in its highest institution—the Committee 
of Ministers. Drawing on recent studies and memoir publications about the 
Russian state, as well as extensive archival sources, Remnev’s book describes 
the practices and psychology of Russian offi  cials as they fi nd ways to cope with 
a system of government presumably based on rules and laws but acquiescent to 
the tsar’s infl uence. 
Th e upbringing of heirs to the throne in eighteenth and nineteenth 
century Russia imbued them with the narrative, imagery, and aspirations of 
the governing myth. Part II deals with two aspects of this. Chapter 4, “Th e 
Russian Empress as Mother,” which was published in 1978, before I  had 
embarked on my study of monarchical representation, focuses on the changing 
roles of the mothers in raising heirs to the throne. It describes the tensions 
between the demands to train a sovereign who rose above the emotional bonds 
of family to devote himself entirely to the welfare of the state and feelings of 
fi lial attachment and dependence. Chapter 5, “Th e Russian Family as Symbol,” 
examines the idealization of the imperial family in the context of the early 
nineteenth-century cult of family and dynasty. Nicholas I  introduced the 
imagery and ceremony that exalted the imperial family as the exemplifi cation 
of domestic virtues, elevating the monarchy and the elite as paragons of western 
dynastic ideals. 
Th e essays in Part III examine the incorporation of the ideas of nation 
and people into a  myth of conquest that evoked symbolic distance between 
the ruler and the ruled. Chapter 6, “Th e Invention of Tradition and the 
Representation of Russian Monarchy,” discusses invented traditions in 
nineteenth century Russia as devices to accentuate heroic departures and 
breaks from previous reigns. Despite gestures of fi delity to tradition, the 
representation of Russian monarchy from Peter the Great reveals a pattern of 
symbolic discontinuity, a cadence of demonstrative signs of change rather than 
the persistence of traditional bonds, a dynamic process, but one that produced 
jolting reorientations that could discourage the progressive development of 
existing governmental institutions. New ceremonies and imagery showed 
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the bonds of the monarch with the nation in terms that fi t the ascendant 
monarch’s scenario, and established ones such as the imperial coronation were 
modifi ed to refl ect current circumstances and goals. Chapter 7, “National 
Narratives in the Representation of Nineteenth Century Russian Monarchy,” 
shows how this process led to the emergence of diff ering concepts of a national 
monarchy, the two distinct national narratives advanced in the nineteenth 
century: Nicholas I’s “Offi  cial Nationality,” which maintained the basic themes 
and images of the European myth, by claiming the devotion of the Russian 
people to their westernized monarchs, and Alexander  III’s, “national myth,” 
which introduced ethnicity to the representation of the tsar’s person. 
Th e succeeding chapters describe the opening of a  gulf between the 
monarchy and the state as the tsar sought to return to an imagined Muscovite 
autocracy that sacralized the personal patriarchal police power of the tsar and 
delegitimized the laws and institutions that had developed since Peter the 
Great. Chapter 8, “Moscow and Petersburg: Th e Problem of Political Center, 
1881-1914,” my earliest publication on imperial representation, explores the 
symbolic implications for Alexander III in rejecting the narrative that had 
consecrated Petersburg as the symbol of westernized monarchy, which had 
been desecrated by the assassination of Alexander II, and establishing Moscow 
as the sacred center of a reborn national monarchy. Chapter 9, “Nicholas II and 
the Revolution” takes the evolution of the national myth into the twentieth 
century, focusing on Nicholas II’s sense of a  personal bond with the Russian 
people that persisted and grew even more intense aft er the 1905 Revolution, 
inspiring him with a vision of a resurrection of a seventeenth-century national 
autocracy devoid of Jews. At this point, the confl ict between the monarch, with 
his belief in absolute prerogatives derived from God, and the political leaders of 
the emerging nation came into the open. Th e monarchy itself then became an 
active force in the subversion of the status quo, establishing the political setting 
for the violent confrontations of early twentieth century Russia. 
Part IV examines the complex relationship between nation and empire in 
the representation of the ruler, who assumed the roles of both tsar of Russia 
and emperor of a  multinational empire, greater Russia—Rossiia—served by 
a multinational elite. Th e dominant view stated most trenchantly by Geoff rey 
Hosking holds that the imperial state discouraged the developed of a  civic 
or ethnic Russian nationalism that could provide the core of a  nation state: 
Russian autocracy “was generated by the needs of empire, and had to be 
reinforced as that empire came increasingly into confl ict with nation-building.” 
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His thesis is that “in Russia state-building obstructed nation-building,” and 
that autocracy and  backwardness “were symptoms and not causes: both were 
generated by the way the building of the empire obstructed the formation 
of a nation.”19 
But though this interpretation makes clear the clash between aspirations 
to empire and nation, I argue that it omits the exercise of agency, leaving 
the process peculiarly abstract and incorporeal. Chapter 10, “Nationalism, 
Nationality and the Russian State,” explores the dynamic that produced this 
outcome, shift ing the focus to the monarchy and the rulers’ determination 
to rule without public participation: to incorporate both the nation and the 
empire in the institution of autocracy. Th e article discusses the troublesome 
dilemma of Russians seeking to form a  political nation, but deterred by 
a  monarchy claiming to assume the mantle of nationhood—a monarchical 
nation—that incorporated the Russian people. In this respect, the empire and 
the nation become indistinguishable entities according implicit assent to the 
absolute power of the monarch. Th e expectation of Russian liberals to claim 
leadership of the nation was repeatedly thwarted by an emperor presuming 
to embody or represent the nation himself. Th e Russian pattern again was 
the antithesis to the British, where the emerging popular nationalism found 
expression in empire, which then came to be personifi ed in the fi gure of 
the monarch.20
Th e Russian ruler’s absolute power was closely entwined with the 
maintenance of the unity and the integrity of the Russian empire, the subject 
of chapter 11, “Th e  ‘integrity’ (tselost’) of the State in Imperial Russian 
19 Geoff rey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1997), xxiv, xxvi, xvii. 
20 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1992). She writes, “For most Victorians, the massive overseas empire which 
was the fruit of so much successful warfare represented fi nal and conclusive proof 
of Great Britain’s providential destiny. God had entrusted Britons with empire, they 
believed, so as to further the worldwide spread of the Gospel and as a  testimony 
to their status as the Protestant Israel. And this complacency proved persistent. 
Well into the twentieth century, contact with and dominion over manifestly alien 
peoples nourished Britons’ sense of superior diff erence. Th ey could contrast their law, 
their treatment of women, their wealth, power, political stability and religion with 
societies they only imperfectly understood, but usually perceived as inferior. Empire 
corroborated Britain’s blessings, as well as what the Scottish socialist Keir Hardie 
called ‘the indomitable pluck and energy of the British people,’” 368-69.
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Representation.” Absolute power not only made possible the unity of empire, 
as Alexander II’s remark that a constitution would result in “the disintegration 
of the Empire into pieces" suggested, but the empire with its concomitant 
advantages—international standing, the grandeur and accoutrements of 
imperial representations—sustained the claims to absolute power. From 
the reign of Peter the Great, the extent and the variety of empire prompted 
statements alluding to its vulnerability that justifi ed forceful and unlimited 
exercise of monarchical authority. Apprehensions about the integrity of 
the state surfaced with especial poignancy in the early twentieth century 
when Nicholas II, his ministers, and later the Cadet party made the empire’s 
integrity a  primary concern and again with the government of Vladimir 
Putin, who proclaims the goal of maintaining the integrity (tselostnost’) 
of Russia to enhance the historical grounds of his own authoritarian rule. 
Th e article is followed by an exchange with editors of Ab Imperio, who raise 
questions challenging my assumptions and conclusions. Chapter 12, “Th e 
Tsar and Empire: Representation of the Monarchy and Symbolic Integration 
in Imperial Russia,” examines the eff orts to assimilate nation and nationalities 
into the hierarchical structure of the monarchy, particularly in the reign of 
Alexander  II, when the state began, within the context of Alexander  II’s 
scenario of love, to strive to create a sense of citizenship. Th e article summarizes 
the diminishing success of these eff orts and the resort to force and the 
imagery of national conquest in order to reaffi  rm the unity of the empire. Th e 
establishment of the Duma in 1906 only abetted the centrifugal tendencies 
awakening in a multinational empire. 
I owe a great debt of gratitude to my student Ernest A. Zitser, whose 
comprehensive bibliography of my works concludes this volume.
#
 






1. Russian Monarchy and the Rule of Law: 
New Considerations of the Court Reform of 1864 *
$
T he relationship of the legal system—the courts, the legal administration, the discipline of Russian law—to the Russian state has been an ongoing 
and unresolved problem in modern Russian history and remains a contested 
issue in contemporary political life. Th e monarchy, the Soviet regime, and the 
current Russian government all affi  rmed and reaffi  rmed the importance of 
law and legal institutions, but without abandoning their fear and antagonism 
toward judicial institutions and judicial expertise. Th e Court Reform of 1864 
stands out as an exceptional event, when the government adopted a  judicial 
system that embodied the very principles that the rulers and offi  cials of the 
Russian state had long repudiated as alien and pernicious. When I embarked 
on my research for Th e Development of a  Russian Legal Consciousness in the 
mid-1960s, I was principally interested in explaining this extraordinary break 
from tradition, which, I  concluded, could not in the long run overcome the 
autocracy’s jealousy of its prerogatives. Here, I will revisit this subject, taking 
into consideration both my own studies of tsarist myth and symbols and later 
scholarship, some of which contests my pessimistic conclusions about the post-
reform era. I will examine the question raised, directly or indirectly in all these 
works: was a rule of law possible under Russian monarchy? 
I sought the origins of the court reform by studying the evolving 
institutions and personnel of the Russian state in the fi rst half of the 
nineteenth century—a  subject which, despite its obvious importance, had 
* Th is essay is a  somewhat modifi ed version of the introduction to the Russian 
translation of Th e Development of a  Russian Legal Consciousness published by NLO 
press in Moscow.
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long been neglected by historians. Th e Russian state remained a  great and 
powerful eminence responding at times as an evil force of oppression, at others 
as a  demiurge of progress and enlightenment, whose acts were known, but 
whose motivations and inner workings remained mysterious. Pre-revolutionary 
historians had published initial studies of Russian state institutions, but 
their treatments had been constrained by limited access to the archives and 
ideological biases that prompted either uncritical praise or a  determination 
to seek out the fl aws and hypocrisy of governmental policies. Until the 1960s, 
Soviet historians had paid  little attention to the state, which, according to 
party doctrine, represented an epiphenomenon, historically determined and 
ultimately doomed by the Marxist dialectic. Western historians of Russia, 
including myself, had focused their attention on intellectual history, the 
history of the revolutionary movement, and later on social history.
It was Petr Andreevich Zaionchkovskii who opened the study of the 
imperial Russian state to serious scholarship in the 1960s. His numerous 
monographs, his editions of memoirs made clear that the state represented an 
entire culture, with its own values, goals, politics, and ideology. Zaionchkovskii 
recognized and came to propound the role of “the subjective factor” in history, 
though of course he could not do so in print. He viewed the Great Reforms of 
the 1860s not as a defensive response to an ostensible “revolutionary situation” 
among the peasantry (even if he gave the obligatory statement of such views 
in his publications), but as a  process taking place in the bureaucracy, where 
offi  cials, responding to the Crimean War, devised plans to change Russia in 
order to enter the new era. He courageously defended this view in public. 
In the winter of 1966-67, I  attended a  lecture he gave at Leningrad State 
University on the role of the subjective factor in history. Th e large audience, 
which overfl owed the hall, responded with amazement and curiosity. 
An understanding of the subjective factor, Zaionchkovskii believed, 
involved the study of the attitudes and ideas of governmental offi  cials. Th is 
aspect of institutional history was of particular interest to me as a  student of 
intellectual history. It demanded the close examination of archival sources, and 
Petr Andreevich did everything he could to overcome the obstacles that we 
faced in acquiring the necessary documents in the archive. (Perhaps the most 
serious of these was the prohibition of providing foreigners with opisi, which 
made it impossible for us to know the extent of the sources on a given subject.) 
I had met Petr Andreevich in 1962, and in the fall of 1966 I traveled to Russia 
to work under his direction on the reform of the courts.
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As my work progressed, I  began to narrow my focus to a  study of the 
offi  cials who were involved in the administration and the reform of the 
Russian judiciary. In this respect, my approach was infl uenced by the work 
of Marc Raeff  and Hans-Joachim Torke on the ethos of Russian offi  cials, 
and of Walter  Pintner on the changes in the composition of administrative 
personnel in the fi rst half of the nineteenth century. Raeff  raised the 
question of administrative professionalization, arguing that the Russian 
offi  cialdom of the fi rst half of the nineteenth century did not fi t the Weberian 
model of an educated, specialized offi  cialdom, applying rational norms to 
their administrative tasks. Th is point of view was supported by Torke’s 
comprehensive and defi nitive study of the early nineteenth-century Russian 
administration. Walter Pintner’s pioneering quantitative analysis of service 
lists, formuliarnye spiski, on the other hand, revealed the beginning of processes 
of change in the direction of increased education and professionalization.1
My own research, fi rst on personal sources, later on service lists 
( formuliarnye spiski) revealed similar changes in the legal administration. 
It became clear to me that the Russian legal profession was not born with the 
Court Reform of 1864, but in the decades before the reform when a  group 
of offi  cials dedicated to the law and trained in the educational institutions 
founded under Nicholas I  began to staff  important offi  ces in the Ministry 
of Justice. Th ese offi  cials had both attained a  considerable knowledge of law 
and developed a respect for and even a devotion to the law as a higher ethical 
cause. In this way, they fi t not only the Weberian but the Durkheimian model 
of a  profession as a  group dedicated to their sphere of expertise as an ethical 
absolute, as a  higher calling. Th ey began to see themselves principally as 
servants of the law, rather than as servitors of the tsar or the state, and sought 
to lift  the prestige and authority of the judiciary. It is this pattern of thought 
that I refer to as a “legal consciousness.” 
1 Marc Raeff , “Th e Bureaucratic Phenomena of Imperial Russia, 1700-1905,” American 
Historical Review 84, no.  2 (April 1979): 399-411; Marc Raeff , “Th e Russian 
Autocracy and Its Offi  cials,” in Raeff , Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial 
Russia, 76-87; Hans-Joachim Torke, Das russische Beamtentum in der ersten Hälft e 
des 19. Jahrhunderts in Forschungen zur osteuropaischen Geschichte 13 (Berlin: 
Otto Harrassowitz, 1967); Walter Pintner and Donald Rowney, Russian Offi  cialdom: 
Th e Bureaucratization of Russian Society fr om the Seventeenth to the Twentieth 
Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 190-249.
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Th e term “legal consciousness” needs several words of explanation, fi rst 
in regard to the indefi nite article “a”, which does not translate into Russian. 
I describe it as a legal consciousness in order to make clear that it is not necessarily 
the only legal consciousness in Russian history, or one that was generally shared. 
Indeed, although the development of a  consciousness of the transcendent 
importance of the law was of great signifi cance for its own time and subsequent 
decades, it encountered formidable and eventually insuperable obstacles, and 
its rise appears more as a  glorious but tragic episode than a  central trend of 
Russian history. Secondly, I defi ne this mode of thinking as a “consciousness” 
rather than a  “mentality,” because of its intellectual, ideological character, 
drawing on legal and philosophical ideas. In this respect, these legal offi  cials, 
along with many of the reformers, shared a  way of thinking with members 
of the intelligentsia: they too conceived their role as transforming Russian 
institutions on the basis of western ideas and western institutional models. 
Th eir moment of triumph came in the summer of 1862, when the emperor 
allowed the transfer of responsibility for legal reform from the Second Section, 
the codifi cation section of the emperor’s chancellery, to the State Chancellery, 
the chancellery of the State Council. Th e State Council, the highest legislative 
body in the government, deliberated on and modifi ed the projects for reform, 
draft ed by the reform-minded offi  cials in the State Chancellery. Th ey were 
now charged with draft ing projects for reform based on European science and 
experience. Th eir success was made possible by the particular circumstances of 
the 1850s and 1860s: the humiliations of the Crimean War, and the nobility’s 
demands for courts that could protect property rights aft er the emancipation of 
the serfs had deprived them of patrimonial authority. Th e reformers fashioned 
a  system of independent civil and criminal courts, with judges enjoying life 
tenure, and open adversarial trials. 
By emphasizing the ideological roots of the court reform, I  questioned 
a  standard interpretation of its origins—that the reform was a  necessary 
concomitant to emancipation. Th e conventional argument went that the 
freeing of the serfs required new courts to replace the corrupt and inept 
justice of the pre-reform era, and provide a  basis for civic rights in the new 
era. Mikhail Grigor’evich Korotkikh has argued this point in his valuable 
study of the draft ing of the judicial reform. Th e goal, according to Korotkikh, 
was to create a  “mass social group of property owners from the emancipated 
peasants and nobility” by guaranteeing “the inviolability of property.” It 
is true that the emancipation necessitated a  judicial reform, but there is 
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no evidence that it determined the type of judicial reform that would be 
introduced. Th e emancipation settlement certainly did not defi ne the liberal 
terms of the  court reform of 1864, which did not comprise institutions of 
justice for  the peasantry. Th e statutes of 1861 provided the peasants with 
their own volost' courts, which were under the jurisdiction of the Minister 
of the Interior and thus hardly independent. Th e judges of volost' courts were 
peasants elected from the communal leadership and were supposed to take 
peasant customary law into account. 
Korotkikh also reiterated the orthodox Soviet interpretation that the 
reform was a  response to the revolutionary situation among the peasants.2 
But it is clear from correspondence between the tsar and high offi  cials that, 
in their eyes, it was the disgruntlement of the nobility and their demands 
for  protection of property and personal rights that constituted the principal 
threat to stability. It was Petr Valuev’s report on the mood of the gentry in 
September 1861 that persuaded Alexander II to accept the views pressed 
upon him by the reformers and to approve of the western principles of justice 
enshrined in the court reform of 1864.
Th e court reform, as I  suggested above, contradicted an abiding distrust 
of the judicial function in Russian autocracy. But at the same time, it was the 
culmination of the determination of Russian monarchs to introduce western 
ideas of law into the operation of the Russian state, to pursue the goal of 
legality (zakonnost'). From the reign of Peter the Great, Russian monarchs 
issued countless decrees on the necessity of reforming the administration of 
justice. Th eir notions of legality followed the model of German states; that 
is, they viewed laws as means to induce offi  cials to implement the legislative 
enactments of the supreme power. In the late nineteenth century, it became 
associated with the idea of the German Rechtsstaat, which Harold Berman has 
described as a state governed by laws issued by the legislative authority.3 
In fact, Hiroshi Oda has shown, the idea of Rechtsstaat in Germany went 
through several stages. In the early nineteenth century, it expressed the vision of 
2 Mikhail Grigor’evich Korotkikh, Sudebnaia reforma 1864 goda v  Rossii: 
sushchnost’ i  sotsial’no-pravovoi mekhanizm formirovaniia (Voronezh: Izdatel’stvo 
Voronezhskogo universiteta, 1994), 177-78. 
3 Harold J. Berman, “Th e Rule of Law and the Law-Based State (Rechtsstaat) (With 
special reference to the Soviet Union),” Th e Harriman Institute Forum 4, No.  5 
(May 1991): 449-58.
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German liberal jurists of a parliamentary state refl ecting the will of the people 
and an independent judiciary supervising the dispensation of justice. Aft er 
the failure of the revolution of 1848 to attain these goals, Rechtsstaat assumed 
the meaning of the eff ective enforcement of the laws, “the formal Rechtsstaat”, 
which “focused on the ‘legality of administration’, i.e., the problem of whether 
the administration is eff ected in accordance with statutory laws.” It was based 
on the presumption that it was possible to achieve eff ective enforcement of the 
laws in a monarchical system.4 
Th ose who aspired to legality in the tsarist state strove for the latter 
ideal, but it proved diffi  cult to attain. First of all, it required the application 
of written laws to guide the institutions of justice, and codifi cation remained 
an elusive objective in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Russia. It was 
undertaken ten times in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century without 
success, and complaints about the corruption, ineff ectiveness, and general 
inadequacy of the  court system echo through the literature and government 
memoranda of that time. 
Th e question of the role of law in Russian history has been both a vexing 
and peripheral one. Russia adopts western forms of legality, but without 
the legal institutions of western monarchy, so that the law oft en appeared 
as an alien imposition on the informal and personal relationships native 
to Russia. Western anti-legalism found a  ready reception among the ruling 
groups in Russia, even when they pronounced the signifi cance of legality, 
for it expressed the impatience of offi  cials with legal constraints and the 
monarch’s fears of an incipient legal profession—an unwelcome element of 
pluralism. Th e Soviet regime mobilizing the population for struggle against 
class enemies and then the building of industry gave new force to western 
anti-legalist attitudes. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, reform 
of the courts was always on the agenda for rulers, offi  cials, and intellectuals, 
but the issue was quickly overshadowed at the beginning of the reigns of 
Alexander I  and Nicholas I  by eff orts for or against political reform. Th e 
same pattern has recurred since the beginning of perestroika. Th e attempts 
to reform the courts and to promote legal guarantees necessary to a market 
economy have once more been overshadowed by the exigencies of establishing 
a new political order.
4 Hiroshi Oda, “Th e Emergence of Pravovoe Gosudarstvo (Rechtsstaat) in Russia,” 
Review of Central and East European Law 25, No. 3 (1999): 378-79.
RUSSIAN MONARCHY AND THE RULE OF LAW
 9 
Th e role of law in Russian monarchy, I realized, could be understood only 
by understanding its place in the broader framework of values embodied in 
the political culture of Russian monarchy. And it was this realization that led 
me to embark on my study of Russian monarchy as a  culture with its own 
symbolic system.5 Th e primacy of the executive, it became clear, refl ected 
a  larger ethos of domination expressed and enacted in a  myth of conquest. 
Mythical narratives and imagery identifi ed the monarch with foreign models 
of  sovereignty and presented him as a  fi gure superordinate in his virtue and 
heroic dedication. Each monarch, ascending the throne, devised his own 
scenario of the myth, which in a contemporary cultural idiom dramatized his 
distance from, and consequently his superiority to, the subject population. 
Th e emperor, in addition to representing the anointed of God, appeared 
as a  demiurge of progress dedicated to the general welfare. In this context, 
there could be no question about legal limitations of his, or even his servitors’ 
authority. Th e Fundamental Laws of the empire made it clear that it remained 
in the power of the monarch to revoke general laws of the empire, and while 
he was supposed to observe these laws until that time, “every act of his will 
obtains mandatory force without the consent of another institution.”6
Law represented an attribute of power that identifi ed the ruler with exalted 
foreign images of sovereignty just as it served as a means to control and civilize 
the Russian administration. In the seventeenth century, it associated the ruler 
with the law of the Justinian Code. In the eighteenth century, legality connoted 
western theories of cameralism and natural law. But these ideas ill accorded 
with Russian institutional reality. Th e Russian state lacked the traditions 
of feudal and Roman law, and what Montesquieu termed “intermediate” 
institutions, such as the French parlements and estate institutions that were 
capable of ruling on legal issues and dispensing justice. As the example of 
Japan suggests, legal reform on a  western model could proceed even in the 
absence of such institutions and traditions. But the Japanese monarchical 
myths did not present the emperor as conqueror, as ruthless head of a powerful 
executive apparatus. Law remained an ideal and ornament in Russian political 
culture, what Victor Zhivov has described as a  “cultural fi ction,” enhancing 
the mythical image of the Russian monarch. Th e enforcement of law was 
not a  primary concern of the emperors and their high offi  cials, despite their 
5 Scenarios of Power, 1 and 2. 
6 Oda, “Emergence,” 385.
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exasperation with the failure of the administration to dispense justice 
eff ectively. Zhivov writes of the “ineffi  cacy” (nedeistvennost’) of the law for it 
was not meant to be eff ected, but rather fulfi lled an “ideological function.”7 
* * *
Th e centrality of the myth of the conquest in the symbolic system of 
Russian monarchy ensured the continued subordination of the judicial 
function. Th e myth framed a group of options and values that was completely 
diff erent from those that governed most European monarchies. In Western 
Europe, monarchs did not easily yield power to judicial institutions, but they 
did so when expedience dictated forbearance and the acceptance of assertive 
and autonomous judicial institutions. Th e Nobel prize-winning economist 
Douglass C. North, in his studies of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
England, formulated a  model for understanding the appearance of a  respect 
for law in a monarchy. He argued that “a credible threat of removal” was one 
factor that had convinced kings ruling aft er the English revolution to accept 
the autonomy of the common law courts and secure property rights—changes 
that he concluded helped stimulate the rapid development of the English 
economy in the eighteenth century. Th e king’s respect for the law became 
a  “self-enforcing” incentive in that he saw it as in his interest not to meddle 
in this sphere, an interest that was rewarded by rapid economic growth.8 In 
nineteenth-century Germany and France, monarchs, faced with the threat of 
removal, found it expedient to make compromises, both by allowing autonomy 
to the courts and fi nally accepting some type of constitutional limitation. 
Th e conquest myth imposed a quite diff erent understanding of expedience. 
In its context, the threat of removal appeared as a  challenge to struggle to 
defend realm and dynasty against the invasion of foreign doctrines. Th e 
myth was reformulated in the scenarios of Nicholas I  and Alexander  II 
with a  national grounding that banished the threat of removal by affi  rming 
the distinctive character of Russian state institutions. As expressed in the 
7 V. M. Zhivov, Razyskaniia v  oblasti istorii i  predystorii russkoi kul’tury (Moscow: 
Iazyki slavianskoi kul’tury, 2002), 256-70.
8 Douglass C. North and Barry W. Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: 
Th e Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century 
England,” Th e Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4 (December 1989): 803, 817, 819; 
Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton, 
1981), 21-22.
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notions of “offi  cial nationality,” the Russian people obeyed and worshipped 
their monarchs and remained immune to alien doctrines of liberalism 
and revolution. Expedience was understood in terms of struggle against all 
political change, an ethos diff erent not only from Western monarchies, but 
also from the Japanese, which adopted European legal and constitutional 
forms as means to strengthen and modernize the monarchical state.9 
Russian emperors saw their interest as embodied in the ruthless defense of 
its right to determine the general good from above. Th is dictated a stubborn 
refusal to part with any element of imperial power. Th e assignment of 
responsibilities to a loyal prime minister, or chancellor, common in European 
monarchies, occurred only under the most dire of emergencies. Th e co-opting 
of conservative groups into the process of decision-making was resisted 
bitterly. When the revolution of 1905 forced a cabinet system on Nicholas II, 
Petr Stolypin—the one Prime Minister who introduced reforms that might 
have preserved the monarchy—prompted the tsar’s fear and distrust, as well as 
steps by the monarch to undermine his authority.10 Nicholas’s obstinacy and 
isolation were only another expression of a  form of mythical thinking that 
took into account only domination and grateful obedience. 
It was his belief in the national character of Russian monarchy that 
emboldened Nicholas I, in the wake of the Decembrist uprising of 1825, to 
prove that the Russian monarchy with its distinctive history of effi  cacy and 
triumph could make law something more than a legal fi ction. Th e publication 
of the laws issued since the Ulozhenie of 1649, the digest of the laws, the 
beginning of serious legal education in the universities, and the establishment 
of the School of Law (Uchilishche Pravovedeniia) were measures that resulted 
from the emperor’s resolve. But those offi  cials who attempted to make the 
system work soon despaired of the possibility of improving the system without 
signifi cant reform. Th ey had studied legal ideas and systems of the west, and 
they began to envision an independent and respected judiciary that enjoyed its 
own sphere of expertise and authority.
9 On the development of the emperor myth as a means to modernize Japan see Carol 
Gluck, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1985).
10 On Nicholas’s domination of Stolypin, much of which went on behind the scenes, 
see Abraham Ascher, P. A. Stolypin: Th e Search for Stability in Late Imperial Russia 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).
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* * *
Opening the tsarist state to reform, Alexander II saw himself acting in 
consonance with the spirit of national distinctiveness: that absolute monarchy 
would bring the benefi ts of liberal institutions to Russia and thus further 
enhance its image of authority and support in educated society. Instead, 
the Great Reforms stirred broader expectations of public participation in 
government, the very changes that the reforms were meant to forestall. 
Alexander rebuff ed all such proposals, even for limited participation in 
government. Political activity remained proscribed and police persecution 
drove opposition underground, where it responded to violence in kind. In this 
battlefi eld, the courts occupied a  middle ground between a  regime ruthlessly 
opposed to political change, and an opposition whose only weapon was 
revolution. In this setting, the reformed courts appeared as a hindrance to the 
autocracy and an expedient for the revolutionaries. 
Th e introduction of an independent court system raises the question 
of the possibility of establishing a  law-based government under the Russian 
autocracy. Th e court reform was the most thoroughgoing of all the great 
reforms. Th e new courts retained considerable independence until the end 
of the empire and dispensed civil and criminal justice far more eff ectively 
than the pre-reform courts. But they also were limited by the continued 
predominance of administrative authorities and the growing suspicion of 
judges and lawyers of the newly established Russian bar. Recent works have 
provided fresh approaches and materials on the post-reform legal system. 
While they all recognize the great advances made possible by the court reform, 
they also make clear the limits of legal jurisdiction under the autocracy. Th ese 
limits appeared at the points of interface of the monarchical state with legal 
institutions: administrative law, political crimes, the requirement to base 
decisions on written statute law without leeway for judicial interpretation, 
and the development of a legal profession. Such spheres, as these works make 
clear, turned into scenes of struggle between an administration insisting on 
the supremacy of the executive authority governed by the imperial will and 
a  corps of professional jurists who, impelled by their legal consciousness, 
sought to assert the primacy of law.11 
11 For a  brief analysis of the struggle between professionalism and monarchical 
principles in Russian political culture in the subsequent decades, see Teodor 
Taranovski, “Sudebnaia reforma i  razvitie politicheskoi kul’tury tsarskoi Rossii,’’ in 
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Ekaterina Pravilova’s groundbreaking history of administrative justice 
in Russia revealed the monarchy’s unstinting resistance to legal controls over 
the governmental offi  cials. Th e court reform of 1864 introduced the idea of 
administrative justice in Russia—giving individuals certain rights to defend 
themselves against administrative wrongdoing—but without providing 
suffi  cient procedural mechanisms to make these rights defensible. Th e Statute 
of Civil Procedure established the right to sue offi  cials for material losses. Th e 
new provincial commissions established to hear such cases, however, consisted 
only of administrative offi  cials from  the provincial bureau and the defendant’s 
chief (nachal’nik). Th e state bore no liability in cases of this type, so even if 
the plaintiff  succeeded in his suit, he faced the impossible task of collecting 
from the offi  cial himself. Parties contracting with the government had the 
right to sue for breach of contract, but the Ministers had the right to protest 
the decision of the Judicial Chambers to the highest appellate court—the 
Cassation Departments of Senate—and such cases could drag on for years 
without remedy of the plaintiff ’s grievances. Most important, despite many 
eff orts at change, there existed no legal procedure to charge offi  cials with 
crimes violating individual rights. Cases about administrative conduct were 
governed by “the administrative guarantee”—that no offi  cial could be tried 
without the agreement of his superior.12
Th e model for the establishment of administrative justice in Russia, 
Pravilova makes clear, was not the Anglo-Saxon system of assigning 
independent courts jurisdiction over the administration, but continental 
systems of tribunals with judicial functions established within the 
administration, with the institutions operating according to what Oda 
refers to as the “formal Rechtsstaat.” In Prussia, joint courts of offi  cials and 
judges heard cases involving administrative personnel at the local level, while 
a  supreme administrative court, also with mixed administrative and judicial 
personnel exercised supervision over such cases. In France, the State Council, 
Velikie Reformy v  Rossii 1856-1874, ed. Larissa Zakharova, B. Eklov [Eklof], Dzh. 
Bushnell (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1992), 301-15.
12 Ekaterina Anatol’evna Pravilova, Zakonnost’ i  prava lichnosti: administrativnaia 
iustitsiia v  Rossii, vtoraia polovina XIX v.-okt.  1917 (St. Petersburg: Izd-vo SZAGS, 
2000), 55-58. A  fl agrant example of the implications of this arrangement was the 
failure to prosecute a single local offi  cial for their actions during the pogroms of 1903 
and 1906. See Benjamin Nathans, Beyond the Pale: the Jewish Encounter with Late 
Imperial Russia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 329.
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the supreme administrative tribunal, began to judge administrative cases 
according to legal norms aft er the establishment of the Th ird Republic in 
1871. But Russia could not approximate even the “formal Rechtsstaat.” Aft er 
the court reform of 1864, administrative cases in Russia remained under 
administrative jurisdiction. Th ey were heard in the First Department of the 
Senate, a  department not aff ected by the new statutes on court procedure. 
Th e First Department continued to deliberate in secret, like the old courts. 
Its members did not enjoy life tenure. Th e legal relations of administrative 
institutions, Pravilova concluded, continued to be governed by the culture of 
autocracy, in which every offi  cial regarded himself as a personal representative 
of the monarch. Th e symbiosis of administrative and judicial organs and 
personnel—the ideal of the European Rechtstaat—was, by its very nature, 
alien to the political culture of Russian monarchy.13 
In 1865, the Minister of Justice, Dmitrii Zamiatnin, submitted a project 
to reform the First Department and make it an organ of judicial review of 
administrative instances. Th is initiative met opposition from all of the other 
ministers and was terminated by his successor, Konstantin Pahlen.14 Many 
offi  cials saw legal overview as alien to the Russian tradition. Constantine 
Pobedonostsev, then a  professor of Civil Law and a  reformer of the judicial 
system, defended the supremacy of executive power in Russia. Pravilova 
cites a  memorandum he wrote in the early 1860s, in which he insisted that 
a  court could not judge the activity of the administration because it “did 
not have the capacity to take on the process of discretion (usmotrenie) that 
in some cases defi nes the activity of [administrative] organs.” Such courts, 
Pobedonostsev argued, would increase confl icts within the administration 
and bring only harm. Western institutions, he believed, were not applicable 
in Russia, where the economy and education had not reached western levels. 
Russia’s vast territory and sparse population dictated executive supremacy. 
“In such a  situation of disconnection and dispersal, the centralization of 
power represents a necessity.” Society, in his view, was at a primitive level and 
13 Pravilova, Zakonnost’ i prava lichnosti, 81, 84-86.
14 Ibid., 64-80, 117-18; E. A. Pravilova, “Administrativnaia iustitsiia v Rossii: proekty 
reformy Senata 1862-1867gg,” in Problemy sotsial’no-ekonomicheskoi i  politicheskoi 
istorii Rossii XIX-XX vekov, ed. Boris Vasil’evich Ananich et al. (St.  Petersburg: 
Aleteiia, 1999), 222-35; Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Polovtsov, Dnevnik gosudarst-
vennogo sekretaria A. A. Polovtsova, 1883-1886, 2 vols. (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), 1: 86.
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conceptions of law were weak. Th e lowest level of the administration did not 
understand the limits of their authority and continually had to turn to higher 
authorities even on minor matters.15
Nonetheless, though the members of the First Department of the Senate 
did not have judicial standing, Pravilova shows, they acted as if they were 
members of a judicial rather than an administrative instance. Th ey did not enjoy 
the life tenure guaranteed to judges in the court system, but in fact, with only 
one exception, they remained in offi  ce at their own discretion. Th e fi rst cohort 
of the Department consisted of liberal jurists and strove to keep government 
within the bounds of law. Public organizations, including the zemstvo and 
town institutions, had the right by law to appeal to the First Department 
decisions of the governor that they considered infringements of their rights.16 
But such activity aff ronted many high offi  cials, who charged that the Senate’s 
actions were “anti-governmental.” Endeavoring to reassert the personal role of 
the tsar, the Minister of Justice, Nikolai Valerianovich Murav’ev, introduced 
a  project into the State Council in 1897 stipulating that in cases touching 
the responsibility and criminal actions of governors, Senate decisions would 
have to receive the emperor’s approval, requested through the  Committee 
of Ministers. Th e majority of the State Council voted against the project, 
but  Nicholas II approved the minority recommendation, signifi cantly 
narrowing the Senate’s powers of supervision over provincial government. 
Increasingly, appointments to the First Department of the Senate went to 
reliable highly placed offi  cials rather than jurists. But the First Department 
continued to take the side of zemstva against governors until aft er the turn of 
the century.17 
Aft er the Revolution of 1905, the reform of administrative justice 
fi gured in the programs of all the moderate parties, the Octobrists, the 
Progressists, and the Constitutional Democrats. Pravilova gives thorough 
analyses of the various governmental and Duma projects in these years. Little 
progress was made, because the Ministers of Interior and Justice refused to 
15 Ibid., 58-61.
16 On the Senate’s decisions on appeals for the zemstva see, P. Lissem, 
Verwaltungsgerichbarkeit im späten Zarrenreich: Der Dirigierinde Senat und seine 
Entscheidungen zur russichen Selbstverwaltung (1864-1917) (Frankfurt am Main: 
n.p., 1996).
17 Pravilova, Zakonnost’ i prava lichnosti, 89-95.
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accept measures that would have empowered judicial institutions to pass on 
administrative cases. Th e very notion of legal norms governing the state ran 
counter to Nicholas II’s general mistrust of institutions. Th e Fundamental 
Law of April 1906, issued by the tsar, maintained the tsar’s right of legislative 
initiative and the sole right to change the Fundamental Law itself.18 
Nicholas’s conception of the law was expressed by the Minister of Justice, 
Ivan Grigor’evich Shcheglovitov, in a  speech he delivered to the Duma in 
early 1914. Unlike Western countries, he declared, “the principle of legality 
in the Russian state is  . . .  a free manifestation of the supreme will of Russian 
autocrats.”19 
Th e trials of political crimes—revolutionary conspiracies—was another 
source of confl ict between administrative authorities and the judiciary. Most 
judges endeavored to try political crimes impartially, on the basis of the law, 
rather than retaliating against alleged violations. During the 1870s, high 
offi  cials in government continued to have faith in the new legal system, and 
Konstantin Pahlen, the Minister of Justice, felt confi dent that the courts would 
brand those accused of revolutionary activity as criminals, destroying their 
prestige in the eyes of educated society. Th e trial of the Nechaev group in 1871, 
ending with the acquittal of fi ft y-four of the defendants for lack of evidence 
and relatively mild sentences for most of the others, led the government to 
remove political crimes from the jurisdiction of juries to a  special session of 
the Senate. With the rise of terrorist attacks on offi  cials in the late 1870s, even 
the Senators, who enjoyed the status of judges, were deemed unreliable, and, 
at the end of the 1870s, the government began assigning political crimes to 
military courts.20 
Military courts, consisting of panels of military judges appointed by the 
Military Procurator without life tenure, dispatched a  swift er and harsher 
justice. Th ey fell out of usage for political crimes in the 1890s, but the 
revolution of 1905 brought increasing resorts to military justice. William C. 
Fuller Jr. showed that the military courts strove to adhere to judicial process, 
18 Oda, “Emergence,” 395-97.
19 Pravilova, Zakonnost’ i prava lichnosti, 181-82.
20 Of seventy-four major trials of revolutionaries from 1879 to 1882, only three were 
heard in the Special Session of the Senate. Th e remaining seventy-one cases were 
assigned to military courts. Nikolai Alekseevich Troitskii, Bezumstvo khrabrykh: 
russkie revolutionery i  karatel’naia politika tsarizma 1886-1882gg (Moscow: Mysl’, 
1978), 185-202.
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but the growing pressure from above for dispatch led to the abandonment 
of such procedures as preliminary investigations. Th is tendency culminated 
with the establishment of fi eld court-martials in the summer of 1906. It was 
Nicholas II who prevailed on Stolypin to introduce these tribunals, which 
meted out summary justice, oft en within twenty-four hours, and ordered the 
execution of more than 950 individuals.21 
In the last years of Alexander II’s reign, the government also issued a series 
of measures that increased the discretion of the police to detain suspects and 
sentence revolutionaries without resort to the courts. Th ese measures were 
formalized in the Security Law of 1881, which established provisions for 
“Reinforced” and “Extraordinary” states of security, once governors petitioned 
for them in their provinces. In both states of security, the police could detain 
suspects for up to two weeks and propose exile to administrative authorities for 
up to fi ve years. Th e governors could banish these individuals from the cities 
under their authority or propose to the Minister of Interior to exile them to 
specifi c areas of the empire. Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kiev, and several cities in 
Ukraine remained under Reinforced Security until 1917. 
Jonathan Daly has argued that the Security Law represented an eff ort, 
albeit an unsuccessful one, to create a  legal structure to govern cases that 
were not allowed within the purview of the courts. Indeed, he shows that the 
Security Law of 1881 was meant to prevent arbitrariness in this extra-legal 
sphere, though it also increased opportunities for police and administrative 
authorities to act outside the sphere of the law. In many instances, governors 
took the emergency provisions as an excuse to act arbitrarily and to order 
arrests and intervene in matters not covered by the Security Law. In the 1890s, 
administrative exile became the usual way to deal with political crimes. Sergei 
Zubatov, the chief of the Security Division of the Moscow Police, answered 
the criticism that he was dealing with political crimes almost exclusively by 
means of administrative exile, rather than judicial investigations, with the 
blunt statement that administrative exile was “a security agency ‘tradition.’” 
Other European states—Germany, France, and Austria—imposed similar 
security laws at times of emergency. But these regimes lasted only for a period 
of a few years, while Russia’s remained in force for four decades. Th ese states, 
Daly observes, imposed security laws for longer periods and over larger 
21 William C. Fuller, Civil Military Confl ict in Imperial Russia 1881-1914 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), 119-23, 170-76; Ascher, Stolypin, 141-42.
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areas in their colonial possessions.22 Russia’s response to revolutionary threats 
resembled that of a colonial power, an example of the persistence of the ethos of 
conqueror that dealt with native Russian areas as if they were hostile alien lands. 
Th e third source of confl ict was the resistance of the administrative system 
of written law to the eff orts of judges in the Cassational Departments of the 
Senate to evolve legal norms to meet the demands of the new era. Th ere was 
no provision for such changes in the Russian institutional system, in which all 
law came from the legislative processes of the imperial state, compiled in the 
Complete Collection of Laws [Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov], and systematized in 
the Digest of Laws [Svod Zakonov]. William G. Wagner has shown that the 
Civil Cassational Department exercised some interpretive leeway in regard 
to particular cases of family and inheritance law and prepared the way for 
the Duma to enact new laws on legal separation and freedom of disposition. 
Th e Department took steps to permit legal separation of wives from husbands 
and receive support from husbands, a  modifi cation of the strict proscription 
of separation in imperial law. But this new ruling, Wagner concluded, was 
applied inconsistently, and legal separation remained a  rare phenomenon. In 
every case, it was resisted by the Holy Synod, which sought to maintain its own 
jurisdiction over marital law. Th e revision of the law itself did not take place 
until 1914, despite numerous commissions and projects.23 
Th e revision of the antiquated Russian inheritance law met with the 
same rigid opposition. Most noble landholding was defi ned as “patrimonial 
property” (rodovoe imushchestvo), which had to remain within the family and 
be divided equally among sons at death; daughters received a one-eighth share 
of the landed estates. With the growing economic pressures exerted on gentry 
estates in the last decades of the nineteenth century, many noblemen and 
jurists sought ways to prevent the fragmentation of holdings required by law.24 
22 Jonathan W. Daly, “Emergency Legislation in Late Imperial Russia,” Slavic Review 
54, no.  3 (Fall 1995): 602-29; Jonathan W. Daly, Autocracy under Siege: Security 
Police and Opposition in Russia 1866-1905 (De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1998), 333-40; Petr Andreevich Zaionchkovskii, Rossiiskoe Samoderzhavie 
v kontse XIX stoletiia (Moscow: Mysl’, 1970), 104, 153-58, 172-79.
23 William Wagner, Marriage, Property and Law in Late Imperial Russia (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994), 206-23. For a recent vivid description and analysis of the 
legal problems of marital separation at the time, see Barbara Alpern Engel, Breaking 
the Ties that Bound: Th e Politics of Marital Strife in Late Imperial Russia (Ithaca, NY, 
Cornell University Press, 2011).
24 Wagner, Marriage, Property and Law, 227-54.
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Jurists endeavored to introduce a measure of freedom of disposition. In the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, the Civil Cassational Department applied 
a looser interpretation to the bequeathing of patrimonial property in particular 
cases. It refused to extend the testamentary limits to movable property, such as 
stocks. It restricted the traditional right of enforced redemption of patrimonial 
property that had been sold to non-kin, and at the same time, developed 
precedents for complete testamentary freedom for property not defi ned as 
patrimonial. Th e new law on inheritance passed by the Duma and State 
Council in 1912 went further in assigning testamentary powers to the owner: 
he could choose whether to follow the patrimonial rules or to bequeath his 
property to whomever he chose.25
Over time, the inability to participate directly in the shaping of the law—
the resort to painstaking evasions in occasional cases—had the same eff ect 
as the ban on political participation and expression: it drove the issues of law 
into the sphere of ideology. Th e arguments for reform, both conservative and 
liberal, emerged from their ideological predispositions. Wagner argues, “For 
jurists, ideology became the medium through which change was understood 
and a  new identity expressed.” Th e result of all these eff orts was to heighten 
conservative suspicion of the courts and judges, both in the administration, 
church, and society. Conservatives believed that the courts challenged “the 
principles of arbitrary and personalized authority and unequal ascriptive status 
on which the autocratic order rested.”26 In this respect, the courts acted as “a 
destabilizing and even revolutionary force in the last years of autocracy.” Th e 
court system remained self-contained, at odds with the administration and 
not integrated into Russian institutions. At the end of the old regime, Wagner 
concludes, “the diff erent legal orders represented by the courts and by the state 
administration thus remained in confl ict, with the boundary between them 
constantly being contested.”27 
Th e court reform introduced the institutional bases for a legal profession 
in Russia. Educational requirements for judges, procurators, and other 
judicial offi  cials, life tenure for judges, and a  bar of educated attorneys 
vested with the power of maintaining ethical norms of its members were 
25 Ibid., 334, 351-64.
26 Ibid., 290; Oda described the resurgence of the early nineteenth century liberal theories 
of Rechtsstaat in the writings of jurists in this period. Oda, “Emergence,” 401-03.
27 Wagner, Marriage, Property and Law, 379.
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innovations that made possible the rise of a  corps of legal professionals in 
Russia. In some respects, this aspect of the reform proved a great success—
legal professionals appeared with an unprecedented ethical commitment to 
the law and a knowledge of law and legal practice and gained an autonomy 
greater than that of other professions in Russia.28 However, the resistance 
of the autocracy to all independent formations also placed limits on 
the independence of legal offi  cials and the growth and autonomy of the 
bar, and recent research has indicated the very equivocal nature of legal 
professionalization in Russia. 
Sergei Mikhailovich Kazantsev has shown how the procurators, who 
took on the role of prosecutors in the reformed courts, became increasingly 
allied with the police in the government’s struggle against the revolutionary 
movement. Procurators were inclined to collaborate in police investigations 
and received career advancement by their willingness to work with the 
police in securing convictions. In so doing, Kazantsev writes, they “not only 
sanctioned unlawful searches and arrests and the prosecution of persons, but 
also played the leading part in extra-judicial reprisals against political suspects 
and dissidents, including exile without trial.” In the provisions for Reinforced 
Safeguard under the security law, provincial procurators were made dependent 
on the governors.29 In the 1890s, the highest levels of the Ministry of Justice 
kept close contact with their counterparts heading police agencies in the 
Ministry of Interior. Five Ministers of Interior, including Ivan Logginovich 
Goremykin and Viacheslav Konstantinovich Plehve, came out of the procuracy, 
as did numerous Assistant-Ministers of Interior and Directors of Police, 
including Petr Nikolaevich Durnovo and Ivan Grigor’evich Shcheglovitov, 
who, in 1914, as Minister of Justice, identifi ed the law as a manifestation of the 
emperor’s will. 
Th e collaboration between the Ministries of Justice and Interior was 
well known to educated society. Daniel Orlovsky concluded that the tension 
between the personal authority of the emperor and legal institutions and 
professions grew in the last years of Nicholas II’s reign. During his tenure, 
1906-1914, Shcheglovitov advanced many careerists who showed great hostility 
28 On the professions in Russia, see Harley D. Balzer, ed., Russia’s Missing Middle Class: 
Th e Professions in Russian History (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996).
29 Sergei Mikhailovich Kazantsev, Istoriia tsarskoi prokuratory (St. Petersburg: 
Izdatel’stvo Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, 1993), 173-88. 
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to attorneys.30 Th e procurators’ close association with  the administration 
had its roots in the reform itself. Girish N. Bhat has shown that the statutes 
of 1864 actually preserved some of the practices of  inquisitorial procedure. 
Procurators continued to be in charge of the pre-trial investigations in 
criminal cases. Th ey enjoyed a  great advantage over defense lawyers and 
in jury trials, the procurator, presiding judge, and defense lawyer usually 
seeking to reach a  consensus rather than engage in the  open debate of an 
adversarial system.31 
Th e literature on the bar also raises questions regarding the infl uence 
and autonomy of Russians lawyers aft er the reform. Brian Levin-Stankevich 
supports the view that a legal education and considerable degree of professional 
consciousness united judges, procurators, and lawyers, who agreed on the need 
for a  rule of law. On the other hand, he makes clear the high degree of state 
intervention in the organization of the bar and the limits the government 
imposed on those who could gain admission.32 Councils of the bar were 
instituted only in Moscow, Petersburg, and Khar’kov by 1875, when the 
government placed a moratorium on establishing further Councils. Large areas 
of the empire remained without suffi  cient numbers of attorneys. To remedy 
this problem, in 1874 the government created the category of private lawyers 
(chastnye poverennye) who had no educational requirement and remained 
outside the jurisdiction of the bars. Th e dire shortage of lawyers throughout 
the empire, William Pomeranz has shown, resulted in the persistence and 
prevalence of an “underground bar”—pre-reform striapchie (scriveners or 
fi xers)—most of whom were ignorant and corrupt. Th e restriction of the 
admission of Jews in 1889 to both the bar and the category of private lawyers 
further reduced the number of attorneys available to the people and ensured 
the continued signifi cance of the underground bar. Th e elimination of the 
30 Ibid., 188-92; Sergei M. Kazantsev, “Th e Judicial Reform of 1864 and the Procuracy 
in Russia,” in Reforming Justice in Russia, 1864-1996: Power, Culture, and the Limits 
of Legal Order, ed. Peter H. Solomon, Jr. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 44-59; 
Pravilova, Zakonnost’ i prava lichnosti, 182; Daniel Orlovsky, “Professionalism in the 
Ministerial Bureaucracy on the Eve of the February Revolution of 1917,” in Balzer, 
Th e Professions, 270, 278-79. 
31 Girish N. Bhat, “Th e Consensual Dimension of Late Imperial Criminal Procedure: 
Th e Example of Trial by Jury,” in Solomon, Reforming Justice, 61-81.
32 Brian L. Levin-Stankevich, “Th e Transfer of Legal Technology and Culture: Law 
Professionals in Tsarist Russia,” in Balzer, Th e Professions, 223-49. 
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members of the underground bar was an issue recognized by the government 
and widely discussed in the press, but the absence of other sources of counsel 
in the rural reaches of the empire made them virtually indispensable to most 
of Russia’s population.33 
Pomeranz also questions the ethical rigor of the bar councils, which were 
criticized at the time for inconsistency and arbitrariness of their discipline of 
members.34 On the other hand, Jane Burbank interprets the inconsistencies 
of disciplinary approaches—the survival of a  moralistic paternalist tutelage 
in a rational professional setting—as part of the construction of lawyerhood 
in a hybrid society.35 Benjamin Nathans’s study of Jewish lawyers shows that 
many members of the bar shared the government’s suspicion of Jews. Fearing 
that Jews would fl ood the legal profession and lower its moral standards, they 
sought to limit the number of Jewish lawyers. Some Russian lawyers took 
this stand in the face of government determination to introduce such limits, 
hoping to forestall state encroachment on the bar councils’ authority. Th e 
result, in any case, was a compromise of their dedication to the autonomy of 
legal knowledge and commitment, without deterring the government from its 
goal. A  decree of 1889 required the agreement of the Minister of Justice to 
admit a  non-Christian to the bar, thus restricting the autonomy of the bar 
in admitting members of its profession.36 Th e Russian bar produced many 
distinguished and idealistic defenders of the law, and certainly attained 
standards of council and a degree of autonomy unknown before the reform. 
But it did not possess a  monopoly of the practice of the law and its need 
to function within an autocratic system limited its potential to extend its 
infl uence and to sustain its commitment to legal ideals. 
* * *
Th e new legal institutions and profession, of course, faced problems that 
would confront any newly established organs, and which might have been 
overcome with time. But the fact that these problems remained the same, or 
33 William E. Pomeranz, “Justice from Underground: Th e History of the Underground 
Advokatura,” Th e Russian Review 52, No. 3 (July 1993): 321-40.
34 Ibid., 327.
35 Jane Burbank, “Discipline and Punish in the Moscow Bar Association,” Th e Russian 
Review 54, No. 1 (January 1995): 44-64.
36 Nathans, Beyond the Pale, 311-18, 340-55.
RUSSIAN MONARCHY AND THE RULE OF LAW
 23 
increased in the last decade of the empire, suggests that they refl ected structural 
continuities more than growing pains. Th e new courts and the Russian bar 
arose within an autocratic system that would not tolerate rival interpretations 
of the law. Old traditions of administrative domination and contempt for law 
persisted alongside courts dedicated to the law as a calling. Legal institutions, 
in this respect, refl ected the disparate and oft en incompatible character of 
Russian institutions in general. Russian society before World War I comprised 
many confl icting institutional traditions, oft en working toward contradictory 
goals. Th e Petrine administration and service ethos, the Catherinian order of 
estates and provincial governance, the bureaucratic centralism of Alexander 
I  and Nicholas I, coexisted with the overlay of the great reforms with 
movement toward greater openness, citizenship, and legality. Th ese changes 
produced a society that, though personally subordinate to the monarch, was 
fragmented, inchoate, and without fi rm institutional ties to the governmental 
structure. Elise Kimerling Wirtschaft er has observed the Russian state’s 
“limited administrative capabilities and atomized institutional structures” 
that “made it diffi  cult to secure linkages between society and government.”37 
In the midst of this institutional, social, and conceptual mosaic, there lurked 
a memory of an original unity attained in Muscovy that was founded on the 
authority of a national tsar who could engage in free discourse with the masses 
of population without resorting to the tangle of institutions and western 
blueprints for change. 
Th e variegated and fragmented character of Russian society was 
a product of its historical development, a result of the sharp discontinuities 
of rule prescribed by the myth of conquest. Th e imperative of change 
intrinsic to the myth appeared in the scenarios that dramatized feats of 
transformation that elevated the heroic image of each ruler acceding to the 
throne. As a  result, new institutions were established without relation to, 
or in confl ict with, existing institutions. Alfred Rieber has described this 
patchwork as “a sedimentary society,” a  characterization that makes clear 
the indeterminate direction of pre-World War I  social and institutional 
development in Russia. It describes a  situation in which “what appears to 
be a  transition ceases in fact to become an intermediate stage between two 
37 On the institutional weakness and the blurring of social defi nitions see Elise 
Kimerling Wirtschaft er, Social Identity in Imperial Russia, especially 5-9, 37-42, 
169-73.
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well-defi ned types of society, asserts its own stubborn character, and takes 
on a life of its own.”38 
Th e very messiness and uncertainty of this situation has tempted 
historians to discover tendencies that, if developed, would fi t one or another 
teleological model and dispel the cloud of indeterminacy. Two landmark 
studies, Jörg Baberowski’s Autocratie und Justiz and Boris Mironov’s 
Sotsial’naia istoriia Rossii do just that. Th ey simplify the institutional and 
particularly the legal development of Russia by factoring the monarchy out 
of the historical process. Instead, they seize upon the great impersonal forces 
propounded by Hegelian historicism and models of modernization. Th e 
failure to arrive at or approach the fi nal goal is explained by inimical groups, 
particularly those opting for radical democratic change, who disrupt the 
immanent and orderly movement of progress.
Jörg Baberowski’s Autocratie und Justiz was the fi rst comprehensive 
study of the post-reform courts in Russia.39 It is refreshingly free from the 
idealization of the new courts that infl uenced the liberal historiography of the 
Great Reforms. Of particular interest and insight are his treatments of the post-
reform bar, the shortcomings of the jury system, and the motivation and results 
of the counter-reforms of the 1880s and 1890s.40 Baberowski wants to correct 
“accepted prejudices about the possibilities and limits of liberal, constitutional, 
and legal reforms in the backward context of the multi-ethnic empire and to 
38 Alfred Rieber, “Th e Sedimentary Society,” in Between Tsar and People: Educated 
Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia, ed. Edith Clowes, 
Samuel D. Kassow, and James L. West (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 
361-62. Jane Burbank also emphasizes the indeterminacy of Russian development 
in the disciplinary patterns of the Moscow bar. “Th is transmission of existing 
forms of social organization in a  tutelary, conciliar and paternalistic mode into the 
new realm of professional culture should not be regarded as necessarily transitional 
to something else, or as retarding to a  postulated European path for Russian law.” 
Burbank, “Discipline and Punish,” 64.
39 Jörg Baberowski, Autocratie und Justiz: Zum Verhältnis von Rechtsstaatlichkeit 
und Rückständigkeit im ausgehenden Zarenreich 1864-1914 (Frankfurt am Main: 
V. Klostermann, 1996).
40 Other useful works on the bar are Pomerantz, “Justice from Underground”; Jane 
Burbank, “Discipline and Punish”; Nadezhda Vasil’evna Cherkasova, Formirovanie 
i  razvitie advokatury v  Rossii; 60-80 gody XIX v. (Moscow: Nauka, 1987). On the 
jury system see A. K. Afanas’ev, “Prisiazhnye zasedateli v  Rossii, 1866-1885,” in 
Zakharova, Eklov, Bushnell, Velikie Reformy v Rossii, 184-202.
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reveal the necessary presuppositions for political reform.” He views Russia 
as a  backward country just starting out on the path of modernization. Th e 
judicial reform from this perspective appears an inopportune intrusion on 
the road to progress. He shares my evaluation of the important role of the 
cohort of educated offi  cials who took part in the formulation of the court 
reform of 1864, but characterizes them as misguided idealists draft ing a reform 
that in many respects was premature and misbegotten. Th ey appear in his 
interpretation as radical men of the sixties who wanted not only to Europeanize 
the court system but to use it as an instrument to force democratic institutions 
on a country not ready for them.41 
In Baberowski’s view, the radical goals of the legal profession defl ected 
Russia from the gradual process of modernization. Th e reformed courts were 
too advanced for nineteenth-century Russia. Th e jury system and the Justices 
of the Peace were ineffi  cient, inept at dispensing justice, and very much in 
need of state oversight. Baberowski marshals a  great number of sweeping 
critiques from offi  cials and conservatives of the incompetence of juries and 
justices of the peace, their disregard of the law, and the lack of accountability 
for their judgements. Th e conservative “reforms” of the 1880s, including 
the replacement of the Justices of the Peace by Land Captains, under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior, did little to help.42 Th ey merely 
increased the disunity of the system, leading to increasing fragmentation and 
inhibiting progress. 
Based implicitly on the model of imperial Germany, Baberowski’s model 
of modernization construes progressive change as the work of a rational state 
bureaucracy incorporating principles of law and working toward progress. But 
if such a rational bureaucracy had taken these principles seriously, the leaders 
of the legal profession would hardly have been so refractory and oppositional. 
Baberowski attributes the fragmentation and confl ict of institutions to the 
actions of independent institutions. But this explanation ignores the ethos 
41 Baberowski, Autocratie und Justiz, ix, 788-89.
42 Ibid., 188-338. A  critical treatment of the Justices of the Peace is also presented 
by Th omas S. Pearson in Russian Offi  cialdom in Crisis: Autocracy and Local Self-
Government, 1861-1900 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
Th e view of the Land Captain as a  conservative attempt to control peasant local 
institutions and preserve noble domination of the countryside is argued in Francis 
William Wcislo, Reforming Rural Russia: State, Local Society, and National Politics, 
1855-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
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of Russian monarchy and particularly the mentalities of tsarist offi  cials, 
whose critiques of the courts refl ected traditional fears for the extent of their 
own executive authority. Such offi  cials preserved the absolutist faith that 
bureaucratic oversight could correct legal failings, the mechanism that failed so 
patently to cope with the dispensation of justice before 1864. 
Th e conservative Minister of Justice, Nikolai Murav’ev, usually presented 
as a  reactionary seeking to undo the basic principles of the court reform, 
emerges here as the misunderstood hero, struggling to strengthen bureaucratic 
oversight. Appointed in 1894, Murav’ev submitted proposals, never introduced, 
to rationalize and bring unity to judicial institutions, and Baberowski provides 
a  valuable summary and defense of his ideas.43 His initiative of 1897 to 
curtail the jurisdiction of the Senate over governors would have enhanced 
the personal infl uence of the tsar and widened the rift  between the executive 
and legal institutions of Russia, rather than following the Prussian example 
of collaboration between legal and administrative personnel. In Russia, 
the disposition to allow judges to curb administrative arbitrariness clashed 
with a  striving to reassert executive and personal supremacy.44 As Th eodore 
Taranovskii wrote, the great reforms “led to the Revolution of 1905, not only 
because they undermined the existing order, but also because they did not 
undermine it enough.”45 
With the establishment of the State Duma in 1906, Baberowski sees 
the judiciary withdrawing from partisan, anti-state activity and a  new 
group of apolitical jurists arising to staff  the administration. But those he 
mentions were known as anti-Semites and anti-liberals and hardly stood 
apart from the political fray.46 Th e advocates of increasing judicial control 
over the bureaucracy were hardly fi rebrand radicals: they were the leaders 
of the moderate and conservative groups in the Th ird and Fourth Dumas, 
Kadets, Octobrists, and Nationalists who had been elected on the basis of 
the restricted suff rage introduced by Stolypin in 1907. In response to their 
demands, the Ministers became increasingly militant in defending the tsar’s 
prerogatives, even extending his claims. Shcheglovitov went so far as to declare 
that the law was the monarch’s will. Th e response of high judicial offi  cials, 
43 Baberowski, Autocratie und Justiz, 437-80. 
44 Pravilova, Zakonnost’ i prava lichnosti, 44-45, 62.
45 Taranovski, “Sudebnaia reforma,” 315.
46 Baberowski, Autocratie und Justiz, 778-79.
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such as Shcheglovitov, to the pressures from the tsar in the Beilis case hardly 
suggests that the new generation of professional jurists were making an 
advance toward a law-based state, a pravovoe gosudarstvo, either of the liberal 
or the formal type. 
Boris Mironov’s sweeping and magisterial Sotsial’naia istoriia Rossii 
places the evolution of law and legal institutions in a broad social context and 
interprets them as central elements in Russian historical development and 
progress.47 Th e subtitle—“the Genesis of Personality, the Democratic Family, 
Civil Society, and Law-Based State”—announces both his intellectual lineage 
and central themes. Mironov applies the model of progress propounded 
by Russian Hegelians in the middle of the nineteenth century. Th e genesis 
of the personal dignity and rights of the individual, expressed by the term 
“personality” (lichnost’), was a  fundamental proposition of liberal Hegelians 
such as Konstantin Kavelin, who saw its development as characteristic of all 
civilized nations. Making his way through his subjects, the formation of the 
family, sosloviia, and institutions, Mironov traces the ineluctable emergence of 
individuality and the triumph of the law. 
Like Baberowski, Mironov works from the assumption of backwardness, 
from which Russia would emerge or try to emerge through institutional 
reform and sees the Russian autocracy—samoderzhavie—as a  benign force 
driving modernization forward. However, where Baberowski diagnoses 
a pathological process of premature spasmodic development leading to a failed 
modernization, Mironov detects a gradual process of increasing legality, rights 
of the individual, and the development of an embryonic law-based state. 
“In Russia as in all other European states, legitimate rule was realized at all 
stages of development.” Th e “popular monarchy” (narodnaia monarkhiia) of 
the seventeenth century was followed by the “paternalistic noble monarchy” 
(dvorianskaia paternalisticheskaia monarkhiia) of the eighteenth. Th e 
nineteenth-century monarchy sought to use law as an instrument to limit the 
administration becoming what Mironov refers to as a  monarchy limited by 
law (pravomernaia monarkhia), a  term originated by pre-revolutionary legal 
historians. He describes the reform period as the all-estate monarchy limited 
47 B. N. Mironov, Sotsial’naia istoriia Rossii perioda imperii (XVIII-nachalo XX v.) 
(St.  Petersburg: D. Bulanin, 1999); the somewhat revised English translation is 
Boris N. Mironov with Ben Eklof, Th e Social History of Russia, 1700-1917 (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 2000).
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by law (vsesoslovnaia pravomernaia monarkhiia). Th e introduction of the Duma 
initiated what he calls the “dualistic law-based monarchy” (dualisticheskaia 
pravovaia monarkhiia).48
Mironov rejects “the more pessimistic hypotheses about the course of 
Russia’s development.”49 In terms of legal development, he strains to minimize 
discontinuities in order to sustain, like Sergei Soloviev, an evolutionary 
narrative that presents history as an ongoing linear process without sharp 
divisions between periods or ideals.50 He questions the sharp break between 
the old courts and the new, which most historians associate with the court 
reform of 1864. He asserts that a  majority of cases in the pre-reform courts 
were tried by adversarial or mixed procedure rather than the inquisitorial 
system, making it appear that the introduction of adversarial procedure in the 
Court Reform had roots in the Russian past.51 But it is diffi  cult to understand 
how adversarial justice, a  juridical debate between plaintiff  and defendant, 
could be practiced in pre-reform Russia without trained lawyers capable of 
arguing points of law before a court. Th e procedure was predominantly closed 
and based on written statement. Indeed, Dmitrii Bludov’s reform project 
of 1849 proposed the introduction of adversarial procedure to remedy the 
defi ciencies in civil trials in Russia.52 
Mironov disputes the unrelieved dark picture of the pre-reform courts 
presented in most accounts, including my own, using statistical data to deter-
mine whether the diff erences were as great as contemporaries and historians 
have suggested. His statistics indicate a  rising incidence of criminality in the 
decades aft er the court reform, along with increased caseloads. He adduces 
interesting data showing an increase both in the number of cases heard in 
the post reform courts and in the percentage of appeals. But then he off ers 
the dubious conclusion that the increasing frequency of appeals indicates 
48 Ibid., 2: 109-95.
49 “Response to William Wagner’s ‘Law and the State in Boris Mironov’s Sotsial’naia 
Istoriia Rossii,’” Slavic Review 60, No. 3 (Fall 2001): 566.
50 Soloviev followed this principle in his Istoriia Rossii: “v istorii nichto ne okanchi-
vaetsia vdrug i nichto ne nachinaetsia vdrug; novoe nachinaetsia v  to vremia kogda 
staroe prodolzhaetsia.” Sergei Mikhailovich Soloviev, Sochineniia (Moscow: Mysl’, 
1988), 2: 635. 
51 Mironov, Sotsial’naia istoriia, 2: 52.
52 See Richard Wortman, Th e Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 1976), 160-61.
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that “before the reform the population was more satisfi ed with verdicts of 
courts, both criminal and civil, than aft er the reform” and that the pre-reform 
decisions attained greater fairness. A more likely explanation is that the rise in 
the number of appeals in the post-reform courts indicated a greater faith in the 
judicial system and a greater ease in pursuing appeals.53
To sustain the argument of the slow but ineluctable spread of legality, 
Mironov also tends to exaggerate the successes of legal reform in the late 
nineteenth century. Th is is particularly evident in his treatment of the 
attempts to develop administrative law. He fi nds a  “strong continuity in the 
development of the principles of legality in the administration thanks to the 
development of administrative justice over the whole imperial period.” He 
describes the positive steps in the 1860s and 1870s, but omits the fact that 
individuals were left  virtually without recourse in the case of offi  cial abuses and 
oversights.54 Like Baberowski, Mironov ignores the autocracy, except when it 
acts as an agent of modernization, and understates the pervasiveness of offi  cial 
mentalities that placed a greater emphasis on attachment to the emperor and 
hierarchy than to the dispensation of justice. Rather, he imposes the Weberian 
model of bureaucratic professionalization, which he argues was gradually 
taking hold in tsarist Russia. But his evidence is limited to objective factors 
of education, salary, and specialization, and says very little about subjective 
attitudes and the resulting practices.55 It is not clear on what grounds—
error or cunning—that he dismisses the contention of Vasilii Alekseevich 
Maklakov and Vladimir Matveevich Gessen that the entire prosecutorial 
and legal apparatus was helpless when the crime in question was committed 
by an offi  cial. A  moderate liberal like Evgenii Nikolaevich Trubetskoi wrote 
“nowhere are state servants as discredited as they are here in Russia. Th e word 
chinovnik  . . .  cannot be translated into any foreign language, because the sense 
of insult that it carries, like a swear word, is not translatable.”56
Mironov marks the beginning of the law-based monarchy with the 
introduction of a  “constitution” and a  parliament in 1906. Th e maintenance 
53 Mironov, Sotsial’naia istoriia, 2: 56-65. Th ese conclusions are moderated in the 
English version, but without changing the fundamental question of the diffi  culties of 
appeal in the pre-reform system (A Social History 2:302-07).
54 Ibid., 2:169-70.
55 Ibid., 2: 170-75.
56 Ibid., 2: 171; Pravilova, Zakonnost’ i prava lichnosti, 231.
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of executive power in the hands of the emperor was, he concludes, 
“objectively expedient” because it assured the smoothness of the transition to 
constitutionalism. Instead, it assured the contrary—the bitter struggle between 
the fi rst two Dumas and the throne. He construes Stolypin’s change in the 
election law as a positive step “for the purpose of allowing eff ective work of the 
Duma within the framework of existing laws” even though the change in the 
electoral law violated the Fundamental Laws of the empire.57 Th e conservative 
third and fourth Dumas were engaged in continuous confl ict with the throne. 
Th e fact that the establishment of a  parliament only intensifi ed the struggle 
between “society” and supreme authority seems “paradoxical” to him.58 
Th e villains for Mironov are not ideologically inspired judges, but members 
of the intelligentsia, who, inspired by radical ideas and moral nihilism, would 
not allow historical progress to continue along its preordained path.59 But 
it was not only revolutionary extremists, but the moderate parties—the 
Constitutional Democrats, the Progressists, and the Octobrists—who fought 
for civil liberties and a responsible ministry. Once more, the monarch and the 
monarchy have been omitted from the historical picture. Th e law, Mironov 
contends, was observed in regard to 99% of ordinary people. It was violated 
only in regard to “disloyal individuals.”60 Such a conclusion would be hard to 
sustain regarding a state in which offi  cial abuses were rarely prosecuted, and the 
vast network of the political police operated outside the bounds of the law. In 
other cases, perhaps, the law was technically observed, but the limited powers 
of judicial institutions to interpret and create law stymied the development 
of Russian legal rights and jurisprudence. Th e emperor may have lost many 
of his prerogatives in the early twentieth century, but the system of absolute 
monarchy showed great staying power and resistance to further encroachments 
on its authority. Although justice in the early twentieth century was perhaps 
dispensed with greater impartiality and eff ectiveness than earlier in Russian 
history, the forces inimical to a law-based state remained dominant.
Another signifi cant body of recent research touches on the operations and 
infl uence of the volost’ courts in regard to the development of a peasant legal 
consciousness. Th e conventional views of volost’ judges as corrupt and ignorant, 
57 Mironov, Sotsial’naia istoriia, 2: 158-61.
58 Ibid., 2: 158-60.
59 Ibid., 2: 233-35.
60 Ibid., 2: 171.
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and the peasants as contemptuous of the court, have been questioned by 
scholars examining peasant legal attitudes and practices. Mironov emphasizes 
the separateness of the peasants from the dominant legal order and their 
adherence to primitive peasant law, much of it based on superstition, though he 
acknowledges that in some respects it was subject to infl uences of state law and 
the reform courts.61 Several scholars have determined that the peasants were 
turning to the volost’ courts with increasing frequency. Th ey have uncovered 
evidence that peasants were displaying a growing trust in the courts, and that 
the courts themselves were basing their decisions on laws.62 However, they 
have also found evidence of the peasants’ frustration with courts, especially in 
criminal matters, and their frequent resort to violence—lynch law, samosud, 
and arson—the weakness of judicial institutions in the countryside, and the 
persistence of a moral code resistant to the legal and ethical norms vested in the 
legal system.63
In fact, the operation and eff ects of volost’ courts refl ected the patchwork 
character of Russian institutional development in general. Th e state law 
61 Ibid., 2: 76-78.
62 See for example, Jane Burbank, Russian Peasants Go to Court: Legal Culture in the 
Countryside, 1905-1917 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004); Beatrice 
Farnsworth, “Th e Litigious Daughter-in-Law,” Slavic Review 45, No.  1 (Spring 
1986): 49-64; also in Beatrice Farnsworth and Lynne Viola, eds., Russian Peasant 
Women (New York: Oxford University Press 1992), 89-106; Gareth Popkins, “Code 
Versus Custom: Norms and Tactics in Peasant Volost’ Court Appeals, 1889-1917,” 
Th e Russian Review 59, no.  3 (July 2000): 408-424, and “Popular Development of 
Procedure in a Dual Legal System: ‘Protective Litigation’ in Russia’s Peasant Courts,” 
Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unoffi  cial Law no. 43 (1999): 57-87. On the favorable 
response of the urban lower classes to the courts, see Joan Neuberger, “Popular Legal 
Cultures: Th e St. Petersburg Mirovoi Sud,” in Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855-1881, ed. 
Ben Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larissa Zakharova (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1994), 231-46.
63 Stephen P. Frank, Crime, Cultural Confl ict, and Justice in Rural Russia, 1856-
1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Cathy A. Frierson, “Of Red 
Roosters, Revenge, and the Search for Justice: Rural Arson in European Russia in the 
Late Imperial Era,” in Solomon, Reforming Justice, 107-31. Most insightful on the law 
in rural society: Cathy A. Frierson, “‘I Must Always Answer to the Law. . .’ Rules and 
Responses in the Reformed Volost' Court,” Slavonic and East European Review 75, 
no. 2 (April 1997): 308-334. Also see her All Russia is Burning!: A Cultural History 
of Fire and Arson in Late Imperial Russia (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2002), 162-65, 267-74.
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imposed by bureaucratic authorities in the Ministry of Justice both infl uenced 
and confl icted with the peasants own traditional concerns and attitudes 
toward justice. At the same time, the reformed courts had to dispense justice in 
the framework of an absolute state claiming a monopoly of the law. Nicholas II 
responded to the institutional melange of early twentieth century by declaring 
his aversion to offi  cials and institutions both of the state and the courts. He 
envisioned a personal monarchy in which the tsar enjoyed a spiritual bond with 
the peasants that had persisted since Muscovite Rus’ and that had survived the 
excrescence of European-inspired law institutions.64 His means were personal 
rule from above enforced by the instruments of violence—the police and 
the army. His was the most potent expression of the conquest myth, the tsar 
declaring war on governmental institutions and educated society in order to 
restore his autocratic power in the name of the common people. Th is vision left  
little room for a law-based state that would protect the rights and interests of 
Russian citizens.
#
64 See Scenarios of Power, 2, chapters 11-14.
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2. The Representation of Dynasty 
and “Fundamental Laws” 
in the Evolution of Russian Monarchy
$
[Alexander] was never without an ideology, whether real or pretended. Th is 
merely refl ected his education and the infl uence of his mentor. [La Harpe] 
No one would believe, [Alexander] told me, what I had to debate with him. 
Alexander held that heredity was an abuse of sovereignty, and I  had to 
spend more than an hour and use all of my eloquence and logic to convince 
him that it was heredity that comprised the tranquility and happiness of 
peoples. (Napoleon Bonaparte recalling his conversation with Alexander 
I at Tilsit. Interview at St. Helena, 1816)1
In this country, the memory of a deceased emperor is little honored, but in 
the present instance, inclination accords with a policy that would have the 
preceding reign forgotten. (Th e Marquis de Custine, La Russie en 1839)2
I n contrast with the evolution of the absolute monarchies of Europe, the history of Russian monarchy is notable for the weakness of a  concept or 
tradition of legal dynastic succession. Th e explanations for this situation may 
take into consideration the weakness of feudal and Roman law as a grounding 
for the early Russian state, compounded by the traumatic upheavals of 
the seventeenth century that left  Russian monarchy without a  generally 
accepted grounds for succession when Peter the Great adopted the principle 
of designation in 1722. Peter’s law left  succession in doubt, leading to the 
frequent court coups in the succeeding decades. But even aft er Emperor Paul 
I promulgated a law of hereditary succession in 1796, inherited right remained 
an insuffi  cient justifi cation for a new monarch’s claim to absolute authority. 
1 Cited in Marie-Pierre Rey, Alexandre Ier (Paris: Flammarion, 2009), 237.
2 Th e Marquis de Custine, La russie en 1839, vol. 2 (Paris: Grimma, 1844), 117.
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In the nineteenth century, succession followed the hereditary line without 
serious challenge, but hereditary right was never deemed suffi  cient to justify 
the rulers’ claims to the throne.
Th ese claims rather took the form of narratives of conquest and triumph 
introduced by Peter, a  “representational culture” incorporating the imagery 
and ceremonies of the Baroque and eighteenth century conceptions of the 
role of the enlightened monarch.3 Th e rulers of Russia continued to dramatize 
their assumption of power, presenting themselves as Peter’s successors, 
mythical heroes, breaking with the previous reign, transcending human limits 
and bringing enlightenment and order to the Russian state—emphasizing 
renewal and change rather than dynastic continuity. Th e public presentation 
of the mythical image of the monarch and the exercise of absolute power 
were reciprocal processes: absolute rule sustained an image of transcendent 
monarch, which in turn warranted the exercise of his unlimited power. Th is 
article discusses not the accession of one or another ruler, but the eff ects of 
the preponderance of a  representative rather than legal tradition of dynastic 
succession on the mentality and workings of the monarchy, and particularly 
on the role of law in the Russian state. 
Th e legalization of dynasty proceeded within the framework of the 
imperial myth, which in the nineteenth century presented the advancement of 
Russian law as an attribute of the supreme image of ruler. It was embodied in 
the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire decreed by Paul I and Nicholas 
I, which provided laws of state that could regulate and legitimize the growing 
Russian administration, but ensured that legal restraints would remain 
subordinate to the will of the sovereign. In this way, legality issued from the 
will of a transcendent ruler and evolved at his discretion and mercy. 
Dynastic Succession in Europe and Russia
Th e connection between traditions of dynastic succession and the evolution 
of the law has been a  theme in the literature of the past few decades on the 
consolidation of state power in the West. Th e early eighteenth century 
witnessed the culmination of a  long development of European dynastic 
traditions. Enshrined in law, such traditions provided a  core of state power 
and made possible a continuity of rule that sustained the state during periods 
3 On “representational culture” see T. C. W. Blanning, Culture of Power, 59 and 
passim; Jürgen Habermas, Structural Transformation of Public Sphere, 7-10.
THE R EPR ESENTATION OF DY NASTY AND “FUNDAMENTAL  LAWS”...
 35 
of crisis or change. In France, the Salic Law, in the principalities of Germany, 
and in the Hapsburg empire, rules adopted by sovereign families provided 
initial sources of regularity and stability for monarchical power. Th e regulations 
could involve contractual agreements with the estates and oft en came to be 
regarded as examples of a “Lex Fundamentalis,” understood as permanent and 
inviolable. Jurists trained in Roman jurisprudence then elaborated state laws, 
establishing the basis for a  professionalized administration centered in the 
monarchy.4 Th ese developments culminated in the establishment of permanent, 
fundamental laws of succession in early eighteenth century statutes such as 
England’s Act of Settlement, 1701, Sweden’s “On the Form of Rule” (1719), 
Philip V’s of Spain’s testament (1713), and Charles VI’s Pragmatic Sanction of 
1713 for the Hapsburg Empire.5 In this way, the legal formulation of dynasty 
provided a foundation for the absolute state that made possible the persistence 
of monarchies no longer reliant on the representative culture of the Baroque. 
Th e longest dynastic tradition was the French, the Capetians ruling 
without major interruptions from 987 to 1791. Elaborate funeral rituals 
displayed effi  gies of the deceased king that represented the “body politic,” 
preserving the unbroken continuity of the house during interregna from 
the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries.6 Th is practice contrasted with 
the English juridical fi ction of “the king’s two bodies,” which established 
4 Th ere has been extensive development of these ideas in German historical 
literature. See: Heinz Mohnhaupt, “Die Lehre von der ‘Lex Fundamentalis’ und die 
Hausgesetzgebung europäischer Dynastien,” in Der dynastische Fürstenstaat: Zur 
Bedeuting von Sukzessionordungen für die Entstehung des fr ühmodernen Staates, ed. 
Johannes Kunisch and Helmut Neuhaus (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1982), 
14-19; Ulrich Muhlack, “Th ronfolge und Erbrecht in Frankreich,” in ibid., 173-98; 
Wolfgang E. J. Weber, “Einleitung,” in Der Fürst: Ideen und Wirklichkeit in der 
europäischen Geschichte, ed. Wolfgang E. J. Weber (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998), 4-8; 
Weber, “Dynastiesicherung und Staatsbildung: Die Entfaltung des frühmodernen 
Fürstenstaates,” in ibid., 92-101, 118-24; Wolfgang Reinhard, Geschichte der 
Staatsgewalt: Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis 
zur Gegenwart (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1999), 134-38. 
5 Mohnhaupt, “Die Lehre von der ‘Lex Fundamentalis,’” 6; Oleg Omel’chenko, 
“Stanovlenie zakonodatel’nogo regulirovaniia prestolonaslediia v Rosiiskoi imperii,” 
Femis: Ezhegodnik istorii prava i pravovedeniia, Vyp. 7, 2007, 26.
6 Ralph E. Giesey, “Inaugural Aspects of French Royal Ceremonies,” in Coronations: 
Medieval and Early Modern Monarchic Ritual, ed. Janos M. Bak (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990), 35-36, and “Models of Rulership in French 
Royal Ceremonial,” in Rites of Rulers: Symbolism Ritual and Politics Since the Middle 
Ages, ed. Sean Wilentz (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 41-58.
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a distinction between the mortal and the immortal persona of the king. Ernst 
Kantorowicz has shown how the abstractions of the king’s “political body” 
and the crown came to represent the immortal dignity of the monarchy 
during dynastic struggles and political upheaval (See page 41).7 By the early 
eighteenth century, Parliament had determined that the stability and welfare 
of the realm depended on the acceptance of dynastic monarchy, vested in the 
house of Hanover.8 
In Austria, the Hapsburgs’ titles to the lands of their empire came 
principally through strategic marriages. Hapsburg family law remained secret, 
determined by family councils, and known only to the members of the house.9 
Hapsburg rulers were glorifi ed as the last descendants of Aeneas, giving 
mythical expression to their pretensions as Holy Roman Emperors, though the 
titles to their realms derived from principles of hereditary rule as formulated in 
the family law.10 
Th e dynastic laws of the Hohenzollerns and the princes of other German 
states typifi ed the development of a  dynastic monarchy in eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century Europe. By accepting the principle of primogeniture  of 
succession in the seventeenth century, members of German royal houses 
sacrifi ced their individual interests by acceding to the senior male as heir. In this 
way, primogeniture provided an impetus for an ethic of enlightened absolutism. 
It was formulated by Frederick the Great, who wrote in his testament: 
“I command all of my relatives, if need be, to sacrifi ce their personal interests for 
the benefi t of the welfare of the Fatherland and the advantages of the state.”11 
At the accession of each Prussian king, the estates of the realm, the Stände, 
gathered to perform the ceremonies of the oath, Huldigungsfeiern, continuing 
7 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, Th e King’s Two Bodies, 314-450. Ralph Giesey wrote, “Th e 
English were the masters of legal fi ction, the French of ritual symbolism. Th e body 
natural and body politic of English jurisprudence equal the corpse and effi  gy of 
French ceremonial” (“Models of Rulership,” 51).
8 See Howard Nenner, Th e Right to be King: Th e Succession to the Crown of England, 
1603-1714 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 1-12.
9 Günther Kronenbitter, “Haus ohne Macht? Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand (1863-1914) 
und die Krise der Habsburgermonarchie,” in Der Fürst, 179-80.
10 Marie Tanner, Th e Last Descendant of Aeneas: the Hapsburgs and the Mythic Image of 
Emperor (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993). 
11 Daniel Schönpfl ug, “Die Heiraten der Hohenzollern. Verwandtschaft , Politik und 
Ritual im europäischen Kontext 1640-1918,” Habilitationsschrift  Freie Universität 
Berlin, 2009, 37.
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a  medieval tradition that renewed and displayed social bonds between the 
nobility and the dynasty. Amidst processions and celebrations, members of the 
estates made obeisance and pronounced oaths of loyalty to their king. Th ese 
ceremonies carried both juridical and symbolic meaning, attesting to the 
persistence of principles of mutuality, even during the period of monarchical 
absolutism.12 Th e ceremony of coronation, on the other hand, did not fi gure as 
a ritual necessary for accession, and in Prussia coronations took place only in 
1701 and 1861.
From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, dynastic succession and 
marriages were formalized in agreements by councils of members of the 
Prussian ruling house. Th e Hohenzollerns increasingly gave these rules the 
character of public state laws, which, some scholars have suggested, provided 
legal grounds for the establishment of a  constitutional monarchy in 1850. 
Daniel Schönpfl ug has shown that these laws distinguished between the 
private and public sphere of Prussian monarchy, yet at the same time identifi ed 
the dynasty with the state.13 
* * *
Th e princes of Moscow created a  unifi ed monarchy in Russia 
(edinoderzhavie), without the corps of jurists that helped western rulers to 
consolidate their power over local and feudal privilege or the contractual 
relations among members of the ruling houses, and with noble estates that 
characterized European development. Th e Grand Prince of Moscow achieved 
supremacy over competing claims by dint of conquest and coercion and the 
organization of classes of servitors completely subordinate to him.14 Succession 
was principally by testament, according to primogeniture, though there were 
no formal rules or laws to that eff ect. Th e demise of the Riurikovich dynasty in 
1598 plunged Russia into a period of chaos and civil war, “the time of troubles,” 
which ended with the election of Michael Romanov in 1613.
Th e new Romanov dynasty lacked a  hereditary connection with the 
previous dynasty despite the mythological genealogies fashioned during the 
12 Mathias Schwengelbeck, Die Politik des Zeremonialls: Huldigungsfeiern im langen 
19. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2007).
13 Schönpfl ug, “Die Heiraten der Hohenzollern,” 41-57.
14 On the contrasting roles between conquest and hereditary right in Russia and the 
Hapsburg and Prussian monarchies, see  Scenarios of Power, 2:11-12. 
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seventeenth century. Th eir claims to authority were based principally on 
achievements—their restoration of the unity of the realm confi rmed by the 
votes of assemblies. Succession was justifi ed by several principles. Hereditary 
succession according to primogeniture was favored, but descent proved 
insuffi  cient grounds for the legitimation of rule, and it had to be confi rmed 
by popular assent. Th e assembly choosing Michael Romanov swore an oath 
both to him and his sons. His heir, Alexei, was called “hereditary” but, 
Vasilii Kliuchevskii observed, Zemskii Sobors had already been summoned 
three times for the election of tsars (Fedor Ivanovich, Boris Godunov, and 
Michael Fedorovich.) When Alexei came to the throne at age sixteen in 1645, 
a  gathering of all groups of the Moscow population was summoned and his 
succession was confi rmed by formal assent of “all boiars, notables, and the 
whole people.”15
Th us, the customary preference for succession by primogeniture for 
the Romanovs was reinforced by a  demonstration of popular consent. Th e 
formal requirement to succeed the throne, however, remained designation 
by the previous ruler. Th e princes of Moscow in the fi ft eenth and sixteenth 
centuries had willed the throne to their heirs, usually following the principle 
of primogeniture. (Ivan III at fi rst diverged from this practice: he appointed 
his grandson heir, but later reconsidered and chose his eldest son, a  precedent 
mentioned by Peter in his 1722 decree.) Coronation ceremonies of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries began with allocutions stating that the tsar had 
been chosen to rule by his father’s designation, and designation by the father 
was regarded as the principal sign of a  legitimate succession and remained the 
crucial indicator of a rightful succession.16 In September 1674, one and one half 
years before his death, Alexei “proclaimed to the people” that his oldest son, 
Fedor Alekseevich, would inherit the throne.17 Th e death of Tsar Fedor in 1682 
at the age of twenty, before he had produced an heir or indicated a  successor, 
unleashed the bloody interregnum that brought Peter the Great to the throne. 
Th e crisis that followed Fedor Alekseevich’s death in April 1682 marked 
the ten-year-old Peter Alekseevich’s initiation into the political life of the 
15 V.O. Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia v deviati tomakh (Moscow: Mysl’, 1988), 3:76-77.
16 Giuseppe Olshr, “La Chiesa e lo Stato nel ceremoniale degli zar Romanov,” Orientalia 
Christiana Periodica 18 (1952): 354; Drevniaia Rossiiskaia Vivliofi ka (Moscow: 
1788), 7: 258-59. 
17 Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia v  deviati tomakh, 3: 81-82; Samuel H. Baron, ed., Th e 
Travels of Olearius in 17th Century Russia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1967), 195.
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empire. Peter’s half-brother, Ivan Alekseevich, next in line by seniority, was 
mentally weak and apparently unfi t to rule, but was supported by Ivan’s 
mother’s family, the Miloslavskiis. With the backing of Peter’s family, the 
Naryshkins, the Patriarch Ioakim took matters into his own hands and 
summoned an assembly to elect Peter tsar. Sergei Soloviev described the 
dramatic scene:
Th e Patriarch together with the archbishops and magnates (vel’mozhi) 
came out on to the red porch, ordered people of all ranks to gather on the 
square before the Savior Church, and asked who of the two heirs should 
rule. Cries “Peter Alekseevich!” resounded and drowned out the other 
cries, “Ioann Alekseevich!” People of all ranks thus decided the matter. 
Th e patriarch returned to the palace and blessed Peter to rule.18
Peter issued his succession law in 1722, when Russia had not passed 
through the stage of state consolidation that unifi ed dynasty with both the 
state and the estates and that prefi gured the adoption of fundamental laws of 
succession in early eighteenth-century monarchies. His act was above all one of 
representation, an assertion of his role as transforming monarch breaking with 
the past for the benefi ts of dynasty and state. Th e disorders of the seventeenth 
century led him instead to create a  law that would allow the exercise of the 
monarch’s personal will without the intervention of the members of the 
Muscovite elite. Th e customary preference for primogeniture had produced 
a  feeble minded half-brother and a  recalcitrant son who threatened the 
welfare  of the empire. Election had produced the chaos and bloodshed that 
Peter had witnessed as a boy. 
Peter decreed the right of the reigning monarch to choose his successor, 
that is, he enshrined in law the principle of designation in eff ect before his 
accession. Rather than regulate the succession according to heredity, he openly 
subordinated the principle of heredity to the goal of the utility, the well-being 
of the realm, determined by the untrammeled will of the rational legislator. An 
oldest son could be poisoned by the “malice of Absalom.” He ordained that 
the ruling tsar always have the freedom [volia] to designate “whom he wishes 
and to remove the one who has been designated.” In so doing, he claimed to 
act as the defender of “the integrity of our state.”19 In this way, Peter distanced 
18 S. M. Soloviev, Istoriia Rossii s  drevneishikh vremen (Moscow: Social-Economic 
Literature, 1962), 7:263.
19 PSZ, Sobranie 1, no. 3893, February 5, 1722.
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himself from the Germanic tradition of succession by descent by seniority 
within royal houses. However, he did not renounce the principle of heredity 
completely: by citing his own power as “paternal,” Peter also asserted private 
law rights that implied that the choice would be among members of the 
“imperial family.”20 
In the name of law, Peter’s edict was a  signal demonstration of the 
supremacy of the unrestrained imperial will, rather than the legislation of 
a  permanent “fundamental law,” which caused consternation and prompted 
criticism both in Russia and Europe. In response, the Archbishop Feofan 
Prokopovich wrote his tract “Th e Law of the Monarch’s Will”, in order “to 
disabuse foreigners of their false opinion of our people and to give them reason 
to think better of us,” “thus the whole civilized world is our witness.”21 Th e 
initial publication run, 1200 copies, far exceeded the usual number of the time. 
Th e Prussian Academy of Sciences published a  German translation in 1724. 
Catherine I  ordered a  new edition in 1726, and in total 19,051 copies were 
printed. New editions appeared in 1728 and 1788.22 
Feofan Prokopovich cast his defense as a  step taken to ensure the 
welfare of the realm and supported his argument with numerous references 
to Scripture, historical precedents, and European natural law theorists. 
He invoked the natural law theory of an original contract that assured the 
sovereign the consent of his people to rule for their welfare in perpetuity. 
Authority, he made clear, was not imposed by force, but presumed submission 
and submission was a sign of the monarch’s legitimacy. He wrote, “It should 
be understood that the royal house wields the scepter not as something 
usurped by force, but as conferred on it by the general will of the people: for 
the people itself by its voluntary submission, shows that such is its will.”23 
Submission was therefore to be understood as an expression of the people’s 
choice. Nor was the ruler to be bound by his own laws. He wielded “that 
power which itself is not subject to any laws whatsoever,” Prokopovich wrote, 
citing Hugo Grotius.24 
20 Omel’chenko, “Stanovlenie zakonodatel’nogo regulirovaniia prestolonaslediia,”  18-22. 
21 Antony Lentin, Peter the Great: Th e Law on the Imperial Succession; Th e Offi  cial 
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Peter dealt with lack of a  dynastic tradition by a  heroic act of 
transcendence that equated law with the assertion of the imperial will. It 
was another demonstration of the “divine gift  of grace” that Ernest A. Zitser 
has shown emerged from his playing the role of Christ in the antics of the 
sacred “company” of the transfi gured kingdom that constituted Peter’s 
inner circle. Peter displayed the charisma that led panegyrists to hail him as 
“Russia’s God and Christ.”25 In this way, both English and Russian monarchs 
were represented in terms of immortality and likened to Christ, but in 
diff erent, one might say opposite, ways. For English theologians and jurists, 
the Christological literature provided a  metaphor of the savior to express an 
image of the deathless sacral body of the king. Th e metaphor evoked a  “halo 
of perpetuity,” which existed apart from the king’s mortal life and failings.26 
Russian imperial representation drew no such distinction between the monarch 
as mortal and the monarch as ruler.27 An image of the incarnation informed 
the personifi cation of the state in the godlike or Christlike fi gure of the tsar, 
whose persona presented him or her in terms of super-ordinate achievements 
and virtues. Th ese achievements and virtues were revealed in initial acts of 
performance for general approval and reverence—acts of spiritual conquest, 
indicating transfi guration rather than continuity with the past.28 
25 Ernest Zitser has shown how Peter’s “Fools Synod” represented far more than 
a  desecration of religion and old Russian rituals, but a  “sacred parody,” in which 
Peter exercised the charisma of Christ in exalting his authority and vesting him with 
godlike power, a charisma taken on and displayed by his successors. Ernest A. Zitser, 
Th e Transfi gured Kingdom: Sacred Parody and Charismatic Authority at the Court of 
Peter the Great (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
26 “Not only is the body politic more ‘ample and large’ than the body natural, but there 
dwell in the former certain truly mysterious forces which reduce, or even remove the 
imperfections of the fragile human nature.” Kantorowicz, Th e King’s Two Bodies, 9, 
78-86, 314-17, 383-450. 
27 “Th e separation between the emperor and the state did not come about . . . . Th e 
emperor carried with him the whole tradition of the rule Christ-like in person and in 
power, a tradition which, when Christ became irrelevant, made of the emperor a god 
on earth” (Michael Cherniavsky, Tsar and People, 84-85); On the separation of the 
tsar’s person and the state, see Claudio Sergio Nun Ingerfl om, “‘Loyalty to the State’ 
under Peter the Great?”
28 “It is characteristic that at least from the beginning of the eighteenth century the monarch 
can be called not only ‘the anointed’ but Christ.” V. M. Zhivov and B.  A.  Uspenskii, 
“Tsar’ i bog: semiotichestkie aspekty sakralizatsii monarkha v Rossii,” B. A. Uspenskii, 
ed., Iazyki kul’tury i problemy perevodimosti (Moscow: Nauka, 1987), 76. 
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Prokopovich purported to defend the decree as a  fundamental law of 
the monarchy. He named it “the main statute” (glavnyi ustav), the German 
translation rendered as Hauptverordnung. Kliuchevskii and other historians 
referred to it as such.29 But a  Fundamental Law implied permanent 
inviolable rules, and Peter’s decree established that there could be no such 
rules, i.e.  that the permanent law in Russia was ensuring a  condition of 
impermanence, a  lasting uncertainty inviting intervention and glorifi cation 
of the ascendant monarch. 
Representation and Fundamental Law 
in Eighteenth- 
and Early Nineteenth-Century Russia
Peter failed to appoint an heir and left  the question of succession in doubt. 
But he did bequeath a  narrative of accession that presented the claimant to 
the throne as a heroic champion of the salvation and welfare of the fatherland. 
Prokopovich dealt with this eventuality of the deceased tsar’s failure to 
announce his designation, stating that in the absence of oral or written 
expression of his wish “the people [narod] must try to ascertain, by all manner 
of correct conjectures [pravil’nye dogady], what it was or might have been, 
and which of his sons he would have named as his successor, if it had come to 
that.”30 In this event, the “correct conjectures” were decided by the court elite 
with the active collusion of the guards’ regiments, which was understood as 
a rough form of election. 
Aft er Peter’s death in 1725, the offi  cials of the Generalitet and Senate chose 
his spouse, the Empress Catherine, claiming to act on behalf of Peter, whose 
preference they claimed, had been indicated by her coronation in 1724.31 At 
Catherine’s death, the court elite followed the same process, but the principles 
29 Lentin, Peter the Great, 16-17, 134; Kliuchevskii wrote that Peter’s succession law 
was “the fi rst law in the history of Russian legislation of a  fundamental character.” 
Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia v deviati tomakh, 4:193.
30 Lentin, Peter the Great, 216-19; Omel’chenko, “Stanovlenie zakonodatel’nogo 
regulirovaniia prestolonaslediia,” 222-24.
31 Evgenii Anisimov suggested that it was not at all clear that Peter favored Catherine 
as heir at the time of his death. Evgenii Anisimov, Rossiia bez Petra (St. Petersburg: 
Lenizdat, 1994), 18-19.
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of succession and heredity also were honored. Th e confusion is evident in 
a letter of Count I. A. Musin-Pushkin cited by Sergei Soloviev. 
On May 7, at nine in the morning, there gathered in the Great Hall 
the entire imperial family, the entire Supreme Privy Council, the Holy 
Synod, Senators, the Generalitet and other military and civil notables: 
the testament of her imperial majesty has wrought the election of the 
hereditary sovereign, Grand Duke Peter Alekseevich, to the Russian 
throne as new emperor.”32 
Th e aspiration to a hereditary monarchy based on law persisted, refl ected 
in the dubious “Testament of Catherine I” which designated Peter Alekseevich, 
the son of tsarevich Alexei Petrovich, as heir.33 Th e testament laid out the 
course of the succession in the event of his death, based on the Austrian pattern 
set forth in the Pragmatic Sanction of 1713, thereby contradicting Peter’s law 
bestowing on the monarch sole right to choose his successor. Th e testament 
was largely ignored in subsequent decades, but provided a basis for projects of 
hereditary succession at the close of the century. 
Peter’s succession law proved diffi  cult or impossible to follow in succeeding 
decades. But his presentation of the succession in terms of heroic acts of 
salvation became accepted practice, elevating each aspirant to the throne to 
the fervent acclamation of the court elite expressing the joy of the Russian 
people. When Anna Ioannovna ascended the throne in 1730 her manifesto 
declared that she ruled “thanks to the general desire and agreement of the 
entire Russian people.”34 Empress Elizabeth, aft er her 1741 coup, asserted her 
right to the throne by dint of “close blood relationship,” i.e., that Peter was her 
father, and during her reign she revived the cult of St. Catherine promoted by 
her mother, giving religious sanction to her hereditary right.35 But election 
remained a principal justifi cation for her rule. Her accession manifesto referred 
32 Soloviev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen, 10: 81-83 (italics Soloviev’s). 
33 Omel’chenko argues that the so called “Testament of Catherine I” was a falsifi cation, 
in hand of Cabinet Secretary A. V. Makarov, with Catherine’s signature by none 
other than Elizabeth Petrovna. Omel’chenko, “Stanovlenie zakonodatel’nogo 
regulirovaniia prestolonaslediia,” 25-27; See Anisimov, Rossiia bez Petra, 138-41.
34 Omel’chenko, “Stanovlenie zakonodatel’nogo regulirovaniia prestolonaslediia,” 27-28.
35 On the role of iconography and symbolism in the reigns of Russian empresses, see 
Gary Marker, Imperial Saint: Th e Cult of St. Catherine and the Dawn of Female Rule 
in Russia (De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007), passim. 
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to “the disorders and considerable ruin” prompting the coup in response to 
“the unanimous humble petition of our loyal subjects.”36 Catherine the Great, 
who enjoyed no hereditary right to the throne, presented her coup of 1762 as 
a response to popular feeling, to “the fervent wish of all Our loyal subjects to 
see us on the Th rone, and through us to receive deliverance from those dangers 
that have occurred and even greater ones that were about to follow.”37 Paintings 
depicted the major events of the coup and showed her in Preobrazhenskii 
Guards’ uniform astride a white horse, the leader of a brilliant act of conquest, 
ending the reign of despotism and ushering in a new age of justice. 
Whereas the Prussian coronation fell into desuetude, the Russian 
coronation assumed increasing signifi cance as the principal inaugural act 
of each reign. Th e ceremonies and celebrations surrounding the crowning 
presented the scenario that placed the monarch in the mythical narrative of 
the monarchy presenting him or her as the redeemer of the nation from the 
misrule of the previous regime. Th e coronation consecrated the scenario, 
providing ceremonial acclamation and the legitimation of the monarch’s 
absolute power. In addition to the self-crowning of the empress, Elizabeth’s 
coronation introduced lavish secular ceremonies, balls, and receptions that 
would elevate future occupants of the throne as initiators of prodigies, the age 
of gold, justice, and plenty. 
Catherine II staged her coronation only three months aft er her accession, 
undoubtedly avoiding the error of Peter III, who tarried, ignoring warnings by 
Frederick the Great, and was deposed before he had set a date for his crowning. 
Her coronation was a  resplendent display of the popular adulation that 
presumably justifi ed her usurpation of the throne, displaying the themes of love 
and science in the context of the myth of renovation. She appeared as humane 
empress, whose rule was distinguished by compassion and reason that won the 
hearts of her subjects. Th ey in turn responded with exultant celebration, which, 
the text and verse emphasized, was joy animated by a feeling of love. To display 
her reverence for tradition, she spent lavishly on the production of her regalia, 
making certain that their magnifi cence equaled or surpassed western examples. 
Catherine also was determined to remedy the inadequacies of the 
Russian legal system by incorporating the role of legislatrix into her scenario 
36 PSZ, Sobranie 1, no.  8473, November 25, 1741; PSZ, Sobranie 1, no.  8476, 
November 28, 1741.
37 PSZ, Sobranie 1, no. 11582, June 28, 1762; PSZ, Sobranie 1, no. 11598, July 7, 1762.
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of redemption. Th e commission she convened in Moscow in 1767 to codify 
Russian law issued an “Act, signed by the Departments, elected from all callings 
(zvaniia) of the Russian people for the composition of a new Code” which the 
legal historian Oleg Omel’chenko has described as “a supplementary ‘public’ 
(obshchestvennaia) coronation.” Th e Act repeated the acclamation of the event 
and praised Catherine for righting all the wrongs—illegality, fi nancial ruin, 
and the dishonoring of Orthodoxy that she had attributed to Peter III. Aft er 
her accession, 
A wondrous change took place! Happiness broke through the fog 
of sorrows! Despair in the heart gave way to the sweetest hopes! . . . . 
Everywhere the courage and altruism of the Most Kind Sovereign were 
glorifi ed . . . We can enumerate Her good deeds: injury and disorder were 
corrected and ended. Our Orthodox faith is triumphant and beholds 
a Monarch giving Her subjects an example of piety. Justice [pravosudie] 
reigns with Her Majesty on the Th rone. Altruism dwells in Her soul and 
unceasingly soft ens the severity of the laws. Vices disappear, and their 
roots are severed . . . .38
Catherine’s break with the past refl ected an Enlightenment faith in the 
ruler who could reform the administrative system on the basis of fundamental 
laws determined by reason. From Catherine the Great through the reign of 
Nicholas I, the Russian ruler strove to appear as the champion of legality and 
to incorporate the advancement of the law into the imperial myth. Legality 
and law now elevated the image of enlightened ruler as transcendent absolute 
monarch. Catherine was extolled in verse and depicted in paintings as an 
emanation of Minerva, and as the successor to Numa and Solon—one who 
would bestow an enlightenment system of law on Russia. 
Montesquieu had introduced the enlightenment conception of “a 
fundamental law.” He defi ned monarchy as a government in which “only one 
person governs according to fi xed and established laws,” which he termed 
“fundamental laws”—laws that would be permanent and would provide 
guarantees of consistency and continuity in the operation of state. Th e 
observance of fundamental laws, he argued, distinguished monarchy from 
despotism, in which “one person drives everything forward without law or 
38 PSZ, Sobranie 1, no.  12978, September 27, 1767; Omel’chenko, “Stanovlenie 
zakonodatel’nogo regulirovaniia prestolonaslediia,” 35-36.
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rule by his will and caprices.”39 Article 28 of the Nakaz mentioned the term, 
indicating that the execution of the laws required special instructions so that 
the courts of justice could ensure that “the Will of the Sovereign might be 
obeyed according to the fundamental Laws of the State . . . ”40 
But in 1767 Russia had no law either designated or accepted as 
“fundamental.” Most obviously, Russia lacked the one fundamental law 
considered vital for a monarchy—a law of succession. Denis Diderot, during his 
visit to Petersburg in 1773 and 1774, impressed on Catherine the signifi cance 
of such a  law. He warned her of the doleful consequences of determining 
the outcome according to the wishes of the previous ruler. Drawing upon 
Montesquieu, he wrote, “What a  source of disputes in the family! What 
a source of revolutions in the empire! What a source of base adulation! . . . What 
a  source of intrigues!” But Diderot declined to venture suggestions. “Th is 
subject is beyond my powers,” he wrote.41 
Indeed, it would remain an unresolvable dilemma: how to reconcile the 
notion of a  fundamental law, permanent law, above human intervention, 
with the prerogatives of a monarch, who in the cause of the general welfare, 
vaunted his or her absolute powers? Catherine sought to use those powers 
to introduce concepts of dynastic law that placed heredity above utility and 
competence. An incomplete draft  of a  project from 1779 began by stating 
that that a succession law would be vital to the process of codifi cation, which 
she had begun with the Codifi cation Commission of 1767. It asserted that 
the stability of the throne depended upon heredity succession. “Th e fi rst and 
fundamental law [nachal'noi zakon] of this monarchical rule [samoderzhavnoe 
vladychestvo] should be issued and draft ed by Our Imperial hand—that is the 
steadfastness of the throne and stability in its inheritance.” 
She went on to detail the disasters attendant on the weakness of the 
succession, referring to early Russian history, the breakdown of unity and the 
Tatar yoke, and the fall of Byzantium, but not to previous decades. Th e lines of 
inheritance would follow only descending lines of the family, fi rst male, then 
39 Montesquieu, De L’Esprit des lois (Paris: Garnier, 1973), Vol. 1: 14, 22.
40 B. Nol'de, “Zakony osnovnye v  russkom prave,” Pravo No.  8 (1913): 452-55, 459-
60; W. F. Reddaway, ed., Documents of Catherine the Great (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1971), 218.
41 “De l’importance de fonder la succession á  l’empire,” in Denis Diderot, Mémoires 
pour Catherine II (Paris: Éditions Garnier Frères, 1966), 50-51, 288.
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female: the same order that had been set forth in the Austrian system adopted 
in the Testament of Catherine I. But the draft  made clear that the succession 
would not derive from past generations, which would have included Peter III, 
but with herself, defi ned as the Emperor-progenitor (Imperator-rodonachal'nik) 
as the founder of a new legal order, and with her son, Paul as the heir.42 
In 1785, Catherine began to devise a detailed and systematic proposal for 
a succession law, which elaborated on the principles set forth in the 1779 draft . 
Th e fi nal version appeared as the fourth and largest section of her Instruction 
to the Senate of 1787. It emphatically stated the importance of dynasty and 
described at length the lines of succession and the importance and the need 
to maintain the ruling family. Omel'chenko concluded that in the project 
Catherine “gave a concrete basis of a potential public law understanding of the 
Imperial Family.” But the contradiction between the image of the unlimited 
enlightened monarch and the establishment of a  dynastic order persisted. 
Again the dynasty was to begin with her, defi ned as progenitor. Th e monarch 
was to bestow the title of “heir to the throne”—which accorded with Peter’s 
law of succession—and if he failed to do so before his death, the throne would 
pass to his oldest son. Th e project also allowed the sovereign to remove an 
heir from the succession and detailed the circumstances that would permit 
such a  change.43 But Catherine did not promulgate such a  law. Nor did she 
designate an heir. She left  the situation as uncertain as it was at Peter the Great’s 
death. Rumors circulated of a “Testament of Catherine II,” which might have 
removed Paul Petrovich from the succession, but historians have discovered 
no such document nor any other indication that such an intention existed.44 
The Promulgation of a Law of Hereditary 
Succession in Russia
Ascending the throne, Paul Petrovich determined to institute laws of hereditary 
succession by primogeniture. He too faced the dilemma of reconciling 
a legal defi nition of succession while fulfi lling the imperative of appearing as 
transcendent above limitation of law or tradition. As a result, he presented his 
establishment of hereditary succession as a heroic repudiation of Catherine’s 
42 Omel’chenko, “Stanovlenie zakonodatel’nogo regulirovaniia prestolonaslediia,” 36-38.
43 Ibid., 39-46.
44 Ibid., 46-48. 
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reign. His accession manifesto declared that he was ascending “the ancestral 
(praroditel’skii), hereditary, imperial All-Russian throne,” as if hereditary 
succession had not been broken.45 Although he did not perpetrate a coup, his 
appearance in the capital assumed the aspect of an act of violence. His Gatchina 
units invested St. Petersburg. He held his fi rst Wachtparade, which he would 
repeat daily without fail during his reign. He issued decrees imposing Prussian 
military rules upon the Russian army.46 Th ese steps portended the new order 
he was determined to bring to Russian monarchy. 
He dramatized his assumption of power in a series of macabre ceremonies 
to erase his mother’s reign from the history of the previous century and 
to demonstrate that he had inherited the throne directly from his father, 
Peter  III. On November 19, he and the members of the imperial family 
attended a  ceremony of disinterment of Peter III at the Alexander Nevskii 
Monastery. Th e coffi  n was opened and the members of the family proceeded to 
kiss the remains. On November 25, Paul staged the posthumous coronation of 
Peter III by placing the imperial crown on his dead father's casket. Th e burial 
ceremony at the Peter-Paul Cathedral on December 6, demoted Catherine one 
further step. Th e imperial crown rested on Peter III's coffi  n, while Catherine's 
remained bare. Th e scene symbolically and posthumously dethroned 
Catherine the Great as ruling monarch and began the process of sacralization 
of the regalia, which in his reign were to be presented as opulent symbols of 
hereditary right.47 
Paul I’s introduction of a  law of hereditary succession by primogeniture 
also took place as a  dramatic break from the previous order. Again the 
coronation portended the new reign. On Easter Sunday, April 5, 1797, aft er 
the crowning and anointment, arrayed in full regalia, he declaimed the law 
from the steps of the throne of the Assumption Cathedral and ordained 
that it should be placed for preservation at the cathedral’s altar.48 Th e law 
provided rules for primogeniture of succession, modeled on the “Austrian 
45 PSZ, Sobranie 1, no. 17530, November 6, 1796. 
46 N. K. Shil’der, Imperator Pavel Pervyi (St. Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1901), 287-
294; G. R. Derzhavin, Sochineniia (St. Petersburg: Imp. Akademiia Nauk 1871), 6: 
700-701; N. Ia. Eidel’man, Gran’ vekov; politicheskaia bor’ba v Rossii, konets XVIII-
nachala XIX stoletiia (Moscow: Mysl’, 1986), 52-53.
47 Kamer-fur’erskii zhurnal, 1796 (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo Imperatorskogo Dvora, 
185?) 788-91, 821-24, 860-68.
48 PSZ, Sobranie 1, no. 17910, April 5, 1797.
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system,” with women following in line only in the absence of a  male heir. 
Oleg Omel’chenko has remarked that all major provisions repeated articles in 
Catherine’s projects.49 
Th e law stated that the ruling emperor was also ruler of the imperial 
family. All marriages of members of the imperial family required his 
permission. Following the practice of German principalities, Paul presented it 
as a  family agreement, signed by himself and the Empress. Its form emulated 
the collective testaments of German ruling families in the eighteenth century. 
However, as Boris Nolde noted, this tradition was unknown in Russia, and 
both the succession law and the Statute on the Imperial Family were issued not 
as private agreements arrived at by a family council, but as state decrees. Th ey 
were equivalent to “a state command [gosudarstvennoe velenie] the content 
of which was considered to have fundamental signifi cance but that from the 
formal point of view merged with acts of the authority to issue decrees.”50 
Th e succession law made no reference to native precedent. Like Peter’s law, 
it was formulated as a  symbolic statement of the emperor’s determination to 
work for the welfare of the realm. Paul had been educated in Enlightenment 
philosophy and presented his law in terms of the rationalist principles he had 
learned from his tutors. It would ensure “the tranquility of the State, based 
on a fi rm law of inheritance.” Th e opening lines announced the choice of his 
oldest son, Alexander, as heir “according to natural law.” Paul’s succession law 
also evoked the attribute of love as an aff ectionate bond uniting the dynasty. 
“We want this Act to serve as the most powerful proof before the entire world 
of Our love for the Fatherland, of the love and harmony of Our marriage, and 
of Our love for Our Children and Descendants. As a  sign and testimony of 
this We have signed our names and sealed it with our Coats of Arms.”51 
Paul’s succession law announced that connubial love as a  trait to be 
honored and displayed by the imperial family, following the example of 
German states that had begun to elevate the monarch as a model of bourgeois 
family devotion and rectitude, a  model that Nicholas I  would embrace and 
promote. On the same day as Paul promulgated his succession law, he decreed 
the Statute of the Imperial Family and specifi ed that the laws regulating the 
family be placed “among the fundamental laws [ fundamental’nye zakony] of 
49 Omel’chenko, “Stanovlenie zakonodatel’nogo regulirovaniia prestolonaslediia,” 48-50. 
50 B. Nol'de, “Zakony osnovnye v russkom prave,” Pravo no. 9 (1913): 541. 
51 PSZ, Sobranie 1, no. 17910, April 5, 1797.
PA RT I . RUSSI A N MONA RCH Y A ND  LAW
 50 
Our Empire.”52 Th e Statute explicitly stated the utilitarian premises of the 
succession law, identifying the welfare of the realm, not with the unconstrained 
will of the father, but with the fl ourishing of the imperial family. Th e “increase 
[umnozhenie] of the Sovereign’s Family [Gosudarevaia Familiia]" was one of 
the bases for the "illustrious condition" of a state. Russia had experienced the 
principal blessing, "seeing the inheritance of the Th rone confi rmed in Our 
Family, which may the All-High perpetuate to eternity." Th ese words echoed 
current views favoring the growth of population and the precepts of his hero, 
Frederick the Great, who, in his testament and letters, declared the fecundity 
of the royal family essential to the preservation of the state.53 For this purpose, 
he saw it as his duty to “order and establish everything that belongs to Our 
Family, introducing those rules that unfailingly accord with the situation of 
the Empire and natural law.” Paul proved true to his goal of “the increase of 
the Sovereign’s Family,” fathering ten children, nine of whom survived infancy. 
But Paul gave little evidence of devotion to connubial or paternal 
devotion. He made a practice of displaying his mistresses at court, leading to 
embarrassing scenes of domestic discord rather than harmony. His suspicions 
of his oldest son, Grand Duke Alexander, prompted him to consider removing 
him from the succession, which would have been in accordance with Peter’s 
succession law rather than his own. In 1800, he awarded the title of Tsesarevich 
to his second son Constantine, presumably in recognition of acts of valor on 
the battlefi eld, though Article 31 of the Statute of the Imperial Family specifi ed 
that the titles “Heir, Tsesarevich, Grand Duke, and Imperial Highness belong 
only to the Heir to the Th rone as promulgated to the nation [vsenarodno].” In 
1801, he prepared papers to legitimize the children of one of his mistresses and 
considered banishing the empress.54 
German notions of connubial love hardly infl uenced the conduct or the 
inclinations of his oldest sons. Alexander’s aversion to hereditary monarchy, 
declared in the epigraph, expressed not only the ideas conveyed by La Harpe, 
but the strong disposition of Russian monarchs to display their rule as 
52 PSZ, Sobranie 1, no. 17906, April 5, 1797. Th is Statute actually was issued before the 
succession law and was termed “Act of Confi rmation” (Akt utverditel’nyi).
53 Weber, “Dynastiesicherung und Staatsbildung,” 113-16; Schönpfl ug, “Die Heiraten 
der Hohenzollern,” 60-63. 
54 Eidel’man, Gran’ vekov, 240-41; Shil’der, Imperator Pavel Pervyi, 478-79; E. P. Karno-
vich, Tsesarevich Konstantin Pavlovich (St. Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 1899), 74.
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a  representation of something more exalted than mere descent, specifi cally 
as dedication to the ultimate good and happiness of the realm. Neither 
Alexander nor Constantine presented an image of a happy family life. Neither 
produced an heir, and Constantine, who retained the title of Tsesarevich aft er 
Alexander’s accession, was little inclined to take on the role of paterfamilias. 
Constantine early sought to end his marriage to the Grand Duchess Anna 
Fedorovna. Residing in Warsaw from 1816 as Chief of the Russian Armies in 
Poland, he resolved to wed a Polish noblewoman, Joanna Grudzinska. 
Since the reign of Peter the Great, it had been incumbent on all members 
of the imperial family, like western royalty, to choose spouses only of royal 
and therefore foreign lineage, though this principle had never been inscribed 
in law. Indeed, the dynasty became known as “Holstein-Gottorp-Romanov” 
due to the intermarriages with Germany royalty. Paul’s Statute on the Imperial 
Family, however, merely indicated that only legitimate children of marriages 
approved by the ruling emperor could receive material support as members of 
the imperial family.55 
To accommodate Constantine’s wishes and to act in accordance with 
Paul’s law of succession Alexander issued an imperial edict in 1820 announcing 
approval of the annulment of Constantine’s marriage and permitting him to 
proceed with his marriage. Th e decree introduced the principle of “unequal” 
or morganatic marriages into Russian law that was adopted by German 
royal houses wishing to introduce a  degree of fl exibility into marriage rules 
by allowing princes wishing to embark on second marriages to wed spouses 
not of royal lineage by forfeiting royal titles and rights for their progeny. 
Alexander’s edict stated the goal of preserving the tranquility of the imperial 
family and the empire, when a  member of the imperial family married one 
“not with the corresponding dignity” in other words not belonging to a ruling 
or sovereign house. In that case his children could not inherit the throne.56 
Constantine retained the title of Tsesarevich, and remained next in line to 
succeed Alexander. Th e manifesto was promulgated only in Poland, perhaps in 
response to the dowager’s concern for the peasants’ veneration of the sacrament 
of marriage and respect for members of the imperial family. 
Constantine let it be known that he did not wish to rule. He remarked, 
“Th ey would suff ocate me as they suff ocated my father,” referring to the story 
55 PSZ, Sobranie 1, no. 17906, April 5, 1797, article 79.
56 PSZ, Sobranie 1, no. 28208, March 20, 1820.
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that the guards offi  cers had smothered Paul with a pillow. In 1822, he wrote to 
Alexander that he wished to renounce his right to inherit the throne. Alexander 
responded with a  rescript recognizing Constantine’s request. Th en he signed 
a  manifesto draft ed by the Metropolitan Filaret declaring that Constantine 
had renounced the throne and naming the next in line, the young Nicholas 
Pavlovich, heir to the throne. He thus resorted to the practice of designation, 
the principle of Peter’s succession law. But he did not promulgate the decree, 
depriving it of legal force. Instead, he had it and the other documents secreted 
in the chambers of the State Council and in the Assumption Cathedral. It was 
known only to a  few offi  cials and clerics. Although rumors circulated about 
Constantine’s renunciation of the throne, neither Nicholas nor Constantine 
was aware of the document’s existence.57
As a  result, Alexander’s death on November 19, 1825 left  the entire 
government perplexed. At fi rst, a decree from the St. Petersburg Police Chief 
announced that offi  cials, clerics, and offi  cers were to take the oath of fealty 
to Emperor Constantine Pavlovich. Count M. A. Miloradovich, the Saint 
Petersburg Governor-General, insisted that Nicholas obey Paul’s succession 
law, which he noted, did not permit succession by designation. Nicholas then 
swore allegiance to Constantine followed by the generals and guards regiments 
of the capital, a  breach of the tradition of swearing the military only aft er 
the civil offi  cial authorities. Meanwhile, the State Secretary Alexei Olenin, 
opened the envelopes with Constantine’s letter, the rescript and the manifesto, 
before the State Council. But Nicholas refused to accept the orders contained 
in the documents until they were confi rmed by Constantine. Th e tension in 
Petersburg grew during the prolonged exchange of letters between Petersburg 
and Warsaw. On December 12, 1825, Nicholas received Constantine’s 
declaration of abdication, and Mikhail Speranskii drew up Nicholas’s accession 
manifesto, dating his ascension to the throne on November 19. Th e various 
ranks of State Service were now ordered to swear the oath to Nicholas. 
Alexander had left  the succession to the discretion of his leading offi  cials 
and the twenty-nine year old Grand Duke Nicholas Pavlovich, whose previous 
service had been spent as a  guards’ commander. Th e ensuing confusion gave 
57 My discussion is based on V. A. Uspenskii, “Progulki s  Lotmanom i  vtorichnoe 
modelirovanie,” Lotmanovskii Sbornik 1, ed. E. V. Permiakov, 111-21 (Moscow: ITs.-
Garant, 1995), and S. V. Mironenko, Stranitsy tainoi istorii samoderzhaviia (Moscow: 
Mysl’, 1990), 84-93.
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the insurgents the chance to rally their regiments, many of whom had 
already pledged allegiance to Constantine, to stage an insurrection on Senate 
Square on December 14, 1825. Th e Decembrist, S. P. Trubetskoi, wrote, 
“No  other situation could be more favorable to realize the intention of the 
Secret Society.”58 
Learning of an impending revolt, Nicholas took the initiative and 
undertook a virtual coup d’état. On December 13, he presented his accession 
manifesto to the State Council, which the Council approved that very 
evening. He left  the members of the Council little choice. “Today, I  request 
you to take the oath; tomorrow I shall command you.”59 Th e next day he rode 
out before the rebels on Senate Square and, aft er failing to convince them 
to withdraw, dispersed them with gunfi re. Nicholas’s memoir described his 
decision as an  act of self abnegation. “I saw that either I  had to take on the 
spilling of the blood of a few, and save nearly all, or being merciful to myself, 
to sacrifi ce the state.”60 
Th e principles of dynastic succession came to Russian monarchy as another 
emphatic assertion of change, a  heroic and public display of appropriation 
of a  tradition that had gained ascendancy in Europe in the aft ermath of the 
Napoleonic wars but was hardly rooted in Russia’s past. Nicholas appeared 
as conqueror. His dispersal of the rebels by force provided the initial episode 
in a  scenario that glorifi ed the salvation of the regime. Nicholas’s accession 
manifesto, written by Mikhail Speranskii, declared his desire “to affi  rm 
his respect for the fundamental law of the Fatherland on the succession to 
the throne,” and his determination “to safeguard the basic law of succession 
from any infringement in order to dispel the last doubt about the purity of 
Our intentions and to protect Our dear Fatherland from the slightest even 
momentary uncertainty about the Legitimate Sovereign.” Th e closing lines 
vowed that he would follow his brother's example and declared “May Our reign 
be only a  continuation of his reign.” All future accession manifestos would 
contain similar declarations of affi  liation with the deceased ruler.61 
58 Ibid., 114.
59 W. Bruce Lincoln, Nicholas I: Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1978), 22-26, 35.
60 “Iz zapisok imperatora Nikolaia I,” Byloe 10 (1907/1910), 77, 86-87.
61 N. K. Shil'der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi (St. Petersburg: A.S. Suvorin, 1903), 1: 254-
56, 642-44.
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But despite the sentimental evocation of fraternal devotion, Nicholas 
followed the pattern of his forebears and broke sharply with the views and 
policy of his brother’s reign. Custine’s succinct observation, cited in the 
epigraph, characterizes Nicholas’s actual opinion of his brother’s rule. Most 
strikingly, while embracing the principle of dynasty ascendant in the West, 
Nicholas made clear that he rejected the cosmopolitan ethos, expressed in 
Catherine’s dictum, Article 6 of the Nakaz, and embraced by Alexander  I, 
that Russia was a  European country. Nicholas reaffi  rmed Paul’s laws, now 
elevating devotion to the imperial family and the system of autocracy as 
a  national trait. In his manifesto on the sentencing of the Decembrists, 
he declared that the failure of the uprising had demonstrated that the 
monarchy enjoyed the devotion of the Russian people. Like Prokopovich, 
he and his ideologists would interpret their submission as a  sign of consent, 
a  tacit election, but they would now project this devotion into the past as 
a distinctive feature of the Russian nation that had spared Russia the evils of 
revolutionary Europe.62 
Nicholas’s coronation in September 1826 introduced a  family scenario 
for Russian autocracy. Hereditary succession would be consecrated by 
demonstration of the transcendent love uniting the imperial family and 
the Russian people. Th e coronation displayed the Russian people’s devotion 
to the ruling dynasty, making the love of members of the imperial family, 
which Paul had prescribed, a  principal and distinctive attribute of Russian 
monarchy. Pavel Svin’in’s semi-offi  cial account presented the family as an 
object of popular aff ection. Nicholas rode down the avenue fl anked by his 
brother Michael, his brother-in-law, Prince Karl of Prussia, the Duke of 
Württemberg, and his son Alexander. It was Alexander, not the emperor, who 
was endearing. “Th e kind Russian people admired the angelic charm of the 
Heir to the Th rone with indescribable rapture.” Th e author went on to point 
out that this “Royal Child” (Derzhavnyi Mladenets) was particularly dear to 
Muscovites because he had been born in the Kremlin.63 Svin'in's description of 
the ceremonies in the Assumption Cathedral focused on the members of the 
family; they and their German relatives are the only participants identifi ed by 
name. He evoked the warm emotional response of both those in attendance 
62 Ibid., 1: 704-706.
63 “Moskovskiia sovremennye letopisi: perepiska izdatelia Otechestvennykh Zapisok,” 
Otechestvennye Zapiski 27 (1826): 288-89.
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and the “inhabitants of Moscow” the moment aft er the investiture of the 
Emperor and Empress.64 He described similar scenes during the anointment, 
communion and recessional.
Nicholas elevated the imperial family as the emotional center of his court 
and the central symbol of his reign, a  symbol of moral purity of Russian 
autocracy as the purest form of absolute monarchy. Engravings circulated 
that showed Nicholas with his son Alexander, and with their daughters. 
On  December 14, Nicholas had brought Alexander before the Sapper 
Battalion, which had protected the imperial family from the insurgent 
Grenadiers’ Regiment. Nicholas made clear that he and the heir were one. 
He asked the troops to love his son as they loved him. Th e scene became 
emblematic for his reign, commemorated in popular pictures and on the bas-
relief of the statue that Alexander II erected to his father in 1859. Th e fact 
that Alexander had stood at his father's side on the day of the rebellion was 
inscribed in his service list along with the military honors awarded to him 
on that day.65
The Promulgation of 
“The Digest of State Laws”
Like Catherine the Great, Nicholas sought to appear as bearer of the 
principle of law to the Russian state. Like her he presented the advancement 
of legality as an element of his scenario: the law would be a  sign of the 
supreme wisdom and virtue of the ruler. On January 31, 1826, less than two 
months aft er his accession, Nicholas established the Second Section of his 
personal chancellery to pursue the goal of codifi cation of Russian laws, which 
had eluded Russian rulers since the reign of Peter the Great. He appointed 
Mikhail Speranskii, the leading statesman of the time, chief rapporteur. 
Under Speranskii’s direction, the Second Section published the Complete 
Collection of Laws in 1830 (Polnoe sobranie zakonov) and in 1832 a  Digest 
of Laws (Svod Zakonov), those laws presumably in eff ect. Nicholas followed 
64 “Istoricheskoe opisanie Sviashchennogo Koronovaniia i Miropomazaniia ikh Impe-
ra torskikh Velichestv Gosudaria Imperatora Nikolaia Pavlovicha i  Gosudaryni 
Imperatritsy Aleksandry Fedorovny,” Otechestvennye Zapiski 31 (1827): 196-99.
65 M. Korf, Voshestvie na prestol Imperatora Nikolaia Iogo (St. Peterburg: Tipografi a 
IIogo Otdelenie E. I.V. Kantseliarii, 1857), 220. 
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the work closely, dictated its guiding principles, and reviewed reports at 
every stage.66 
Following the example of the house laws of Prussia and other German 
states, Nicholas sought to incorporate Paul’s dynastic legislation, his “fun-
damental laws,” into the codifi cation. Speranskii identifi ed fundamental 
laws with norms of natural law and did not believe that that they belonged 
in a  digest of positive laws. But Nicholas sought to reaffi  rm Paul’s view of 
fundamental laws as those presenting the dynasty as the immutable basis 
of the Russian State, and insisted that the Succession Law and Law of the 
Imperial Family appear among a  body of Fundamental Laws, osnovnye 
zakony to be printed at the beginning of the Digest of Laws and entitled Th e 
Digest of Laws of the Russian Empire, compiled at the Command of Emperor 
Nicholas the First.67 
Nicholas seized the mantle of legality for the dynasty. He dramatized 
his achievement at a  special meeting of the State Council held to mark the 
publication of the Digest of Laws on January 19, 1833. He declared, “My 
Imperial Father, of Blessed Memory, for the fi rst time established the succession 
on fi rm bases of law and published the Statute of the Imperial Family, which 
he, so to say, consecrated at the altar of the Assumption Cathedral.” Alexander 
I, he continued, had added laws about the institution of a  regency and the 
succession which were also placed in the cathedral. Th e account continued, 
“Th e Tsar considered it necessary to bring all together these fundamental laws, 
published long ago and known to all, in one place.”68 
Th e ceremony closed with a  moving scene of recognition of Mikhail 
Speranskii for his work on the codifi cation. “Th e Tsar rose from his seat and 
approached the table where the volumes of laws lay, summoned Speranskii, 
embraced him, and taking from his breast the star of the Order of Saint 
Andrew the First Called, the highest decoration for a  civil servant in the 
empire, conferred it on Speranskii.” Th e members of the State Council all 
66 On Speranskii and the codifi cation see Marc Raeff , Michael Speransky: Statesman of 
Imperial Russia (Th e Hague: Martinus Nijhoff , 1969), 320-46, and Tatiana Borisova, 
“Russian National Legal Tradition: Svod versus Ulozhenie in Nineteenth-Century 
Russia,” Review of Central and Eastern European Law 3 (2008): 295-342.
67 Svod zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii: poveleniem Gosudaria Imperatora Nikolaia 
Pavlovicha sostavlennyĭ (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1832). 
68 Gosudarstvennyi soviet, 1801-1901 (St. Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaia Tipografi ia, 
1901), 56-57.
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in uniforms, wearing their decorations, look on as Nicholas, stiff  and erect, 
confers the order on Speranskii who bows slightly in humility. His brother, 
Grand Duke Michael Pavlovich, the most decorated of those present, stands 
to their side.69 (Figures 1 and 2) Th e scene appeared in pictures and later as 
another bas-relief of the statue of Nicholas I in Isaac’s Square. 
Th e inclusion of the Digest of “Fundamental State Laws” (Svod osnovnykh 
gosudarstvennykh zakonov) and the public honoring of Speranskii in the 
Digest was an act of cooptation, both of the concept of fundamental law and 
of the state administration personifi ed in its leading fi gure, into the dynastic 
scenario. Th e format of the Fundamental Laws, clear bold type and pagination 
in Roman numerals unlike the Digest itself, with its small, fainter print, and 
pagination in Arabic numerals, made clear their distinct and preeminent 
status. Th ey represented an act of symbolic appropriation, the imperial family 
taking possession of the attributes of state legality to validate and elevate their 
claims to absolute power. In this way, the incorporation of the family into 
the legal order in the manner of the German states proceeded not as an act 
of legalization of an entrenched dynasty, but as a  decree from the throne— 
a  display of power asserting the supremacy of the dynasty, now bearing the 
moral aura of familial dignity, over the law and institutions meant to dispense 
and protect it. 
Th e presentation of the emperor as the agent of legality made the 
contradiction between his autocratic will and the regularization of the 
government a  permanent and ineradicable characteristic of the Russian 
state in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Th is was evident in 
the section of the Fundamental Laws devoted to the emperor and laws of 
state. Th e articles deal preponderantly with the imperial family. Part One 
is devoted to the Emperor and the State Institutions. Whereas 47 of the 81 
articles concern the succession and preservation of the monarchy, only 34 
detail the emperor’s relationship with state institutions and their function. 
Part Two, a revised version of Paul’s Statute of the Imperial Family, consists 
of 121 articles. 
Th e most important articles opening Part One, those defi ning the 
monarch’s authority, assert a direct connection between the tsar’s governmental 
and familial authority. Article One, providing the defi nitive formula of 
autocratic power in imperial Russia, states: “Th e Imperial All  Russian 
69 Ibid., 57.
Figure 1. 
Nicholas I, conferring the Order of St. Andrew the First Called on 
Michael Speranskii for his work on the Digest of Laws in the Presence 
of the State Council. Gosudarstvennyi Soviet, 1801-1901 
(St. Petersburg: Gosudarstennaia Tipografi ia, 1901)
Figure 2.
Guide to persons in Figure 1. Gosudarstvennyi Soviet, 1801-1901 
(St. Petersburg: Gosudarstennaia Tipografi ia, 1901)
THE R EPR ESENTATION OF DY NASTY AND “FUNDAMENTAL  LAWS”...
 59 
 Monarch is autocratic and unlimited. To obey his supreme power is ordained 
not only by fear but by conscience as well.” Th e two sentences have diff erent 
sources. Th e fi rst, “Th e Imperial All Russian Monarch is autocratic and 
unlimited” derives from the Statute of the Imperial Family, article 71, 
ordaining that every member of the family show “complete respect, obedience, 
and subjecthood to the Reigning person as well as peace-loving conduct in the 
preservation of domestic quiet and harmony.” In the contrary situation, the 
monarch, “ruling as unlimited Autocrat” (neogranichennyi Samoderzhets) could 
dismiss the errant individual and deal with him as “one disobeying Our will.” 
Article One of the Fundamental Laws thus based his governmental authority 
on his absolute power as head of the imperial family, while article 71 from the 
Statute of the Imperial Family drew his absolute authority over the family from 
his defi nition as Autocratic power in Part One. Th e relationship is circular, 
pronouncing what was regarded as a  necessary equivalence between the state 
and familial authority of the emperor. Th e second sentence in the formula, “To 
obey his supreme power is ordained not only by fear but by conscience as well,” 
derives from several laws of Peter, the most important being the Military 
Statute of 1716.
Th e thirty-four state laws that sought to defi ne the parameters of 
monarchical power in relation to governmental offi  cials and institutions are 
sandwiched between the laws on succession and accession and the Statute of 
the Imperial Family. Article 47 links the two discourses of the document, the 
family and the state, by drawing upon norms introduced by Catherine the 
Great  and Alexander I  establishing the emperor as the source of state law: 
“Th e  Russian Empire is governed on the fi rm foundation of positive laws, 
statutes, and institutions emanating from the Autocratic Power.” Th is article 
was drawn from Catherine’s manifesto of December 14, 1766, which 
summoned the commission to codify laws of the empire (PSZ, 2801), and 
Alexander I’s manifesto of January 1, 1810 (PSZ, 24064), which announced 
the estab lishment of the new State Council. Catherine’s manifesto declared 
that she was summoning representatives from the estates to “preserve justice” 
and to “legalize State institutions” so that “each state offi  ce in posterity had its 
limits and laws for the observance of good order in the entire state.” 
Alexander’s manifesto affi  rmed “that the true reason of all the improvements 
consisted in the establishment of the administration on the fi rm and 
immutable bases of law,  according to the level of enlightenment and the 
expansion of public activity.” 
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Articles numbered 47 to 56, which prescribed the procedures for 
draft ing, issuing, revising and promulgating laws, did not make clear 
the role of the tsar or administration in issuing legislation, or the way to 
distinguish a  law from an administrative regulation. Rather, they opened 
the system to intervention from the throne, by the tsar or his agents, at 
all levels.70 Article 50 provided that draft s of law are to be reviewed in the 
State Council, then submitted for the emperor’s discretion and would gain 
legal force only “as an act of the Autocratic Power.” Article 54, however, 
stipulated that “a new law and an addition to a law are enacted only with the 
signature of the supreme authority,” and many laws were issued on this basis 
without the participation of the State Council. Th e seeming contradiction 
between articles 50 and 54 refl ected the ambiguity of juridical norms in the 
tsarist system. 
In governmental practice, the emperor and offi  cials followed legal 
procedures, except when the emperor or his favored offi  cials judged it more 
expedient to exercise his personal, unlimited authority directly through his 
decree power. Th e historian Anatolii Remnev concluded, “Russian monarchs 
were ready to rule with the assistance of laws, but not on the basis of laws.”71 
Th e union of the imperial family with the imperial state apparatus expressed 
in the ceremony of January 19, 1833 introduced an uneasy equilibrium 
that existed until the last decades of the century between the monarch’s 
personal power and the claims to legality in the Fundamental Laws. Th e 
highly educated offi  cials who served in the chancelleries of the highest 
state institutions felt a  dominating sense of uncertainty and arbitrariness, 
the laws sometimes observed and sometimes ignored at the indication or 
behest of the emperor himself or of one of the fi gures endowed with his 
favor through personal audiences or his offi  cial designation. Th e Committee 
of Ministers, the point of institutional contact between the tsar and his 
administration, provided a  stage for an ongoing drama as the offi  cials plied 
their particular policies and through reports, intrigues, and subtle readings 
70 N. M. Korkunov, Ukaz i zakon (St. Petersburg: M. M. Stasiulevich, 1904), 323, 328; 
A. D. Gradovskii, Nachala russkogo gosudarvennogo prava (St. Petersburg: M. M. 
Stasiulevich, 1901), 1: 27-31, 44-47.
71 A. V. Remnev, Samoderzhavnoe pravitel’stvo: Komitet ministrov v  sisteme vysshego 
upravleniia Rossiiskoi imperii (vtoraia polovina XIX-nachalo XX veka) (Moscow: 
Rosspen, 2010), 135.
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and manipulations of the ruler, awaiting a  denouement that would resolve 
the issue.72
Th e Fundamental State Laws elevated the image of the Russian monarch 
by uniting the rules governing the imperial family with the laws of the Russian 
state and thus giving the autocracy legal cachet. Th e merging of family and state 
laws established a  metonymic association by contiguity: the Imperial Family 
assumed the exalted character of a  monarchy that honored “fundamental 
laws” both in family matters and matters of state. Th e fundamental laws 
left  the procedures of legislation and the limits of the emperor’s legislative 
powers indefi nite, permitting him to intervene without regard to law and 
to issue decrees with the force of law at will. Th ese were not the immutable 
fundamental laws that Speranskii had envisioned, which is probably one reason 
why he did not expect them to be attached to the Digest of Laws. Th ese laws 
remained in force until the revisions enacted in 1906 to take account of the 
October manifesto. In the meantime, the dynasty ruled on the basis of a legal 
system that was its own emanation.
 
Ceremony and the Burdens of Dynasty
Th e dynastic scenario would, in diff erent versions, continue to shape the 
representation of the Russian monarch until the end of empire, elevating the 
family as an embodiment of the monarch’s transcendence. Nicholas introduced 
ceremonies of dynasty that identifi ed the governing elite and estates of the 
realm with the emperor, the empress, their children, and particularly the 
heir. Th e conferral of the Order of St. Andrew on Speranskii expressed the 
monarch’s determination to display his bond with the state administration in 
ceremonies and celebrations of the imperial court. Th ere, lesser ranking civil 
offi  cials joined the highest representatives of the state elite to witness imperial 
processions in the Winter Palace, the gala celebrations of New Year’s Day, 
Easter, and the emperor’s name day.73 
Nicholas also introduced the panoply of ceremonies that elevated the 
dynasty and particularly the bond between father and son as principal symbol 
72 See ibid., and M. D. Dolbilov, “Rozhdenie imperatorskikh reshenii: Monarkh, 
sovetnik i  ‘vysochaishaia volia’ v Rossii XIXv,” Istoricheskie zapiski, 9 (127) (2006): 
5-48. 
73 Scenarios of Power, 1: 322-26. 
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of the moral preeminence of the ruling house. Th ey presented Alexander, the 
fi rst Russian heir to succeed his father peacefully since the seventeenth century, 
as a demonstration of dynastic continuity. At his sixteenth birthday in 1834, 
on Easter Sunday April 22, 1834 Alexander appeared in a majority ceremony 
composed by the Metropolitan Filaret of Moscow. Before the assembled 
elite of the Russian state, the son pledged obedience to his father, the autocracy, 
and the laws of Russia. He pronounced oaths, the fi rst an oath of succession, 
before highest ranks of the Russian state, the second a  military oath before 
offi  cers of the armed forces. 
To display the heir as the object of the nation’s love for the dynasty, 
Nicholas sent Alexander on a  tour that brought the dynastic scenario to the 
reaches of the Russian empire. Th e journey took place from April to December, 
1839, aft er Alexander’s nineteenth birthday. Accompanied by the poet Vasilii 
Zhukovskii, who supervised his education, and S. A. Iur'evich, an adjutant of 
Nicholas, the heir covered a  distance of over thirteen thousand miles. It was 
the longest tour of the empire by a Russian emperor or heir and took him to 
regions, including parts of Siberia, never visited by a member of the imperial 
family. Alexander’s charm awakened sentiments that attached the population 
to the autocracy, drawing the local elites into the family love as a trope for loft y 
and humane feelings. Zhukovskii called the tour Alexander’s “all-national 
betrothal with Russia.”74 At the conclusion of his tour in Novocherkassk, 
Alexander received the pernach, the Cossack mace, from his father, in a  new 
ceremony that marked his appointment as honorary ataman of the Don 
Cossack host. 
In Nicholas’s reign, the performance of scenes of family devotion revealed 
the family’s moral transcendence and the vitality of the dynasty. Th e assertion 
of the primacy of the family principle in maintaining the order and prosperity 
of the realm endowed the house with a  symbolic preeminence that ensured 
the continued subordination of the state and legal order to the personal 
and moral sway of the monarchy. But the merger of family with state, and 
the merger of fi lial aff ect and with service to the monarchy, linked the 
conduct of the monarchs’ personal life with the operations of government 
offi  ces and produced tensions and anomalies that introduced discord and 
a sense of unreality into autocratic rule. Th e family scenario inscribed in the 
74 S. S. Tatishchev, Aleksandr II: Ego zhizń  i tsarstvovanie (St. Petersburg: A. S. Suvorin, 
1903), 1: 89; For a  detailed discussion of Alexander’s upbringing see Scenarios of 
Power, 1: 343-51.
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Fundamental Laws, not only subjected the members of the imperial family 
to the emperor as head of state as well as of the family, but also implied that 
the private conduct of each member bore a burden of public obligation as if 
his conduct represented an extension of the imperial state. Th e heirs to the 
throne were expected to perform the scenario of the virtuous paterfamilias, 
incarnating the moral supremacy of the imperial family. Th e fate of the state 
and dynasty hung on their character and talents. 
Th e daunting personal obligations incumbent on the heir to the offi  ce 
of tsar and emperor of Russia were spelled out in the exhortations of the 
tutors to Nicholas’s oldest son, the Grand Duke Alexander Nikolaevich. 
Alexander’s mentors repeatedly evoked the loft y calling he had to live up to in 
order to justify the autocratic power of the dynasty he would wield. Th e boy's 
every step and misstep in the microcosm of the family had consequences for 
the macrocosm of the realm, as he was reminded by his instructors’ rebukes 
and his father's icy stares. Zhukovskii constantly reminded him of his moral 
obligations. In a  letter of 1832, he congratulated Alexander the Grand Duke 
on a  victory over “the common hated enemy . . . .called laziness.” His ally was 
the feeling of “dolzhnost',” duty or offi  ce, which would help him to conquer 
the talisman “moral worth” (nravstvennoe dostoinstvo). Th e moral education of 
the boy was not merely a  matter of preparing his mind to exercise reason. It 
was a basis for the moral leadership of the people. “Th e mob can have material 
strength; but moral power is in the soul of sovereigns: for they can be active 
representatives of justice and good.”75
Alexander’s instructor of religion, V. B. Bazhanov, admonished him that 
he should do more than govern his subjects well, in the service of God. He 
should protect the morality and piety of his people and serve as an exemplar of 
personal virtue. “Th e eyes of the whole people are turned to the Tsar, who by 
his merit and image is the Vicar of God on earth.” He had to provide a model 
of respect for religious teachings, propounded by the church, of Christian 
conduct, and to be “the best spouse, the best father of a  family.” Alexander’s 
adjutant, S. A. Iur’evich, wrote to him in 1847, “Your domestic happiness is the 
guarantee of the welfare of the Russian tsardom.”76
75 V. A. Zhukovskii, Sochineniia (St. Peterburg: n.p., 1885), 6: 386-87.
76 Gody ucheniia ego Imperatorskogo Vysochestva Naslednika Tsesarevicha (Sbornik 
Russkogo Istoricheskogo Obshchestva) 31, (St. Petersburg: 1881), 105-08; S. A. Iur’evich, 
“Pis’ma ob Avgusteishikh Synoviakh Aleksandra II,” Unpublished manuscript, Baltic 
and Slavonic Division, New York Public Library, 135. 
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Although Alexander performed the domestic scenario of Nicholas’s reign 
and staged the ceremonies to surround heirs to the throne, the story of his 
life, we know, tells of his failure to live up to these injunctions. His father’s 
severe image never left  him, appearing before him frequently in dreams 
throughout his reign. His own inclinations led him otherwise, and just as his 
determination to win the love of his people led him to introduce the reforms 
that contradicted Nicholas’s scenario of stern administrative oversight, his 
open infi delities made clear the moral defi ciencies of a monarch whose power 
rested in part on self-control, willpower, and the capacity to sacrifi ce personal 
gratifi cation for the welfare of the realm. 
His philandering began early. In the previous century, the ruler’s marital 
behavior had not been a  vital part of his role as ruler, but now, with  the 
sovereign or future sovereign presented as a  model for his servitors and 
subjects, the personal life of the emperor and other members of the imperial 
family clashed with the moral and symbolic imperatives of the Russian 
monarch. In this respect, the crisis of the imperial family that ensued in 
the last decades of the regime carried particularly serious implications. 
Alexander’s passionate romance with Catherine Dolgorukova, his atten-
tiveness to the children he fathered with her, their marriage aft er the 
empress’s death, which many considered a violation of the coronation vows, 
all spoke to an open rebellion against the constraints of a domestic scenario, 
an undoing of the heritage that had justifi ed the persistence of the autocratic 
power he wielded. 
Several of Alexander’s brothers and sons also took advantage of the 
atmosphere of moral laxity. His brothers, Constantine and Nicholas 
Nikolaevich, engaged in rather well-known aff airs with ballerinas. Prince 
Dmitrii Obolenskii wrote in his diary, in March 1874, of the Grand Dukes 
Vladimir and Alexei’s carousals with gypsies during the imperial family’s 
recent visit to Moscow: “Th e debauchery has actually taken on colossal 
dimensions and no censorship prohibitions can guard the imperial prestige 
from debasement when dissolute youth unconstrained by fear of respon-
sibility, feelings of propriety, or a sense of their own dignity, impudently and 
publicly drag their imperial calling in the mud.”77
77 D. A. Obolenskii, Zapiski kniazia Dmitriia Aleksandrovicha Obolenskogo, 1855-1879 
(St. Petersburg: Nestor-Istoriia, 2005), 352.
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Such conduct besmirched the image of the dynasty, calling into question 
the claims of moral and personal ascendancy that both set the imperial family 
above mortal weakness and self-interest and presented its members as moral 
exemplars of the Russian state. Th eir aff airs with women who were not their 
social equals, as a  result, had more serious implications than their European 
counterparts’. Liberal ideas and revolutionary events had led European 
monarchs to adapt to the changes of the previous half-century. Th ey sought 
fl exibility in the enforcing family matrimonial regulations and tolerated 
morganatic unions when expedient—as did Emperor Franz Josef when he 
accepted Archduke Franz Ferdinand as his heir.78 
The National Myth 
and the Representation of Dynasty
Th e assassination of Alexander II brought about a sharp reaction against the 
European principles and imagery and the striving for legality that had inspired 
state reforms since the reign of Catherine. Conservative critics associated the 
loss of control at the end of Alexander’s reign with the laxity and immorality of 
members of the imperial family. Alexander III sought to redeem the integrity 
of autocratic government and the imperial family by recasting the monarchy’s 
representation as a national myth, which, by reaching back beyond the Petrine 
reforms, glorifi ed an assertion of decisive authoritarian rule. 
Th e national myth, introduced in the fi rst months aft er the assassination 
of Alexander II, reached back to pre-Petrine Russia of the seventeenth century, 
consigning the intervening period to oblivion. Invoking ideas borrowed from 
Slavophiles, Alexander III claimed to return to the traditions of early Russia, 
which had survived in the substratum of national life, when Muscovite tsars 
were truly Russian and, with the support of the Russian people and the 
Orthodox Church, were endowed with the strength of will to wield fi rm, 
personal power. He maintained the narrative of heroic savior of the realm, his 
transcendence now emanating from his power to stand apart from his fumbling 
predecessors and resurrect the distant past. A scion of Western royalty, he was 
78 On the fl exibility regarding unequal marriages in Prussia, see Schönpfl ug, “Die 
Heiraten der Hohenzollern,” 141-42, and John C. G. Rohl, Young Wilhelm: the 
Kaiser’s Early Life, 1859-1888 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
332-53.
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presented as ethnically Russian: gruff , artless, but straightforward, forceful, 
and even ruthless, he appeared as the most Russian of Russians. His full red 
beard—the fi rst beard worn by a  Russian monarch since the seventeenth 
century—the new Russian style guards’ uniforms he wore and introduced 
with large jackboots, his early trip to Moscow, where he pronounced his union 
with the Russian people, aft er having been betrayed by foreign infl uences—all 
proclaimed his closeness to his subjects. His coronation and religious festivities 
displayed the union of the people with the Orthodox Church and the tsar and 
demonstrated the survival and resurrection of autocratic power, triumphing 
over the revolutionary menace. 
Th e national myth assigned little importance to principles of legality or 
regularity in the operation of government that were embodied in the now 
suspect Great Reforms. Th e decree of April 19, 1881 reaffi  rming the principle 
of autocratic power rather emphasized the importance of vigor (bodrost’) 
in the exercise of that power, which meant, in practice, a  revitalization of 
police power, through the Ministry of Interior and the organs of the police. 
Th e offi  cials of the State Council and the Ministry of Justice were suspect 
because of their attachment to the reforms and legality and their opposition 
to Alexander’s counter-reforms. Alexander III sought offi  cials who were “true 
Russians,” those who regarded legality as equivalent to the fulfi llment of his 
will. Th e equilibrium between autocracy and the legal state ordained by the 
Fundamental Laws thus became strained.79 
Alexander dealt with the moral crisis of the imperial family by vigorously 
exercising his paternal powers as defi ned in Article 71 of the Statute of the 
Imperial Family. He issued a  new version of the Statute, which limited the 
benefi ts of the collateral lines of the house and clearly defi ned the marital 
obligations of members of the family.80 He introduced a  strict moral regime 
over the Grand Dukes, barring Constantine Nikolaevich from residing in 
Petersburg and expelling Nicholas Nikolaevich from service. He tried to 
prevent unequal, morganatic marriages of the Grand Dukes though they 
remained legal according to the Fundamental Laws. 
Confl ict between his intentions to discipline his male relatives and the 
Fundamental Laws arose during the 1880s. Alexander was determined to 
79 Remnev, Samoderzhavnoe pravitel’stvo, 152, 165-69, 214, 293-94, 301-03, 335, 395-
98; Scenarios of Power, 2: 200-202, 256-63. 
80 PSZ, Sobranie 3, no. 3851, July 2, 1886. 
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prevent his cousin, the Grand Duke Michael Mikhailovich, from entering 
into morganatic marriages, but his eff orts were in vain. In 1889, he 
issued a  decree to the Minister of the Court, prohibiting all marriages of 
members of the Imperial Family to “those who do not have corresponding 
rank, that  is, who do not belong to a  ruling or sovereign [vladetel’nyi] 
house” (PSZ, 5868, March 23, 1889).81 He ordered that his will should be 
communicated to the heads of the families (semeistva) that belonged to the 
Family ( familiia). Th e decree indicated his “care for utmost preservation 
of  the rights and privileges” of his house, in keeping with “Fundamental 
State Laws.” 
Th e decree exercised the power that Nolde had identifi ed in the 
promulgation of Paul’s Fundamental Laws and bypassed the State Council. 
Th e practice was simplifi ed by revisions of the Digest of Laws introduced 
by the chief of the Second Section, E. V. Frisch, in February 1885, which 
created the device of “a signed supreme decree” from the tsar. Th is made 
possible the insertion of decrees which were like administrative regulations 
in the Digest of Laws without submission to the State Council.82 Alexander 
even believed that his decree on morganatic marriages should be attached 
to the Fundamental Laws. He ordered that it be conveyed directly to the 
Codifi cation Division of the State Council for publication in the Complete 
Collection of Laws and to be placed as a  note to article 63 of the Statute 
of the Imperial Family in the Fundamental Laws. Th e 1906 edition of 
the Fundamental Laws, under Article 188, contains the anomaly of a  law 
providing that off spring of morganatic marriages cannot inherit rights of the 
imperial family while the footnote to the article forbids all such marriages!83 
When in 1891 Michael Mikhailovich nonetheless prepared to wed the 
countess, Alexander stripped him of military and court rank and exiled 
him abroad.84
Alexander III shift ed the reference point of imperial representation from 
the reception of European absolutist imagery to an idealized seventeenth 
81 PSZ, Sobranie 3, no.5868, March 23, 1889.
82 Remnev, Samoderzhavnoe pravitel’stvo, 152.
83 Marc Szeft el, Th e Russian Constitution of April 23, 1906: Political Institutions of the 
Duma Monarchy (Brussels: Editions de la Librarie encylopédique, 1976), 106.
84 David Chavchavadze, Th e Grand Dukes (New York: Atlantic International 
Publications, 1990), 177-79. 
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century, when a  pious Russian tsar who was one with the Orthodox 
Church and the Russian people exercised unlimited personal authority. 
Nicholas II’s scenario elevated him as a  less severe but more exalted and 
grandiose ruler,  endowed with a  divinely ordained religious mission. 
Th e representations of the fi rst decade of his reign sanctifi ed him and the 
empress Alexandra as  embodiments of the spirituality of early Russia, 
exemplars of a holy family. Nicholas made clear that his designation as tsar 
came directly from God, which set him above the administration and even 
the Orthodox Church. At his coronation, he was presented as the chosen 
of the  Lord, as  one who embodied the “idea of Christian autocrat.”85 In 
subsequent years, he  displayed his piety and his religious bond with the 
Russian people at public appearances in Moscow during celebrations of 
Holy Week, in Sarov at  the canonization of St. Serafi m, and during the 
Tercentenary events of 1913. 
Nicholas and Alexandra sought their dynastic roots among their 
distant Muscovite forebears, presenting themselves as reincarnations of pre-
Petrine royalty, transcending time and cultural change. Alexandra became 
indignant when she learned that the Almanach de Gotha had designated the 
Russian imperial dynasty as “Holstein-Gottorp-Romanov,” and demanded 
that “Holstein-Gottorp” be deleted. When the editors refused, she tried, 
unsuccessfully, to ban the volume’s import into Russia.86 Th e emperor and 
empress appeared in seventeenth-century dress at the 1903 costume ball. 
Th ough the event was presented as a  masquerade, it was the fi rst time that 
a  Russian tsar appeared in masquerade costume, a  break with tradition 
that was thought to portend the return of early Russian dress to the court. 
Numerous pictures of the pair in seventeenth-century costume circulated in 
the popular press (Figure 3). Nicholas and Alexandra celebrated the long-
awaited birth of a  son in 1904 by naming him Alexei, aft er Tsar Alexei 
Mikhailovich. 
Nicholas II’s exalted medieval persona was an expression of the growing 
distance between him and the offi  cials who headed the Russian government, 
whom he regarded with distrust and even contempt. He preferred to exercise 
his power through individuals who approached him with humility and 
85 Wortman, Scenarios of Power, 2: 344-45, 353. 
86 A. A. Mosolov, Pri dvore poslednego Rossiiskogo imperatora (Moscow: Ankor, 1993), 
43-45.
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deferred to his Muscovite persona—like his Minister of Interior, Dmitrii 
Sipiagin, who liked to appear as a seventeenth-century boiar, and the personal 
agents he dispatched to the Far East to pursue an adventurous foreign 
policy that would culminate in the Russo-Japanese War. He also instituted 
special commissions and conferences that reported directly to him. He 
strove to assert what A. M. Bezobrazov described as “proprietorial power,” 
(khoziaskaia vlast’) reminiscent of Muscovite Rus’ when Russian princes and 
tsars claimed Rus’ as their personal appanage. “Th ank God,” Bezobrazov 
wrote, “that we still have proprietorial power, otherwise, with all our 
scoundrels and idiots attached to the various bureaucratic mechanisms, we 
simply would have perished in vain.”87 
Th e Fundamental Laws of 1832 had evoked a  symbiotic relationship 
between autocratic monarchy and the state administration. Nicholas’s 
disdain  for offi  cials and institutional formalities dispensed with this 
relationship, straining the symbolic union embodied in the Fundamental 
Laws.88 When the establishment of a  State Duma increased the enmity 
between sovereign and state, Nicholas made clear that the limitations of 
his prerogatives did not preclude his claim to act as autocrat. During the 
deliberations on revision of Article 4 of the Fundamental Laws in April 
1906, he fi nally accepted the deletion of the word “unlimited” from the 
formula defi ning the monarch’s power as "autocratic and unlimited," 
samoderzhavnyi i  neogranichennyi.” But he insisted on the retention of the 
word “autocratic.” Th e word autocrat, samoderzhets, meant more to him 
than juristic concepts of an absolute monarch. It expressed the symbolic 
preeminence, the transcendence inscribed in the mythical narrative of his 
divinely inspired hereditary power. It evoked a  fi gure designated by God, 
sharing the historical destiny of the Russian people and ruling above and 
apart from the institutions of the Russian state.89 
In the aft ermath of the revolution of 1905, Nicholas and Alexandra 
enacted what appears as the ultimate version of the dynastic family scenario. 
87 Remnev, Samoderzhavnoe pravitel’stvo, 314, 317-18. On the concept of the ruler 
as proprietor in Muscovy, see Kliuchevskii, Sochineniia v deviati tomakh, 2: 119-21, 
3: 15-16.
88 Wortman, Scenarios, 2: 341-42, 374-77; Remnev, Samoderzhavnoe pravitel’stvo, 
 301-11, 314-18.
89 Andrew Verner, Th e Crisis of Russian Autocracy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), 299-300.
Figure 3. 
Nicholas II in Robes of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. M. S. Putiatin, 
ed. Letopisnyi i Litsevoi Izbornik (Moscow, S. S. Ermolaev, 1913)
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Living a  sanctifi ed life in the precincts of the Fedorov Village, a  medieval 
town built at Peterhof in the years aft er the revolution, they displayed the 
transcendence of a  holy family, just as the legitimation of the tsar’s authority 
was challenged by the insurgent forces of popular sovereignty. At the Fedorov 
Cathedral, constructed in early Russian style, they showed their dedication to 
the Fedorov Mother of God, the protectress of the dynasty, whose icon had 
blessed the young Michael Fedorovich when he accepted the throne in 1613. 
Surrounded by guardsmen dressed in seventeenth century attire, Nicholas 
envisioned himself leading a  recrudescence of Russian monarchy, reenacting 
its resurgence aft er the Time of Troubles. A collection of scholarly essays that 
accompanied the Tercentenary in 1913, and bearing the title Izbornik like early 
Russian anthologies, contained historical studies of the Russian Romanov 
past and was embellished with pseudo-medieval decorations as in illuminated 
manuscripts. Th e frontispieces showed them again in seventeenth century 
attire, with Nicholas wearing the crown and holding the scepter. One article 
traced Alexandra’s genealogy to seventeenth-century contacts between Saxon 
princesses and Russian tsars!90 
Th e fi guration of the dynasty as ancient, ethnically Russian, and divinely 
inspired also strengthened Nicholas’ determination to exert forceful authority 
over the marital choices of the Grand Dukes. It was his lot to ascend the throne 
when the call of duty was weakening for many who felt it their right to marry 
the women they would wed. Aft er Michael Mikhailovich, Nicholas’s uncle 
Paul Aleksandrovich, Nicholas’s cousin, Kirill Vladimirovich, and fi nally and 
most signifi cant his brother, Michael, embarked upon or wanted to embark 
upon marriages contrary to the imperial will. (Th e Grand Duke Alexander 
Mikhailovich was about to follow their example, but his mistress refused the 
off er.) In 1902, Nicholas sent Paul Aleksandrovich into exile for contracting 
a morganatic marriage with a divorced wife of a colonel.91
Nicholas considered the enforcement of his will on these matters of such 
urgency that he assigned high offi  cials to assist in his eff orts. Grand Duke 
Kirill Vladimirovich had wed his cousin Victoria Melita, of Saxe-Coburg, 
90 M. S. Putiatin, ed., Letopisnyi i  Litsevoi Izbornik Doma Romanovykh: Iubileinoe 
izdanie v  oznamenovanie 300-letiia tsarstvovaniia (Moscow: Literaturnyi i  Istori-
cheskii Otdel, 1913).
91 Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich, Once a Grand Duke (New York: Farrar and 
Rinehart, 1932), 140-41, 240.
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without so much as requesting Nicholas’s permission, a requirement according 
to the Fundamental Laws. Th at was the fi rst breach: the second was his 
marriage to a  fi rst cousin, a  violation of church law. Nicholas then convened 
two conferences to determine the implications of the case for the Grand Duke’s 
rights of succession and inheritance. 
Th e fi rst conference, in December 1906, was presided over by no one 
less than the Prime Minister and Minister of Interior Petr Stolypin. Th e 
conference’s resolution confi rmed that the marriage violated church laws and 
should be regarded as invalid and the children as extra-marital. Th e second, 
in January 1907, chaired by E. V. Frisch, now Chairman of the State Council 
and including Stolypin, ruled unanimously that Kirill Vladimirovich had 
forfeited the right of succession to the throne. However, Nicholas never 
approved this resolution. He yielded to the entreaty of his uncle, Kirill’s father, 
the Grand Duke Vladimir Aleksandrovich, and allowed the Grand Duchess 
and her recently born daughter to preserve their titles. He did not, however, 
rule on the rights of succession, which later, in emigration, would allow 
Kirill Vladimirovich and his descendants to advance claims to the throne.92 
Likewise, he charged Stolypin with the task of directing the police surveillance 
of his younger brother, Michael, to prevent the Grand Duke and his mistress, 
Countess Brassova (Natalia Wulfert) from fl eeing abroad and marrying. Th e 
couple, however, succeeded in eluding the police tail and took wedding vows in 
a Serbian Orthodox church in Vienna.93
Th e Grand Dukes bridled at the newly imposed restrictions. In 1911, 
Nicholas II responded to their objections by allowing them to convene 
a conference of Grand Dukes and their less august relatives, the Princes of the 
Blood, to consider changes in the law under the chairmanship of Grand Duke 
Nicholas Nikolaevich. Th e majority of the members requested that morganatic 
marriages be allowed for Grand Dukes and made recommendations for the 
clarifi cation of the rules on such marriages for Princes of the Blood. Nicholas 
92 R. G. Krasiukov, “K probleme prestolonaslediia v  Rossii v  sovremennom aspekte,” 
Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, Ser. 2, Vyp. 2 (No. 9): 4-6. 
93 R. Sh. Ganelin, “Velikii kniaz’ Mikhail Aleksandrovich i  Nikolai II,” in Dom 
Romanovykh v Istorii Rossii (St. Petersburg: Izd. Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta, 
1995), 225-29. See also the excellent study by Rosemary and Donald Crawford, 
Michael and Natasha: Th e Life and Love of Michael II, the last of the Romanov Tsars 
(New York: Scribners, 1997).
relented for the latter, but he stalwartly refused to reverse his father’s decree for 
the Grand Dukes.94
* * *
Nicholas and Alexandra’s bizarre impersonations were the last of the 
exalted representations of the ruling dynasty that had justifi ed its rule since 
the eighteenth century in the absence of legal tradition of dynasty. In this light, 
Alexander I’s exchange with Napoleon at Tilsit suggests that it was not only 
enlightenment ideology or La Harpe’s infl uence that had led him to distrust 
heredity as a suffi  cient grounding for monarchical succession. Th e insuffi  ciency 
of a  native dynastic tradition and its legal underpinnings, which might have 
made the dynasty a basis for state continuity and administrative order, required 
performance of scenarios of heroic acts of transformation and renewal: the 
Russian monarch justifying his accession by appearing as the Palladium of 
Russia, the guarantor of its well-being and future greatness. 
Nicholas I introduced the concept of dynasty into his scenario, presenting 
its achievements and conduct as exemplifi cations of the nation’s destinies. 
Law and legality were represented as attributes of dynasty and embodied in 
fundamental laws that combined autocratic power with legal regulation in 
an amalgam that left  the boundaries of each one only vaguely defi ned. Th e 
uneasy equilibrium between the two persisted until the 1880s, whereupon 
the autocracy, under siege from liberal and revolutionary threats, began to 
introduce national representations and ceremonies that discredited legal 
and institutional limitations and presented the tsars as rulers with divine 
sanction and ethnic credentials to exert unlimited power. Nicholas II’s 
scenario expressed a  radical alienation from state institutions, which only 
intensifi ed with the establishment of the Duma and precluded concessions and 
compromise. Th e breach between the autocracy and the legal state proved fatal 
as the tsar explored the byways of his historical imagination for a narrative of 
transcendence, while leaving the institutions of the Russian state to confront 
a rising tide of political and social discontent. 
94 S. V. Dumin, “Soveshchanie Velikikh Kniazei v  1911 godu: Neravnye braki 
v  Rossiiskom Imperatorskom Dome,” Dvorianskii Vestnik, No.  3 (46) (1998): 4-5; 
“Gosudarstennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” Fond 601, delo, 2143, l., 58-59.
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S amoderzhavnoe Pravitel’stvo is an expanded version of the author’s 1986 kandidat dissertation that traces the history of the Committee of Ministers, 
the highest executive institution in the tsarist state, from its creation in the reign 
of Alexander I until its dissolution in April, 1906. It follows the monographic 
organization of a  systematic work of institutional history, describing the 
Committee’s legal bases, or lack thereof, and then focusing on the reform period. 
Successive chapters describe its composition and competence, its relations with 
other supreme institutions—the State Council, the de jure legislative body of the 
empire and the Senate, its highest judicial institution—and the numerous state 
committees subordinate to it. Th e last two chapters are devoted to the futile 
eff orts to attain a “unifi ed government” from the reform era to the creation of 
a Cabinet headed by a Prime Minister in October, 1905. Th e book ends with 
the dissolution of the Committee of Ministers in 1906. Remnev draws on 
a wide array of sources, including secondary works, both Russian and western, 
* Th is review was completed before Professor Remnev’s tragic death. It remains 
unchanged except for editorial modifi cations. I knew Anatolii Viktorovich only from 
his works and a  few brief meetings at conferences, where he impressed me with his 
acuity and knowledge, as well as his articulateness and charm. He represented the best 
of the post-Soviet younger generation of scholars, with a dedication to serious archival 
scholarship and a  determination to open new areas of research with new insights 
and methodologies. Th e reworking of his candidate’s dissertation sadly proved to be 
a valedictory. It gives a sense of what might have been. He will be badly missed.
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numerous recently published memoirs and diaries, and extensive archival 
documents. Samoderzhavnoe pravitel’stvo represents the most thorough and 
informative study of the Russian central administration in the last century of 
the monarchy that we have to date.
Remnev’s dissertation was written in response to what he describes 
as “a  type of boom in the investigation of the history of governmental 
institutions” that had occurred in the preceding decades (3). Th e boom was 
inspired by P. A. Zaionchkovskii, whose teaching and mentorship brought 
the study of tsarist institutions and the offi  cials who directed them into the 
historian’s purview. For example, his Pravitel’stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi 
Rossii v  XIX v, published in 1978, provided quantitative data revealing the 
changes in social and economic status of government offi  cials and in the size 
of  the administration.1 Meanwhile, the study of the state system had begun 
in the west, with works by Marc Raeff , Hans-Joachim Torke, and Walter 
M. Pintner, which also focused on the changing character of administrative 
personnel.2 Zaionchkovskii’s students, both Soviet and Western, went on to 
study the government in the period of Great Reforms, following the example 
of  his own works on the administration.3 Th ey investigated the reforms as 
acts  of state directed by “enlightened bureaucrats” briefl y empowered by 
the crisis following the Crimean War, and the institutional politics that 
both enabled them to succeed and established the limits to the reforms they 
introduced. Th e preoccupation with reforms, however, left  unanswered 
questions about the nature and functioning of the monarchical state once the 
reforms ended. Th e work of Daniel T. Orlovsky represents a partial exception 
to this pattern,4 and many of Orlovsky’s points adumbrate those made by 
Remnev in his volume. Orlovsky’s work focuses principally on the failures of 
governmental reforms in the 1860s, the inability of the government to achieve 
1 P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Pravitel’stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v  XIX veke 
(Moscow: Mysl’, 1978), 5.
2 For brief reviews of the themes and problems raised by this literature, see Daniel T. 
Orlovsky, “Recent Studies on the Russian Bureaucracy,” Russian Review 35, No.  4 
(October 1976): 448-467; Marc Raeff , “Th e Bureaucratic Phenomena of Imperial 
Russia, 1700-1905,” 399-411.
3 O. V. Bolshakova, “P. A. Zaionchkovskii i amerikanskaia rusistika, 1960-1980-kh gg.,” 
in Petr Andreevich Zaionchkovskii: sbornik statei i  vospominanii k  stoletiiu istorika, 
828-42.
4 Daniel T. Orlovsky, Th e Limits of Reform: Th e Ministry of Internal Aff airs in Imperial 
Russia, 1801-1881 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
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a “conservative renovation,” which proceeded elsewhere in Europe, Japan, and 
the Ottoman Empire. 
Remnev deals with the eff orts at reform, but places them in the 
framework of a  functioning system of autocracy from 1801 to 1906. He 
seeks to examine, citing Mikhail Dolbilov, “the history of autocratic 
power as a  process of administration” (3) in order to show how “autocratic 
government” manifested itself both in practice and in the mentality of those 
offi  cials who were both loyal to their sovereign and determined to observe 
the norms of legality fundamental to a  modern bureaucracy.5 In this way, 
Remnev examines the structure and function of autocracy rather than 
conjunctural failures of reform explained by personal dispositions of the tsar 
and his offi  cials. Th e book’s title reveals the core contradiction that Remnev 
believes defi ned the operations of the Russian state: “autocratic government,” 
he observes, is an oxymoron, clothing the tsar’s sacral unconstrained power 
in “rational, legal forms” (6). 
Th e ongoing confl ict between autocratic power and the law in the 
tsarist administration has been a  common theme in the historical literature, 
summarized in the succinct words of Th eodore Taranovskii (also cited by 
Remnev): “In the language of contemporaries, autocracy maneuvered between 
arbitrariness and legality, between the principle of unlimited personal power 
and the need to strive for a  more rational organization of state” (321).6 
Remnev shows how this tension was refl ected in specifi c operations of the 
state under the Committee of Ministers and in the mind-set of the offi  cials 
responsible for its workings. Th e tension gave rise to “a unique rhetoric” in 
the plans for reform of the system and the arguments of ministers and other 
offi  cials to advance policies that would presumably strengthen the state. 
“High governmental dignitaries (sanovniki) and their conservative allies and 
opponents had to play according to the general scenario, presenting themselves 
as true defenders of autocracy” (5). But such eff orts at reform at the same time 
involved obstructions to the ruler’s will. At every level of administration, a tug 
of war went on between working according to regulations and law and heeding 
the will of the autocrat. 
5 Th e reference is to Mikhail Dolbilov, “Th e Political Mythology of Autocracy: 
Scenarios of Power and the Role of Autocrat,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and 
Eurasian History No. 4 (2001): 774-75.
6 T. K. Taranovskii, “Osobennosti rossiiskoi samoderzhavnoi monarkhii v  XIX  sto-
letii,” in Rossiiskaia Monarkhiia: voprosy istorii i  teorii, ed. M. D. Karpachev 
(Voronezh: Istoki, 1998), 166. 
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Th e Committee of Ministers provides the ideal setting to investigate these 
operations. Although it was burdened with a  profusion of minor matters 
demanding the tsar’s signature, it remained the supreme executive institution 
of the empire, the contact point between the administration and the tsar. 
It considered matters that could not be resolved in the State Council or the 
Senate: ministers would move them to the Committee’s jurisdiction, where 
they could expect a more favorable outcome. It also took up matters that the 
tsar considered urgent and were therefore not subject to legislative procedures. 
Th is occurred on such critical occasions as aft er Dmitrii Karakozov’s 
assassination attempt on Alexander II in 1866, when, through the Committee, 
chief of police Petr Shuvalov assumed a  preponderant role, and in the 1890s 
when Sergei Witte dominated it in order to promote measures to advance 
industrialization (see page 85). 
Th e Committee of Ministers was an institution that was not an integral 
component of the ministerial system that Mikhail Speranskii endeavored to 
create in the fi rst years of the reign of Alexander I. Unlike the State Council, 
the supreme legal institution of the government, and Senate, its highest 
judicial instance, Speranskii regarded the committee only as a  location 
where ministers would gather to report to the tsar collectively. When it took 
institutional form, he asked that it be abolished. It was not mentioned in 
the General Statute of Ministries of 1811, though the General Instruction 
to the Ministries indicated that when laws were inadequate or when the 
permission of the ruler was required, matters should be submitted to the 
emperor through the Committee of Ministers. It received formal defi nition 
in 1812 as a temporary institution to deal with the government in the tsar’s 
absence, described by the Minister of Justice, K. D. Troshchinskii, as a form 
of “supervisory power [bliustitel’naia vlast’] implementing measures enacted 
by the judicial and legislative powers” (30-31).
Remnev approaches the Committee of Ministers as a  microcosm of the 
functioning of the state—an ongoing demonstration of the oxymoronic 
“autocratic government.” Th e indefi niteness of the Committee’s responsibilities 
remained characteristic of its activity throughout its existence, and indeed of 
the functioning of the ministerial system as a  whole. It resembled a  cabinet, 
but lacked the key element of a  cabinet—a prime minister, who would chair 
a government of ministers dedicated to a united policy. Whereas monarchies 
like Prussia and Austria utilized the services of a  chancellor to direct the 
ruler’s policy, such an option was precluded by the autocrat’s jealousy of 
power. Rather, the sovereign dealt individually with each minister, playing 
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them off  against each other, thus forestalling the development of institutional 
solidarities that might counter his will and leading to open rivalries between 
them, most fl agrantly between the Ministers of Finances and Interior during 
the last decades of tsarism. 
Reform-minded offi  cials sought to remedy these problems and to establish 
a unifi ed government that would operate according to the law. As early as 1841, 
State Secretary Modest Korf deplored the absence of “a general bond.” “Every 
[ministry] acts only according to its own objectives, not perceiving that the 
actions of one [ministry] inevitably have a consequence for and an infl uence on 
another.” In 1844, he wrote in his diary, “Th e absence of any unifi ed direction 
or general unity in the measures and initiative of the Government may come 
about because there is no prime minister or Cabinet of Ministers” (329).7 In 
1862, he submitted a proposal that would have restored to the State Council 
the right to determine which measures would be designated laws. But the 
proposal preserved the tsar’s prerogative to issue decrees that had the force of 
law without the Council’s approval (143-44). Remnev also discusses at length 
a  project draft ed by the Foreign Minister, Chancellor Alexander Gorchakov 
in 1868, which proposed appointing an individual, presumably Gorchakov 
himself, to head a  “united ministry whose members would act under his 
direction” (354-56).
To solve the problem of governmental unity, Alexander II introduced 
a  new institution, a  Council of Ministers (Sovet Ministrov), in 1857, and in 
1861 established it by law. Th e Council deliberated on problems that arose 
with the enactment of the Great Reforms and that exceeded the competence 
of the individual ministers. Th e tsar chaired its meetings. Remnev makes 
clear that the Council never achieved the unity of a  cabinet, and merely 
reproduced problems endemic to the Committee of Ministers. Th e individual 
ministers sought beforehand to divine or infl uence the tsar’s opinion, which 
the Committee as a  whole then proceeded to endorse (362). Like his uncle, 
Alexander I, Alexander II soon tired of meeting with the assembled ministers. 
Aft er 1862, the Council met intermittently, only two to four times a year by 
the end of his reign. It was abolished in 1882. 
In 1865, Grand Duke Constantine Nikolaevich, appointed chairman 
of the State Council, succeeded in convincing Alexander II to issue a  decree 
7 For the full critique Korf composed in 1844, see E. V. Dolgikh, K  probleme 
mentaliteta rossiiskoi administrativnoi elity pervoi poloviny XIX veka: M. A. Korf, 
D. N. Bludov (Moscow: Indrik, 2006), 181-83. 
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providing that “in the future ministers should not be emboldened to go to the 
tsar with special reports on matters that have already been submitted to the 
State Council.” But the ministers persisted in the practice. Th e Grand Duke 
declared in exasperation, “Th is is absolutely contrary to law, but if anyone 
remarks about its illegality, then his mouth is shut by a reply that it has received 
supreme consent (vysochaishee soizvolenie)!!! Th at is to say, to defend himself 
against a  charge of illegality, the minister protects himself with the name of 
the tsar!” (141-42) 
Serious eff orts at reform of the central institutions then ceased and were 
revived only on the eve of the revolution of 1905. Th e ministers’ practices, 
which had struck the Grand Duke Constantine as hypocritical, were the result 
of the contradictory pressures that made duplicity necessary to reconcile the 
contradictory motivations intrinsic to the system of autocratic government. 
Offi  cials continued to regard the tsar as supreme fi gure enjoying a quasi-sacral 
aura who alone wielded sovereign power in the Russian state. Th ey gave several 
justifi cations for their reverence. First, they proposed that the tsar’s distance 
from the administration and indiff erence to special interests guaranteed an 
objectivity of judgment expressed in his “supreme will” (vysochaishaia volia). 
Th e historian and jurist B. N. Chicherin, writing in 1861, expressed his 
distrust of a prime minister in Russian monarchy. Th e other ministers would 
suspect a prime minister of being a favorite of the tsar, and the prime minster 
in turn “not relying on the support of public opinion, would hide everything.” 
But without a  prime minister, Chicherin contended, the monarch could feel 
free to recruit “all the most able people in all of the country,” and rely on public 
opinion “formed by people of moderate persuasion” (352-353). 
A second opinion pervasive among the offi  cialdom and conservative 
advocates of autocratic government was that the tsar’s absolute power was 
an expression of the will of the Russian people, the narod, who presumably 
adhered to what Daniel Field has described as “peasant monarchism.”8 
I. I. Tkhorzhevskii, who served in the Committee’s Chancellery, wrote:
In the severe and agitated school of the Committee of Ministers, a basic 
political impression quickly took form: aft er all the clashes and storms of 
the ministers, when our carefully compiled reports usually were turned 
into imperial commands, they immediately came alive, became part of 
Russian life, Russian reality [byt]. Th ose rejected by the tsar remained in 
the drawer as dead letters. Th e tsar impressed everything with a radiant 
8 Daniel Field, Rebels in the Name of the Tsar (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 208-14.
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life-giving stamp . . . . In the psychology of the Russian people, only 
the authority of the tsar—no matter who assisted him, the Duma or 
offi  cials—remained the source of law (324-25).
Like the image of the reforming tsar, the notion of the people’s worship of 
the tsar was a component of the offi  cials’ own psychology. For them, it was the 
tsar who breathed life into the workings of the administration. Modest Korf 
wrote in his diary that a personal report to the tsar was “a joy that represents 
the ultimate goal of all our service” (110). Whether or not the great mass of the 
Russian population actually believed that “the personal authority of the tsar  . . . 
remained the source of law,” the offi  cials serving the tsar certainly did, while 
they continued to nurture hopes for reform. 
With the accession of Alexander III, the concept of a legal autocracy was 
eclipsed by a neo-Slavophile image of tsar as national ruler, united with the 
people by faith and feeling. Th e national myth ushered in an era of extreme 
distrust between the tsar and his institutions. Th e representation of the ruler 
as a  national tsar expressed a  determination to increase his personal power 
and to enhance the role of the executive institutions at the expense of the 
legislative and judicial arms, the State Council and the Senate. A proposal by 
E. V. Frisch, submitted in 1885, made the signature of the tsar on a  decree 
(imennoi ukaz) the formal sign of a  law, which would be issued as a  signed 
supreme decree (podpisnoi vysochaishii ukaz). Th is provision, approved by 
Alexander III, permitted even administrative rulings to be entered directly 
into the Svod Zakonov without consideration by the State Council (151-
52), and further blurred the line between the tsar’s personal authority and 
permanent laws of state. 
* * *
One of the major contributions of Remnev’s study is his demonstration of 
the concrete workings of monarchical agency. In most works on imperial Russia, 
the monarch appears as a  fi gure adventitious to the administration, one who 
approves governmental policies or does not, advances reforms or opposes them. 
Remnev shows how the monarchy systematically worked within and through 
the administration. He takes account of the diff erent modes of interaction 
pursued by successive monarchs while they continued to regard their servitors 
with abiding distrust. “However paradoxical it may seem, Russian monarchs 
oft en saw the main threat not in representative institutions but in pre-modern 
attempts on their power by their closest assistants and advisers” (494). 
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Th e source of monarchical power in Russia, I have argued, derived not from 
the legality of the monarchs’ acts or their own adoption of an administrative 
ethos, but from their transcendent role as protagonist of myth, from which 
they descended to the role of ruler of state.9 Th e monarchy constituted its own 
universe, with its own political culture governing the imperial family, the tsar’s 
entourage, and the court. From Peter through the reign of Alexander II, the tsar 
appeared as the embodiment of state institutions, realized most fully in the fi gure 
of Nicholas I, who absorbed leading offi  cials into Russian monarchical culture 
as the highest expression of western absolutism. But the reforms of Alexander II 
placed this relationship in jeopardy, and it broke down in the course of sub-
sequent decades. Th e culture of Russian monarchy had vested itself in the forms 
of European absolutism, but without its legal traditions and estate institutions. 
Th e psychology and imagery of absolute transcendence persisted when 
the symbiosis between monarch and state broke apart in the last decades of 
the nineteenth century. Remnev’s study reveals this clash of mentalities and 
ultimate goals as integral to the processes of government, from the eff orts of 
reform to the mechanics of administration, as it was expressed in the “unique 
rhetoric” that trimmed between aspirations to change and fawning subservience 
to the sovereign. From Remnev’s analysis we can understand the operations of 
the Russian government as an institution of monarchy with its own modus 
operandi in tension with the institutions of the administrative state. 
If the fi rst tension was between the unlimited power of the autocratic 
ruler and the desire to observe the limits and regularity of legality, the second 
set the tsar’s symbolic supremacy at odds with practical implications of his 
obligation to intervene at will at all levels of the state hierarchy. Th e quasi-
sacral image of a distant tsar coexisted with his authority as highest offi  cial, the 
“fi rst servant of the state,” to manage all matters, to “envelop everything” (vse 
okhvatit’). Th e Russian monarch was faced with the dilemma of the absolute 
monarch articulated by Norbert Elias with regard to Louis XIV: the king had 
“to govern” (pravit’) and “to administer” (upravliat’). In this respect, the image 
of the tsar shadowed the work of all offi  cials, his supreme will remaining the 
one source of legitimate authority. “Th e religious myth of the tsar and the 
[offi  cials’] profane acquaintanceship with the head of state,” Remnev writes, 
“inevitably gave rise to a confl ict that threatened to destroy the very essence of 
supreme power, its ideological grounding” (323).
9 See my article, “Th e Representation of Dynasty and the ‘Fundamental Laws’ in the 
Evolution of Russian Monarchy,” Number 2 in this volume. 
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Th e tsar had to reconcile the irreconcilable: to maintain distance and yet 
be involved at all levels. Th ese contradictory imperatives gave rise to an ongoing 
sense of uncertainty that enhanced the role of the Committee of Ministers, 
whose indefi nite purview rendered it a ready instrument of manipulation and 
intrigue. Th e very uncertainties that offi  cials felt about the tsar’s views, or for 
that matter about the procedures to be followed, ensured that his will would 
not be challenged. Th e means to achieve his ends was the exercise of personal 
ties with offi  cials whose authority was measured not so much by their offi  ce as 
his personal trust, making them his allies in the forbidding landscape of the 
administration.
Remnev analyzes the action of personal agency in three spheres of 
state under the Committee of Ministers: the Ministries, the Committee’s 
Chancellery, and the specialized committees established under its purview. 
Offi  cials and other fi gures could move between these spheres, individuals 
whom Alfred Rieber has described as “free-fl oaters.”10 According to the 
initial rules governing the Committee, ministers were to submit reports 
and recommendations to the Committee as a  whole, which then would 
be confi rmed by the tsar. Nicholas I  at fi rst insisted on the observance of 
this practice, but then relented, and ministers began to deal directly with 
him (110, 332-33). Th e resolutions then would be formalized as statutes 
of the Committee of Ministers confi rmed by the emperor, many of which 
would appear in the Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov. As Dolbilov has shown, 
meetings of ministers and other high offi  cials with the tsar took the form 
of conversations during which they sought to “divine the imperial will” 
(ugadyvat’ vysochaishuiu voliu). “Divining the imperial will” could involve 
subtle manipulation, planting ideas in the tsar’s mind while convincing him 
that they were his own.11 Alfred Rieber has pointed out that the minister 
then might become “an autocrat in his own right with a  vast network of 
clients who are professionally trained and loyal to their department”12 (333).
Th e Chancellery of the Committee of the Ministers was under the tsar’s 
direct supervision, and Remnev’s section on it is most illuminating. On the 
10 Alfred Rieber, “Bureaucratic Politics in Imperial Russia,” Social Science History 2, 
No. 4 (Summer 1978): 407.
11 M. D. Dolbilov, “Rozhdenie imperatorskikh reshenii: Monarkh, sovetnik i  ‘vyso-
chaishaia volia’ v Rossii XIX v,” Istoricheskie zapiski 9 (127) (2006): 5-48.
12 Alfred J. Rieber, “Interest Group Politics in the Era of the Great Reforms,” Russia’s 
Great Reforms, 1855-1881, 59.
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basis of memoirs and diaries, as well as secondary works on changing personnel 
policies, he traces the evolution of the Committee’s Chancellery from an 
institution that was merely a  subordinate clerical apparatus into a  source of 
expertise and instrument of power.13 Th e fi rst half of the nineteenth century 
witnessed a  growing emphasis on clarity and elegance of style. Mikhail 
Speranskii, Modest Korf, and Iakov Grot brought a  “literary language” into 
Chancellery documents, making them accessible and even pleasant reading 
for the sovereign. Jurists introduced scholarly legal terminology, analyses, and 
theoretical principles derived from journals. “Scholarship became an attribute 
of those serving in the chancelleries of higher governmental institutions, and 
editing was lift ed to the level of an art” (74). Later in the century, the graduates 
of the elite schools, the Lycée, and the School of Jurisprudence, as well as the 
universities, fi lled the chancelleries and promoted “the intellectualization of 
the bureaucracy” and the appearance of the “professional bureaucrat” (78-79). 
Remnev shows how these exemplars of professional expertise in 
the chancellery served the monarch, rather than the autonomy of the 
bureaucracy. Th ey were of high social standing, graduates of the elite schools 
or the university. One of their number, I. I. Tkhorzhevskii, described them 
as “hussars of the civil service” (72). Th ey developed their own bureaucratic 
“poetics” that enabled them to construct narratives that concealed the 
intricacies and inconsistencies of the ministers’ arguments and produced lucid, 
easily understood narratives for the tsar. Th eir role as editors vested them with 
a  special power in the reporting of discussions in both the Committee and 
State Council. 
Remnev places these developments under the rubric of modernization, 
increasing the administration’s “eff ectiveness” (73). Improving eff ectiveness 
no doubt was a  consideration in the changes of the culture and personnel 
of the chancellery. But the process also permitted the sovereign to make use 
of the expertise of educated and cultured noblemen who did not occupy 
high administrative offi  ces. Th e heads of the Committee’s Chancellery, the 
upravliaiushchie delami, could enjoy access to the court and the favor of the tsar. 
Remnev draws extensively on the unpublished memoirs of N.  A.  Kulomzin, 
a  graduate of the Juridical Faculty of Moscow University, who served as 
13 L. E. Shepelev, Chinovnyi mir Rossii XVIII-nachalo XX v. (St. Petersburg: Iskusstvo-
SPB, 1999), 47-55; Dolgikh, K  probleme mentaliteta rossiiskoi administrativnoi 
elity, 151-53; and my Th e Development of a  Russian Legal Consciousness (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1976), Chapter 8. 
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Head of the Chancellery from 1883-1902 and also held the position of State 
Secretary. “Th e head of the chancellery was completely independent and was 
not subordinate to the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers,” Kulomzin 
wrote in his memoirs, which describe his dominating role in determining the 
agenda and decisions of the committee. His offi  ce united “the powers of the 
secretary and the offi  cial making the report” (83). 
Under his direction, the chancellery summarized and oft en rewrote 
ministerial reports. In composing the journals of sessions, Kulomzin 
abbreviated and simplifi ed the views of the ministers and other offi  cials so that 
all the views were expressed in simple terms presenting clear alternatives. In this 
way, he justifi ed the trust of the tsar, who aspired to absolute impartiality of 
presentation, while carefully concealing his own views, which suited whichever 
minister enjoyed the tsar’s favor. Since the Head of Chancellery could not 
aspire to independent infl uence or power, his relations with the tsar lacked the 
tension and pretense of those with other fi gures in the bureaucracy. Kulomzin 
presented the journals of the Committee to the tsar for confi rmation and 
formulated his resolutions—tsarskie voprosy, poveleniia, and otmetki. Th is 
power had no legal basis but was freely practiced from at least 1861 (94). Th e 
numerous reports from the provinces submitted to the Committee usually did 
not reach the tsar’s desk: the Head of Chancellery spared him the mountain of 
detail about provincial matters. 
* * *
Many specialized “supreme committees” (vysshiia komitety) were created 
under the purview of the Committee of Ministers to deal with cases that 
escaped the competence of the established institutions. Th ese comprised 
“branch [otraslevye] committees” assigned matters concerning the censorship, 
the peasantry, Old Believers, railroads, and fi nances. Territorial Committees 
were introduced to bring unity to the administration of regions under the 
jurisdiction of Governor-Generals, whose power oft en overlapped with the 
competence of central ministries. Remnev, noted for his distinguished works 
on the administration of Siberia and the Russian Far East, examines the 
confl icts and operations of the various Siberian committees in the course of the 
nineteenth century, as well as those for the Caucasus, the Western Provinces, 
the Kingdom of Poland, Finland, and the Jewish Committee.14 A  fi nal 
14 See for example his Samoderzhavie i  Sibir': administrativnaia politika v  pervoĭ 
polovine XIX v. (Omsk: Izd-vo Omskogo universiteta, 1995), and Rossiia Dal'nego 
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section is devoted to the Siberian Railroad and the Far Eastern Committees. 
Th ese sections are rich in detail and insight and will be most informative for 
historians concerned with the specialties and regions administered by the 
individual committees. 
At the close of the nineteenth century, when the notion of a national tsar 
free from institutional constraints was in the ascendant, the committees also 
became convenient sites for the machinations of the tsar’s personal agents. 
Remnev mentions numerous contemporary books that elaborated the notion 
of a  union between tsar and people that would overcome the “dividing 
wall” of the state institutions, which validated Nicholas II’s open disdain 
of all administrative offi  cials. He provides vivid descriptions of a  process 
of deinstitutionalization. By the end of the century, this resulted in the 
multiplication of numerous “verticals of power” that Remnev likens to the 
chaos of pre-Petrine prikazy, which had arisen on an ad-hoc basis (223). 
Th eir activities could further important goals of state, as in the case of 
Sergei Witte, who acted as a  “free-fl oater” agent of industrialization in the 
committees he chaired—the Financial Committee and the Siberian Railroad 
Committee—and then proceeded to dominate the Committee of Ministers 
to the dismay of his colleagues there. Th e currency reform—the adoption of 
the gold standard—was enacted through the Finance Committee, temporarily 
chaired by Nicholas himself in order to avoid the opposition of other offi  cials, 
particularly those in the State Council. Th e Chancellery of the Committee 
of Ministers served as the Siberian Committee’s offi  ce staff , and Kulomzin, 
Witte’s ally, played a considerable role in directing the section that served the 
committee. Kulomzin draft ed the project for the manifesto announcing the 
beginning of the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and behind the 
scenes infl uenced the opinions of the other ministers (299-300). 
But the reliance on personal agents had calamitous consequences for 
Russian Far-Eastern policy. Nicholas created the Far East Committee to 
empower A. M. Alekseev and the guards’ offi  cers A. M. Bezobrazov and V. 
M. Vonliarliarskii in their schemes to advance Russian ambitions in the Far 
East. Th e Committee, which Nicholas chaired, replaced the Siberian Railroad 
Committee but merely served as a  cover for the escapades of the Bezobrazov 
group. Its members played to Nicholas’s sense of himself as pre-Petrine tsar, 
wielding divinely inspired personal proprietorial power unencumbered by 
Vostoka: Imperskaia geografi ia vlasti XIX-nachala XX vekov (Omsk: Izdanie OmGU, 
2004), in addition to his numerous articles and edited volumes.
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institutions. Bezobrazov wrote of Nicholas’s “proprietorial power” (khoziaskaia 
vlast’) as being reminiscent of Muscovite Rus’, when Russian princes and tsars 
claimed Rus’ as their personal appanage. “Th ank God,” Bezobrazov wrote, 
“that we still have proprietorial power, otherwise, with all our scoundrels and 
idiots attached to the various bureaucratic mechanisms, we simply would have 
perished in vain” (314).
Th e disorder and confusion in government of the fi rst years of the 
twentieth century gave rise to new plans for a  united government and 
a  cabinet system, which Remnev relates and analyzes. He gives a  detailed—
perhaps overly detailed—discussion of the various plans to introduce a prime 
minister and a  cabinet, all of which Nicholas adamantly opposed. Only the 
General Strike of October, 1905 and the collapse of authority forced him to 
yield and establish a  Council of Ministers, with his bête noir, Sergei Witte, 
Prime Minister appointed on October 17, the day he issued the October 
Manifesto. Remnev’s narrative ends with the dissolution of the Committee of 
Ministers in April, 1906. 
“Autocratic government,” analyzed with such acuity and force in this 
volume, resumed its practices of personal ties and machinations with the tsar, 
and by the advent of war, “united government” had proved little more than 
an ephemeral fi ction.15 Remnev reveals “autocratic government” not only as 
a  system diffi  cult to reform, but as a  troubled symbiosis between a monarchy 
and an administrative state, inhabiting diff erent mental universes. Th e 
alliance that Alexander III and Nicholas II evoked between tsar and people 
overcoming the barrier (sredostenie) between them was an alternative to the 
merger between tsar and state that had its origin in the principles of the early 
modern absolute state. For the rulers of Russia, Remnev observed, the threat of 
constitutionalism was no greater than the threat of ambitious offi  cials, which 
for Nicholas II mounted to the level of phobia. Th e menace to the Russian 
state in the fi rst decades of the twentieth century came not only from the 
revolutionary organizations and dissatisfi ed masses, but from a tsar seeking at 
all costs to preserve his heritage of undefi led symbolic supremacy. Remnev’s 
book enables us to understand both the durability and the failings of a political 
culture that harbored the very sources of its own breakdown. 
15 For a  close examination of the ill-fated eff orts to sustain a  united government 
between 1905 and the outbreak of war in 1914, see David M. McDonald, United 
Government and Foreign Policy in Russia, 1900-1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1992).
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4. The Russian Empress as Mother
$
L ike monarchs of all periods, the monarchs of nineteenth-century Europe strove to exemplify certain dominant values of their era. Prominent among 
these was a trust in the sanctity of the family and the high role of the parent. 
Queen Louise and King Frederick William III of Prussia, Emperor Franz-
Joseph, and, of course, Queen Victoria became symbols of royalty's adoption 
of the familial values of the middle class. Th ey created an aura of domestic 
respectability that enhanced claims to reverence and obedience that had been 
challenged by the French Revolution. Th e queen or empress, as fi rst lady of the 
land, had to become the fi rst mother as well, embodying the purity, wisdom, 
and selfl essness associated with child-rearing. Her virtues would guarantee the 
sound moral development of her children and ensure the future of the dynasty. 
Th e princesses who came from Germany (or, in one case, from Denmark) 
to wed the Russian heirs brought with them current European attitudes about 
the roles of the wife and the mother. Beginning with the reign of Nicholas I, 
the Russian royal house also adopted these attitudes, and family responsibility 
and loyalty became part of its ethos. Upon her arrival the future empress would 
take on a  new name and a  new faith and then become the subservient wife, 
devoted to the tasks the nineteenth-century mind assigned to women—among 
them, motherhood. But the role of mother in the royal family would not be 
an easy one. Th ere were problems inherent in the personal inclinations of the 
individual empresses, and maternal and royal obligations were in many ways 
mutually exclusive. In addition, the political and psychological circumstances 
of the Russian royal house oft en discouraged the mother’s active participation 
in the lives of her children. Th is paper examines the evolution of the Russian 
empress’s role as mother, particularly her relationship to the heir. My aim is 
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to highlight several aspects of this relationship, in the hope that they may be 
explored more thoroughly in further research.1
In Russia, as elsewhere, the emphasis on the family marked a rejection of 
the eighteenth century and its values. Th e reprehensible past was epitomized by 
Catherine the Great, who, possessed by ambition, fl agrant in her inconstancy 
and indiff erence to the family, seemed threatening to the very notion of 
nineteenth-century legitimacy. Most important, she had been an accomplice 
in the murder of her husband. Catherine was a  product of Peter the Great’s 
succession law, which had eliminated the precedence of family and of men over 
women in the succession. Th e law had expressed a fear of the natural heir: the 
fi rst-born son, as Absalom, was a potential threat to the strength and wisdom 
of the monarchy. Peter’s succession law argued from the premise of utility: the 
successor had to be qualifi ed to serve the best interests of the empire, regardless 
of his position in the family.2
In the eighteenth century, the heir’s mother was suspect on two accounts. 
Not only could she use her infl uence over her son to further her own selfi sh 
political designs, but her closeness to the heir could also lead to personal 
attachment and dependency that would divert him from concern for the 
welfare of all. Th e qualities of the good monarch were strength, wisdom, and 
an ability to submit personal impulses to the voice of reason. Th e son was to 
be in the image of the father, or the present ruler, and to realize the hopes for 
a strong, enlightened monarchy. Aft er giving birth, the mother was accordingly 
banished from association with the heir. Eighteenth-century Russian monarchs 
followed practices of mother avoidance that were common in the absolutist 
states of Europe.3 Peter the Great tried to keep his son Alexei away from the 
1 Th e empresses discussed in this paper are: Maria Fedorovna (1) (1759-1828)—Sophie, 
daughter of the Duke of Württemberg, wife of Paul I, mother of Alexander I  and 
Nicholas I; Alexandra Fedorovna (1) (1798-1860)—Princess Charlotte of Prussia, 
wife of Nicholas I, mother of Alexander II; Maria Aleksandrovna (1824-1880)—
Princess Maximilien of Hesse-Darmstadt, wife of Alexander II, mother of Grand 
Duke Nicholas Aleksandrovich and Alexander III; Maria Fedorovna (2) (1847-
1928)—Princess Dagmar of Denmark, wife of Alexander III, mother of Nicholas II. 
Alexandra Fedorovna (2) Princess Alix of Hesse-Darmstadt, wife of Nicholas II.
2 PSZ, Sobranie pervoe, 46 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1830-43), no. 3893, February 5, 1722. 
3 See David Hunt, Parents and Children in History (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 17. 
Hunt writes of the upbringing of Louis XIII: “Th e dauphin was physically separated 
from his mother, discouraged from developing any kind of deep aff ective ties with 
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tsaritsa Evdokiia Lopukhina; a  generation later, Empress Elizabeth removed 
Grand Duke Paul from the care of his mother, Catherine, immediately aft er 
his birth, and Catherine, when empress, did the same, taking the Grand Duke 
Alexander away from his parents, the Grand Duke Paul Petrovich and the 
Grand Duchess Maria Fedorovna.
Th e new attitude toward the family was heralded by the succession law 
of Paul I, promulgated in 1797. Issued in response to the power struggles and 
assassinations of the previous century, this law conceived the threat to the 
monarchy to be not the fi rst-born son but the conniving empress who, devoid of 
family responsibility, pursued her own ambitions and disrupted the succession. 
Th e fi rst words of the law ensured priority to the fi rst-born son, and, following 
the “Austrian” principle of succession, gave preference to men before women. 
Proclaimed at the end of the coronation of Paul and Maria Fedorovna and 
signed by both husband and wife, it took the form (extraordinary for Russia) of 
a familial act or collective testament.4
Th e 1797 succession law was a  fi rst, symbolic step toward transforming 
the empress from a political rival into a helpful member of the imperial family. 
It remained for the royal house to become a closely knit family and to fortify 
its power through kinship bonds. Tsar Alexander I, who came to the throne 
through the assassination of his father, cared little for his wife, and produced 
no heir, could not himself achieve this goal. But he held loft y ideals of family 
life which had been nurtured by the sentimental literature he had read. Th e 
emblematic event in this respect was a conversation with his younger brother 
Nicholas Pavlovich in 1819. Alexander pointed out that neither Constantine 
(the second in line) nor he himself, both of whom had been brought up under 
Catherine's supervision, had enjoyed a  happy family life or had provided an 
heir. Revealing that Nicholas was to be his successor, Alexander sadly confessed 
that he felt himself incapable of realizing his own ideal of family happiness.5
Nicholas Pavlovich, the fi rst of Maria Fedorovna's sons to be reared under 
her supervision, was also the fi rst to present himself as a  family man. While 
her, reminded constantly that he belonged to papa: thus did absolutism attempt to 
sabotage the Oedipus complex.”
4 PSZ, XVII, no. 910, April 5, 1797: B. Nol'de, “Zakony osnovnye v russkom prave,” 
Pravo, no.  9 (1913): 524-526; V. I. Zhmakin, “Koronatsii russkikh imperatorov 
i imperatrits, 1724-1856,” Russkaia Starina, no. 6 (1884): 636.
5 Shil' der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi, 1:122.
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in Paris he had met the Duke of Orleans and had admired his close family 
life. “What enormous happiness it is to live that way, in a  family,” Nicholas 
exclaimed. “It is the only true and fi rm happiness,” the Duke replied.6 In 1819, 
the twenty-three-year-old Nicholas, though uncouth, unpopular, and poorly 
educated, could already boast a  loving wife and a son. As Tsar Nicholas I, he 
would make fatherhood and paternal authority an important part of the image 
of manhood presented by the tsar. He personifi ed the masculine virtues of 
potency, authority, and austere ruthlessness. Th e ability to win love, in which 
his brother Alexander I had excelled, would be relegated to the empress.
Th e nineteenth-century empress was to fi t the new conceptions of the 
family and to act as cherishing mother to her child. Her principal sphere was 
to become the home, rather than the court or state. Th e offi  cial world came 
to represent alien and unpleasant obligations to her. “Both of us,” Alexandra 
Fedorovna (1) wrote, “had a horror of everything that was the court.”7 She had 
to embody the purity and respectability of the regime, and, at the dynastic 
level, to act out the woman’s nineteenth-century role as moral custodian of 
a  society that otherwise could not attain high morality. Th e model that she 
provided depended on her separation from the brutal and oft en gruesome 
demands of autocratic polity. She had to stand apart as a  sentimental ideal, 
rewarded with admiration and even worship for her forbearance and passivity. 
No longer “mother of the fatherland,” as Catherine II had been styled, she 
would become the mother of the family.
Th e empresses brought high notions about motherhood and the family with 
them when they came to Russia. As a girl, Maria Fedorovna (1) had been taught 
that a mother’s mission was to educate her children, an attitude reinforced by 
her own parents’ long and close marriage. Alexandra Fedorovna  (1) shared 
the familial values of her parents Queen Louise and King Frederick William 
III. Upon the death of her mother, her father told her that she had replaced 
the queen in his eyes. She always kept a bust of her mother on the desk in her 
study.8 Maria Fedorovna (2) came out of the strong patriarchal tradition of 
the Danish  royal house. Of the nineteenth-century empresses, only Maria 
6 Ibid., 46.
7 “Imperatritsa Alexandra Fedorovna v  svoikh vospominaniiakh,” Russkaia Starina, 
no. 10 (1896): 52. 
8 A. Th . Von Grimm, Alexandra Feodorowna, Kaiserin von Russland (St. Petersburg: J. 
J. Weber, 1866), 1: 58, 226.
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Aleksandrovna lacked such a  background, but she, too, brought to Russia 
feelings of the importance of a mother’s role in the upbringing of her children.
Under Nicholas I, motherhood was extolled in verse, art, and architecture. 
Zhukovskii greeted the birth of the heir Alexander Nikolaevich in 1818 with 
an epistle to Alexandra Fedorovna (1) that dwelled on the parents’ joy and the 
feelings of the young mother. 
Your child, like a heavenly messenger, 
Told your soul of a better life, 
Alit the purest hopes within it. 
Now your wishes are not for you, 
Your joys not for yourself; 
Wrapped in diapers, 
Still without words, with unseeing eyes, 
He fi nds love in your eyes.9
At the accession of Nicholas, a  series of prints and paintings showed 
members of the royal family to the nation. Th ey represented a departure from 
the usual eighteenth-century practices of separate portraiture or large court 
scenes. Th e English artist George Dawe completed a  series of engravings 
of Nicholas's family. An engraving of Th omas Wright, aft er a  painting of 
Dawe released not long aft er Nicholas’s accession, set the young Alexander 
Nikolaevich, the emperor and the empress in medallions set above a  scene of 
the Winter Palace bathed in sunlight.10 (Figure 1) Another showed Alexandra 
Fedorovna (1) holding the infant Olga Nikolaevna with her right arm while 
Alexander grasps her skirt and looks lovingly at his little sister.11 (Figure 2) At 
Peterhof, Nicholas set off  a  small private estate, Alexandria, for the empress 
and built a  “cottage” in English style where the family would create a  rustic 
domestic life. Th ere Alexandra reigned as a kind of goddess-mother, indulging 
her whims and receiving ostentatious signs of love and respect.12
9 V. A. Zhukovskii, “Gosudaryne Velikoi Kniagine Aleksandre Fedorovne na rozhdenie 
v.k. Aleksandra Nikolaevicha, poslanie,” Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (St.  Petersburg: 
A. F. Marks, 1902), 2: 125.
10 Shil' der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi, 1: 297.
11 Ibid., 1: 385.
12 See A. Shemanskii and S. Geichenko, Krizis samoderzhaviia: Petergofskii Kottedzh 
Nikolaia I (Moscow: Gos. Izd-vo Izobrazitelnykh iskusstv, 1931).
Figure 1. 
Emperor Nicholas I, Grand Duke Alexander Nikolaevich, 
and Empress Alexandra Fedorovna, 1826. 
Engraving by Th omas Wright. Artist, George Dawe. 
From Shil’der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi, Vol. 1: opp. 296.
Figure 2. 
Empress Alexandra Fedorovna, Grand Duke Alexander Nikolaevich 
and Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna. 
Engraving by Th omas Wright. Artist, George Dawe. 
From Shil’ der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi, Vol. 1: opp. 384.
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Yet if the symbols and gestures of family and motherhood became 
elements of the new panoply of autocracy, the actual role of the empress as 
mother was limited. Th e old suspicions lingered when it came to rearing and 
educating an heir. Th e callow and frightened princesses who arrived from 
Europe were not considered capable of rearing a future autocrat. In addition, 
the demands on her time for court ceremonial and charitable work were great, 
and current social mores did not allow an empress to participate in many 
of the more menial tasks of child-rearing. It was, above all, as child-bearers 
that the nineteenth-century empresses were exalted as mothers; beginning 
with Alexandra Fedorovna, they executed this responsibility conscientiously. 
Alexandra Fedorovna gave birth to fi ve children in her fi rst seven years of 
marriage; Maria Aleksandrovna to her fi rst four children in fi ve years, and 
Maria Fedorovna (2) to her fi rst three in four years.
Other family members assumed the chief responsibility for directing 
and supervising the training and education of the heir. Maria Fedorovna 
(1), who had seen her fi rst children removed by Catherine, followed similar 
practices when she became a  grandmother. While she could not separate 
mother and child, she did preside over the early upbringing of Alexander 
Nikolaevich and selected the staff  that cared for him.13 Th ough it may be 
true that Alexandra Fedorovna (1) chose Zhukovskii as Alexander’s preceptor, 
her role in her son’s education went no further. Nicholas I  supervised the 
education of his children, presumably because the empress was burdened 
by so many other obligations that she could not attend to it.14 Alexander II 
claimed to assign chief responsibility for his own children’s education to his 
wife, Maria Aleksandrovna: “she has more time for it.” However, her strong 
convictions and interest in state aff airs aroused suspicions, and she was kept 
from exerting a  signifi cant infl uence on her sons’ education. Only the outcry 
of liberal public opinion in 1857 and 1858 about the careless education of the 
heir made it necessary for her to participate in the search for new preceptors.15 
13 S. S. Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr II, 1: 6.
14 K. K. Merder, “Zapiski K. K. Merdera, vospitatelia Aleksandra Nikolaevicha,” 
Russkaia Starina, No. 7 (1885): 42; Grimm, Alexandra Fedorovna, 2: 104, 112-14.
15 E. S. Kamenskii, “Ot detstva do prisiagi; iz zhizni avgusteishikh detei Imperatora 
Aleksandra II,” Istoricheskii vestnik 37, no.  1 (January 1916): 102-103; F. A. Oom, 
“Vospominaniia,” Russkii arkhiv 34, nos.  5-8 (1896): 245. For a  discussion of the 
controversy and changes in Grand Duke Nicholas Aleksandrovich’s education, see 
Scenarios, 2: 92-99.
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Later in the century, misgivings about the heir’s mother began to diminish. 
Maria Fedorovna (2) played a signifi cant role in Nicholas II’s education, since it 
was not of great interest to Alexander III. She made every eff ort to keep tutors 
from gaining an infl uence over her son, perhaps distressed by the sway over her 
husband exerted by his former tutor, Constantine Pobedonostsev.16
It is clear that the grand duchess or empress had little contact with her 
children. From the moment of delivery, numerous servants saw to the care 
of the infant. Robust peasant women were brought in from their villages to 
nurse him.17 Th e nineteenth-century empresses could not or would not heed 
the dictum of the current child-rearing literature that breastfeeding by the 
mother contributed to the child’s well-being. Maria Aleksandrovna, whose 
fi rst-born son, Nicholas, had been given to a  wet nurse, expressed the desire 
to breastfeed her second, Alexander—but, like many of her wishes, this one 
was refused. Her father-in-law Nicholas I  insisted that the child be fed by 
a wet nurse.18 Fears for the empress’s health, current expectations of how an 
empress should act, ceremonial demands, and the desire for more children all 
combined to discourage the empress from breast feeding. Empress Alexandra 
Fedorovna (2), infl uenced by Victorian practices, insisting on nursing her fi rst 
three children, Olga, Tatiana, and Maria.19
Servants performed the early work of rearing. Th e heir spent his fi rst 
years in the care of a staff  of women, headed by a court lady of high standing 
and impeccable reputation. Th e children’s nurses were foreigners, usually 
English, as were their governesses. It was common for the grand dukes to 
develop strong attachments to the women who cared for them in their early 
years and to remain fond of them throughout their lives. However, when 
the heirs reached the age of seven they were abruptly removed to the care 
of men, who would seek to initiate them in the military ethos and practices 
central to the representation of the monarchy and to provide them with 
the civil education necessary for governmental and diplomatic obligations. 
16 E. Flourens, Alexandre III, sa vie, son oeuvre (Paris: E. Dentu, 1894), 77-78.
17 I have found direct mention of the use of wet nurses for Nicholas I, Nicholas 
Aleksandrovich, Alexander III, and Nicholas II. Alexandra Fedorovna I returned 
from Moscow to St. Petersburg separately from the heir, less than two months aft er 
the birth, suggesting that she was not nursing him.
18 A. I. Iakovleva, “Vospominaniia byvshei kamer-iungfery Imperatritsy Marii Alek-
sand rovny,” Istoricheskii Vestnik 9, no. 2 (February 1888): 410.
19 See Scenarios of Power, 2: 334.
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A  hierarchy of offi  cers and teachers saw to the “moral” and intellectual 
training of the heir, who was placed directly in the care of an avuncular 
offi  cer enjoying the tsar’s trust. Th e heir’s mother, as well as his father, would 
be invited to carefully prepared examinations, where she could watch and 
approve of her son’s performance.
Descriptions of tsars’ early childhoods are few and vague, making it 
diffi  cult to reconstruct their daily lives. From available accounts, it appears 
that the children visited their mothers for one or perhaps two hours a  day, 
rarely longer. When the empress was taking one of her frequent trips to 
Europe, for health reasons or to visit relatives, the children were deprived 
even of this contact. Alexandra Fedorovna (1) left  in September 1820 on 
a  journey that lasted more than a  year, while the two-and-one-half-year-
old Alexander remained in St. Petersburg under the supervision of his 
grandmother, Maria Fedorovna (1). Maria Aleksandrovna took a seven-week 
trip through Germany in the fall of 1843, only two months aft er the birth 
of her fi rst son, Nicholas. She visited her home, Darmstadt, the next spring 
for six weeks while pregnant with her son Alexander. Among her subsequent 
travels was a lengthy trip to Europe in 1847, when Alexander Aleksandrovich 
was just two years old and Vladimir three months.20 If one counts the time 
of confi nement for births and convalescence, it is clear that there were 
long stretches when the young heir would be separated from his mother. 
Injunctions against reliance on servants and exhortations for the mother to 
take direct care of her child could lead only to fastidiousness in the selection 
of the nursery staff .
Yet, despite obstacles to intimacy, Russian empresses appear to have 
exerted a  signifi cant infl uence on the development of the heirs’ personalities. 
In their personal characteristics, mannerisms, and tastes, the nineteenth-
century tsars resembled their mothers far more than their fathers. Nicholas 
I’s rigid self-righteousness and despotism, Alexander II’s poise, fl irtatiousness, 
and absorption with the frivolous and external, Alexander III's asociability 
and brooding religiosity, and Nicholas II’s cold charm, suspiciousness, and 
secretiveness all appeared to derive from their mothers. Th e tsars emulated 
their fathers chiefl y in their devotion to the principles of autocracy. Th e public 
image of the tsar, represented by the father, embodied demands that the heir 
found intimidating and beyond his powers. Th e heir saw his father as tsar, 
as a  person rising to fulfi ll the demands and ceremonies of the offi  ce he was 
20 Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr II, 1: 116.
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obliged to assume.21 But the mother could act not only as empress but also as 
an individual with thoughts and feelings of her own. Th e heirs seem to have 
received their notions of personal life from their mothers.
Although the empress continued to remain apart from the chief tasks of 
child-rearing, she was expected to show aff ection and kindness to her children 
when she did see them. Barred from the formal tasks of socialization, she was 
allowed and encouraged to perform the role of emotional nurturer. In this 
sense the new conceptions of motherhood aff ected the ideas of how a mother 
should act and how a child should approach her, even if they did not greatly 
alter child-rearing practices in the imperial family. Th e heir may have spent 
little time with his mother, but this time was the high moment of the day. 
Since the quality and intensity of parental contact are oft en more important in 
shaping a relationship than the amount of time spent with a child, the empress 
could provide an emotional focus in the heir’s life, and could serve as a highly 
praised model of virtue.
Th e importance of the empress to her children is evident from the feelings 
they expressed about her absence. Grand Duchess Olga Nikolaevna wrote 
that it was like “paradise” for the children to be near their mother, Alexandra 
Fedorovna (1). Th ey were desolate when she was gone: “If mother was away, 
we were like lost souls.”22 When Nicholas I  and Alexandra visited the south 
during the Russo-Turkish War of 1828, Alexander Nikolaevich, then ten years 
old, was inconsolable. He wandered through the palace at Tsarskoe Selo saying, 
“Here is where Papa and Mama have dinner. Here sat Papa, and there Mama. 
Where are they now?” He lost interest in play, and his usual cheerful manner 
disappeared. He wrote in his diary, “My nice Mama and Mary left  for Odessa. 
I cried a  lot.”23 Nicholas II, when about ten, lived for the two hours a day he 
could spend with his mother, whom he worshipped. It was a time of love and 
recreation in the midst of a general isolation and regimentation. “Th e children 
longed for their mother, enjoyed her warmth, did not want to be parted from 
her.” When Maria Fedorovna (2) was giving birth to Mikhail Aleksandrovich, 
her sons could not see her, and they became forlorn. “Th e childrens’ cheeks 
were sunken. Th ey became pale and began to eat and sleep poorly.”24
21 See Scenarios of Power, 1, 343-62.
22 Olga Nikolaevna, Grand Duchess, Son iunosti (Paris: Voennaia Byl’, 1963), 35.
23 Merder, “Zapiski,” Russkaia Starina, no. 2, (1885): 355-356.
24 Il'ia Surguchev, Detstvo Imperatora Nikolaia II (Paris: Vozrozhdenie, 1953), 88-90, 
92-93.
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Maria Aleksandrovna was more reserved with her children, and her 
concern expressed itself in worry and strictness. She appeared sad in the 
presence of her children.25 Yet the heir missed his parents when they were away 
in 1847. Th e four-year-old Grand Duke Nicholas Aleksandrovich exclaimed, 
“Papa went away. Mother went away. Lina went away. But what can we do?” 
Just before their return he said, “When Papa, Mama, and Lina come back 
I will be so happy that I will walk on my head.”26 Th e younger sons, including 
the future Alexander III, retained a sense of being deprived of parental warmth 
and attention, and they recalled these feelings bitterly later on.27
Loved, worshipped, regretted, the empress became one who was sought 
aft er and imitated by her children. She provided an example which, as Olga 
Nikolaevna suggested, aff ected the children, even if she did not concern herself 
directly with them.28 Her example was one of personal feeling and conduct, 
a  model of emotional expression. Th e father had to contain or suppress his 
personal feelings and conform to the public image of tsar—a distant and 
awesome fi gure. Th e empress could provide an initial sense of comradeship and 
the fi rst lessons in the ways that royalty could appear human.
Th e empress’s treatment of the heir might confl ict with the spirit of his 
formal education. She could shield him from the demands of strength and 
self-control impressed by his teachers; she could pamper him, and show 
understanding for his weaknesses. Or her refusal to provide such support could 
be viewed as rejection and lead to diffi  culties in expressing such feelings. Th e 
former pattern prevailed in the early lives of Alexander II and Nicholas II. In 
Alexandra Fedorovna (1), Alexander was able to fi nd a way to avoid his studies 
and to go to the theater or for a walk. Aft er a fall from a horse, which brought 
only rebukes from his father, he could spend a  whole day in the company of 
his mother. Maria Fedorovna’s (2) protective attitude toward Nicholas II was 
partly responsible for decreasing the rigor and seriousness of his education, 
resulting in a diminished importance being assigned to formal training. Maria 
Aleksandrovna, on the other hand, did not provide such consolation for her 
25 A. F. Tiutcheva, Pri dvore dvukh imperatorov, Vospominaniia, Dnevnik, 1853-1882 
(Cambridge, UK: Oriental Research Partners, 1975), 2: 63-66, 102, 116-117.
26 S. A. Iur'evich, “Pis'ma ob avgusteishikh synov'iakh Aleksandra II,” Unpublished 
manuscript, in New York Public Library, 49, 131.
27 Oom, “Vospominaniia,” 254; “Iz dnevnika A. A. Polovtsova,” Krasnyi Arkhiv, 33 
(1929), 187.
28 Olga Nikolaevna, Son iunosti, 35.
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children and was critical of their progress. Both Nicholas Aleksandrovich 
and Alexander III grew up without an alternative source of support in their 
mother, and both remained ill at ease in expressing their feelings.29
It was not only association and identifi cation that fostered a  bond 
between empress and heir, but also their common position as prominent but 
necessarily subservient members of the imperial family. Since both of them 
were potential rivals for authority, the tsar regarded them with suspicion when 
matters of state were at issue. Th ey shared a common passive role, serving as 
parts of the ornamentation of autocracy: they were both gracious victims of 
the requirements of state. Alexandra Fedorovna (1) was to play the doll who 
displayed autocracy’s conversion to domesticity and male dominance. In 
return for her eff acement, she could count on the satisfaction of her caprices. 
For her amusement Nicholas I  turned Peterhof into a  playground where 
she could live in a  world of make-believe. He treated her as a  child, playing 
games by posing as a servant who brought her presents. She was called a little 
bird, ptichka, upon her arrival in Russia, and charmed all around her into 
obedience to her whims. She represented what Alfred Rieber has described 
as the “fl irtatious” response to the dilemma of the woman’s role in the 
nineteenth-century Russian court.30 But the air of frivolity hid the isolation 
and condescension she felt as empress. Her public appearances alternated with 
increasingly frequent bouts of disease and nervous illness that made her the 
object of more serious attention.31
Her son, Alexander Nikolaevich, was paraded about as proof of the 
dynasty’s persistence and fertility. On the day of the Decembrist revolt he was 
displayed, and at the coronation and the ensuing balls and festivities. His poise 
and charm won general admiration. Subordinating his own impulses, he, too, 
accepted a stage role. In his submission to the demands of the classroom, in his 
abandonment of his fi rst real love, and in his participation in governmental 
matters, he struggled to accept this enforced denial. Th e letters of Alexandra 
and Alexander to Zhukovskii at the time of the coronation express a common 
29 Merder, “Zapiski,” Russkaia Starina, no. 8 (1885) 224-225; no. 9 (1885): 433; no. 12 
(1885): 504; Tiutcheva, Pri dvore dvukh imperatorov, 2: 63-66, 116-17, 191.
30 “Imperatritsa Alexandra Fedorovna v  svoikh vospominaniiakh,” 16; Alfred J. Rieber, 
Introduction to Tiutcheva, Pri dvore dvukh imperatorov.
31 Alexandra Feodorowna, Grimm, passim; Tiutcheva, Pri dvore dvukh imperatorov, 
passim.
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sympathy in the sharing of ritual excess. Alexandra, admiring the fi gure cut by 
her eight-year-old son, sympathized with him when he burst into tears in the 
middle of the ceremony. Alexander, in his turn, wrote to Zhukovskii, “Th ank 
God, Mama stood that long ceremony.”32
Both Alexander III and Maria Aleksandrovna felt the eff ects of 
Alexander  II’s suspicion of family members. Mother and son were treated as 
unwanted and insignifi cant. Maria Aleksandrovna, a  melancholic woman of 
doubtful legitimacy from a  lesser German state, was alien to the demanding 
court milieu she was supposed to exemplify. Aft er her arrival in Russia, she 
tried to share her husband’s interests, and she did enjoy discussions with him 
and other important fi gures. Such eagerness, however, only revived misgivings 
about her ambitions and stirred Alexander’s insecurities. At the moment of 
her husband’s accession, Maria was given to know that her involvement in 
government could not be received kindly, and she was denied all possibility 
of infl uence. It was said that these steps were prompted by rumors that the 
empress, not the emperor, would rule. 
Maria Aleksandrovna then retreated into her own coterie. She found solace 
in mysticism and a Slavophile absorption with Russia, becoming the model of 
what Rieber calls the “pietistic, sentimentalist, passive type.” In contrast to her 
frivolous predecessor, she attracted loyalty by her sincerity and helplessness, 
evoking solicitude rather than delight. Th ough not inclined to self-indulgence, 
she suff ered from frequent illness and nervous disorders, which made her well-
being of concern to others.33 Her son, Alexander Aleksandrovich, plodding 
and seemingly dull, was regarded as something of an embarrassment and 
remained in the shadow of his older brother Nicholas until the latter’s death 
in 1865. Th en he began to share his mother’s mystical and Russophile interests, 
encouraged by his tutor, Constantine Pobedonostsev. His association with 
Pan-Slavism and attempts to meddle in government put left  him languishing in 
a virtual state of disgrace during the 1870s. Meanwhile, the tsar’s establishment 
of a  second household with his mistress, Catherine Dolgorukova, created 
a  condition of open hostility between emperor and empress, the tsarevich 
clearly siding with his mother.
32 “Pis'ma Imperatritsy Aleksandry Fedorovny k  V. A. Zhukovskomu, 1817-1842,” 
Russkii Arkhiv 35, no. 4 (1897): 498-499.
33 Tiutcheva, Pri dvore dvukh imperatorov, 1: 79-81, 2: 79, 117, 123; Oom, “Vospo-
minaniia,” 245.
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In this context, we can see the tsarevich and empress sharing certain 
strategies in dealing with the overpowering fi gure of the tsar. In the face 
of Nicholas I’s stern paternal sense of obligation and self-denial, Alexandra 
Fedorovna (1) and Alexander Nikolaevich strove to please by compliance and 
conspicuous shows of joy and delight. Alexander II’s distrust and contempt 
for members of the family led Maria Aleksandrovna and Alexander 
Aleksandrovich to withdraw and fi nd their own goals and interests, which 
were remote from, and oft en antithetical to, the tsar’s. Alexander III, though 
a good family man, was intolerant of disagreement and grew violently angry 
when crossed; Maria Fedorovna (2) and Nicholas II used a  combination 
of deceit and placation to cope with him. Th ey used the same devices with 
others, particularly men, whom they regarded as outside of or threatening 
to their domestic alliance. Nicholas, who was unusually dependent on his 
mother, remained squeamish about befriending or trusting anyone outside 
the family. Wary of outsiders, mother and son propitiated them with 
superfi cial shows of civility. Writing to Nicholas when he was nineteen, 
during his fi rst participation in military maneuvers, Maria Fedorovna 
reminded him that everyone would be watching his fi rst “independent” steps. 
She instructed him to behave courteously with his comrades but warned 
him to avoid “too much familiarity or intimacy,” and to beware of fl atterers. 
Nicholas replied, “I will always try to follow your advice, my dearest, darling 
Mama. One has to be cautious with everybody at the start.” Contemporaries 
would remark on both his sociability and his extreme wariness of personal 
attachments.34
Th e foreign identity of nineteenth-century empresses created additional 
grounds for rapport. From the reign of Nicholas I, the imperial family 
began to stress its Russian character and to use Russian within the family 
and the court. Th e empresses had to endeavor to show their Russianness 
and to prove their fealty to their new nationality. Th ey expressed their 
attachment to Russian cul ture in many ways, but most eff ectively in the piety 
of their Orthodox faith. Th eir sense of national diff erence was shared by the 
heirs, who grew up with feelings of ambivalence about their own national 
identity. Th ey usually spoke to their mothers in French or German, later 
English, while  Russian increasingly became the language of their everyday 
34 Edward J. Bing, ed., Th e Secret Letters of the Last Tsar (Toronto: Nicholson and 
Watson, 1937), 33, 36.
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contacts outside the family. Th ey were never quite sure what language was 
their own.35 Th ey, too, looked upon their Russian character as something 
assumed,  external to themselves, to be discovered and displayed. Th ey 
showed Russian tastes in dress and food and encouraged Russian art, 
music, and ballet. Devotion to Russian Orthodoxy would be the chief 
expression of  their national identity, just as their association with the 
church formed their most apparent bond with the Russian nation. Th e 
particular character of the piety of the last three tsars closely resembled that 
of their mothers.
In closing, we can say that the nineteenth-century Russian empresses 
exerted considerable infl uence on the characters, personal styles, and tastes 
of their sons, the heirs. Th e circumstances of autocracy gave the empress and 
the tsarevich similar roles to play in enhancing the image of the tsar-father. 
Th e empress’s foreign origin made her something of an outsider, leading to 
uncertainties in the heir’s own feeling of nationality. Initially, the sense of 
rapport between mother and son was discouraged by the fears of maternal 
infl uence that were intrinsic to eighteenth-century views of monarchy. 
As the royal house came to accept the middle-class values of childhood, 
motherhood, and the family, the barriers to mother-son closeness fell away 
and the stigmas were replaced by expectations of an aff ectionate relationship. 
Th e greater acceptance of the mother’s role in emotional nurturing and the 
fear of the hostile world surrounding the imperial family made possible 
a more intimate relationship between mother and son. Nicholas II’s closeness 
to his mother and dependence upon her were a  striking and uncommon 
characteristic of an heir.
While we can only speculate about the eff ects of this relationship, the 
example of Nicholas II would appear to confi rm some of the old absolutist fears 
concerning close association of the heir with his mother. Maria Fedorovna’s (2) 
infl uence over Nicholas’s upbringing served to emphasize family ties at 
the expense of formal training and offi  cial obligations. Her protectiveness 
encouraged traits that contemporaries recognized as passive and infantile.36 
35 Alfred J. Rieber, "Commentary," Group for the Use of Psychology in History Newsletter 
(March 1976): 30-31.
36 “Dnevnik V. N. Lamzdorfa,” Krasnyi Arkhiv 46 (1931): 7-8; Elizabeth Narishkin-
Kurakin, Under Th ree Tsars (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1931), 161-162; Charles Lowe, 
Alexander III of Russia (New York: MacMillan, 1895), 369-370.
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Yielding to aff ectionate feelings, whether toward his mother or his wife, 
Nicholas would sometimes allow emotional indulgence to take precedence 
over offi  cial obligations. Personal whim increasingly dominated his public 
personality as he seemingly assigned more importance to family life than to 
public offi  ce. Th e result was to jeopardize the separation between the tsar’s 
public and private selves—a diff erentiation which had been intrinsic to the 
imagery of autocracy.37 It became diffi  cult for Nicholas to play the role of self-
abnegating tsar who, in his devotion to offi  ce and nation, stood above personal 
attachments and sensitivities.
#
37 On the role of private tastes and motivations and the predominance of his private 
self, see “Publicizing the Imperial Image in 1913,” in Self and Story in Russian 
History, ed. Laura Engelstein and Stephanie Sandler (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2000), 94-119; Scenarios of Power, 2: 409-11, 489-502.
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5. The Russian Imperial Family as Symbol
$
O n the occasion of his coronation, Easter Sunday, April 5, 1797, Emperor Paul I  issued two edicts that drew a  close connection between the fl ourishing 
of the imperial family and the well-being of the state. He decreed his Law of 
Succession, then had it placed “for preservation” in an ark in the Assumption 
Cathedral. Th e law supplanted the Petrine rule of designation with an order of 
heredity succession. Paul sought to ensure “the tranquility of the State,” to be 
“based on a fi rm law of inheritance upon which every right-thinking person 
is certain.”1 A  Statute of the Imperial Family, issued the same day, declared 
the “increase of the Sovereign family (Familiia)” one of the grounds for the 
“illustrious condition” of the state. Russia had experienced the principal 
blessing, “seeing the inheritance of the Th rone confi rmed in Our Family, which 
may the All-High perpetuate to eternity.” Th e statute specifi ed the estates and 
revenues to go to members of the family, the titles they held, and the rules of 
inheritance they would observe. It established an Appanage Department to 
manage the family’s estates and income.2
Th e need to restore a reliable order of succession was widely understood in 
Russia during the second half of the eighteenth century. Leaving the succession 
to each ruler’s discretion had put the throne at the disposition of the cliques 
in the court, particularly the guards’ regiments. Th e turmoil accompanying 
each succession, it was clear, endangered the security of the state. Catherine 
II, herself a benefi ciary of this situation, set about composing a new succession 
law, as early as 1766. She remarked, in a draft  of the statute that “the fi rst and 
1 PSZ, sobranie 1, no. 17910, April 5, 1797. 
2 PSZ, sobranie 1, no. 17906, April 5, 1797.
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fundamental law of this autocratic (samoderzhavnoe) rule issued and draft ed 
by our imperial hand, should, by its essence, be the steadfastness of the throne 
and fi rmness in its inheritance.” Th e project would have appointed Paul her 
successor and established an order of hereditary succession following the male 
line. Catherine returned to this question in 1785. A  project of this year also 
provided for hereditary succession in the male line. Both projects contended 
that such a  law was necessary to preserve the unity and indivisibility of the 
empire, the reason that Peter had cited in justifi cation of succession by 
designation.3 
However, Catherine did not issue a  succession law. Indeed, hereditary 
succession, though preferable in principle, hardly suited the interests or tastes of 
Russian monarchs of the late eighteenth century. Even aft er Paul promulgated 
his law, it proved hard to follow, and neither he nor his fi rstborn son, 
Alexander, acted in a way to implant a fi rm or certain system of inheritance. 
A dynastic tradition could not be established by an edict alone; it required the 
elevation of family values and patterns of public conduct and these took hold 
in Russia only in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. Th e law could 
only have the desired eff ect when it corresponded to the principal symbols that 
the monarch used to represent his power. Th is paper will discuss the emergence 
of the imperial family as principal symbol of Russian monarchy as it was 
presented to the elite in ceremonies, literature, and visual representation—what 
I call a dynastic scenario. 
Th e modes of behavior and representation that governed the imperial 
court until 1825 were consistent with the principles underlying Peter the 
Great’s succession law of 1722. Th e law stated the fundamental incompatibility 
between the principle of inheritance and Peter’s own conception and practice 
of monarchy. Petrine absolutism was grounded on a  principle of utility; the 
monarch’s dedication to the well-being of the state justifi ed his extensive 
authority. Peter’s statutes proclaimed the submergence of the past, and the 
principle of hereditary monarchy could hardly withstand this razor. An 
ineff ectual or destructive son was an obstruction to the goals of monarchy. 
Th e succession took on the features of an oedipal drama recounted in Alain 
Besançon’s account of the bitter struggle ending in the death of Alexei 
Petrovich. Peter’s second-born son, Peter Petrovich, had died in 1719, thereby 
depriving him of a  male heir. Th e succession law projected the father-son 
3 For a detailed discussion of the problem of succession, see article 2 in this volume.
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confl ict into the next century. Th e son, possessed by “the malice of Absalom,” 
was an ever-present threat to the throne, the greatest source of instability and 
a  peril to the general good. Th ese notions were formulated and elaborated 
in  the tract, Pravda voli monarshei, which has been generally attributed to 
Feofan Prokopovich.4 
Th e results of the law are well-known to us from the series of coups and 
the constant fears of plots and usurpers that menaced the throne during the 
eighteenth century. But a  law does not operate in a  vacuum, and in many 
respects it continued to refl ect the dominant values of the rulers and the 
court. Th e utilitarian legitimation continued to dominate in the manifestos, 
odes, coronation orations, and the symbolism of the court in the eighteenth 
century. As Cynthia Whittaker has shown, the conception of the “reformer-
tsar” defi ned the persona of each of the monarchs. In a  more practical sense, 
the absence of a husband for the reigning empress ensured that the well-being 
of the noble elite would be observed. In either case, a  heir was an incubus, 
menacing the claims based as much or more on achievements than hereditary 
rights. Th e heir represented a  potential challenge to the claims of having 
ushered in an “age of gold” or paradise; his existence, posing the suggestion of 
an alternative, impugned the panegyric mystique.5 
Th us, Elizabeth designated Peter of Holstein her successor, keeping him 
and his wife Catherine under close watch, but there was already an eff ort to 
remove him before she breathed her last. Peter III pointedly omitted mention 
of his son, Paul, in his decree of accession, which became one of the grounds 
cited by Catherine II when she deposed him seven months later. Catherine 
herself may have viewed hereditary monarchy as a  necessity to maintain the 
stability of empire, and she called Paul “heir” in her accession manifesto, but 
4 Alain Besançon, Le tsarévitch immolé; la symbolique de la loi dans la culture 
russe (Paris: Plon, 1967), 109-22; G. Gurvich, “Pravda voli monarshei” Feofana 
Prokopovicha i eia zapadnoevropeiskie istochniki (Iur'ev: K. Mattisen, 1915); Mikhail 
Zyzykin, Tsarskaia vlast' i  zakon o  prestolonasledii v  Rossii (Sofi a: A. A. Liven, 
1924), 72-82.
5 On the age of gold in Russia, see Stephen J. Baehr, Th e Paradise Myth in Eighteenth 
Century Russia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), 38-40, 44-49; and 
“Fortuna Redux: Th e Iconography of Happiness in Eighteenth Century Courtly 
Spectacles,” in Great Britain and Russia in the Eighteenth Century: Contacts and 
Comparisons, ed. A. G. Cross (Newtonville, MA: Oriental Research Partners, 
1979), 110.
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confi rming her son’s rights was something that she never ventured to do, and 
rumors, probably without substance, suggested that she wished to replace him 
with her grandson, Alexander, in the last years of her reign.6 
Th e utilitarian premise was not an abstract idea but a behavioral principle 
affi  rmed in the statements and ceremonies of the imperial court. Th e metaphor 
of a  god, the performance of classical allegories in the court, were meant to 
set the ruler apart, to show him or her as the exemplifi cation of eternal 
values of reason, beauty, and justice, achieved by the reign of a  sovereign qua 
deity. Th e standard of conduct set by the courts of France and the German 
principalities hardly emulated the biblical example of the righteous and 
humble nuclear family. Th e word “virtue” was used to designate the type of 
civic behavior consonant with the conduct of the genteel servant of the state 
and not Christian probity. Th e escapades of the empresses were hardly matters 
for discreet silence. Indeed, for those following the example of Louis XIV, 
the display of lovers was a  display of power, Eros and wisdom representing 
modalities of a classical symbol of transcendence. 
Th e members of the ruler’s family were included in the realm of 
monarchical representation during the eighteenth century. Peter the Great 
designated the birthdays and name days of members of the imperial family 
tabel'nye or vysokotorzhestvennye dni, in the manner of German princes. 
Family members, particularly the heir, were kept safely distant from center 
stage. Catherine II, who had no claim to the throne except her relationship 
to her son, included him in major ceremonies, but, especially as he grew older 
and more threatening, tried to keep him away from the life of the court. Th e 
popularity he attracted when he visited Moscow in 1775 with his fi rst wife, 
the Grand Duchess Natalie Alekseevna, so troubled Catherine that she forbade 
Paul and his second wife, Grand Duchess Maria Fedorovna, from visiting 
Moscow aft er their wedding in 1781.7 
It was Paul’s intention to end this distrust and to introduce a  feeling of 
reverence for the imperial family as dynasty. In the initial days of his reign, he 
6 PSZ, Sobranie 1, no.  11390, December 25, 1761; Petr Bartenev, Osmnadtsatyi vek; 
istoricheskii sbornik (Moscow: T. Ris, 1869), 4: 217; the story of Catherine’s reputed 
intention to remove Paul from the succession is discussed in Oleg Omel’chenko, 
“Stanovlenie zakonodatel’nogo regulirovaniia prestolonaslediia, 36-46.
7 E. S. Shumigorskii, Imperatritsa Mariia Fedorovna (1759-1828) (St. Petersburg: 
I. N. Skorokhodov, 1892), 1: 174.
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set about restoring his father, Peter III, to the imperial genealogy, emphasizing 
his own descent from Peter the Great. Paul staged a  macabre ceremony of 
disinterring Peter III and then crowning his coffi  n, staging the coronation 
that his unfortunate father had not hastened to plan. To establish the spousal 
character of the monarchy, the corpse of Catherine was lift ed from her coffi  n 
and crowned at the side of her dead husband’s coffi  n. Paul thus made an initial 
gesture to establish the symbolic role of the imperial family.8
Th is was refl ected in the unprecedented form of the new succession law, 
a  covenant between him and the empress Maria Fedorovna, which they had 
composed in 1788. Th e decree carried both signatures. Th e families of the 
German states oft en made such family agreements, but they did not issue 
them from the throne with only two signatures. It thus represented an element 
of private law given public force by the sovereign will. On the basis of their 
agreement, the emperor and empress designated their son Alexander heir, “by 
natural law.” Th e statute introduced what was called the “Austrian system” 
of succession: male primogeniture of succession, with women following 
in line only in the absence of a  male heir. It required the permission of the 
ruler for marriages of all those in line for the throne. It also spelled out the 
organization and conditions of regencies in case the heir had not reached 
maturity, to prevent a recurrence of the events that had kept Paul himself from 
the throne in 1762.9 
Just as Peter’s succession law sought to deal with the peril of an 
incompetent successor, Paul’s sought to ensure “the tranquility of the State,” 
which was “based on a fi rm law of inheritance upon which every right-thinking 
person is certain.” If Peter’s Succession Law was directed at the scheming and 
perfi dious son, Paul’s took care to support the claims of the son and to leave no 
room for the pretensions of an ambitious consort. Love now was to be defi ned 
in terms of the dedication and constancy to be exemplifi ed by the members of 
the imperial family, who identifi ed their destinies with those of the fatherland. 
Th e conclusion of the law declared that it provided “proof before the whole 
World, of Our love for the Fatherland, the love and harmony of our marriage, 
and love for Our Children and Descendants.”
8 Kamerfur’erskii tseremonial’nyi zhurnal, 1796g (St Petersburg: Ministerstvo 
Imperatorskogo Dvora, 185?), 788-91, 821-24, 861-68.
9 PSZ, Sobranie 1, no. 17910, April 5, 1797; B. Nol'de, “Zakony osnovnye v russkom 
prave,” Pravo, No. 9 (1913): 524-26.
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Paul I introduced the legal and symbolic basis for the dynastic monarchy. 
He also fathered the children who represented and established the dynasty in 
the fi rst half of the nineteenth century. However, he had been raised in the 
ways of the eighteenth century, and governed in the circumstances of a court in 
which such values held little respect. While he sought to restore the respect due 
to the father of the family, his behavior in this regard followed the pattern of 
absolute monarchs of the last century. Even before his accession, he had openly 
taken Catherine Nelidova as mistress, and during his reign he continued to 
exhibit his infi delities, particularly with Anna Lopukhina, the daughter of his 
procurator-general, to whom his court had to show the proper signs of respect. 
Paul’s relationship with his son, Alexander, also followed the eighteenth-
century pattern. Th e distrust between father and son, fed by Catherine’s 
infatuation with her grandson, only grew aft er her death. Paul suspected, 
possibly with some grounds, that Alexander was involved in conspiracies to 
oust him from the throne. In the last two years of his reign, he began to hint of 
plans to name a new heir.10 
Neither Alexander nor his younger brother Constantine Pavlovich evinced 
a  predilection for the family or married life. Both were married young, at 
Catherine's instance, to princesses who quickly wearied them. Constantine's 
spouse, the Grand Duchess Anna Fedorovna, left  Russia in 1801, only fi ve years 
aft er their marriage, and his liaisons were numerous and well-known in the 
court. Alexander, aft er the fi rst few years, paid little attention to the Empress 
Elizabeth Alekseevna, who spent most of his reign living a  lonely isolated 
life. His numerous dalliances became the subject of the talk of the European 
elite, for whose eyes, indeed, many of them were presented. Th e two daughters 
Elizabeth bore him died in infancy, and he left  no heir. 
Th e Imperial Family at the close of Alexander’s reign provided no basis 
for the sure and reliable political continuity that Paul had envisioned in his 
law of succession. Constantine had shown reluctance to rule, and in 1820, 
aft er divorcing the Grand Duchess Anna, contracted a  morganatic marriage 
with a  Polish aristocrat. While not a  legal bar to the throne, the marriage 
10 N. Ia. Eidel'man, Gran' vekov, 240-41; Shil'der, Imperator Pavel Pervyi, 287-94; 
E. P. Karnovich, Tsesarevich Konstantin Pavlovich, 74. Th e title ostensibly was given 
as a reward for Constantine’s exploits with Suvorov in Italy and Switzerland, but was 
motivated, in part, by Paul’s suspicions of Alexander. I thank Mikhail Safonov for his 
observations on this matter. 
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made him an unlikely candidate to represent the future of the dynasty. Yet 
Constantine made no open statement of abdication. Alexander, in eff ect, 
was forced to act according to the Petrine law and choose his successor. 
He apparently informed his younger brother, Nicholas, of his decision to 
designate him heir. But he did so in so secretive and fumbling in a  manner 
that virtually ensured a succession crisis at his death. Th e manifesto Alexander 
signed in 1823 was placed, with two letters from Constantine indicating his 
intention to abdicate, in the State Council, the Senate, the Holy Synod, and 
the Assumption Cathedral in Moscow. But it had not been promulgated, 
for reasons that remain inscrutable, and therefore had no legal force. At the 
moment of Alexander’s death, it was known only to Alexei Arakcheev and 
A. N. Golitsyn, the Metropolitan Filaret, Maria Fedorovna, and possibly to 
Nicholas himself.11 Th e succession crisis that ensued created the setting for 
the uprising of December 14, 1825. 
Maria Fedorovna, Nicholas Pavlovich, 
and the Creation of a Dynastic Scenario
Th e verbal, visual, and ceremonial presentations of the reign of Nicholas 
I  elaborated the themes of family and dynasty. As in the eighteenth century, 
Europe provided the model of these values, and Russian monarchs adopted 
and displayed them in their most consistent and uncompromising forms. Th e 
Russian court not only upheld family values but glorifi ed them as attributes of 
Russian autocracy. Just as Catherine the Great sought to display the Russian 
empire as the most enlightened and progressive of states, Nicholas I  would 
present it as the exemplar of the familial values of the west. In so doing, he 
created the dynastic ceremonies and symbolic forms that would rule Russia 
until the fall of the monarchy. 
Clearly, the principal factor promoting an ethic of family solidarity was the 
specter of revolution: the threat of violent overthrow united father with son 
and brother, and encouraged shows of aff ection rather than caution. However, 
as the examples of Paul and Alexander suggest, the threat was insuffi  cient 
in itself to instill the norms and patterns of conduct necessary to make the 
imperial family a  central symbol of monarchy. Th is awaited the reception of 
11 S. V. Mironenko, Stranitsy tainoi istorii samoderzhaviia (Moscow: Mysl’, 1990), 74-
85; W. Bruce Lincoln, Nicholas I: Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, 22-26.
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the sentimental or early romantic family ethos that arose aft er the French 
revolution. 
Th e monarchies that reemerged on the ashes of Napoleonic Europe 
diff ered fundamentally from those of the previous century. Once restored to 
their dominant position in domestic and international aff airs, monarchs had 
to adapt to take into account the new social and political forces awakened 
during the revolutionary period. Th e principle of popular sovereignty may have 
been defeated, but only by calling upon the principle of popular sovereignty 
itself in rallying national feeling against Napoleon’s forces. Nineteenth-century 
monarchs began to develop ways to represent themselves as the embodiments 
of national feeling rather than as distant fi gures whose title to rule stemmed 
from otherworldly origins.12 
In certain respects, this change was the next step in the ongoing 
“desacralization” of European monarchy during the eighteenth century. 
But the new imagery could be no less elaborate or fanciful than the old. Th e 
spinning of personal and historical mythology around the monarchs would 
continue over the next half-century, elevating them as fi gures revered or 
worshiped by the elite and uniting conservative elements of the nation during 
periods of rapid change. If the monarch could no longer be presented as a god, 
he or she could be idealized as a better kind of mortal, embodying the features 
that people admired. Francis II of Austria and especially Frederick-William 
III of Prussia exemplifi ed what Heinz Dollinger described as the “leading-
image of bourgeois monarchy.” Self-eff acing, modest, averse to elaborate public 
presentations, they preferred the comfort of their homes. An aff ectation of 
simplicity and equality replaced resplendent majesty as a royal ideal.13
While this image may have appealed to “bourgeois” values, European 
monarchs succeeded in divesting it of egalitarian connotations. Th ey 
displayed a style of life that may have been bourgeois in its origins, but by the 
early nineteenth century took on the attributes of a  cultural ideal that was 
portrayed in the literature and art of the period. Th e new monarchs appeared 
as immanent rather than transcendent ideals: no longer gift s from the heavens, 
shedding benefactions on the land, they became exemplars of human conduct, 
12 See Heinz Dollinger, “Das Leitbild des Burgerkönigtums in der europäischen 
Monarchie des 19.Jahrhunderts,” in Hof, Kultur, und Politik im 19. Jahrhundert, ed. 
Karl Ferdinand Werner (Bonn: L. Röhrscheid, 1985), 325-62.
13 Ibid., 345-52.
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of modest virtue, to be admired by their subjects. Th is virtue was demonstrated 
in the monarch’s private life, particularly in the realm of the family. European 
rulers of the eighteenth century had hardly been encumbered by biblical 
strictures; their nineteenth-century successors were expected to provide models 
of probity for their subjects. 
Th e increasing autonomy of European bureaucracies encouraged this 
change. Administrative reforms of the early nineteenth century in Prussia 
and Austria created a  separation between court and bureaucracy, limiting 
the monarch’s powers over administrative institutions and making his 
symbolic role all the more signifi cant. Th e Prussian king and the Hapsburg 
emperor, as centers of aristocratic society and the emerging middle-class elite, 
epitomized common values of family and religion that appealed to both. 
Th e idealization of the monarch’s family elevated the ruling dynasty as the 
historical embodiment of the nation. Th e sentimental family idyll, thus, was 
united with the national past to create a myth of the ruler as national ideal. 
King Frederick-William III was the model of the eff acing king, who 
exemplifi ed probity, constancy, and piety. In the austere tradition of Prussian 
royalty, he constructed no immense palaces. Th e single “palace” he built, at 
Paretz, hardly suited a  court; he told the architect David Gilly, “Everything 
should be made very simple, just think that you are building not for a prince 
but an ordinary landlord.” He hated public appearances and preferred to 
walk alone in the woods. He disliked the etiquette of the court and would, 
unpredictably, ignore it. Only on the parade ground did Frederick-William 
show a  taste for show, but the symbolic value of his military leadership was 
destroyed by the debacle at Jena in 1806.14 
Frederick-William also diff ered from his predecessors in his preference 
for a virtuous and ideal family life. From the outset of his reign, he presented 
himself as a model of familial rectitude. At his accession in 1797, he banned 
his predecessor’s mistresses and introduced “almost the style of a  German 
burgher home” to his court.15 In addition to this strict morality, his family 
14 Th omas Stamm-Kuhlmann, “Der Hof Friedrich-Wilhelms III. von Preussen 1797 bis 
1840,” in Hof und Hofgesellschaft  in den deutschen Staaten im 19. und beginnenden 
20. Jahrhundert, ed. Karl Möckl (Boppard am Rhein: H. Boldt, 1990), passim; Hajo 
Holborn, A History of Modern Germany, 1648-1840 (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1964), 
2: 375-76.
15 Ibid., 375.
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represented an ideal of romantic love to unite the nation. In the aft ermath 
of the French Revolution, he sought to emphasize not the distance between 
king and nations but their common values. Th e fi rst issue of the new journal, 
Jahrbücher der Preussischen Monarchie unter den Regierung von Friedrich 
Wilhelm III, published in 1798, identifi ed the household of the king, which 
was “pervaded with the values of true domesticity,” with the greater family of 
the people.16 
Th e image of the family united the monarchs and subjects who “entered 
into this beautiful sphere.” Th e royal family now began to put on display the 
ideal of love in marriage. An essay in the June 1798 issue of Jahrbücher der 
Preussischen Monarchie, entitled “Belief and Love,” averred, “We have seen in 
our time that a  marvel of transubstantiation has come to pass. Has not the 
court turned into a  family, the throne into heaven, a  royal marriage into an 
eternal union of the heart?”17 Dispossessed of his kingdom aft er the battle 
of Jena, forced to accept the reforms instituted by Baron Heinrich Stein, 
Frederick-William indeed was left  with private realm as his only domain. He 
claimed no designation from above and even removed the words “from the 
grace of God” from his title. A  painting of “Frederick-William and Queen 
Louise with their Children” typifi ed the Biedermeier style and became a model 
for subsequent royal family pictures.18 
If Frederick-William exemplifi ed paternal feeling and morality, Queen 
Louise became the model of cultivated, selfl ess mother and spouse. She 
combined the elements of “true religiosity” and “true patriotism,” epitomizing 
“the new Prussian wife.” She participated in the German literary awakening 
of her day, though her fi rst language remained French. From the pietism 
of Gerhardt, she acquired a  faith in the spiritual perfectibility of mankind, 
and, infl uenced by the theories of Rousseau and Pestalozzi, she tried new 
approaches to the upbringing of her children. Aft er her death in 1810, shortly 
aft er returning from exile to Berlin, she became the subject of a cult of the pure 
and holy woman. Poets sung her virtues; artists depicted her in terms of the 
transfi guration and with the features of the Virgin Mary. One adept of this 
16 Wulf Wülfi ng, Karin Bruns, and Rolf Parr, Historische Mythologie der Deutschen 
(Munich: W. Fink, 1991), 59.
17 Ibid., 60.
18 Holborn, A  History of Modern Germany, 2: 396; Dollinger, “Das Leitbild des 
Burgerkönigtums,” 347. 
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cult was the queen’s oldest daughter, Princess Charlotte, the future Empress 
Alexandra Fedorovna of Russia.19 
Following the example of his father-in-law, Frederick-William III, Nicholas 
I presented himself as a model of constancy, family values, and simple religious 
faith. Th e ruler’s superordinate character now derived not from his Olympian 
achievements, but from the immortality of a dynasty consecrated by God and 
history. Nicholas created the illusion that the hereditary rights of the dynasty 
were identical to the historical destinies of the Russian state. Russian imperial 
presentation, however, did not permit the retiring, private lifestyle of the 
Prussian king. Th e monarch as exemplar of private virtue had to be presented 
in a scenario, an elaborate dramatic performance of domestic dedication, to be 
admired and imitated by his servitors. Th e Prussian manner of reserve had to 
be combined with the French model of constant representation of the monarch 
as supreme being. Nicholas as stern and righteous paterfamilias became the 
living manifestation of the moral preeminence of the dynasty. 
It was the dowager empress, Maria Fedorovna, who shaped the new 
scenario and instilled familial values in Nicholas during the last decade of 
Alexander’s reign. Only forty-two years old at Paul’s death, Maria Fedorovna 
retained precedence as the principal fi gure at the imperial court. While 
Alexander shunned public appearances, she presided over social functions, 
family dinners and outings, enforcing the strict etiquette she had observed in 
Paul’s reign. Her palace at Pavlovsk became the social and cultural center of the 
monarchy. She brought to Russia Protestant notions of the altruistic mission 
of women and the image of empress as protector of the poor and bereft . She 
developed the network of foster homes and women’s training institutes that 
she had founded under Paul and encouraged other charitable activities. 
Maria  Fedorovna initiated the tradition of secular charity as a  women’s 
concern in Russia.20
19 Wülfi ng et al., Historische Mythologie, 61-78; Stamm-Kuhlmann, “Der Hof Friedrich-
Wilhelms III,” 318; Bogdan Krieger, “Erziehung und Unterricht der Konigen Luise,” 
Hohenzollern Jahrbuch (1910): 117-73; A. Th . Von Grimm, Alexandra Fedorovna, 
Empress of Russia (Edinburg: Edmonston and Douglas, 1870), 1: 51-54.
20 On Maria Fedorovna’s creation of a  conservative core and promoting conservative 
national values in her court, see N. N. Mazur, “Iz istorii formirovaniia russkoi 
natsional’noi ideologii (pervaia tret’ XIX v.)” in “Tsep’ nepreryvnogo predaniia . . . ”: 
Sbornik pamiati A. G. Tartakovskogo, ed. V. A. Mil’china, A. L. Iurganov (Moscow: 
Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Gumanitarnyi Universitet, 2004), 196-250. 
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Maria Fedorovna shared the religious and ethical values of the Prussian 
royal house. Her father, a Duke of Württemberg, had been in Prussian service, 
and she had been educated both in stern patriarchal Protestant values and the 
French manners and tastes of the German courts of the eighteenth century. 
As Grand Duchess and Empress, she maintained close family ties, intervening 
to ensure her parents and siblings’ marriage alliances, positions in Prussian 
and Russian service, and, when necessary, subsidies to avert fi nancial disaster. 
Her attachment to her parents was encouraged by the sentimental literature 
of the late eighteenth century. She wrote to them in 1780 that she admired 
the stoics’ ability to remain indiff erent to everything, but had no desire to 
emulate them. “Th e closer I come to maturity the more I become convinced 
that the ability to feel nurtures our soul: without it people become savage and 
cease being people.”21 
Th ese sentiments remained with Maria Fedorovna, and she strove to 
instill them in the members of the Russian imperial family. She introduced 
the practice of demonstrative mourning for the deceased members of the house 
and the sense that family bonds only grew stronger aft er death, aspects of “cult 
of memory” ascendant in the west. She hallowed the memory of her parents 
and her husband with two memorials built in the park at Pavlovsk, “To My 
Parents,” and “To My Husband-Benefactor.” Th omon’s “To My Husband-
Benefactor,” completed in 1810, is a monument in the form of a Greek temple 
to her grief for Paul, for whom her feelings had been less than tender. Th e 
interior is occupied by Ivan Martos’s statue of a  mourning wife, her head 
resting at the side of an urn. Th e motif of twenty-four weeping faces on the 
metopes expresses the feeling of sorrow due the father of the dynasty.22
Maria Fedorovna tried to show her children the importance of marriage 
and marital love, but her oldest sons remained deaf to her pleas. She  became 
the family conscience, warning her children that they served as personal 
models for their subjects. When, in 1803, the Grand Duke Constantine 
informed her that he wished to terminate his marriage to the Grand Duchess 
Anna Fedorovna with a divorce, the empress replied with an angry letter. Aft er 
describing “wounds of the heart” he had infl icted on her, she pointed out the 
symbolic implications of such a step. It would bring “ruinous consequences for 
21 Shumigorskii, Imperatritsa Mariia Fedorovna, 1: 149.
22 Pamiatniki arkhitektury prigorodov Leningrada (Leningrad: Stroiizdat. Lenin-
gradskoe otdelenie, 1983), 248-49.
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public morals as well as the lamentable and dangerous temptation for the entire 
nation.” Th e humblest peasant far from the capital, noting the absence of the 
Grand Duchess’s name next to his in church prayers, would lose respect for the 
sacrament of marriage and for religious faith itself.23 
Maria Fedorovna’s romantic vision of family relations and connubial love 
was extolled by her protégé‚ the poet Vasilii Zhukovksii. Zhukovskii's verse 
shift ed the referent of imperial virtue from a civic ideal, personifi ed in fi gures 
of the gods, heroes, or Roman emperors, to the private ideals of the nursery 
and the hearth. He announced the new motif in an ode to Maria Fedorovna 
of 1813. 
And where is a more glorious subject for the poet?
Tsaritsa, mother, spouse, daughter of tsars,
Th e beauty of tsaritsas, the joy of the hemisphere,
Who can fi nd the language proper for it?
Zhukovskii concluded the ode with an evocation of Alexander’s imminent 
return to Russia. He presented the moment as a family, not a mythical event, 
personal aff ection expressing imperial glory. 
Blessed hour! In the form of martial heroes,
He bends his illustrious head,
Th e Lord-son before the mother-tsaritsa,
May their love bless this glory—
And withal the saved world lies,
Before your sacred hand!24
Maria Fedorovna’s three youngest children, Nicholas, Michael, and Anna, 
grew up sharing strong feelings of family solidarity. Ignored by the court, they 
drew close to each other. Th ey formed their own club, “triopathy,” and wore 
special rings, one of which they gave to their mother as an honorary member. 
Th ey maintained close ties throughout their lives, what Anna Pavlovna 
23 E. P. Karnovich, Tsesarevich Konstantin Pavlovich, 141-48; Shil'der, Imperator 
Nikolai Pervyi, 1: 128. 
24 V. A. Zhukovskii, “Gosudaryne Imperatritse Marii Fedorovne,” Polnoe sobranie 
sochinenii (St. Petersburg: A. F. Marks, 1902), 2:24-25
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described as their “family union.” Th eir later correspondence continued to 
express an intimacy of feeling and a common purpose that united the members 
of the house.25 
Grand Duke Nicholas Pavlovich shared his mother’s reverence for the 
institution of marriage and inclination to regard marital vows as loft y and 
sacred. When Nicholas showed an interest in Princess Charlotte of Prussia on 
his return from France in 1814, Maria Fedorovna’s esteem for him, previously 
none too high, rose appreciably. She herself had dreamt of such a match, and 
in 1809 had discussed the possibility with Queen Louise herself. Princess 
Charlotte worshipped the memory of the queen, whose bust she later kept in 
her boudoir. She made herself in her mother’s image, adopting her romantic 
literary tastes and showing the same devotion to family and children. Aft er 
Louise’s death, which had occurred in Charlotte’s thirteenth year, she took 
her mother’s place at her father’s side and learned at an early age the poise and 
confi dence of royalty.26 
* * *
Th e writers and artists serving eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Russian monarchs employed the devices of their craft s to present the acts and 
ceremonies of their sovereign in terms of the monarchical ideals of their age. 
Th ese devices transformed the transitory appearances of the monarch and the 
presentations of the court into charismatic moments, expressing the sacred 
character of imperial rule. Th e metaphorical mode predominated in eighteenth 
century texts and illustrations; metaphor transformed the rulers into heroes 
and heroines, gods and goddesses, establishing a distance between the monarch 
and his elite, and between the elite and the ruled. Th e nineteenth-century 
mode sought to create the illusion of immanence rather than transcendence. 
Nicholas’s person expressed qualities and values integral to this world, or as 
was claimed, particular to Russia. In this respect, he adopted the manner of 
Frederick-William III and other western monarchs who appeared as exemplars 
of virtue and the private life for their subjects. Th e principal device that 
produced the illusion of immanence was the metonym, or, more specifi cally, 
the synecdoche, which presented the emperor with his family as a  concrete 
expression of the nation. 
25 S. W. Jackman, Romanov Relations (London: Macmillan, 1969), 4, 107, and passim.
26 A. Th . Von Grimm, Alexandra Feodorowna, 1: 52-55.
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Th e texts of Nicholas’s reign presented imperial display with new 
meanings. Rather than expressions of otherworldly spheres where godlike 
fi gures cavort and rejoice, ceremonies of the monarch served as microcosms 
of Russia, representing the attitudes towards authority and modalities of 
conduct, both offi  cial and private, that should prevail in the macrocosm of 
the empire.27 In this equivalence, the macrocosm was defi ned in terms of 
the microcosm. Th e emperor, his family, the dynasty, the army and state 
epitomized the principal qualities of Russia and represented the whole. 
Here we see a  kinship between political and symbolic representation. Both, 
Kenneth Burke observed, invoke synecdoche to describe the connection 
between microcosm and macrocosm. All attempts to “represent” the general 
will of the people in parliamentary institutions involve a transfer of qualities 
to the representative body that stands for the people as a whole.28 Likewise, 
the imagery of offi  cial nationality claims to refl ect the will of the people 
by making the tsar in his ceremonial appearances the representation of the 
whole. Nicholas was frequently described as “the embodiment of Russia.” Th e 
ceremonies of the monarchy embodying Russia were presented to a broadened 
elite of offi  cials through the offi  cial and semi-offi  cial press, which became an 
important medium during the Napoleonic Wars and expanded greatly during 
Nicholas’s reign.29
Th e elevation of the family became apparent from the moment of 
Nicholas’s victory over the Decembrist revolution. On the aft ernoon of 
December 14, Nicholas brought his eight-year-old son Alexander before the 
Sapper battalion, which had saved the imperial family from a  threat from 
the Grenadiers’ Regiment. Nicholas made clear that he and the heir were 
one. He  asked the troops to love his son as they loved him. Th en he placed 
27 On the synecdoche as the expression of the identity of microcosm and macrocosm, 
see Kenneth Burke, “Four Master Tropes,” in his A  Grammar of Motives and 
A Rhetoric of Motives (Cleveland: World, 1962), 508.
28 Ibid. 
29 On the semi-offi  cial press, see Nurit Schleifman, “A Russian Daily Newspaper 
and its New Readership: Severnaia Pchela, 1825-1840,” Cahiers du monde russe 
et soviétique, volume 29, No 2 (April-June 1987): 127-44; Charles A. Ruud, 
Fighting Words: Imperial Censorship and the Russian Press, 1804-1906 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1982), 58-59, 64-65; N. L. Stepanov, “‘Severnaia Pchela’ 
F.  V. Bulgarina,” in Ocherki po istorii russkoi zhurnalistiki i  kritiki (Leningrad: 
Leningradskii gos. Universitet, 1950), 1: 310-11.
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Alexander in the arms of several Cavaliers of the Order of St. George and, at 
his command, the fi rst offi  cers in each line rushed to the boy and kissed his 
hands and his feet.30
Th is was the initial demonstration of the new importance of the 
principle of primogeniture in the life of the imperial house. Nicholas 
showed that the imperial family rather than the emperor alone represented 
the spirit and values of autocracy. Th e scene became emblematic of his 
reign. It was commemorated in popular pictures and on the bas-relief of 
the statue Alexander erected to his father in 1858. (Figure 1) Th e fact that 
Alexander had stood at his father’s side on the day of the rebellion was 
inscribed in his service list along with the military honors he received on 
that day.
Th e family as exemplar of autocracy was a  central theme of the visual 
imagery of Nicholas’s reign. An engraving by Th omas Wright, aft er a painting 
by George Dawe completed not long aft er Nicholas’s accession, indicates the 
new importance of the emperor's family for the future of Russian monarchy. 
A  portrait of the Grand Duke Alexander Nikolaevich is set in a  large 
medallion surrounded by fl owers, between medallions with portraits of 
the emperor in uniform and the empress in a  décolleté gown (see Article  4, 
Figure  1). Th e medallions are placed above and dominate a  small sketch of 
the winter palace.31 It was the family of Nicholas that now represented 
the benefactions of monarchy, symbolized by the sun emanating from the 
imperial residence. 
Th e domestic happiness of the imperial family was depicted in the 
mannered poses of English sentimental art by English artists at the Russian 
court. Th e paintings of George Dawe, rendered into engravings by his 
compatriot, Th omas Wright, presented royal personages for the fi rst time 
in intimate family groups. One of these shows the empress sitting with the 
infant Olga Nikolaevna in her right arm, and the seven-year-old Alexander 
Nikolaevich grasping her gown on the left 32 (see Article 4, Figure 2). Another 
is a  garden scene: Alexander Nikolaevich in sailor suit pushes his little sister 
Maria, wearing a fl owered bonnet, on a swing. Both have the innocent cherubic 
30 M. Korf, Vosshestvie na prestol Imperatora Nikolaia Iogo (St. Peterburg: II-oe otdelenie 
sobstvennoi ego Imp. Vel. Kantseliarii, 1857), 220. 
31 Shil' der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi, 1: 297
32 Ibid., 1: 385.
Figure 1.
Bas Relief on Nicholas I Statue. Nicholas I presents his son, Alexander, 
to the Sapper Battalion, December 14, 1825. 
By N. Ramazanov. 
Lithograph from Russkii Khudozhestvennyi Listok (1859)
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expressions of nineteenth-century beautiful children. Popular prints took up 
this theme and showed the emperor adjusting his son’s pillow and a  family 
scene at Ekateringof.33 
Upon the death of the Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich in June 
1831, Nicholas issued a  decree declaring, that “Our most beloved son” 
should henceforth be called “Sovereign Heir, Tsesarevich and Grand Duke.” 
(Gosudar' Naslednik, Tsesarevich i Velikii Kniaz') Th e decree was printed in 
the press and a  series of pictures executed that made Alexander’s new title 
known.34 Many lithographs and paintings presented the heir at various stages 
of his education. A lubok of 1831 shows him in stylized equestrian pose; he 
wears a  cuirassier’s uniform, and looks dashing and heroic. At the bottom 
among his various titles the word tsesarevich is inscribed in bold capitals. In 
a watercolor by Alexander Briullov, the heir stands at the center of a group of 
cadets in dress uniform at Peterhof in 1831. He is the tallest and most poised 
of the boys. His arm is on a  staff ; beside him is a  waving standard. At his 
foot, sitting under the barrel of a cannon, is his younger brother Constantine 
Nikolaevich, not yet four years old. Behind, Merder looks on, and an offi  cer 
in a plumed hat sits on a horse. Lithographed copies of the painting were sent 
to all military schools.35
Most important, Nicholas made his family the principal subject of 
imperial ceremonies. Here I will focus on three: the coronation, the ceremony 
of the majority of the heir, and Alexander’s initiation as the hereditary ataman 
of the Cossacks of the Don. Th ese ceremonies presented the imperial family as 
the symbol of the monarchy and likened the types of political subordination 
to the bonds of dear kin. Th e paternalistic theme of the tsar as father, 
protecting his children, now took on a  higher moral and literary meaning 
of sentimental love. Th e various estates of the realm were gathered to show 
loyalty as familial act. Th e “love” of the people became a way to absorb them 
into a greater family embracing all of Russia. 
33 D. A. Rovinskii, Podrobnyi slovar' russkikh gravirovannykh portretov (St. Petersburg: 
Akademiia Nauk, 1886), 1: 19-20; Imperatorskaia glavnaia kvartira; istoriia 
gosudarevoi svity; tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaia I  (St. Petersburg: M. O. Volf, 
1908), 6.
34 Severnaia Pchela, September 7, 1831.
35 Imperatorskaia glavnaia kvartira; istoriia gosudarevoi svity; tsarstvovanie Imperatora 
Alexandra II (St. Petersburg: R. Golike and A. Vil’borg, 1914), 43.
PA RT II . SCENA R IOS OF FA MILY A ND NAT ION
 124 
* * *
Th e coronation remained the central declaratory ceremony of Russian 
monarchy through the nineteenth century, consecrating the showing of the 
character and goals of the monarchy as well as the character of each new 
reign. But the central theme of the ceremony had shift ed markedly during 
the nineteenth century. Eighteenth-century coronations had celebrated 
the successful aspirant to the throne as the champion of the general good, 
legitimizing dubious claims to succession. Nineteenth-century coronations, 
beginning with Nicholas’s, consecrated the monarchy itself, as it was incarnated 
in the ruling dynasty of which the enthroned emperor was god-chosen 
representative. Nicholas’s immediate family became embodiment of a dynastic 
tradition that in fact had begun in practice only with Nicholas’s reign. 
Th e principal account of Nicholas I’s coronation, written by Pavel Svin'in 
in his journal Otechestvennye Zapiski, presented the entire imperial family as 
the object of popular aff ection. In the entry procession to Moscow, Nicholas 
rode down the avenue fl anked by his brother Michael, his brother-in-law, 
Prince Karl of Prussia, the Duke of Württemberg, and his son, Alexander.36 
It was Alexander, not the emperor, who was endearing. “Th e kind Russian 
people admired the angelic charm of the Heir to the Th rone with indescribable 
rapture.” Th e author went on to point out that this “Royal Child” (Derzhavnyi 
Mladenets) was particularly dear to Muscovites because he had been born in 
the Kremlin. A lithograph issued at the time shows the entry into Moscow at 
the Tver gate. Nicholas is looking smart on a prancing horse next to his brother 
and the suite; the empress sits in an open carriage, under a  parasol. Peasants 
stand on the buildings waving their caps; joyous people crowd the windows 
and the balconies.37 
With Nicholas’s coronation, great reviews and maneuvers became an 
integral part of the coronation celebrations. Th ey assumed the character of 
ceremonial expressions of the devotion of the military to the imperial family. 
Military reviews took place frequently during the month between the entry 
procession and the coronation ceremonies. On July 30, a  parade of over fi ft y 
thousand troops paid homage to the dowager empress. Grand Duke Alexander 
rode in his father’s suite, on a  magnifi cent steed. Th e eight-year old galloped 
past the emperor, charged up and stopped before him to the delight of the 
36 Ibid., 284.
37 Shil'der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi, 2: 13.
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spectators. Th e son had paid deference to the father. Th en, Nicholas led 
a  detachment before his mother and saluted her, giving recognition to her 
personal and ceremonial preeminence in the house.38 Nicholas took part in 
large scale maneuvers of the Moscow regiments on August 15 and 16, which 
were summarized in Svin'in’s articles. Th e maneuvers not only served as 
a  useful exercise for the troops, but provided the large numbers of foreigners 
and other spectators “a splendid spectacle rare for the residents of Moscow.”39 
Th e feeling of the unity of the dynasty was enhanced by the surprise 
arrival of the Grand Duke Constantine in Moscow. Constantine was peevish 
as usual, but Nicholas’s deferential attention succeeded in calming him by 
the day of the ceremony. A  broadsheet printed at this time shows the three 
brothers, Nicholas, Constantine, and Michael, riding side by side, with the heir 
on horseback at Michael’s side. On the day of the coronation, a manifesto was 
issued establishing the rules for a  regency and designating Nicholas’s “most 
kind” brother, Michael, regent lest Nicholas die before the heir’s majority.40
Svin'in’s account of the ceremonies in the Assumption Cathedral focused 
on the members of the family; they and their German relatives are the only 
participants whom he identifi es by name. Svin'in evoked the emotional 
response of the moment aft er the investiture of the Emperor and Empress with 
the regalia: “What rapture (vostorg) seized the hearts of those standing by and 
of all the inhabitants of Moscow learning by the resounding of the bells and 
the salvos from the cannons that the Imperial Couple were invested with the 
purple and crowned!” He remarked how Maria Fedorovna overfl owed with 
rapture, vostorg. “All of Her [Maria Fedorovna’s] thoughts, all of Herself, it 
seemed, was in the heavens from which the blessing descended upon the Head 
of Her Crowned Son.” He then marveled over the feeling with which Nicholas 
38 S. S. Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr II, 1: 9-10; Maréchal de Marmont, Duc de 
Raguse, Mémoires (Paris: A l'Expé dition [W. Schmidt] 1857), 8: 118-19.
39 “Istoricheskoe opisanie Sviashchennogo Koronovaniia i  Miropomazaniia ikh 
Imperatorskikh Velichestv Gosudaria Imperatora Nikolaia Pavlovicha i Gosudaryni 
Imperatritsy Aleksandry Fedorovny,” Otechestvennye Zapiski (1827), 31: 45-47. 
Henceforth, “Istoricheskoe opisanie.” 
40 Imperatorskaia glavnaia kvartira . . .  tsarstvovanie Imperatora Nikolaia I, 219-20; V.I. 
Zhmakin, “Koronatsii russkikh imperatorov i  imperatrits, 1724-1856,” Russkaia 
Starina 38 (1883): 14. Th e rules designated Grand Duke Michael regent in the 
circumstance that there was no heir of age to ascend to the throne. PSZ, Sobranie 2, 
no. 537, August 22, 1826. 
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kissed her and his brothers, Constantine and Michael.41 Svin'in described the 
anointment, communion, and recessional in similar elevated terms. 
Th e author of the offi  cial coronation album, published in Paris, one 
Henry Graf, also rhapsodized over the family drama. Th e embrace between 
the dowager and the young emperor was “with a visible emotion shared by all 
those present.” But Graf focused primarily on the embrace with Constantine, 
thus confi rming the solidarity of the dynasty for the European audience. “Few 
of those present could hold back their tears, especially when the Emperor 
embraced the Tsarevich Grand Duke Constantine, who gathered at this 
moment the fi nest fruit of his noble sacrifi ces.” Th e illustration entitled “the 
Crowning” of Nicholas presented, instead of the crowning, Constantine 
embracing Nicholas, who had already been crowned. An act of aff ection 
thus was used to show the tsarevich’s homage to his younger brother and to 
dispel the uncertainties about his abdication. Th e same scene was depicted in 
a popular print of the time.42
Th e spectacle fulfi lled the literary and symbolic expectations of the 
foreign guests and the Russian offi  cial elite. Th e Duke of Raguse found 
the unity and devotion of the family “one of the most beautiful things the 
imagination can conceive.”43 Alexander Benckendorff , the chief of gendarmes 
and of the Th ird Section of Nicholas’s chancellery, recalled the family coming 
out of the cathedral: “Th e incomparable face of the sovereign shone with 
beauty under the valuable gems of the imperial crown. Th e young empress 
and the heir near the empress-mother also attracted everyone’s gaze. It was 
impossible to imagine a  more splendid family.” Th ose in attendance also 
followed the sentimental scenario; they gave their sympathy to the family 
by weeping—shedding tears of joy to share in the pathos of the triumphant 
dynasty. Benckendorff  remarked on the tears shed when Nicholas handed 
his sword to Constantine Pavlovich.44 State-Secretary Dmitrii Bludov wept 
unabashedly when Maria Fedorovna embraced the emperor. Th e ceremony 
confi rmed his religious belief. “I was again assured of the sweetness and the 
41 “Istoricheskoe opisanie,” 31: 196-99.
42 Vues des cérémonies les plus intéressantes du couronnement de leurs majestés Impériales 
l'empereur Nicholas Ier et l' impératrice Alexandra à Moscou (Paris: Didot, 1828), 5; 
IGK, ts. Nik. I, 222.
43 Marmont, Mémoires, 8: 132-33; E. F. Komarovskii, Zapiski (St. Petersburg: Ogni, 
1914), 256-57. 
44 Shil'der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi, 2: 7.
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necessity of Faith, that every passion, even the most noble love of Fatherland, 
not purifi ed by religion, leads only to error and misfortune.”45 
Nicholas’s coronation introduced scenes of family devotion and 
reconciliation to the solemn Byzantine rites. Th e family became a metonymic 
expression of the constant, devoted, and pure feelings that attached servitors 
and subjects to the throne. Th e political bond was sustained by a  mythical 
bond of aff ection for the imperial family, which the dignitaries of Nicholas’s 
state would be expected to display at the proper occasions. Th e shedding 
of tears of joy, and when necessary grief, became obligatory at court 
ceremonies—a sign of loyalty and sharing in the family life of the tsar, which 
symbolized his moral and therefore political supremacy. Th e elite became 
absorbed in the family of the tsar, a  family that exemplifi ed the current 
European ideal of dynastic monarchy and the current Russian ideal of utter 
dedication to one’s sovereign. 
* * *
Paul’s Law of Succession of 1797 had set the majority of the heir at the 
young age of sixteen in order to ensure a smooth succession in the event of the 
early death of the ruling emperor. Alexander was the fi rst heir to reach that 
age under the law, and to mark the event Nicholas staged a major ceremony on 
April 22, 1834, introducing a new rite of passage into the life of the imperial 
court. Pronounced by all Grand Dukes, the oath made the maintenance of 
autocracy a  fi lial obligation consecrated by God. Metropolitan Filaret of 
Moscow composed an imposing ceremony in which the son pledged obedience 
to his father, the autocrat, and the laws of Russia before the assembled elite of 
the Russian state. 
Alexander’s oath, written by Mikhail Speranskii, gave emphatic statement 
to the principles of the unity of family feeling with autocratic government and 
the maintenance of the inviolability of the prerogatives of the father-sovereign. 
Th e purpose of the ceremony, Speranskii asserted, was to confer religious 
sanction on the heir’s future obligations. An oath, he wrote, “is an act of 
conscience and religion, by which he who vows summons God in witness to 
the sincerity of his promises and submits himself to His wrath and vengeance 
in case of violation.” Th e Archpriest Pavskii’s instruction to Alexander before 
the ceremony summoned him to renew the vow to Christ that had taken 
45 “Dva pis'ma gr.D.N. Bludova k supruge ego,” 1047. 
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place at his baptism. “Only a true follower of Christ and sound member of the 
kingdom of god can be a useful member of the human kingdom.”46 
Like the promulgation of the succession law, the fi rst ceremony of majority 
took place on Easter Sunday, lending it an especially sacred character. It was 
an important rite of passage for the heir, from a  child to his father’s helper, 
joining his father at least symbolically in the exercise of autocratic power. At 
midnight of New Year’s Eve, 1834, Nicholas and Alexandra had told him that 
the coming year would be the most important of his life. Alexander wrote in 
his diary, “I feel its importance and will try to prepare myself as much as I can 
for this moment, for I know that even aft er it is over, the main task awaits me, 
that is to complete what has been begun. I ask the All-Powerful Father to give 
me strength to follow the example of my father in a worthy manner.”47
As the day approached, the solemnity of the occasion and its signifi cance 
for Russia were impressed upon him. On April 16, Nicholas took him on 
a  walk to the Peter-Paul fortress. He told him of the diffi  culties he would 
encounter, and urged him to turn to his father and mother for advice. “I will 
never forget this conversation,” Alexander wrote in his diary. Nicholas now 
initiated him in the cult of ancestors, the immortal unity of the dynasty. 
At  the cathedral, father and son kissed the graves of Paul I  and Alexander 
I  and their spouses and the grave of Constantine Pavlovich. Nicholas 
kissed him and said, in French, “When I lie there, visit me sometimes.” “Th ese 
words touched me so much that I  could not contain my tears, and I  prayed 
to  myself that the All-Powerful God allow a  long life to my dear father.”48 
Th e next day, Alexander received the epaulette and braids of a Flügel-Adjutant 
of Nicholas’s suite. 
Th e ceremony of the oath on April 22, 1834 in the Great Church at the 
Winter Palace was a  major state occasion, described in a  detailed account 
published in Russkii Invalid and Severnaia Pchela.49 Th e ceremony sought to 
involve the entire state in the family drama of the Russian house; the account 
referred to those present as “all of Russia.” On one side, there stood arrayed 
the diplomatic corps, State Councilors and Senators. Behind them were Court 
Offi  cials, members of the Emperor’s Suite, Generals, State Secretaries, and 
46 Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr II, 1: 62.
47 “Aleksandr II; Dnevnik, 1834 g.” GARF, 678-1-280, 1.
48 Ibid., 21.
49 Severnaia Pchela, April 26, 1834, 365-66; Russkii Invalid, April 27, 1834, 407-08.
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others with the right of entry “behind the Cavalier Guards,” and the mayor 
of St. Petersburg. Th ey faced the wives of the diplomatic corps, and ladies of 
the court. Deputies representing art, science, commerce, and industry were 
also present. Offi  cers of the guards and lesser civil offi  cials waited in the 
adjoining halls. From Alexander’s teaching staff , Zhukovskii, Edward Collins, 
and possibly others attended.50 Th e palace was so crowded that Pushkin had 
diffi  culty slipping through the back stairways to visit his aunt.51
Th e fi rst part of the event, in the Great Church, was the recitation of the 
oath as heir to the throne. Aft er the Metropolitan Serafi m and other clergy 
met the imperial family with the cross and holy water, Nicholas led his son to 
the pulpit, before the life-giving cross and the gospels. Alexander, raising his 
right hand, delivered the oath. He vowed to serve and obey his father “in all 
respects” (vo vsem). He promised that he would not spare his life, and would 
give his last drop of blood, the words of Peter the Great. He would defend the 
rights and power of “the autocracy of His Imperial Majesty” and would “assist 
the service of his majesty and the welfare of the state.” He pledged to observe 
all the rulings of the throne and the Laws of the Imperial House. Finally, 
he called upon God “to guide and teach him in the great service” that had 
devolved upon him. At this point, he broke down in tears and took several tries 
to continue. Th e emperor and empresses then embraced and kissed him. 
Metropolitan Filaret in a letter to Prince D. V. Golitsyn described similar 
feelings. “Kisses and tears reunited father, mother and son. When my own 
absorption in this inspiring spectacle ended, and my own tears dried, I could 
see that all present were in tears.”52 Pushkin indicated in his diary that those 
who did not weep made sure to wipe their eyes as well.53 Th e ceremony was 
a  reprise of the domestic scenario, and a  display of feeling, whether real or 
feigned, showed participation in the spectacle of family solidarity. 
50 I. A. Shliapkin, “Iz bumag odnogo iz prepodavatelei Aleksandra II,” Starina i 
Novizna 22 (1917): 15. 
51 My description is based on the account published in both Severnaia Pchela, 
April 26, 1834, 365-66; Russkii Invalid, April 27, 1834, 407-08; Vysochaishe 
utverzhdennyi tseremonial prisiagi Gosudaria, Naslednika, Aleksandra Nikolaevicha 
(n.p., n.d.); Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr II, 1: 63-65; Grimm, Alexandra 
Fedorovna, 2: 89-91.
52 Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr II, 1: 63-64. 
53 A.S. Pushkin, Dnevnik Pushkina, 1833-1835 (Moscow-Petrograd: Gosudarsvennoe 
izdatel’stvo, 1923), 10.
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Aft er pronouncing the oath, the heir signed it and Count Nesselrode, the 
Foreign Minister, removed the document for safekeeping in the State Archive. 
Th e fi rst part of the ceremony concluded with the singing of a  Te Deum, 
a  301 gun salute from the cannons of the Peter-Paul fortress, and the tolling 
of the church bells of the capital. Th en aft er the prayer for the long life of the 
emperor, the imperial family received congratulations from the members of the 
Holy Synod.
Th e tears and the family embrace were understood and presented 
in the sentimental idiom. Th e report published in Severnaia Pchela and 
Russkii Invalid, following the sentimental ascription—and prescription—
of emotion, described a  general feeling of tenderness, of umilenie, which 
“penetrated all hearts.” It dwelled on the embraces of parents and son. 
First, Nicholas kissed Alexander three times. Alexander wanted to hug His 
Mother, but Nicholas reached her fi rst. Th en the emperor clasped both of 
them to him in an embrace. “With this spectacle of all royal and human 
virtues, a  reverent tremor of tenderness [umilenie] touched all hearts.” Th e 
author of the newspaper accounts compared Alexander’s tears to those of 
Michael Fedorovich when as a  boy he had accepted the throne of Russia; 
the tears showed his understanding of the importance and greatness of the 
ritual. “May Your tears, Successor of the Great Tsars, be pleasing to God. 
May they be a guarantee of the goodness of Your soul and the happiness of 
Your Fatherland.” Th e civil ceremony was followed by an equally imposing 
military ceremony, the heir’s taking of the oath as military offi  cer in the Hall 
of St. George. Th e subsequent celebrations, receptions, banquets, and balls 
continued through Holy Week.54 
Th e ceremony of the majority represented the fi rst formal presentation of 
Alexander as a dynastic symbol, expressing the unity of the governmental and 
social elite with the dynasty. Th e rhetoric of the writers close to the throne 
transformed him into a national symbol as well. A song Zhukovskii wrote for 
occasion, set to music by Count Mikhail Viel'gorskii, presented Alexander’s 
birth as a national event. From the heights of the Moscow Kremlin, the poem 
began, “the Russian Land,” (Russkaia zemlia), had witnessed Alexander’s 
birth. Years had passed quickly, and now, on the day of the resurrection, 
the “touching ritual” (umilitel'nyi obriad) was taking place in “Petrograd.” 
Alexander embodied the unity between Moscow and Petersburg, the word for 
the capital now Russifi ed. 
54 Severnaia Pchela, April 26, 1834, 365-66; Russkii Invalid, April 27, 1834, 407-08.
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Th e ceremony revealed both generational and political solidarity. Father 
and son, dynasty and people were united in the person of the heir. Th e son 
enters the cathedral, raises his hands to heaven,
 
Before him the father and ruler, 
Th e tsar receives the oath of his son. 
Hearken with a blessing,
To the words of his young soul,
And raise your arms to heavens,
Faithful Russia, together with him.55
Another “Russian Song,” by one B. Fedorov, appeared in Russkii Invalid 
on May 2. Fedorov used a group of boatmen, rowing up the Neva to the palace, 
as an expression of the joy of the nation as a whole. Th e boatmen he imagined 
provided a  synecdochical voice of acclamation, on the birthday of “the kind 
son.” Th ey sang to the tsar,
Great is your Imperial joy, 
It spreads through all Holy Rus.
You have raised an Heir for Yourself,
ALEXANDER, Your young son is Your hope!
He is the comforting ray of the bright sun, 
Our dawn, our light from the great day!
Glory to the Russian sun!
Rejoice Father of the Fatherland!56
* * *
Alexander’s tour of the empire aft er his nineteenth birthday, from April 
through December 1837, brought the dynastic scenario to the reaches of the 
Russian empire. Accompanied by Zhukovskii and an adjutant of Nicholas, 
S. A.  Iur'evich, Alexander covered a distance of over thirteen thousand miles. 
It was the longest tour of the empire by a  tsar or tsarevich, and took him to 
regions, including parts of Siberia, never visited by a member of the imperial 
family. His charm in public appearances awakened sentiments that attached 
the population to the autocracy, drawing the local elites into the family love as 
a trope for loft y and humane feelings. 
54 V. A. Zhukovskii, Sochineniia (St. Petersburg: I. D. Sytin, 1902), 4: 22-23.
55 Russkii Invalid, May 2, 1834, 424.
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Two events of Alexander’s trip assumed especial importance for the role 
Alexander was to play in his father’s scenario—the visit to Moscow in July and 
August, and his installation as Cossack Ataman in Novocherkassk in October. 
Th e Moscow visit linked his personal appeal as heir who was born in Moscow 
with Russia’s historical past. Th e Metropolitan Filaret emphasized this theme 
in the welcome speech he delivered upon Alexander’s arrival, which was printed 
in Severnaia Pchela. Alexander, Filaret declared, had now reached Moscow, the 
resting place of his ancestors. “Here you will come even more into contact with 
the heart of Russia and its vital force, which is an inherited love for hereditary 
tsars, repelling in previous centuries so many enemy forces. You will see it in 
its free play, in those waves of people striving towards You, in those enraptured 
(vostorzhennykh) gazes and solemn cries.” An inherited historical aff ection was 
the source of the ruler’s authority. “May the love of Russians make your task 
easy, inspired by love for Russia.”57 
According to Nicholas’s instructions, Alexander slept in the room where 
he was born and took historical tours of the city that identifi ed his and the 
family’s fate with Russia’s past. Andrei Murav'ev, a  specialist on religion and 
Muscovite antiquities, published an account of his excursions with Alexander 
to the sites of Moscow and its vicinity. Murav'ev described the young heir’s 
visit to the relics and shrines of his ancestors. In the Novospasskii Monastery, 
Alexander proceeded slowly beneath a  painting of his family tree, “as if 
attaining at the end of this long genealogical chain that bright link to which he 
was predestined,” Murav'ev wrote.58 
Another dramatic moment of Alexander’s visit to Moscow was his meeting 
with his mother on August 3, aft er a separation of three months. An account 
of the reuniting of mother and son by the popular children’s writer Prince 
Vladimir L'vov appeared in the September 27 issue of Russkii Invalid. L'vov 
described the scene of a moving embrace. Th e sun shone with bright rays. Th e 
empress and one of his sisters embraced him. “Let foreigners envy us!” L'vov 
wrote. “Let all Russia enjoy this spectacle and let it be repeated many, many 
times. Happy is the people whose ruling family gives such an example of love 
and friendship. Can the tears of joy and the cries of the suff ering fail to strike 
a chord in their hearts?”59
56 Severnaia Pchela, 172 (August 3, 1837): 685.
57 A.N. Murav'ev, Vospominaniia o  poseshchenii sviatyni Moskovskoi Gosudarem 
Naslednikom (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1838), 13.
58 Russkii Invalid, September 27, 1837, 960.
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Th e trip culminated with the meeting of father and son at Novocherkassk 
in the steppes of New Russia, at a  new ceremony of initiation that expressed 
the allegiance of the elite of the Don host not only to the emperor, but to the 
heir, and the dynasty as a  whole. Nicholas had anticipated this event when, 
in October 1827, he named Alexander, honorary “Ataman of all the Cossack 
Hosts” and “Chief of the Don Regiment.” Th e position of honorary ataman 
was presented as a direct personal bond between the imperial family and the 
Cossacks that brought the Host into the single great family of those loyal 
to the tsar. Th e ceremony on October 21 cemented this bond. It likened the 
devotion of the Cossacks to the devotion of son to father, establishing a rite for 
all future heirs to throne.60 
Emperor and heir rode in ceremonial procession into Novocherkassk, the 
administrative center of the Don Host. Th e Cossack leaders formed a  circle 
around the cathedral; in the middle, the “appointed” (nakaznyi) Cossack 
ataman conferred the pernach, one of the maces constituting the Cossack 
insignia of power, on Nicholas, who then conferred it on Alexander. Nicholas 
explained the signifi cance of the event. He declared that appointing his son 
ataman, he was giving a “most valuable pledge (zalog)” of his good will to them. 
“May this serve as proof of how close you are to my heart. When he replaces 
me, serve him as loyally as you served my ancestors and me. He will not forsake 
you.” In his diary, Alexander described the ceremony and copied down his 
father’s address. Russkii Invalid reported that “these words were impressed on 
the heart of each and every one of those present. General, but silent tenderness. 
(umilenie) Th is then passed into the joyous cries of pure enthusiasm (vostorg) 
from the people.”61 Th e next day, Alexander and Nicholas inspected a review of 
over 17,000 members of the Host and in the evening attended a ball where the 
heir took part in several dances.
* * *
Th e domestic scenario introduced in the reign of Nicholas I represented 
far more than a  romantic embellishment to the image of the tsar. It made 
the family a  central symbol of the moral purity of Russian autocracy, which 
59 On the myth of “tsar and Cossack,” see Robert H. McNeal, Tsar and Cossack, 1855-
1914 (Oxford: MacMillan, 1987), 1-5. 
61 Russkii Invalid, November 24, 1837, 1182-83; Severnaia Pchela, November 2, 
1837, 989; Tatischev, Imperator Aleksandr II, 1: 89; “Dnevnik V. Kn. Aleksandra 
Nikolaevicha vo vremia poezdki po Rossii, May 1-December 12, 1837,” 95-96.
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purported to be the purest form of absolute monarchy. Th e association between 
domestic morality and autocratic government outlived Nicholas’s reign and 
remained intrinsic to the image of the Russian monarch for the duration of the 
empire. To violate the principle of autocracy became tantamount to a biblical 
sin against the father, while violation of family morality would throw into 
doubt the moral foundations of autocratic rule. Nicholas introduced the forms 
of behavior, the ceremonies, the feeling of obligation that underlay the notion 
of Russian dynastic monarchy in the nineteenth century. 
Th e family scenario served various functions in the adaptation of the 
monarchy to the political circumstances of nineteenth century Europe. Th e 
attachment between father and son and between husband and wife elevated 
the concept of dynastic inheritance to a moral plane and made so elusive a goal 
appear as part of the national concept of Russian monarchy. Th e sentimental 
outpourings of family feeling described by numerous Russian and European 
writers reaffi  rmed the common values that identifi ed the Russian sovereign 
with his western counterparts. Finally, the display of family devotion 
became a model for the expression of political loyalty. Th e political bond was 
personalized. Th e allegiance to the monarch, no longer demonstrated in the 
mere witnessing of baroque allegories, now required shows of personal ardor, 
manifestations of the soul, such as rapture, tenderness, and profuse weeping—a 
public sharing of what purported to be the innermost feelings of the members 
of the imperial family. 
#
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6. The Invention of Tradition 
and the Representation of Russian Monarchy
$
A t the conclusion of Paul Miliukov’s lectures at the University of Chicago in 1903, he declared that Russia had no “real political tradition.” Th e old 
political traditions had been destroyed by Peter the Great and “could not 
possibly be renewed.” Th e existing system owed its solidity “not so much to 
any tradition as to the force of inertia, and to such multiform and numerous 
measures that the autocracy has been obliged to take in self-defense.” Miliukov 
contrasted Russia’s experience to Japan’s, which he had learned of from the 
lectures of a Professor Ienaga at the same university. In Japan, Miliukov argued, 
the rapidity of change during the Meiji restoration had allowed old traditions 
to survive and “to enter into some degree of combination with the elements of 
the new life and culture.”1
We now know, from the work of T. Fujitani and Carol Gluck, that 
these presumably old Japanese traditions had been ingeniously contrived 
by a  modernizing elite in the second half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, 
Fujitani provides a  systematic account of the creation of such imperial 
ceremonies, images, and forms of ritual behavior during the Meiji restoration.2 
Fujitani and Gluck have traced the process of “the invention of tradition” 
that Eric Hobsbawm memorably defi ned as an object of historical study and 
investigated in his path-breaking book by that name. Hobsbawm focused on 
the social and political contexts that prompt the invention of new traditions, 
which “where possible  . . .  attempt to establish continuity with a  suitable 
1 Paul Miliukov, Russia and Its Crisis (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 400-03.
2 T. Fujitani, Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1996); Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths.
PA RT III . NA R R AT I V ES OF MONA RCH A ND NAT ION
 138 
historic past.”3 David Cannadine developed the concept in relationship 
to British monarchy by detailing the invention of a  tradition of pomp and 
magnifi cence in the late Victorian era.4 
But for invented traditions to take hold there must be an inclination to 
receive them—a belief in certain overarching fi ctions they sustain. Th e study 
of “the invention of tradition” oft en ignores the symbolic context of the 
continuities these traditions are supposed to establish. Th us, Hobsbawm and 
Cannadine discuss the adoption of the Gothic style in nineteenth-century 
England, but do not suggest why the Gothic style was chosen. Th e meaning of 
invented traditions can be understood only within the context of the mythical 
narratives that served as their referents. It is notable that in both the British 
and Japanese case, the monarch represents something more than a ruler: he or 
she is a  symbol of national unity and grandeur that is not dependent on the 
exercise of political power. Th e invention of tradition proceeded in a symbolic 
context that presumed a  separation of the act of ruling from the symbolic 
preeminence of the monarch. 
British ceremonial innovation took place under a  monarchy that had 
represented the popular focus of nation and empire at least since the eighteenth 
century.5 Vernon Bogdanor wrote, “most of us surely have always understood 
in our bones, that we remain a profoundly monarchical nation.”6 In Japan, the 
emperor had long represented the bearer of a symbolic supremacy untainted by 
the demeaning obligations of exercising power, fulfi lled instead by high fi gures 
in the elite.7 Th e Prussian and Hapsburg monarchs in the nineteenth century 
broadened their popular support by de-emphasizing but not eliminating the 
attributes of political power in their public image. 
In Russia, the symbolic preeminence of the emperor had always been 
closely linked with the extent and effi  cacy of monarchical power. Th e sophis-
3 Th e Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1-2.
4 David Cannadine, “Th e Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: Th e British 
Monarchy and the ‘Invention of Tradition,’ c. 1820-1977,” in Hobsbawm and Ranger, 
eds., Th e Invention of Tradition, 101-64.
5 Linda Colley, “Th e Apotheosis of George III: Loyalty, Royalty and the British 
Nation 1760-1820,” Past and Present, No. 102 (February 1981): 94-129.
6 Cited in Th e New York Times, June 5, 2002, 12.
7 John Whitney Hall, “A Monarch for Modern Japan,” in Robert E. Ward, ed., Political 
Development in Modern Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 11-64.
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ticated distinction between the “body-mortal,” and the “body-politic,” which 
was made to a greater or lesser degree in the absolute monarchies of the West, 
did not take hold in Russia.8 Russian monarchs themselves had to display 
the transcendent features of the political order in performances constantly 
reaffi  rming the superhuman, heroic attributes attached to the state. Myth 
and ceremonies elevated the monarch above the population as a  distant and 
legitimate sovereign. I have called the particular realizations of the governing 
myth by the successors to the throne “scenarios of power.” Th e scenarios cast 
each ruler as a mythic hero, transforming the myth to fi t his or her personal 
views and tastes, as well as the cultural and political circumstances of the time. 
Rhetoric and iconography evoked a  transcendent persona endowed with the 
features idealized in the scenario. 
Th e representation of Russian monarchy appears as a  succession of 
apparent ruptures, producing an illusion of constant renewal, prodigies of 
transformation eff ected by the irresistible power of the monarch’s will. Th e 
political threats posed by nineteenth-century revolutionary movements and 
increasing governmental role of bureaucratic institutions produced only 
more demonstrative affi  rmations of the ruler’s prerogatives. Th e godlike 
image carried a mystique of its own: the offi  ce of a Russian emperor without 
unlimited authority was unthinkable and intolerable for the individual ruler, 
regardless of expedience or principle.
Th e defi nition of power precluded political participation, even of the 
highest, most conservative layers of society. English monarchs preserved 
their symbolic preeminence while withdrawing from the exercise of political 
power. In Japan, the governmental elite fashioned a  popular monarchy by 
introducing a  representative system that comprised only 1.1 percent of the 
population. In Germany and the Hapsburg Empire a limited suff rage was the 
basis of parliamentary institutions that the emperor and his ministers could 
dominate. Russian emperors repeatedly rebuff ed proposals to co-opt even the 
most conservative supporters of the political status quo and allow limited 
participation in government. While this intransigence is explained in part 
by the fear that concessions would begin the erosion of monarchical power 
observed in France, it had deeper roots in the culture of Russian monarchy. Th e 
authority of the emperor derived from his symbolic preeminence and distance 
8 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, Th e King’s Two Bodies, 383-450; Michael Cherniavsky, Tsar 
and People, 86. 
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from his subjects and could founder if compromised. For example, Alexander 
II oversaw the emancipation of the Russian serfs and sweeping reforms of local 
government and the court system, which involved consultation with members 
of the nobility. However, though he received proposals for limited participation 
in government, he never relented in his belief that only the monarch could 
transcend the separate interests of the estates and direct the formulation 
of policies. In 1865, he refused to receive the address of the Moscow gentry 
calling for a popular assembly to consist of gentry representatives. He declared, 
“To none of [my subjects] is it allowed to give prior notice to MY incessant care 
for the well being of Russia, or to decide beforehand questions about the basic 
principles of her state institutions. No class has the right to speak in the name 
of other estates. No one is called to take it upon himself to petition me about 
the general good and the needs of state.”9 
Th e myths of Russian monarchy set the ruler above the noble and imperial 
elites by evoking a  power derived from God, but elevated by the foreign 
sources of his authority. His image was derived from beyond the seas, from 
the Vikings, from the Byzantine emperor, from Roman and western rulers—
Ivan IV boasting of his descent from Riurik, the legendary founder of Russia, 
declared that he was no Russe. Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich in the seventeenth 
century presented himself in Byzantine robes and adopted ceremonies meant 
to follow those of the Byzantine emperor. With Peter the Great the image 
became Western, as he took on the Roman models of Western Europe and cast 
himself as Imperator. 
My point here is not about the practice of borrowing, since borrowing 
of features and signs characterizes many if not all monarchies. Rather it is 
that in Russia the act of borrowing itself became an attribute of power. Th e 
appropriation of the attributes of foreign exemplars of sovereignty elevated 
the  ruler and his servitors above the Russians and other subject peoples of 
the empire. A  second, and for us particularly germane, characteristic was an 
imperative to demonstrate change from previous presentations or scenarios 
of power. Beginning with Peter the Great, the power to transform—to show 
himself unbound by traditions of the previous reign, but to eliminate its abuses, 
and reverse its failures—was a  sign of his absolute power. Peter the Great, 
Georges Florovsky wrote, “was inclined to exaggerate everything new. He wanted 
9 Terence Emmons, Th e Russian Landed Gentry and the Peasant Emancipation of 1861 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 411.
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everything refurbished and altered until it passed beyond all recognition.”10 
It did not matter whether the changes represented true innovations or not; it 
was the appearance of change that was important, for the signs of renovation 
revealed the transformative powers of the Russian emperors and empresses. 
Each scenario repeated the Petrine cadence, opening with energetic 
demonstrative change, a  discrediting, explicit or implicit of the predecessor, 
a new vision of the creative perspective of the autocrat. Each reign, except the 
last, undertook a  symbolic repudiation of the previous one, an assertion of 
the transcendent image of a ruler not limited by the examples or legacy of his 
or her predecessors. In the nineteenth centuries this dynamic of repudiation 
continued, though it was tempered with assertions of dynastic continuity 
and devotion to a  national heritage. Leo Tolstoy observed this pattern early 
in the reign of Alexander II. He remarked, “Alexander II came to the throne 
and as always happens the new reign began to act in a  spirit contrary to his 
predecessor [sic].”11 Th e invention of tradition—making the new appear as if 
it were old—took place in Russia under the symbolic imperative that the old 
appear new. New traditions had to occasion a  break with the past in order 
to create a  diff erent conception of the past more suited to the cultural and 
political needs of the contemporary monarchy. Miliukov, like most members 
of the liberal intelligentsia, regarded these traditions as fl im-fl am generated 
by a doomed monarchy. Th e traditions of Russian monarchy, it is true, failed 
to unite government and society, but they did provide rationales for the 
preservation of absolutism in Russia.
* * *
In nineteenth-century Russia, the invention of traditions strove to make 
the monarchy appear national. Th e westernized monarchy, which since Peter’s 
reign was at pains to display its European character, now sought instead to 
display distinctive native traits that would ensure that it would not follow the 
fatal course of its counterparts. Th e emperors who succeeded the throne aft er 
the revolutionary threats of 1825 and 1881—Nicholas I and Alexander III— 
presented images that distanced themselves from the European goals, images, 
and policies that were associated with their predecessors. To this end, they 
10 Georges Florovsky, Ways of Russian Th eology (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1979) 1:114.
11 Cited in Kathryn B. Feuer, Tolstoy and the Genesis of War and Peace (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1996), 150.
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sought to establish traditions that would link them with the Russian people, 
without, however jeopardizing the distance that ensured their symbolic 
preeminence.
Th e statements in the months following Nicholas I’s accession explained 
the failure of the Decembrist uprising by the innate loyalty of the Russian 
people to their rulers. Th e manifesto on the sentencing of the Decembrist 
revolutionaries, issued on July 13, 1826, disclosed a new grounding for imperial 
authority. Th e Decembrists’ design to introduce western constitutional 
institutions, the manifesto stated, was alien to the Russian people. “In a state 
where love for monarchs and devotion to the throne are based on the native 
characteristics of the people, where there are laws of the fatherland and 
fi rmness in administration, all eff orts of the evil-intentioned will be in vain 
and insane.”12 Th e emperor no longer appeared as a remote and supernal fi gure, 
the philosopher king, whose authority was justifi ed by the supreme reason he 
brought to bear on institutions for the benefi t of his people. Rather, he was 
presented as the object of the people’s devotion, making the monarchy appear 
grounded on a tacit popular mandate.
Th e love of the people thus justifi ed the westernized monarch’s power. 
In the fi rst decade of Nicholas’s reign, this relationship was consecrated, or 
reifi ed, in an idea of absolute monarchy expressed in the word “autocracy” 
(samoderzhavie). Th e idea, projected into the past, became the dominant motif 
of offi  cial history. A  lecture, delivered in 1832 in the presence of the then 
Assistant Minister of Education, Sergei Uvarov, by Mikhail Pogodin provided 
the regime’s tale of origin: “Th e Varangians came to us, but voluntarily chosen, 
at least from the start, not like Western victors and conquerors—the fi rst 
essential distinction in the kernel, the seed of the Russian State in comparison 
with other Europeans.”13 Uvarov’s famous memorandum of 1833 provided an 
ideological formulation of these ideas, announcing the slogan—Orthodoxy, 
Autocracy, and Nationality. Autocracy was clearly the central element of 
Uvarov’s triad. He wrote, “autocracy constitutes the main condition of the 
political existence of Russia . . . . Th e saving conviction that Russia lives and 
is protected by the spirit of strong, humane, and enlightened autocracy must 
permeate popular education and must develop with it.”14 
12 N. K. Shil'der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi, 1: 704-06. 
13 M. P. Pogodin, Istoriko-kriticheskie otryvki (Moscow: Semen, 1846), 6-8.
14 Cited in Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Offi  cial Nationality in Russia, 1825-
1855 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 74-75.
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It was in this context that new traditions appeared showing the 
emperor’s absolute power to be a  historical expression of Russia’s national 
heritage. Here I will discuss two of these invented traditions: new forms of 
presentation at the Russian coronation, and what was conceived as native 
styles of Russian church architecture. Both contributed to the performance 
of a  national narrative that showed the common past uniting the emperors 
with their Russian subjects. 
Th e coronation of Nicholas I in 1826 marked this change of the meaning 
of Russian imperial coronations. It consecrated both the idea of absolute 
monarchy and the ruling dynasty as expressions of the idea of nation. Th e 
most important innovation took place at the conclusion of the coronation 
ceremonies. Aft er the recessional to the Archangel and Annunciation 
Cathedrals, Nicholas ascended the Red Staircase before the Palace of Facets, 
turned to the crowd, and bowed three times, to their thunderous Hoorahs! 
Th e triple bow showed the emperor’s response to the people’s acclaim. It was 
an unprecedented sign of a  reciprocity of feeling, a  signal expression of the 
ruler’s bond with the people, marking a  breach of the imagery of Olympian 
distance. It aroused the indignation of the tsar’s younger brother, the Grand 
Duke Michael Pavlovich, who did not think it befi tting of an emperor.15 In 
subsequent decades, the triple bow from the Red Staircase became a  central 
ceremony of Russian autocracy, whenever the emperor visited Moscow. 
(Figure 1) By the end of the century, it was customarily described as an “ancient 
tradition.”16 
Th e creation of a  national style of church architecture expressed another 
theme of offi  cial nationality—the historic bond between the autocracy and 
the Russian Orthodox Church. Nicholas I  and Alexander III looked to pre-
Petrine models to build contemporary artifacts of a Russian national past. To 
meet their sovereigns’ expectations, offi  cial architecture had to create a national 
architecture from multifarious Byzantine and indigenous styles. Constantine 
Th on, a  young architect of German-Russian extraction, answered Nicholas’s 
wish for a national architecture when his project for the St. Catherine’s Church 
in St. Petersburg suggested the fi ve-cupola form of the Vladimir and Moscow 
Assumption Cathedrals. A decree of March 25, 1841 ordained that “the taste 
of ancient Byzantine architecture should be preserved, by preference and as 
far as is possible” in the construction of Orthodox churches. “Th e drawings 
15 Cherniavsky, Tsar and People, 148-49.
16 Scenarios of Power, 1: 290-92. 
Figure 1.
Alexander III Bows to the People From the Red Staircase, July 17, 1881. 
Lithograph, Vsemirnaia Illiustratsiia, No. 656 (1881)
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of Professor Constantine Th on composed for the construction of Orthodox 
churches may prove useful in this regard.”17
Th on’s architectural projects typify the nineteenth-century tendency 
to use architecture to present a  historical narrative, in this case the 
adoption of Byzantine forms of monarchy and culture in early Rus’. Th on 
graft ed the fi ve-cupola form of the Assumption Cathedrals in the Moscow 
Kremlin and Vladimir onto a  nineteenth-century neoclassical structure, 
expressing the eclectic spirit of Nicholas’s offi  cial-nationality doctrine, 
which, while claiming national distinctiveness, sought to defend the western 
cultural and institutional heritage.18 Its most prominent example was the 
massive Cathedral of Christ the  Redeemer in Moscow (1837-1882), built 
to commemorate Russia’s victory over Napoleon in 1812.19 While the 
proportions, the arcades, and the structure of the cupolas of the cathedral 
were typically neoclassical, the exterior decorative elements asserted the 
building’s Russian character by recalling the architecture of the fi ft eenth 
century.20 Th e Redeemer Cathedral set the pattern for similar churches that 
would provide specifi c visual references to both the national past of autocracy 
and the universalistic context of empire derived from Byzantium. Published 
explanations of the buildings spelled out these references, disclosing the 
meaning of Russia’s architectural heritage to all. Th e Redeemer Cathedral 
was regarded in the nineteenth century as cumbersome and something of an 
eyesore on the Moscow landscape. It was razed in 1931-1932, but it retained 
its national associations and has recently been reconstructed at its site in the 
center of Moscow.21 (See Figure 1 in Article 8).
17 Svod zakonov rossiiskoi imperii, (St. Petersburg: Tip. II Otd. Sobstvennoi E.I.V. 
Kantseliarii 1857), 12: 49. Th e provision is article 218 of the Stroitel'nyi Ustav.
18 E. A. Borisova, Russkaia arkhitektura vtoroi poloviny XIX veka (Moscow: Nauka, 
 1979), 100, 101; Konstantin Ton, Tserkvi, sochinennye arkhitektorom Ego Impera-
torskogo Velichestva Professorom Arkhtektury Imperatorskoi Akademii Khudozhestv 
i chlenom raznykh akademii Konstantinom Tonom (St. Petersburg: n.p, 1838).
19 Th e most thorough treatment of the history of the building is E. Kirichenko, Khram 
Khrista Spasitelia v Moskve (Moscow: Planeta, 1997).
20 Ibid., 61-63; Borisova, Russkaia arkhitektura, 106-09. 
21 See the perceptive comments of Svetlana Boym, who sees the rebuilding as one 
episode in the “obliteration of memory” that proceeded aft er the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. She cites the words of “a middle aged man with wistful eyes” in 
a tourist advertisement, “Don’t divide Russian into past and present. Russia is one.” 
Svetlana Boym, Th e Future of Nostalgia (New York, Basic Books, 2001), 100-08.
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Th e assassination of Alexander II occasioned an even sharper symbolic 
break—a blanket repudiation of the westernizing tradition of the autocracy 
and the adoption of a  new historical myth. If the offi  cial nationality located 
the nation in the Russian people’s worship of their western overlords, the new 
myth presented the emperor as ethnically and religiously one with his people, 
as the most Russian of Russians. Th e program of Alexander III’s reign was set 
forth in the manifesto of April 29, 1881, written by Alexander III’s mentor 
and closest advisor, Constantine Pobedonostsev. Reaffi  rming the principle of 
autocracy, Pobedonostsev evoked a new founding period of the Russian empire 
in an idealized vision of seventeenth-century Muscovy. Th e words “zemlia 
russkaia,” Russian land, conjured a Slavophile picture of the unity of all estates 
in Russia, a single people, living in harmony with their tsar. Th e Russian land 
had been disgraced by vile sedition, but “hereditary tsarist power,” continued 
to enjoy the love of its subjects, and this power “in unbreakable  . . .  union 
with Our land” had survived such troubles—smuty—in the past. Th e people 
displayed their devotion to the tsar through prayers in the Orthodox church. 
Th ese prayers brought divine blessings on the sovereign. 
Alexander III’s coronation in 1883, and that of Nicholas II only thirteen 
years later, expressed not the merger of the Western and Russian polarities of 
imperial culture, but a  coming home: a  denial of polarities and a  celebration 
of the national character of the Russian emperor. Th e rhetoric of offi  cial and 
semi-offi  cial texts emphasized the organic and ethnic connections of the simple 
Russian people with their Russian tsar. Th e Pan-Slavist journalist and general 
Vissarion Komarov described the people of Moscow on May 15, the day of 
the coronation ceremonies, as “a vital force, concealing in itself the presence 
of God.” He evoked a  physical sense of the merger of people and sovereign. 
His key words were “splosh',” total, variants of the verb “splotit'” to fuse, 
etymologically connected with the word used to describe binding longitudinal 
sections of wood.22
Th e post-coronation festivities evoked the dynasty’s Muscovite past in art, 
poetry, and music, making a political idiom of le style russe. Th e seventeenth-
century interior of the Hall of Facets, with murals of Semen Ushakov, was 
restored for the coronation banquet by artists brought from the Palekh shop of 
22 V. Komarov, V  pamiat’ sviashchennogo koronovaniia Gosudaria Imperatora 
Aleksandra  III i  Gosudaryni Imperatritsy Marii Fedorovny (St. Petersburg: 
V. Komarov, 1883), 110.
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icon painters. Th e banquet menu, designed by the painter Victor Vasnetsov, in 
old Russian style showed a scene of boyars bearing the tsar’s regalia to the feast; 
the reverse depicted a priest and peasants bearing bread and salt, and a player 
of the ancient gusliar’ singing praise to the tsar. An orchestra performed 
Tchaikovsky’s cantata, “Moskva,” composed especially for the occasion. Th e 
libretto by the pan-Slavist poet Apollon Maikov presented the tsar as the epic 
Russian folk hero, the bogatyr’ representing the hopes of all Slavic nations. 
Th e gala performance at Alexander II’s coronation celebrations in 1856 was 
of Donizetti’s opera bouff e, “L’Elisir d’Amore;” now it was the fi rst and last 
scenes of Glinka’s “Life for the Tsar,” about a simple Russian peasant’s sacrifi ce 
to save the newly chosen Michael Romanov in 1613. A  chorus of nearly 
800 singers, accompanied by musicians playing old horns, sang the Glory 
(Slav’sia) chorus as row aft er row of soldiers marched in to bring the opera, and 
presumably the Troubles of the early 1880s, to a rousing close.23 
In a letter to the empress Maria Fedorovna on the fi rst anniversary of his 
coronation, Alexander III described it as a  “great event for us. And it proved 
to a  surprised and morally corrupt Europe that Russia is still the same holy, 
orthodox Russia as it was under the Moscow Tsars and, if God permits, as it 
will remain forever.”24 Alexander sought to display the Muscovite character of 
imperial Russia by building Orthodox Churches in what he believed was a true 
Muscovite style. Th e building announcing the new offi  cial national style was 
the Resurrection Cathedral erected on the site of Alexander II’s assassination, 
in popular parlance, “the Savior on the Blood.”25 
Michael Flier’s articles on the planning, architecture, and iconography 
of the Resurrection Cathedral provide a  remarkable glimpse of the process 
of the invention of tradition.26 Th e architects who participated in the initial 
competition did not understand the new scenario or its implications, and 
23 Borisova, Russkaia arkhitektura, 307.
24 GARF, 642-1-709, 24-25. Letter of May 16, 1884. 
25 For a more extended discussion of the revival churches see my article, “‘Th e Russian 
Style’ in Church Architecture as Imperial Symbol aft er 1881,” in Architectures of 
Russian Identity: 1500 to the Present, ed. James Cracraft  and Dan Rowland (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 101-116; Scenarios, 2, 244-56.
26 Michael S. Flier, “At Daggers Drawn: the Competition for the Church of the Savior 
on the Blood,” in For SK: In Celebration of the Life and Career of Simon Karlinsky, 
ed. Michael S. Flier and Robert P. Hughes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1994), 97-115. 
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draft ed their plans in Th on style. Alexander, not one to temper his opinions, 
rejected them all. He insisted that he wanted the church to be in “Russian 
style,” and “in the style of the time of the Muscovite tsars of the seventeenth 
century,”27 without indicating precisely what he had in mind. Th e project 
that won the tsar’s approval was submitted by Father Ignatii, the abbot of 
the Trinity-Sergeev Hermitage at Peterhof. Ignatii, who had briefl y studied 
at the Academy of Arts, drew the sketch of the church, he claimed, “almost 
automatically,” on the day of Annunciation. But he was not a  professional 
architect, and his plans had to be completely revised by the architect Alfred 
Parland. Th e fi nal form of the cathedral, Michael Flier has shown, was 
a  mélange of the plans of many architects who were struggling to fi nd 
a  seventeenth-century national style that suited the emperor’s taste.28 Th e 
decision to depart from the classical Moscow-Vladimir style was clearly the 
emperor’s. Although the church was built on the basis of public donations, 
the imperial family donated nearly one-quarter of the 4.6 million ruble cost. 
Alexander continued to watch over the completion of the cathedral and 
resisted proposals to economize.29 
Th e example Alexander III had in mind was St. Basil’s cathedral on Red 
Square in Moscow, and the project designed by Alfred Parland, presumably 
on the basis of Ignatii’s sketches, recalled St. Basil’s cathedral (see Article 8, 
Figure 2). Th e fl amboyant exterior decoration—the devices of kokoshniki, and 
shirinki, the tent roof, and onion cupolas—set the church apart from the Th on 
model and evoked a  diff erent historical narrative. However, Boris Kirikov 
has shown that the new church’s fi ve-cupola cruciform structure, with a large 
central basilica-like hall, has little in common with the intricate warren of 
Vasilii the Blessed, and the decorative elements borrow from a great number of 
seventeenth century churches in the Moscow-Iaroslavl style.30
27 In April, 1882, the mayor of St. Petersburg informed the City Duma that he had 
received notifi cation from the St. Petersburg Governor that the Minister of the 
Interior had conveyed the tsar's wish that the cathedral be built “in Russian style.” 
Moskovskie Vedomosti, April 9, 1882; A. A. Parland, Khram Voskresenie Khristova 
sooruzhennyi na meste smertel'nogo poraneniia v  Boze pochivshego Imperatora 
Aleksandra II na ekaterinskom kanale v Sankt-Peterburge (St. Petersburg: n.p., 1909), 2. 
28 Michael S. Flier “At Daggers Drawn,” 109-11. 
29 Iu. V. Trubinov, Khram Voskreseniia Khristova [Spas na Krovi] (St. Petersburg: Beloe 
i Chernoe1997), 33, 54, 94.
30 B. M. Kirikov, “Khram Voskreseniia Khristova (k istorii russkogo stilia v  Peter-
burge)," Nevskii Arkhiv: istoriko-kraevedcheskii sbornik 1 (1993): 230-33; I. Grabar', 
Istoriia Russkogo Iskusstva, Vol. 9, Book 2 (Moscow: n.p., 1965): 269. 
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Th e theme of resurrection was central to Alexander III’s scenario, which 
envisioned the rebirth of Russian monarchy aft er the troubled last years of his 
father’s reign. Michael Flier has shown the predominance of the resurrection 
imagery in the church. Th e exterior mosaics depict the bearing of the cross, 
the Crucifi xion, the Deposition, the Descent into Hell, and, on the Southern 
Pediment, Christ’s Resurrection. He observed that the interior is modeled on 
the layout of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, also named “Th e 
Resurrection of Christ.” Th e new cathedral thus places Russia’s beginning 
not at the Roman empire—as in the legends of Andrew the First-Called 
and Prus—or at Byzantium, as claimed in the legend of Monomakh, but at 
Golgotha itself, now with Christ’s martyrdom transposed to Russia.31 Th e 
mosaics thus established Jerusalem as a new point of beginning for the sacred 
narrative of Russian monarchy and defi ne Russia as possessing a sacred history, 
distinct not only from the west, but also from Byzantium. 
Th e Resurrection Cathedral built on the site of Alexander II’s assassination 
on Catherine Canal is easily visible from Nevskii Prospect. Th ere is nothing 
understated in its appearance; it is a declaration of contempt for the order and 
symmetry of the capital, producing what Louis Réau, the noted French student 
of Russian art history, described as “a troubling dissonance.” A  prominent 
building in Moscow style set in the middle of classical Petersburg was meant to 
express this rejection. It was, Flier writes, “old Muscovy plunged into the heart 
of European Petersburg.”32 Although the cathedral was not consecrated until 
1907, its amalgam of the fi ve-cupola form with pre-Petrine ornamentation 
became the dominant model for church design in the offi  cial Russian style, 
from 1881 to 1905. Pobedonostsev wrote in a  report of the 1890s that 
Alexander himself reviewed projects for churches and “willingly approved 
those projects that reproduced the ancient tradition of Russian churches.”33 
More than twenty offi  cial Russian style churches went up in St. Petersburg 
from 1881-1914. Th e Assumption Cathedral of the St. Petersburg branch of the 
Kiev Monastery of the Caves (1895-1900), looks out over the Neva from the 
31 Michael S. Flier: “Th e Church of the Savior on the Blood; Projection, Rejection, 
Resurrection,” in Christianity and the Eastern Slavs, ed. Michael S. Flier and Robert 
P. Hughes (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 32-43.
32 Louis Réau, Saint Petersburg (Paris: H. Laurens, 1913), 67-68; Flier, “Th e Church of 
the Savior on the Blood,” 30.
33 A. Iu. Polunov, Pod vlast' iu ober-prokurora: gosudarstvo i  tserkov' v  epokhu 
Aleksandra III (Moscow: AIRO-XX, 1996), 76.
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Nikolaevskii embankment, a fi ve-cupola church with elaborate seventeenth-
century decoration. Th e Resurrection Cathedral on the Obvodnyi Canal 
(1904-08) within view of the Warsaw Railroad Station features a Byzantine 
central basilica, embellished with kokoshniki and a tent belfry characteristic 
of sixteenth and seventeeth century Russia. Nicholas Sultanov’s Peter-Paul 
Cathedral at Peterhof, completed in the late 1890s, brought the images of 
the Resurrection Cathedral to the playground of the court. Set on a  pond, 
it reproduced the tent forms and kokoshniki of the seventeenth century in 
brick, which Sultanov considered the building material most suitable for 
Russian churches. It was in stark contrast to the Rococo elegance of the 
Peterhof palaces. 
Churches built in the provinces were also situated at prominent sites as 
means to edify or rebuke the population.34 A  fanciful single domed Church 
of the Savior covered with kokoshniki and other decorations accompanied by 
a tent shape bell-tower went up at Borki near Kharkov, the site of the wreck of 
the emperor’s train in 1888, as a sign of miraculous salvation.35 Churches built 
near factories promoted eff orts by the government and church to awaken the 
religious faith of industrial workers. At the beginning of the 1890s, Leontii 
Benois designed a church for 2,000 people near the textile factory of the Hof-
meister, N. K. Nechaev-Maltsov, in the town of Gusev, near Vladimir. Th is 
massive edifi ce was surmounted by a great tent roof and bell tower at one end, 
and by cupolas and kokoshniki in the Iaroslavl style at the other. Th e image of 
St. George, the patron saint of Moscow, placed over the portal was probably 
the work of Victor Vasnetsov, who executed the paintings on the interior walls. 
A drawing of this church, which has been destroyed since, recalls the tent and 
cupola forms of Vasilii the Blessed. Fedor Shekhtel’s large Church of the Savior 
in the textile center at Ivanovo-Voznesensk, completed in 1898, was built in 
neo-Byzantine style.36
As the last example suggests, the appearance of new forms did not rule out 
churches built in the previous style. Under Nicholas II, churches in the Th on 
34 Th ese edifi ces as well as others in the national style are discussed in V. G. Lisovskii, 
“Natsional’nyi Stil’’ v arkhitekture Rossii (Moscow: Sovpadenie, 2000), 197-211.
35 Niva, 24 (1894): 569.
36 Zodchii (1893): 8, Plates, 1, 2, 6, (1903), 30-31; William Craft  Brumfi eld, Th e 
Origins of Modernism in Russian Architecture (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1991), 129. 
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style arose along with those in the style of seventeenth century Muscovy. 
Competing traditions persisted, confusing the symbolic statement that 
the monarchy was strenuously trying to exert.37 In late imperial Russia, we 
observe a  process of symbolic fragmentation that corresponds to the social 
fragmentation described in Alfred Rieber’s model of a “sedimentary society,” 
in which “successive social forms accumulated, each constituting a layer that 
covered all or most of society without altering the older forms lying under 
the surface.” Th e invention of tradition in Russia sustained a myth requiring 
dramatic reversals and sharp discontinuities in order to reinforce an image 
of supreme and irresistible power. In this context, invented traditions 
hardly contributed to a sense of a unifi ed historical past. To the critical eye 
of Paul  Miliukov, the plethora of traditions appeared as equivalent to no 
tradition at all. 
 
#
37 Alfred Rieber, “Th e Sedimentary Society,” in Between Tsar and People: Educated 
Society and the Quest for Public Identity in Late Imperial Russia, ed. Edith Clowes, 




in the Representation of Nineteenth-Century 
Russian Monarchy 
$
I t is a  truism in the literature about Russian nationalism that a  popular, democratic nationalism failed to appear in pre-revolutionary Russia. Russia 
diverged from the Western European model, exemplifi ed by England, France, 
and Sweden, where a concept of nation evolved under the aegis of a monarchy 
providing continuity between pre-modern dynastic concepts of nation, and 
modern civic nationalism.1 One reason that this transition did not occur 
in Russia was that the rulers preempted national appeals and endeavored 
to present themselves as the expression of the will of the Russian people. 
Russian monarchs utilized this foundation not only to bolster their authority, 
but also to preclude the possibility of civic nationalism and to show that 
democratic institutions were alien to Russia. Russian monarchs sought to make 
“nationality” (narodnost’) an attribute of imperial power, refl ected in the past 
activity and identity of the monarchy—to fi nd in the westernized court and 
monarchy a common past with the Russian people.
1 See Alain Guéry, "L'état monarchique et la construction de la nation française," Revue 
de la Bibliothèque Nationale, No.  32 (Summer 1989): 6-17; Linda Colley, Britons; 
Forging the Nation, 1707-1837 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). Th is 
corresponds to the fi rst type of nation building in Miroslav Hroch’s model: Miroslav 
Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: Th e Nation 
Building Process in Europe,” in Becoming National: A  Reader, ed. Geoff  Eley and 
Ronald Grigor Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 61; On Russia see 
Hans Rogger, "Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma," Comparative Studies 
in Society and History 4 (1961-1962): 253-56; Geoff rey Hosking, Russia: People and 
Empire, 1552-1917, xxiv, xxvi.
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To demonstrate their national credentials, Russian monarchs of the 
nineteenth century elaborated mythical narratives that demonstrated their 
bond with the Russian people. Such narratives show the ancient character of 
nations, common origins evolving from the past. Th ey evoke what Etienne 
Balabar called a “fi ctive ethnicity which makes it possible for the expression of 
a preexisting unity to be seen in the state, and continually to measure the state 
against its “historic mission” in the service of the nation, and, as a consequence 
to idealize politics.”2 In Russia, the mythical “idealization of politics” fi rst 
took the form of an eff ort to identify the Petrine heritage—the westernized 
Russian monarchy and multinational empire—with nationality, narodnost’, the 
term that gained currency and resonance in the fi rst decades of the nineteenth 
century. Th e word narodnost’ seems to have been fi rst used by the poet Petr 
Viazemskii as a  translation of the French nationalité in 1819. (Nationalité 
fi rst appeared in a French dictionary in 1835). It denoted a distinctive native 
character or identity, but what that identity was and where it was to be found 
remained unclear. Whether nationality was located in a  national literature, 
language, customs, institutions, people, or history, or some combination of the 
preceding, was the question intellectuals debated during successive decades. 
In  any event, the search for a  distinctive characteristic began under the 
infl uence of the French revolution and German idealistic philosophy, whether 
or not the word narodnost’ was used.3
Russian monarchy sought to appropriate nationality for itself, denying 
a  separate existence to the people, and trying to square the circle, to show 
that the westernized absolute monarchy was native in origin and spirit.4 
Here I argue that this appropriation of the idea of nation assumed two quite 
diff erent symbolic forms in the nineteenth century—the doctrine of offi  cial 
2 Etienne Balabar, “Th e Nation Form: History and Ideology,” in Becoming National: 
A Reader, ed. Eley and Suny, 133, 140, 143-44.
3 On the question of nationality see Nathaniel Knight, "Ethnicity, Nationality, and 
the Masses: Narodnost' and Modernity in Imperial Russia," in Russian Modernity: 
Politics, Knowledge, Practices, ed.  David L. Hoff man and Yanni Kotsonis 
(Houndsmills: MacMillan, 2000), 41-64. 
4 Th is corresponds to the type of national myths imposed by authoritarian states, 
rather than those worked out through open processes of discussion. David Miller 
observes that the distortion of the truth in such cases may be blatant, particularly 
when it touches on the legitimacy of the ruler. David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 39.
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nationality, which defi ned the relations between tsar and people during the 
reigns of Nicholas I  and Alexander II, and what I  call the national myth, 
which was propagated during the reigns of Alexander III and Nicholas II. Th is 
formulation diverges from a widespread view that Alexander III’s nationalism 
was merely a revival Nicholas I’s. It represented, I contend, not only a diff erent 
conception of the relationship between the monarch and Russian people, but 
a new conception of the state that played a crucial role in shaping the policies 
of the autocracy in the early twentieth century. 
Official Nationality
Nicholas I, following the pattern of his forebears, took on a  concept 
prevalent in the West and incorporated it into imperial mythology. Th e word 
“nationality” suggested an idea or spirit distinctive to a people; Nicholas I and 
his advisors identifi ed this spirit with the westernized Russian monarchy 
and its past. Th e central themes of offi  cial nationality were expressed in the 
manifesto announcing the sentencing of the Decembrists issued on July 13, 
1826. Th e Decembrists’ design to introduce western constitutional institutions 
was alien to the Russian people. “Neither in the characteristics nor the ways of 
the Russian is this design to be found . . . . Th e heart of Russia was and will be 
impervious to it.” Th e manifesto went on, “In a state where love for monarchs 
and devotion to the throne are based on the native characteristics of the people, 
where there are laws of the fatherland and fi rmness in administration, all 
eff orts of the evil-intentioned will be in vain and insane.”5 Th e failure of the 
Decembrist uprising was itself proof of the love of the people for the monarchy 
and its national character, which set Russia apart from European states that 
had come to rely on representative institutions. 
Th e establishment of political authority was most successful in Russia 
because of the Russian people’s love for those who had come from outside, 
or appeared to come from outside, to govern them. Th e Russian people set 
the model of obedience and loyalty for the other nationalities of the empire, 
who also accepted subordination to a multinational elite, sharing the western 
culture of the Petersburg court. Th e monarchy demonstrated the historic 
devotion of the Russian people to their conquerors and rulers, in ceremony, 
history, and church architecture. Th e fi rst ceremonial demonstration took 
5 Shil'der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi, 1: 704-06. 
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place a  few months aft er that manifesto in the summer of 1826. Aft er the 
coronation service in the Assumption Cathedral, Nicholas I  made the 
traditional procession in full regalia stopping fi rst at the Archangel, then 
the Annunciation Cathedrals. Th en he ascended the Red Staircase before 
the Palace of Facets, turned to the crowd, and bowed three times, to their 
thunderous Hoorahs! Th e bow was an initial ceremony of recognition between 
the emperor and the Russian people, expressing an unspoken bond of devotion. 
It was a  true “invented tradition,” which was repeated on future ceremonial 
visits of the emperors to Moscow and at all future coronations. Later in the 
century, the triple bow came to be hallowed as an “ancient tradition” distinctive 
to Russia, expressing the popular character of the monarchy.6 
Historical narratives now incorporated the Russian people into the 
dominant Petrine myth, giving the monarchy a  patina of democracy by 
showing it to be the choice of the nation. Th e founding legend for the myth 
was the summoning of Viking princes in 862 by the people of Novgorod with 
the words “Our land is great and rich, but there is no order in it. Come to rule 
and reign over us.” Nicholas Karamzin’s popular History of the Russian State 
(1818-1829) described this as “an astonishing and nearly unparalleled case in 
the chronicles . . . . Everywhere the sword of the powerful or the cunning of 
the ambitious introduced absolute monarchy [samovlastie] in Russia it was 
confi rmed by the general agreement with the citizens . . .  Th e Slavs voluntarily 
destroy their ancient popular government and demand sovereigns from the 
Varangians.”7 
Th e historian Mikhail Pogodin asserted that the summoning of the 
Varangians revealed the paradigm of the historical development of Russia and 
the political order exemplifi ed by Nicholaean autocracy. In a lecture delivered 
in 1832 in the presence of the Assistant Minister of Education, Sergei Uvarov, 
Pogodin declared, “Th e Varangians came to us, but voluntarily chosen, at least 
from the start, not like Western victors and conquerors—the fi rst essential 
distinction in the kernel, the seed of the Russian State.”8 Th e Russian people 
had invited their rulers, had obeyed and loved them; autocracy had national 
roots. Th e acceptance and worship of the supreme foreign ruler had become 
6 See Scenarios of Power, 1: 290-92.
7 Ol’ga Maiorova, “Bessmertnyi Riurik: Prazdnovanie ‘Tysiacheletiia Rossii’ v 1862,” 
Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 43, No. 3 (2000):137.
8 M. P. Pogodin, Istoriko-kriticheskie otryvki (Moscow: A. Semen, 1846), 6-8.
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the distinguishing mark of the Russian people. Th e invitation was enshrined 
as the offi  cial version of the foundation of the Russian state. In 1851, the fi rst 
volume of Sergei Soloviev’s History of Russia advanced the argument that the 
invitation took place in 852, rather than 862, and provoked angry responses 
from Pogodin, N. M. Ustrialov, and others. Pogodin declared Soloviev’s 
contention a  blasphemy against one of the “sacred dates” of Russian history. 
In 1852, Nicholas I issued an order to the Minister of Education insisting that 
higher educational institutions preserve the traditional date of 862.9
Th e ideological formulation of these themes was the work of the 
Minister of Education, Sergei Uvarov, who coined the slogan, “orthodoxy, 
autocracy, nationality.” pravoslavie, samoderzhavie, narodnost'. Uvarov 
advanced eighteenth-century utilitarian justifi cations of autocracy as the 
institution that had created and saved the Russian state. He did not mention 
divine sanction; autocracy was “the necessary condition of the existence of 
the empire.” Orthodoxy was presented not as a  revealed truth, but as the 
“guarantee of social and family happiness.” Th e Russian nation was defi ned 
not as an ethnic entity, but by the utter devotion of the Russian people to 
their rulers, which set them apart from western peoples, seduced by liberal 
ideas.10 Th e principles of Uvarov’s slogan were proclaimed and defended by 
a  number of offi  cial writers, contributing to such state-subsidized journals 
as Severnaia Pchela and Moskvitianin and refl ected the views of much of the 
educated public at the time.11
Th e subtext of the new version of the Petrine myth was that the institutions 
of the Russian state had been consecrated by its history: they were not to 
be judged by western ideas or the experience of western states. Th e history 
followed Karamzin’s linear pattern, the passing of the tradition of autocracy 
from reign to reign, its culmination in the existing Russian state. Th e offi  cial 
nationality doctrine preserved and enhanced the Petrine identifi cation of the 
emperor with the state. Mikhail Cherniavsky wrote that Peter’s governmental 
institutions all were “executive extensions of Peter’s personal will.”12 Much the 
9 Maiorova, “Bessmertnyi Riurik,” 137-40. 
10 On the idealistic and utilitarian grounds of Uvarov’s slogan see Andrei Zorin, 
“Ideologiia ‘Pravoslaviia-Samoderzhaviia-Narodnosti': Opyt rekonstruktsii,” Novoe 
literaturnoe obozrenie 26 (1996): 86-87, 92-101.
11 Nicholas Riasanovsky, Nicholas I  and Offi  cial Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), passim.
12 Michael Cherniavsky, Tsar and People, 86.
NATIONAL NARR ATIVES IN THE R EPR ESENTATION OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY...
 157 
same can be said for the institutions of Nicholas’s state. Although the Russian 
administration had attained massive dimensions by the end of his reign, 
Nicholas regarded the state as inseparable from his own personal authority. 
He took care to watch over his offi  cials as closely as possible, either through 
the function of nadzor—administrative supervision—or through the Th ird 
Section of His Chancellery, which served, among other functions, as an 
organ of personal surveillance over the administration. Nicholas’s person was 
omnipresent, and offi  cials regarded him as the incarnation of the state. “He 
gives meaning and color to everything,” Baron Modest Korf, a State Secretary 
of Nicholas, wrote. “All the radii of the many sided public activity converge on 
him.” Th e imperial court in Nicholas’s reign served as a display of the unity of 
the highest offi  cials of the administration with the emperor and other members 
of the imperial family.13
Nicholas remained fully German in manner, temperament, and dress, and 
made known his admiration for Frederick the Great and Prussian monarchy. 
At the same time, he openly displayed his predilection for Russian culture 
and  history. Th is took many forms: for example—preservation of artifacts 
of the Russian past, encouraging a  national style in church architecture and 
Russian music, arranging ceremonial visits to Moscow. It was made clear that 
these were not mere instances of personal taste, but visual statements of the 
monarchy’s identity and past. A  new style in church architecture gave visual 
expression to Nicholas’s conception of Russia’s national past. Constantine 
Th on created an offi  cial national style, which in 1841 was established by 
decree. Breaking from the eighteenth-century classical models, Th on designed 
fi ve-cupola churches on the model of the Vladimir and Moscow Assumption 
Cathedrals. His Moscow-Byzantine style is exemplifi ed by the massive 
Christ the Redeemer Cathedral in Moscow, which has recently been rebuilt 
at its original site in the center of Moscow. Th e Cathedral identifi es Russian 
Orthodoxy with the Byzantine imperial tradition, stating its distance from the 
Western monarchical tradition, which had proved weak and decadent. Neo-
Byzantine decorative elements were graft ed onto a massive western neo-classical 
structure, creating a  fusion of Russian and Western motifs characteristic of 
the eclectic spirit of Nicholaean culture.14 (See Article 8, Figure 1).
13 M. A. Korf, “Iz zapisok,” Russkaia Starina 98 (1899): 373. 
14 E. A. Borisova, Russkaia arkhitektura, 106-09; E. Kirichenko, Khram Khrista 
Spasitelia v Moskve (Moscow: Planeta, 1997), 61-63.
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Nicholas demonstrated the monarchy’s attachment to the traditions of 
pre-Petrine Russia at ceremonial appearances in the Moscow Kremlin, where 
he repeated the triple bow he had performed in 1826. Th ese trips assumed 
especial importance aft er the revolution of 1848, when ancient Rus’ signifi ed 
the religious national faith that preserved Russia from the dissension and 
upheavals that had affl  icted the West. Th ese displays of national affi  liation 
confi rmed rather than contradicted the authority of Nicholas’s westernized 
elite. He called upon the traditions of ancient Moscow but without wishing to 
revive them. 
Some of the more nationally inclined writers, like Pogodin and Stepan 
Shevyrev, on the other hand saw the emperor’s presence as a sign of a return to 
Muscovite culture. Th e diff erence between their image of a national monarchy 
and the emperor’s became clear during a visit to Moscow in 1849 to dedicate 
Th on’s New Kremlin Palace. Pogodin wrote that Nicholas assumed a diff erent 
persona when he left  the setting of the palace. “Are the Russian Tsar and the 
European Emperor two persons? No, they are one! From the Vladimir Hall 
[of the new Kremlin Palace] it is only a few steps to the Hall of Facets and the 
Red Staircase. Once [Nicholas] opens the door to the people, or even opens the 
window of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, all of Moscow, and with her all of Russia 
will see and hear him and answer, ‘Th e European Emperor is again the Russian 
Tsar!’” Pogodin’s article, however, did not pass the censors.15
Th e eff orts of the Slavophiles to recapture their conception of early Russian 
culture evoked a  sharp response. When Alexei Khomiakov, Constantine 
Aksakov, and several other Slavophiles ventured to appear at court in beards 
and what they believed was the Russian clothing of early Russia, a swift  rebuke 
came down from the Ministry of Interior. A circular of the Ministry of Interior 
to provincial marshals of the nobility, announced that “Th e tsar is displeased 
that Russian noblemen wear beards. Because for some time news has been 
received from all provinces that the number of beards has greatly increased.” 
It went on to explain that in the west, beards were “a sign of a certain type of 
ideas. We do not have this here.” Th e tsar, it concluded, “considers that beards 
will interfere with the nobleman’s elective service.”16 In Nicholas’s frame of 
mind, beards signifi ed not Russians but Jews and radicals. Th e offi  cial view 
15 Nikolai Barsukov, Zhizn' i trudy M. P. Pogodina (St. Petersburg: M. M. Stasiulevich, 
1898) 10: 234-35, 238. 
16 Ibid., 10: 250-51. 
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identifi ed the nation with the ruling western elite, and the suggestion that 
there was another, contradictory measure of the nation in the peasantry or 
the past intimated rebellion. Nicholas’s shows of national spirit were meant 
to preserve, not to narrow the distance between the autocratic-noble elite 
and the ruled: to dramatize obedience as a  spiritual quality of the nation. 
Authenticity, truth, and other versions of the national past jeopardized the 
monologic universe of the imperial myth. Th e beard symbolized a  coming 
together of elite and people in a  national culture whose features were not 
defi ned by the autocratic power.17 
Th e offi  cial nationality narrative also provided the grounding for 
a  dynamic view of the monarch as the ruler of a  reformed state leading 
a  mission of building a  dynamic and powerful Russian empire. Such fi gures 
as N. N. Murav’ev, A. P. Balasoglo, N. I. Nadezhdin, and other members of 
the Russian Geographical Society envisioned a revitalized Russian empire that 
would represent the Russian nation.18 Th e presumption of the devotion of the 
Russian people to a  monarch who embodied the state and empire underlay 
the rationale for the Great Reforms. Th e steps taken on behalf of the people 
by the monarchical state justifi ed the love of the people to their sovereign. 
Reform had been a  goal of Nicholas’s enlightened despotism, though fear of 
disruption deterred all but a  few eff orts to introduce change. Alexander II’s 
scenario adapted the ideas and images of offi  cial nationality to a  program 
of reform. He appeared as the humane European monarch, conferring 
benefactions on a grateful and devoted people—the emancipation of the serfs, 
the establishment of reformed courts and organs of local self-government. Th e 
Great Reforms were presented as expressions of the love uniting sovereign and 
people, distinctive to Russia, which would enable Russia to reap the benefi ts 
17 On the meanings imputed to the wearing of beards among the Slavophiles, and the 
Slavophiles' responses, see N. N. Mazur, “Delo o  borode: Iz arkhiva Khomiakova: 
pis'mo o zapreshchenii nosit' borodu i russkoe plat'e,” Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 
No. 6 (1993-1994): 127-38.
18 Mark Bassin, Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion 
in the Russian Far East, 1840-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
12-13, 94-101; Nathaniel Knight, “Narodnost’ and Modernity in Imperial Russia,” 
48-50; Nathaniel Knight, “Science, Empire, and Nationality: Ethnography in the 
Russian Geographic Society, 1844-1855,” in Imperial Russia: New Histories for the 
Empire, ed. Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press 1998), 108-42.
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of increased freedom and social development while avoiding the political 
upheavals of the West. 
Following the promulgation of the emancipation manifesto in February 
1861, demonstrations of gratitude and approval by the people showed the 
popular grounding of monarchical power fundamental to offi  cial-nationality 
thinking. Th e tsar remained the supreme westernized fi gure of godlike 
elegance, distant from his people and bestowing the benefi ts of progress and 
civilization upon them. Popular prints (lubki) issued in the era of emancipation 
present Alexander II standing above peasants and workers on their knees 
in prayer, displaying gratitude and adoration to the emperor, a  fi gure from 
a higher realm.19 Th e anniversary of the Millenium of Russia in Novgorod in 
1862 celebrated the emblematic act of rapport between ruled and their rulers 
in 862. Alexander addressed the Novgorod nobility calling the celebration 
“a new sign of the indestructible bond of all the estates of the Russian land 
with the government with one goal, the happiness and well being of our dear 
fatherland.”20 
The National Myth
Th e great divide in the history of the representation of the Russian emperor 
in the nineteenth century occurred not with the Crimean War and death 
of Nicholas I, but with the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. Th e 
assassination dealt the fi nal blow to the Petrine myth, the notion that Russian 
monarchy embodied the ideal of the European absolute state, but surpassed 
its models in power, majesty, and virtue. If the offi  cial nationality doctrine 
accommodated the concept of nation to the Petrine myth, Alexander III’s 
scenario presented the emperor as the hero of a national myth that emphasized 
his ethnic character as the most Russian of Russians, who stood apart from the 
westernized Russian state. 
Th e images and themes of the myth took form in the 1860s and 1870s 
among the members of the so-called “Russian party,” which consisted of 
offi  cials and journalists, disaff ected one way or another from the policies 
of Alexander II, such as Constantine Pobedonostsev, Mikhail Katkov, and 
Vladimir Meshcherskii. Th eir conceptions of the nation were vague and 
19 See Scenarios of Power, 2: 71-75.
20 Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr II, 1: 404. 
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diverse, but they all opposed what they perceived as irresolute domestic foreign 
policies and a  want of characteristically Russian traits. None of their views 
corresponded to the notion of civic nation, which they considered alien to 
Russia’s culture and past.
Th e new national myth was elaborated in the manifesto of April 29, 
1881. Th e manifesto, draft ed by Pobedonostsev, brought to an end the 
discussions of governmental reform that had continued under Loris-Melikov’s 
direction in the weeks aft er the assassination.21 Th e manifesto made the 
autocratic, unlimited power of the tsar appear as both a  divinely ordained 
obligation and the mandate of the Russian people. Revising the initial text, 
Pobedonostsev changed the words “the burden of supreme rule,” “bremia 
verkhovnogo pravlenia” to “the holy duty of Autocratic rule,” “sviashchennyi 
dolg samoderzhavnogo pravleniia.”22 Th is gave divine sanction to the tsar’s 
absolute power—not only to the sources of imperial power, but also to the way 
it was exercised. 
Th e people displayed their devotion to the monarchy not as they had under 
Alexander II, in demonstrations of gratitude for benefactions bestowed on 
them. Rather, they showed that the forms of national consent were religious, 
demonstrated through the institutions of the church, in prayer: “the fervent 
prayers of a pious people known throughout the entire world for their love and 
devotion to their sovereigns.” Th ese prayers brought divine blessing on their 
sovereign. 
Th e manifesto replaced the early eighteenth century with a new founding 
period of Russian monarchy. Pobedonostsev wrote not of the Russian state or 
empire, but the “Russian land” “zemlia russkaia.” Th e “Russian land” evoked 
a Slavophile picture of the unity of all estates in Russia, a single people, living 
in harmony with their tsar. Th e people in this way became inseparable from 
an image of an original, undiff erentiated abstraction of the land, uncorrupted 
by the institutions of the Russian state. Th e Russian land now had been 
disgraced by vile sedition, but “hereditary tsarist power,” continued to enjoy 
the love of its subjects, and this power “in unbreakable  . . .  union with Our 
land” had survived such troubles—smuty—in the past. Th e historical paradigm 
now shift s from the legend of the calling of the Varangians to a picture of an 
21 PSZ, Sobranie 3, no. 118, April 29, 1881.
22 O. Maiorova, “Mitropolit Moskovskii Filaret v  obshchestvennom soznanii kontsa 
XIX veka,” Lotmanovskii Sbornik, 2 (Moscow: O.G.I., 1997), 617.
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idealized Muscovite state. Th e elevation and glorifi cation of the monarch now 
took place by claiming to inhabit another time frame, when the tsar was in 
contact with the nation. Th e distance between the ruler and educated society 
was the distance between him and the manifestations of the fallen present 
that encumbered his power. Aft er Alexander III’s death in 1894, Moskovskie 
Vedomosti described him as the initiator of a new period in Russian history, 
“the Russian period”; he was the “great moral gatherer of Russian land,” 
placing him among the princes of Moscow. He had restored “Russian 
autocracy,” which had been realized in Muscovy when the idea of autocracy 
received from Byzantium had gained its distinctively Russian character. If the 
national myth sought to divest Russian autocracy of its western trappings, it 
also announced the separation from its Byzantine origins, which had been 
emphasized under Nicholas I.23
Th e synchronic mode characteristic of late nineteenth-century nationalist 
and racial ideologies replaces the linear development of the Petrine myth. 
Th e synchronic mode was profoundly anti-traditional, for it diminished the 
heritage of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and delegitimized the 
legalistic bureaucracy, the intelligentsia, and the dynamic of reform that had 
reached its culmination in the previous reign. It looked back to a  timeless 
heritage, untouched by historical change. Th e Russian emperor might live 
in Western-style palaces, consort with Western royalty, and share European 
culture, but these superfi cial overlays concealed a  national substratum (ustoi) 
that could be recovered through a  restoration of the earlier political and 
spiritual order. 
Th e image of tsar and people expressed the close cultural and even ethnic 
affi  nity that Alexander III claimed with his subjects. Again, the persona of 
the emperor was displayed early in his reign, and in public ceremonial form.24 
Alexander III was presented as “Russian tsar” in the fi rst months of his reign. 
Despite his parentage, culture, and frequent trips to Denmark, he was elevated 
as the embodiment of the nation. Alexander’s great size, his surly and uncouth 
manner, his impatience with the niceties of society made it possible to present 
him as one alien to the educated elite, whose character was close to the Russian 
narod. Most obviously, he was the fi rst Russian monarch since the seventeenth 
23 S. Petrovskii, ed., Pamiati Imperatora Aleksandra III (Moscow: S. Petrovskii, 1894), 
175, 286.
24 See Scenarios of Power, 2: 204-06.
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century to wear a  beard. While wearing beards had become fashionable 
among the upper classes by the 1880s, a large red beard on the face of Russian 
monarch was a  statement of association with pre-Petrine Russia. Th e image 
of his massive fi gure in a Russian hat and jackboots was the antithesis of the 
former sleek look of the guards’ regiments. It evoked the image of the bogatyr’, 
the burly epic heroes of early Russia, a  reaffi  rmation of state power, coming 
from within, from Russia itself. 
Th e change was displayed in a  new look given to the military. Shortly 
aft er his accession, Alexander issued permission, which was taken as an 
order for guards’ offi  cers to wear beards. (Guardsmen previously had been 
allowed only a  two fi nger-widths unshaven strip on their chins.) Soon 
nearly all guards’ offi  cers appeared with beards, though some thought that 
this gave them the look of peasants (omuzhichanie). New Russian-style 
uniforms were introduced, including the high Russian boots and fur hats. 
At the same time, the guards, the paragon of Petrine westernization, were 
surrounded by  religious symbols of old Russia. For the fi rst time, banners 
of the regiments  were emblazoned with icons of their patron saints. Eight-
pointed Orthodox crosses appeared at the top of the fl agstaff s.25 V. I. Gurko 
later wrote that this fusion of “military and religious ceremonies” produced 
a  feeling of elation, as the monarch became the symbol of the people’s 
might. Such ceremonies, he wrote, were a  distinguishing feature of the 
Russian court, which refl ected the spirit of “‘the ancient Muscovite empire’ 
permeated with religious and secular powers which complemented each 
other and formed one whole.”26 
Th e representations of the monarchy now sought to detach the image of 
imperial Russia from St. Petersburg and locate it in a  new image of Moscow. 
Symbolic Moscow did not encompass modern Moscow, the city of factories, 
the liberal intelligentsia and oft en fractious nobility. It was the Moscow of the 
Kremlin and Red Square, recalling an idealized past of spiritual unity between 
tsar and people and a devotion to the autocratic ruler unsullied by foreign doubts. 
In the summer of 1881, less than six months aft er his accession, Alexander 
unexpectedly announced his desire to travel to Moscow. In the Kremlin, he 
declared, “Moscow has always served as an example for all of Russia. I hope this 
25 Ibid., 2, 244-56. 
26 V.I. Gurko, Features and Figures of the Russian Past (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1939), 340. 
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will be true in the future. Moscow has attested and now attests that in Russia, 
Tsar and people compose one, concordant (edinodushnoe) strong whole.”27 Th en, 
aft er a  religious service, he stepped out onto the Red Staircase to perform the 
triple bow and to receive the acclaim of the crowd. (See Article 8, Figure 1).
Alexander’s coronation in 1883 confi rmed his belief that he was 
returning Russia to its Muscovite roots. In a  letter to the empress on its fi rst 
anniversary, he described the coronation as a “great event for us. And it proved 
to a  surprised and morally corrupt Europe that Russia is still the same holy, 
orthodox Russia as it was under the Muscovite Tsars and, if God permits, as it 
will remain forever.”28 Th e new prominence of the Orthodox Church showed 
the persistence of “holy, orthodox Russia.” Under Pobedonostsev’s direction, 
the church supplanted the state as the principal national institution of the 
monarchy. Th e Holy Synod encouraged the spread of religious literature, the 
building of church schools, and the expansion of church construction. It 
permitted the spread of pastoral movements among the secular clergy. Th e 
spirit of Russia’s religious past was recalled in great religious commemorations 
staged to show the autocracy’s debt to Orthodoxy and the national following 
commanded by the church.29
A new offi  cial national style of church architecture demonstrated a return 
to an original Russian spirit. Th e government gave proof of the vitality of early 
Russia by building Orthodox churches in Muscovite style. Alexander himself 
wanted the Cathedral of the Resurrection to be built on the site of his father's 
assassination in “the Russian style.” Russian style meant for him not the Th on, 
Moscow-Byzantine style of the Redeemer Cathedral but “the style of the times 
of Moscow tsars of the seventeenth century.” By this Alexander meant the 
fl amboyant forms of Vasilii the Blessed on Moscow’s Red Square. Th e external 
27 Vsemirnaia Illiustratsiia no. 656 (1881): 102.
28 GARF, 642-1-709, 24-25. Letter of May 16, 1884. 
29 Seventeen jubilee celebrations marked great religious events of Russia’s past during 
Alexander’s reign. Th e fi ve-hundredth anniversary of the Tikhvin Mother-of-
God and the centenary of the death of Tikhon Zadonskii took place in 1883. 
Th e millennium of Cyril and Methodius followed in 1885, the nine-hundredth 
anniversary of the baptism of Rus' in 1888, the fi ft ieth anniversary of the union with 
the Uniates of the Northwestern region and the fi ve-hundredth anniversary of the 
death of Sergei of Radonezh in 1892. See A. Iu. Polunov, Pod vlast' iu ober-prokurora: 
gosudarstvo i tserkov' v epokhu Aleksandra III (Moscow: AIR0-XX, 1996); Scenarios 
of Power, 2: 239-44. 
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devices—tent forms, the tracery, kokoshniki, and shirinki—borrowed from 
a  great number of seventeenth century churches in the Moscow-Iaroslavl 
style—are in great contrast with the more reserved and symmetrical forms 
of the Redeemer Cathedral. Although the Resurrection Cathedral, usually 
called “the Savior on the Blood,” was not consecrated until 1907, it provided 
the model for church design in the offi  cial Russian style aft er 1881.30 (See 
Article 8 Figure 2). A  report Pobedonostsev wrote as Chief Procurator of 
the Synod in the 1890s asserted that Alexander himself reviewed projects for 
churches and “willingly approved those projects that reproduced the ancient 
tradition of Russian churches.”31
Th e evocation of Muscovy, couched in Slavophile rhetoric and images, 
distanced the person of the monarch not only from westernized educated 
society, but from the institutions of the absolute state, encumbered by forms 
of European legality and institutional autonomy. For Alexander III and 
his advisors, the monarchy could regain its lost authority only by a  signal 
rejection of more recent governing traditions, which had enervated and 
constrained the exercise of autocratic power. Th e Russian tsar now embodied 
not the existing state, but the nation, existing from distant times, and it 
was his personal authority, wielded with diminished regard for legal and 
bureaucratic formalities, that could bring about the spiritual union between 
tsar and people. 
Th e seventeenth century provided a  paradigm for a  state power of 
a  diff erent type, a  government responsive to the monarch’s will that 
could reunite an administration divided by considerations of legality and 
institutional autonomy. Th e manifesto of April 29, 1881 associated the origins 
of the Russian nation with the restoration of monarchical authority aft er the 
breakdown of the Time of Troubles. Th e “Voice of God” (“Glas Bozhii”) 
had summoned the tsar “to turn vigorously to the task of Ruling, with hope 
in Divine Providence.” He would rule, he promised, “with faith in the force 
and truth of Autocratic power, which we have been summoned to confi rm 
and preserve for the people’s welfare from all encroachments.” Th e word 
“vigorously,” (bodro) bespoke an assertion of energetic, ruthless authority, 
inspired by the faith in God and the prayers of the people. 
30 Scenarios of Power, 2: 244-56
31 Polunov, Pod vlast' iu ober-prokurora, 76.
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Bodro became a common term in the rhetoric of conservative periodicals 
in the call for reaffi  rmation of autocratic power. Alexander’s stern and 
brooding mien, his brusqueness and crudity, presented him as a  model of 
that era, an incarnation of unyielding will and determination. He sought to 
restore early Russian autocracy by making the spheres of government directly 
responsive to his wishes—police, fi nances, and foreign policy. Th ese spheres 
would be directed by men completely loyal to him, those he regarded as truly 
Russian. Th e elite of Russian monarchy now narrowed to those sharing the 
tsar’s national vision, who were endowed with energy and shared Alexander’s 
arrogance of untrammeled power. Together, he and his servitors created 
an image of strength that exalted Russian monarchy when the empire’s 
international standing had declined, its fi nances were in disorder, and many 
high offi  cials cherished a  sense of legality that challenged the totality of 
autocratic rule. 
Th e anti-bureaucratic rhetoric that the Slavophiles had used to denounce 
the entire state administration now served to discredit those parts of the 
government resistant to the personal power of the monarch, especially the 
State Council and the court system. Th e contrast with Nicholas I’s Offi  cial 
Nationality, which validated the perfection and reinforcement of the 
existing administrative system, is clear. An article in Moskovskie Vedomosti 
upon Alexander III’s death remarked that the offi  cial nationality under 
Nicholas I remained some kind of “state patriotism,” “kazennyi patriotizm” and 
“was not embodied in living phenomena.” Nicholas I  “was not yet conscious 
with full clarity of the complete separation between Russia and Europe by 
type, was not conscious of the complete distinction of Russian autocracy from 
Western European monarchism.”32
Th e model for Alexander III’s national state was set forth in the pages of 
Russkii Vestnik by Mikhail Katkov’s protegé, the Simbirsk landlord, Alexander 
Pazukhin. Pazukhin evoked a  seventeenth-century Russian state based on 
close cooperation between nobility and bureaucracy, where noblemen served 
as willing executors rather than as independent citizens. For Pazukhin, 
the seventeenth century was a  period of administrative consolidation and 
growing state power in Russia. Th e “land” zemlia comprised for him not 
a community of the people, as it had for the Slavophiles, but the “state ranks” 
(gosudarstvennye chiny). “Th e estate organization in the mind of the old 
32 Petrovskii, ed., Pamiati Imperatora Aleksandra III, 288-89.
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Russian person was the guarantee of order and tranquility in the country.” 
Peter was not the founder but the benefi ciary of an estate system that he used 
to bring Russia closer to the West.33
Th e Slavophile picture of the seventeenth-century served to delegitimize 
the post-reform state with its striving for legality and autonomy. Pazukhin’s 
writings provided a  historical paradigm for counter-reforms that aimed to 
extend the authority of the monarch, through administrative institutions 
of the Ministry of Interior, to the local landed nobility, reconstituting the 
personal bond between the monarch and the estates that had presumably 
existed in seventeenth-century Russia. Th e national myth also provided 
historical grounding for the enhancement of the role of Russian religion and 
language in the governing of subject nationalities. It announced a break with 
the old model of a  multinational elite—a group united by service to their 
sovereign, and a common domination over subject nationalities, among whom 
the Russian people were exemplary in their devotion and subservience. Now, 
the non-Russian elites could no longer be trusted. Th e national autocracy 
identifi ed loyalty and administrative eff ectiveness with Russian ethnicity 
and Russian domination of other nationalities. In the western provinces and 
Poland the new myth justifi ed policies of Russifi cation, while in Central Asia 
they provided a  rationale for a  Russian colonial administration ruling over 
subject nationalities. 
To be sure, few of these goals were realized during Alexander III’s brief 
reign. Pobedonostsev’s schemes to reinvigorate the clergy as agents of national 
consciousness foundered on his policies of central administrative control of 
the activities of the church. Th e counter-reforms were resisted and in many 
ways emasculated in the State Council. Th e Petrine state asserted itself in the 
persons of the liberal bureaucrats and noblemen from the reform era, who 
continued to oppose changes in government particularly in the State Council 
and the Senate. Eff orts at Russifi cation in most areas encountered practical 
obstacles in the local nobilities and administration and fell short of their 
33 A. D. Pazukhin, “Sovremennoe sostoianie Rossii i soslovnyi vopros,” Russkii Vestnik 
(January 1885): 41-47. Alfred Rieber has suggested that Pazhukhin’s text may date 
from as early as 1881. Th is would indicate that his rhetoric and historical imagery 
was rooted in Alexander’s scenario as it was presented in the fi rst years of the reign. 
See Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1982), 95n.
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original goals. In many areas, they awakened the national consciousness and 
stimulated opposition among the subject nationalities. 
Th e national myth continued to defi ne the goals and to represent 
the symbolic reality of autocratic Russia aft er Alexander’s death in 1894. 
Nicholas II saw himself not as heroic westernized ruler, asserting his power 
through the Petrine state, but as exemplar of the nation, and unlike his 
father he did not envision a new administration or offi  cials in the image of 
Pobedonostsev’s ideal offi  cials. Nicholas’s distrust of governmental offi  cials 
was visceral—more profound, all-encompassing, and undiff erentiated than 
his father’s. In the fi rst years of the twentieth century, the imperial Russian 
state came under challenge both from a  growing opposition movement 
demanding constitutional reform, and a  no less insurgent monarch, 
determined to create a  form of personal rule that would express his direct 
bonds with the Russian people, the peasants.34 
Russian monarchical nationalism presented appeals to counter democratic 
ideologies, seeking to thwart the transition from dynastic to civic nationalism 
that had taken place in the West. National narratives fi rst evoked a past that 
presented the westernized autocracy as the object of the Russian people’s 
desire for strong authority imposed from above. Later, they emphasized the 
Russian character of the tsar, who restored strong autocratic rule based on an 
original unity between tsar and people that had been destroyed by western 
thought and culture. Th e image of national monarch sustained the mythical 
aura of the emperor. It helped preserve forms of mythical thinking that 
precluded any hint of dissent or politics that might mar the epic unity and 
silence of the myth by admitting negotiation and compromise. 
Monarchical nationalism in Russia proved a  potent factor impeding 
the rise of a  democratic nationalism that might unite state and society. 
Th is became clear aft er the revolution of 1905, when eff orts to work within 
the conservative framework of the Th ird and Fourth Dumas encountered 
Nicholas II’s stubborn distrust and resistance. Th e great historical 
celebrations that took place between 1909 and 1913, and especially the 
Tercentenary celebrations of 1913, he believed, showed that the people 
were devoted to him and not to elective institutions. Civic or even ethnic 
concepts of the unity of the Russian nation could not be reconciled with 
a  narrative that emphasized the historical bonds of the people with the 
34 See Scenarios of Power, 2, Chapter 11.
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monarch. Th e  popular, conservative Russian nationalism that began to 
spread through moderate society aft er the revolution of 1905 appeared 
to Nicholas  II as merely another threat to the unity of tsar and people 
contributing to  division and strife in Russian society. On the other hand, 
liberal thinkers and political leaders found it diffi  cult to disengage concepts 
of nationality from the institution that represented a  backward and 
oppressive order. Th e various groups in Russian society could fi nd little 
grounds for unity on the eve of a massive war that demanded the common 
eff orts of a united nation. 
#
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8. Moscow and Petersburg: 
The Problem of Political Center in Tsarist Russia, 
188 1-1914
$
E dward Shils’s and Cliff ord Geertz’s concept of political center raises interesting questions when applied to societies containing diverse and even 
confl icting symbolic traditions. In such cases, ceremonial activity defi ning the 
political center may clash with the expectations and beliefs of parts of society 
and cast doubt on the sacredness of the existing political system. Th e last 
decades of the Russian autocracy reveal such a situation of symbolic uncertainty, 
which both refl ected and infl uenced the political strife of the era. A change in 
the values and traditions the autocracy celebrated made the nature and location 
of the political center problematic. Th e d efi nition of symbolic political center 
inevitably aff ected the prestige of the capital, the administrative and political 
center of the empire. Th e tsar, by depriving the capital of his personal aura, 
gave sanction to a historical and symbolic tradition that in many respects was 
at odds with the government through which he ruled. His ceremonial activity 
gave visual expression to the old problem of the two capitals—Moscow and 
St. Petersburg—and created uncertainties about the very nature of Russian 
autocracy.
“St. Petersburg is the fundamental symbol of imperial Russia,” Vladimir 
Veidlé wrote.1 Peter the Great had bestowed the overwhelming force of his 
personality on his city, and his successors continued to reside in the capital, 
and lead its ceremonies and celebrations. St. Petersburg was the residence of 
the emperor, and the ceremonial life of the capital centered on his person. As 
absolute monarch, he represented the incarnation of secular power engaged in 
the strengthening and advancement of the nation. At the great occasions of the 
1 V. Veidlé, Zadacha Rossii (New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1956), 213.
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capital, he appeared in pomp and splendor, the exemplar of the values of the 
social and political elite.
Th e imperial court was the ceremonial center of the administration. Th ose 
who had achieved high rank witnessed or participated in the ritual life of the 
imperial family in the Winter Palace. Th e principal ceremonies—the imperial 
processions, the New Year and Easter functions, the Blessing of the Waters—
were visible expressions of the shared concerns and the bonds of personal fealty 
that united the tsar with his offi  cialdom.
Th e parade fi elds were the ceremonial center of the military. Th ere the 
tsar bestowed his attention upon his troops and gave them inspiring gestures 
of supreme approval. Th ey in turn gave him rousing exclamations of loyalty, 
and performed virtuoso displays of posture, marching, and riding. Th e offi  cers 
who stood or rode by his side felt a common lot and shared military ethos with 
the emperor. Th e tsar knew all personally and usually addressed them with the 
familiar ty, encompassing them in the charmed circle of his associates. “For all of 
us,” a guards offi  cer living in the provinces wrote, “Petersburg was the enchanting 
residence of the Tsar. And everyone who traveled to Petersburg was considered 
one of the elect, who could expect the happiness of being close to the Tsar.”2
Imperial ceremonies had a  secular emphasis: Th ey celebrated the tsar’s 
worldly preeminence. Even when the occasions were religious, attention 
focused on the celebration rather than the occasion, on the imperial fi gures 
rather than the religious services performed on that day. It was the procession 
from the imperial chambers to the palace church that displayed the tsar and his 
family on their way to worship. At Easter, the greetings in the Winter Palace 
and the great balls provided the moments of imperial grandeur, not the services 
themselves. Th e emperor worshiped in a  relatively modest setting. Th en he 
reigned like a demigod over the festivities.
St. Petersburg was the emperor’s city and the emperor was a visible presence 
in its streets. Nicholas I and Alexander II walked or rode through the capital 
without a  convoy until 1879, when revolutionary terrorism put Alexander’s 
life in danger. Th e security and inviolability of the emperor in his city were 
signs of his preeminence. Invulnerable among his subjects, he could openly 
confront them. Th e mythology of autocracy extolled the emperor’s accessibility. 
Th e tsar, strolling through the capital or in the gardens of the capital, met an 
unfortunate and set his grievances right.
2 Col. Paul Brunelli, “Moia letopis’,” Manuscript, Hoover Archive, 14.
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Th e coronation remained the principal ceremony of Moscow. Since Peter 
the Great, it expressed the continuity between the old and new capitals. It 
enacted what Geertz describes as the ruler’s taking possession of his land; the 
all-Russian emperor took possession of his Muscovite heritage. Th ough the 
church ritual remained faithful to the Muscovite original, the trappings—the 
regalia, clothing, and festive events—were those of Petersburg, unveiled in 
their greatest splendor to dazzle the old capital. Th e coronation marked the old 
capital’s recognition of the preeminence of the new.
Nonetheless, Moscow retained the image of national capital. Both cities 
were called “capitals” and Moscow the fi rst or original capital (pervoprestol'naia 
stolitsa), where the throne had been initially located. Th e emperors and 
empresses paid homage to Moscow on gala visits, when the court revealed 
its sumptuous panoply in the cathedrals and palaces of the old capital. Th ese 
visits were also reassertions of Petersburg’s primacy. Th e social and religious 
events expressed the autocrat’s connections with the national heritage. Th e 
court’s departure left  feelings of emptiness and abandonment that confi rmed 
Moscow’s secondary position. Prince Mikhail Shcherbatov captured this sense 
when he personifi ed Moscow as a  forsaken widow. Her sovereigns’ presence 
only expressed their displeasure. “No sooner do they arrive in the city which is 
the ancient capital of their forefathers than they hasten to leave it, in order to 
return merrily to the shores of the Neva.”3
Aft er the Napoleonic invasion, Moscow became the center of patriotic 
and romantic sentiment. Th e rebuilding of the old capital and its intellectual 
development accompanied a  new national pride refl ected in all aspects of 
Russian culture and thought. Th e existence of two capitals troubled the 
awakened national consciousness. “Two capitals cannot fl ourish equally in 
one  and the same state just as two hearts cannot exist in the human body,” 
Pushkin wrote.4
During the 1840s and the 1850s, the question of Russia’s capital became 
the subject of extended debate between the Slavophiles and Westernizers. 
Th e Slavophiles defended Moscow as the true capital. “Moscow is the capital 
of the Russian people,” Constantine Aksakov declared. “Petersburg is only 
3 Mikhail M. Shcherbatov, “Petition of the City of Moscow on Being Relegated to 
Oblivion,” in Marc Raeff , ed., Russian Intellectual History: An Anthology (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), 53.
4 Quoted in M. Perkal', Gertsen v Peterburge (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1971), 158.
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the residence of the emperor,” suggesting that in Russia, the presence of the 
ruler was not suffi  cient to establish the political center.5 Th ey emphasized 
St. Petersburg’s alien spirit and impermanence. Ivan Aksakov called it “the 
negative moment of history,” which “cannot create anything positive in the 
Russian sense.” A  return to the positive was possible only through “the 
negation of Petersburg as a  political principle.”6 Alexander Herzen, before he 
fell under Belinskii’s infl uence, felt similar misgivings. For him, St. Petersburg 
was a city that “had neither a history nor a future,” that each autumn awaited 
“the squall that would submerge it,” a reference to the legend that St. Petersburg 
was doomed to sink into the swamp from which it had arisen.7 Conservative 
intellectuals like Vasilii Zhukovskii and Mikhail Pogodin frequently expressed 
their preference for the old capital, which they thought represented the true 
center of the nation.8 Moscow was the “heart of Russia.”
Th e emperors also showed recognition of Moscow’s national character. 
In the eighteenth century, Peter the Great and Catherine the Great oft en 
visited Moscow to celebrate victories. Nicholas I’s trips to Moscow were 
occasions for displays of national sentiment. Nicholas’s appearances at 
the Kremlin cathedrals and other shrines were described at length and 
extolled in the offi  cial press. But the recognition was fl eeting, and the 
visits served as much to display the western character of the Moscow elite 
as the national sentiments of the court. Th us in 1849, Nicholas decided to 
spend Easter week in Moscow—the only occasion of an imperial visit for 
the holiday in the nineteenth century. But the principal reason for the 
emperor’s presence was the dedication of the new, neoclassical Kremlin 
palace. And the principal event, in the eyes of all except nationalist writers 
like Pogodin and Shevyrev, was the great masquerade at the palace of 
5 Aleksandr Gertsen, Byloe i dumy (Moscow: Gos. Izd. Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 
1962) 1:470; on the evolution of the Petersburg myth in general, see N. Antsyferov, 
Dusha Peterburga (Paris: YMCA Press, 1978); See also “Petersburg and Moscow as 
Cultural Symbols,” in Th eophanis George Stavrou, ed. Sidney Monas, Art and 
Architecture in Nineteenth-Century Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1983), 26-39.
6 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 66.
7 A. I. Gertsen, Sobranie sochinenii (Moscow: Ak. Nauk, SSSR, 1954), 2:34.
8 See for example M. Pogodin, Istoriko-kriticheskie otryvki, 131-59; V. A. Zhukovskii, 
Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (St. Petersburg: Marks, 1902), 12:155.
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Governor-General Zakrevskii. Indeed, Nicholas showed his contempt for 
the unguarded expressions of national taste that accompanied his visit. He 
remained true to the western institutional and military values that centered 
in St. Petersburg.9
During the reform era, political confl ict began to disturb the quiet of 
St. Petersburg. Emperor Alexander II and Empress Maria Aleksandrovna 
increasingly regarded the city with distaste and preferred the solitude of 
their rural palaces. In 1858, Alexander wrote to his mother of his wish to 
get away from the capital, “whose atmosphere is more or less gangrened.” In 
1861, he referred to “the gangrened population of the capital” in a  letter to 
his sister. Th e empress warned her son, Grand Duke Vladimir, of “the bad 
infl uences of idle and dissolute youth, which swarm in Petersburg.”10 At the 
same time, conservative nationalist writers depicted St. Petersburg as the 
symbol of all destructive western infl uence. Constantine Leontiev, writing of 
the decomposition of “Petrine models,” asserted that the “sooner Petersburg 
becomes something in the nature of a  Baltic Sevastopol or a  Baltic Odessa, 
the better it will be, I maintain, not only for us but probably also for so-called 
humanity.”11 Leontiev dreamt of Constantinople as capital. Alexander  III’s 
tutor, Constantine Pobedonostsev, felt uncomfortable in Petersburg and 
expressed his preferences for Moscow. As tsarevich, Alexander III associated 
with the “Russian party” in Moscow and supported its nationalist and 
protectionist program. He also felt ill at ease in the court life of the capital. He 
wrote to Pobedonostsev in 1880 of his longing “to be far from all the vileness 
of city life and especially Petersburg.”12
But until the beginning of the 1880s, these sentiments remained private 
and did not aff ect the ceremonial activity of the members of the imperial 
family. Th ey continued to appear at reviews, balls, and receptions and 
 9 N.P. Barsukov, Zhizn' i  trudy M. P. Pogodina, vol.  10 (St. Petersburg: A. Semen, 
1896), 220-53.
10 Alexander II to Alexandra Fedorovna, April 20, 1857, GARF, 728-1-2496, p.  65; 
Alexander II to Olga Nikolaevna, October 8, 1861, GARF, 728-1-26123, p. 4; Mariia 
Aleksandrovna to Vladimir Aleksandrovich, November 16, 1871, Houghton Library, 
bMS Russian, pp. 26, 35.
11 Konstantin Leontiev, Against the Current (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1969), 
208-09.
12 “Pis'mo Tsesarevicha Aleksandra Aleksandovicha k  K.P. Pobedonostsevy,” Starina 
i Novizna (1902), 5:1.
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remained visible in the streets of the capital. Only in the last two decades of 
the nineteenth century did the emperor begin to withdraw his presence from 
the city. At this point, Petersburg, which had never enjoyed the reputation of 
national capital, began to lose the aura that attached to it as residence of the 
tsar as well. Th ere took place a shift ing of allegiance, as the emperor, appearing 
as Russian tsar, increasingly associated himself with the old capital and the 
national feelings it evoked.
Th e turning point in this respect was the assassination of Alexander II at 
the Catherine Canal in Petersburg on 1 March 1881. Th e murder of the tsar as 
he rode to his weekly review of the guards of the capital destroyed the image 
of St. Petersburg as the emperor’s own city. No longer could he appear in its 
streets as if in an Olympian enclave. With the assassination, the sense of the 
tsar’s inviolability died as well, much as it had in France with the execution of 
Louis XVI.13 Th e emperor was no longer visible or accessible in his capital. 
Alexander III retreated to the suburban palace of Gatchina, which, surrounded 
by cordons of guards, became the imperial residence. Th e tsar came to be 
known as “the prisoner” (uznik).
But more than the tsar’s security was jeopardized. Th e act represented 
a  profanation of the imperial city. St. Petersburg became in the eyes of some 
“a defi led, disgraced and indecent place for the residence of the Sovereign.” 
Th ere were suggestions, especially in the Moscow press, that the capital be 
moved to Moscow.14 But they were hardly taken seriously in offi  cial spheres. 
St. Petersburg remained the capital, but it was St. Petersburg without the signs 
of its preeminence, divested of its charisma. Th e ceremonial acts and events 
that distinguished the capital lapsed or lost their symbolic force. Th e tsar 
became increasingly suspicious of the administration, regarding bureaucrats 
with their legalistic and practical preoccupations as threats to his authority. 
Th e capital ceased to appear as the political center even as the administration 
became larger, more assertive, and unyielding. Th e blocks of massive 
government edifi ces were deprived of their sacred aura once the imperial favor 
13 Michael Walzer, Regicide and Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1974), 5, 13-14, 35-42.
14 V. V. Voeikov, “Poslednie dni Imperatora Aleksandra II i  votsarenie Imperatora 
Aleksandra III,” Izvestiia Tambovskoi Uchenoi Arkhivnoi Komissii, Vyp. 54 (Tambov, 
1911), 102; F. A. Wellesley, With the Russians in Peace and War (London: E. Nash, 
1905), 90-91. 
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became ambiguous. Th en St. Petersburg began to lose its reason for existence. 
It became a  phantasmic presence in the world of the symbolists, a  signifi er 
without a signifi ed.
* * *
Alexander III preferred a  simple life of solitude in the country. Th e 
descriptions of him, chopping wood early in the morning at Gatchina, wearing 
a checked Russian shirt and Russian boots, playing with animals and children, 
presented the tsar as “of the same rough texture as the great majority of his 
subjects.”15 Like Peter the Great, he broke with the established culture of the 
elite and, by taking on features of the common man, withdrew his support 
from its pretensions. His open impatience with the amenities and trappings 
of court functions was a public repudiation of the capital and its values. “Not 
loving external glitter, superfl uous luxury, and blinding splendor, the late 
sovereign did not live in the Great Winter Palace,” a columnist of Moskovskie 
Vedomosti wrote aft er his death.16 But Alexander III did not follow Peter’s 
example and impose his own cultural mode. Rather he withdrew into his 
solitary, simple, private life, and participated, albeit half-heartedly, in the social 
and ceremonial functions of the capital.
Alexander III conscientiously resumed the events of the social season aft er 
the years of revolutionary crisis. But it was the empress who was the spirit of 
these occasions. A  charming and convivial hostess, Maria Fedorovna loved 
to dance and socialize, while the emperor preferred to withdraw to a game of 
cards. Alexander was an awkward and forbidding presence, who intimidated 
his intimates and did not seek their aff ection or admiration. “His manner 
is cold, constrained, abrupt, and so suggestive of churlishness as oft en to 
deprive spontaneous favors of the honey of friendship for the sake of which 
they are accorded,” the London Times correspondent Charles Lowe wrote.17 
He immediately curtailed the military ceremonials in St. Petersburg that had 
remained prominent events during his father’s reign. He discontinued the 
popular Sunday reviews of the guards in the Manege and the spring parades. 
15 Charles Lowe, Alexander III of Russia (New York: MacMillan, 1895), 322.
16 S. Petrovskii, ed., Pamiati Imperatora Aleksandra III (Moscow: S. Petrovskii, 1894), 
318-19. 
17 Lowe, Alexander III, 330; Vera Galitzine, Reminiscences d’une emigrée (Paris: n.p., 
1925), 70-71.
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Occasions for drill became increasingly infrequent, and owing to the new, 
drab, Russian style uniforms that he introduced, proved uninspiring.18
Nicholas II also made no secret of his dislike of St. Petersburg. He longed 
to move the capital, though he had the Crimea and not Moscow in mind.19 
In the fi rst years of his reign, he endeavored to live at the Winter Palace and 
carry on the traditional social obligations of emperor. But he too felt ill at ease 
in public, and the Empress Alexandra abhorred public occasions and had none 
of her mother-in-law’s social grace or charm. She immediately discontinued the 
empress’s small dinners for members of the court, which had kept the imperial 
family in touch with court society.20 Th e imperial family spent increasingly 
prolonged periods at Tsarskoe Selo.
Nicholas II, unlike his father, loved the parade grounds and felt in his 
element among the offi  cers’ corps. He resumed the spring parades and replaced 
the simple Russian style uniforms of his father’s reign with new imposing 
ones reminiscent of earlier splendor. But his association with the military 
was, for the most part, not visible in the capital. He joined the offi  cers in their 
regimental breakfasts and dinners. Th e center of military ceremony shift ed 
from the capital to the camp at Krasnoe Selo, where maneuvers and parades 
united the tsar with his elite troups in a holy ceremony, followed by brilliant 
social occasions.21 But even when military exercises and celebrations took place 
in the capital, the mood had changed. Th e champs de mars, the scene of the 
great parades and popular entertainments, now had a  mortuary atmosphere 
about it. “It is surrounded by objects calculated to bring back recollections of 
the saddest nature,” the English military attaché noted.22 A  hundred yards 
from the northeast corner was the votive chapel on the site of Karakozov’s 
attempt on Alexander II’s life. To the southeast was the Engineering Castle, 
where Emperor Paul, the father of two nineteenth-century emperors, had 
been murdered. To the southwest, a  chapel and later a  cathedral was erected 
on the spot of Alexander’s assassination, worshiped as a  sacred shrine to his 
18 B. V. Gerua, Vospominaniia o moei zhizni (Paris: Tanais, 1969), 1:81.
19 A. A. Mosolov, Pri dvore Poslednego Rossiiskogo Imperatora (Moscow: Ankor, 1993), 27. 
20 Carl Graf Moy, Als Diplomat am Zarenhof (Munich: Prestel, 1971), 208.
21 Allan K. Wildman, Th e End of the Russian Imperial Army: Th e Old Army and the 
Soldiers' Revolt (March-April 1917) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980) 
6-7; P. N. Krasnov, Pavlony (Paris: Izd. Glav. pravlenī e zarubezhnago soiuza russkikh 
voennykh invalidov, 1943), 51-73.
22 Wellesley, With the Russians, 32-33.
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martyrdom. Petersburg had become the scene of the emperors’ mortality not 
their immortality, recalling their tragedies rather than their triumphs.
Moscow, “the holy city,” represented the traditional religious values that 
the ideologists of autocracy now extolled. Constantine Pobedonostsev, chief 
procurator of the Holy Synod, emphasized the role of the Russian Orthodox 
Church in the preservation of the authority and prestige of autocratic 
government. He named the principal statement of his political views Moscow 
Collection (Moskovskii Sbornik—the English translation is entitled Refl ections 
of a  Russian Statesman). Aft er the assassination, attempts were made to give 
St.  Petersburg something of the appearance of Moscow. Alien, western 
infl uences were to be dispelled; the capital was to be sanctifi ed by making it 
more like Moscow, by Muscovitizing St. Petersburg. Th e fi rst expression of 
this tendency was the cathedral built to consecrate the site of Alexander  II’s 
assassination on the Catherine Canal. Th e offi  cial announcement for the 
architectural competition specifi ed that it was to be in the “national” style. 
Th e architects submitting projects followed the earlier offi  cial defi nition 
of “national,” decreed by Nicholas I; that is the neo-Byzantine manner of 
the Assumption Cathedral in the Kremlin (see Figure 1). Alexander III was 
displeased and declared that the temple should be built in the “style of the time 
of the Moscow tsars of the seventeenth century.”23
Th e architect, Alfred Parland, unlike the others in the competition, un-
derstood what Alexander meant—the fl amboyant national architecture of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, or, more specifi cally, Vasilii the Blessed. 
Assisted by Father Ignatii, the abbot of the Trinity-Sergeev Hermitage at 
Peterhof, Parland drew up plans for the Temple of the Resurrection of Christ 
or, as it came to be called, the Savior on the Blood, as a  copy of Vasilii the 
Blessed. Its multicolored intricate decorations and mosaics introduced a strange 
contrast to the other great cathedrals of the capital—the Kazan Cathedral 
and St. Isaacs, both replicas of St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome. Th e eff ect in the 
neoclassical city was less than felicitous, creating what one authority described 
as “a troubling dissonance”24 (see Figure 2).
23 Moskovskie Vedomosti, April 9, 1882.
24 Khram Voskreseniia Khristova sooruzhennyi na meste smertel'nogo poraneniia 
v boze pochivshego Imperatora Aleksandra II na ekaterinskom kanale v S-Petersburge 
(St.  Petersburg: R. Golike and S. Vil’borg, n.p., 1907), 2; Louis Réau, Saint 
Petersburg, 67-68.
Figure 1.
Imperial Procession of Alexander III 
and Maria Fedorovna from the Assumption Cathedral, July 17, 1881.
Lithograph, Vsemirnaia Illiustratsiia, No. 658 (1881)
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Th e interior itself was a strange cultural amalgam. Th e design followed not 
the warren of Vasilii the Blessed, but the traditional open cruciform space of 
the Byzantine cathedral. Th e walls were covered by frescoes, among them works 
of Victor Vasnetsov and Mikhail Nesterov. Th e pavement stained with the 
emperor’s blood was kept under a  fl amboyant canopy in seventeenth-century 
style. Th e enormous donations allowed no expense to be spared for a  temple 
which “surpasses all the churches of Petersburg in its sumptuousness.” It was 
illuminated by 1,589 electric lights and even equipped with steam heat.25
Nicholas II shared his father’s taste for a national style in architecture and 
introduced more Muscovite motifs into the Petersburg landscape. He had the 
new neoclassical building of the School Council of the Holy Synod remodeled 
into the Alexander Nevskii Temple-Monument in memory of Alexander  III. 
Th e architect, Alexander Pomerantsev, made over the right side of the building 
in imitation of an Old Russian church at Borisoglebsk. Th e neoclassical lines 
and symmetrical disposition of windows were now decorated with an old-
Russian portal, mosaic frescoes, and tracery. Five onion-form cupolas and 
a tent-style steeple rose above the fl at rectangular roof. Inside, paintings with 
“a religious-moral meaning” depicted the lives of Nevskii, St. Sergei, and other 
princes and saints of old Russia.26 Th e Tercentenary Cathedral, dedicated 
in 1914, was an explicit and exact copy of Rostov church architecture of the 
seventeenth century. At Tsarskoe Selo, Nicholas had the Fedorov Cathedral 
built for the empress in imitation of the Annunciation Cathedral in the 
Kremlin, though with seventeenth-century elements to give it a more national 
appearance.27
Nicholas also tried to bring Moscow into his own life and the life of the 
Petersburg court. If his father’s national persona was the peasant-tsar, Nicholas’s 
was the Muscovite tsar wearing the vestments and performing the Byzantine 
ceremonies of the seventeenth century. Like his father, he enjoyed reading 
about Russia’s early history. But lacking Alexander’s practical disposition, he 
was given to imagining himself in roles and situations of the past, especially 
25 Khram Voskreseniia Khristova, passim; Réau, Saint Petersburg, 68; Grigorii 
Moskvich, Petrograd i ego okrestnosti (Petrograd: Izd. G. Moskvich, 1915), 103.
26 K. Korol'kov, Tsar' mirotvorets, Imperator Aleksandr III (Kiev: n.p., 1904), 57-60; 
Niva no. 13 (1901): 259.
27 Niva no.  5 (1914): 97; Alexandre Spiridovitch, Les dernières annees de la cour de 
Tsarskoe selo (Paris: Payot, 1928-29), 2:253-62; “Th e Feodoroff  Imperial Cathedral in 
Zarskoe Selo,” typescript in New York Public Library, Slavonic Division, 135. 
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when political diffi  culties began to multiply. Muscovite autocracy came to 
represent for him the ideal polity that existed in harmony with all classes of the 
population. It was a fantasy of government free from confl ict, the ruler obeyed 
and loved by his subjects.28
For his model, Nicholas looked to Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, the most 
tranquil tsar, who could rely on his own judgments without struggling 
against the heads of administrative institutions or challenges from political 
movements. He appropriately chose the name Alexei for his son. Th e 
Minister of Interior, Sipiagin, artfully played upon and encouraged Nicholas’s 
predilections. He had the minister’s chambers in the neoclassical building 
of the ministry redesigned to resemble the Hall of Facets in the Kremlin 
and longed to receive the tsar with Muscovite ritual and hospitality. When 
Nicholas accepted his invitation, he ordered an elaborate Russian feast with 
a gypsy orchestra from Moscow. Th e day before the event was to take place, 
Sipiagin was felled by an assassin’s bullet.29
Th e most spectacular recreation of the seventeenth century was the gala 
costume ball of 1903. Nicholas viewed this as no mere masquerade, but as 
a  fi rst step toward restoring Muscovite court ritual and dress. Seventeenth-
century attire was mandatory. Museums were searched for pictures, artists 
and couturiers were hired to make costumes at enormous cost. Courtiers came 
as boiars, okol'nichie, and other service ranks of Muscovy. Th e ladies wore 
seventeenth-century gowns studded with their ancestral jewels. Th e offi  cers of 
the guards were dressed as strel'tsy, the musketeers of old Russia. Nicholas wore 
a brocaded processional robe and crown of Alexei, Alexandra a gown brocaded 
in silver, a miter, and a huge emerald pendant surrounded with diamonds.30
“Th e court looked very pretty fi lled with ancient Russian people,” Nicholas 
wrote in his diary. Th e event was so huge a  success that it was repeated for 
the dowager, who had been abroad, and members of the diplomatic corps, 
who attended in their usual evening dress. A  deluxe two-volume album was 
28 L. G. Zakharova, “Krizis samoderzhaviia nakanune revoliutsii 1905 goda,” Voprosy 
Istorii, no.  8 (1978): 130-32; A. A. Polovtsov, “Dnevnik,” Krasnyi Arkhiv, no.  3 
(1923): 99-100; Alexandre Iswolsky, Mémoires (Paris: Payot, 1923), 271-72.
29 Zakharova, “Krizis,” 130-32; S. E. Kryzhanovskii, Vospominaniia (Berlin: Petropolis, 
n.d.), 192-93, 206-8. 
30 Grand Duchess Maria Georgievna, “Memoirs,” manuscript in personal collection of 
David Chavchavadze, 129-32; V. N. Voeikov, S  tsarem i  bez tsaria (Helsinki: n.p., 
1936), 38-39. 
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published with photographs of all the guests in their costumes, identifi ed with 
their twentieth- and seventeenth-century ranks. But the court regarded the 
ball as little more than an enchanting diversion, and the forbidding expense of 
adopting Muscovite dress discouraged further experiments of this type. Soon 
aft er, the Russo-Japanese War and then the revolution of 1905 brought a halt 
to all social and ceremonial life in the capital.31 
St. Petersburg remained impervious to Muscovite infl uence. To express 
their attachment to Moscow, Alexander III and Nicholas II visited the 
old capital. Th ere they sought to enter communion (obshchenie) with what 
they viewed as the faithful masses of the Russian people. Alexander III fi rst 
envisaged a  Zemskii Sobor, an assembly of 3,000 to 4,000 deputies, most of 
them peasants, which was to meet with the tsar in the Church of the Redeemer 
in Moscow. Pobedonostsev and other advisers, however, quickly discouraged 
this scheme. Instead, the communion was to be expressed in ceremonial form. 
Th e tsar, visiting the shrines of the Kremlin, received the adulation of the 
faithful, which replaced institutional expressions of support for autocracy.32
Th e fi rst of these visits took place only a few months aft er Alexander III’s 
accession. In July 1881,  during the maneuvers at Krasnoe Selo, the tsar 
abruptly announced his intention to travel to Moscow. At the Kremlin, where 
he bowed to the people and received the traditional greetings of the estates, he 
demonstrated his unity (edinenie) with the fi rst capital. (Figure 1 and Article 6, 
Figure  1.) He declared, “Th e Late Little? Father (batiushka) expressed his 
gratitude many times to Moscow for her devotion. Moscow has always served 
as an example for all of Russia. I hope this will be true in the future. Moscow 
has attested and now  attests that in Russia, Tsar and people comprise one, 
concordant [edinodushnoe] whole.”33 (See Figure 1.)
Th e gratitude to Moscow for its devotion contrasted with the disdain 
Alexander had shown toward St. Petersburg. Th e acclaim he received in the 
Kremlin on this and subsequent visits was taken by the devotees of autocracy 
as a  national mandate. On the steps of the “red porch” in the Kremlin, the 
31 Zakharova, “Krizis,” 131; Maria Georgievna, “Memoirs,” 132; V. N. Voeikov, 
S  tsarem, 39; Al' bom kostiumirovannogo bala v  Zimnem Dvortse v  fevrale 1903 g. 
(St. Petersburg,[publisher] 1904); Mosolov, Pri dvore Imperatora, 18.
32 P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Krizis samoderzhaviia na rubezhe 1870-kh—1880kh godov 
(Moscow: Moscow University, 1964), 450-60. 
33 Vsemirnaia Illiustratsiia, no. 656 (1881): 102. 
Figure 2.
Th e Cathedral of the Resurrection of Christ “on the Blood.”
A. A. Parland, Khram Voskreseniia Khristova (St. Petersburg: n.p. 1907) 
Lithograph, Vsemirnaia Illiustratsiia, No. 658 (1881)
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tsar heard thunderous hoorahs, the ringing of bells, a  salute. He bowed in 
acknowledgment. Voeikov, an offi  cer of the Uhlans, indicated the great 
signifi cance of the gesture. “Th is is a  custom unique to the world—the 
autocratic tsar bows to his faithful subject people. Th is custom is the sacrament 
of the communion of the tsar with his people.” Such rhapsodic accounts as well 
as prints of the highlights of the tsar’s visit appeared in popular periodicals. 
Th e cover page of Vsemirnaia llliustratsiia showed Alexander and the empress 
receiving the acclaim of the crowd before the Assumption Cathedral in 
the Kremlin.34 (See Article 6, Figure 1.)
From Moscow, Alexander traveled through the old towns along the 
Volga “from the most ancient times consecrated by devotion to Russia, where 
aft er the great troubles of the XVII century, true Russian people elected the 
Romanov house to the throne.” Th e tsar now sought to renew the original 
mandate of 1613, to root his rule in the feelings of the people of the Russian 
heartland. He followed the itinerary that he had taken three times as 
tsarevich. He visited Nizhnii-Novgorod, the gathering point of the militia of 
1612, and Kostroma, the location of the Romanov votchina where Michael 
and mother were in hiding in 1613. Th e jubilation, Voeikov wrote, provided 
the tsar with a  sense of popular, national support. “He drew from these 
outpourings of the people, these historical shrines alive with their past, the 
necessary strength and faith to pacify and uplift  the Russian State, preserved 
and given to him by God.”35
Alexander on this and subsequent trips was no longer the sovereign 
proceeding through his land to take possession of it by displays of grandeur and 
majesty. Rather, he returned to the historical center in order to reveal his bond 
with the old monuments and symbols, once the new had become treacherous 
and threatening. He was expressing his sense of belonging to the Muscovite 
origins of the Russian empire and distancing himself from its St. Petersburg 
phase. St. Petersburg, the symbol of rational power containing the disorderly 
elements of Russia, had lost its force as a  source of authority. Th e tsar rather 
found justifi cation for his rule in the elemental devotion of the simple people 
of Russia to their sovereign and to the order and might that he represented.
Th e coronation of the tsar, taking place in Moscow, now became an 
event, declaring the new national, religious sense of authority to Russia and 
34 Ibid.
35 V. V. Voeikov, “Poslednie,” 151-54.
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the world. Th e offi  cial accounts of Alexander III’s coronation in 1883 stressed 
the national and popular character of the celebration. Th ey presented it as far 
more than the traditional conferral of God’s blessings on the tsar’s rule. Th e 
Church now represented the Russian people. Th e offi  cial album described the 
coronation as "an all-national event which expressed the historical union of 
the Sovereign with his State, his vow to the Church, that is to the soul and 
conscience of his people, and fi nally the union of the Tsar and people with 
the Tsar of tsars in whose hands rests the fate of both tsars and peoples.” Th e 
people’s attitude toward the tsar had remained unchanged since the sixteenth 
century, it emphasized. “Th e people saw and see in him the bearer of its moral 
consciousness, its conscience and faith.”36
Th e events surrounding the coronation emphasized the new importance 
of Russia’s Muscovite heritage. For the occasion, Tchaikovsky composed 
a cantata, Moscow, based on the romantic historical poetry of Apollon Maikov. 
Th e work, which has not found a  place in the symphonic repertory, was 
performed during the Coronation Banquet in the Hall of Facets. It sung the 
glory of the  Muscovite princes and tsars who had united Rus' and overcome 
the Tatars. Th e bogatyr', symbolizing Russia, was addressed by “people of God 
of all countries, of eastern countries.”
For all eastern countries, you, now,
Are like the rising star of Bethlehem,
A prophesy about Moscow, Your Moscow
Two Romes Fell,
Th e Th ird Stands
Th ere will be no fourth.37
Th e gala performance at the Bolshoi Th eater included the fi rst and last 
acts of Glinka’s Life for the Tsar, the latter showing Tsar Michael’s entry into 
Moscow in 1613.  At Alexander II’s coronation, it had been L'Elisir d'Amore.
Alexander III’s coronation received massive publicity both in Russia 
and abroad. For the fi rst time, foreign correspondents were admitted to the 
36 Opisanie sviashchennogo koronovaniia ikh Imperatorskikh Velichestv Gosudaria 
Imperatora Aleksandra III i Gosudaryni Imperatritsy Marii Fedorovny (St. Petersburg 
and Ekspeditsia Zagotovleniia Gosudarstvennykh Bumag, 1883), 2-3. 
37 Ibid., 27.
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coronation services in the Assumption Cathedral. Th ey described the grandeur 
and excitement of the ceremony to an international audience. Charles Lowe 
wrote, “Th e solemn strains of the national anthem, the joyful pealing of the 
bells, the thunder of the swift ly served cannon, the surging sea of spectators, 
and the loud and continued cheers, all produced a  scene that can never be 
forgotten by those who witnessed it.” At night, “the city went almost mad with 
Monarchical joy.” Th e correspondent for the Standard sensed the meaning 
of the event. “Peter’s town may rule for a  time, but Moscow still remains the 
center of national life and some day may with greater right become the capital 
of the Russian tsars.”38
In subsequent years, conservative publicists in Moscow stressed Moscow’s 
contribution to the evolution of the Russian state. For them, Moscow’s 
feminine character, rather than the masculine ruthlessness of St. Petersburg, 
represented the source of the state spirit. Moscow’s self-abnegating love assured 
the tsar’s complete obedience. “Surrounding their cradles with tender care, 
caressing their childhood and days of youth, Moscow conveyed from clan to 
clan the love for the generations of its tsars, transferred from clan to clan the 
harmonious ideas of the state principle [gosudarstvennost'], the precepts of her 
wise fi rst-service.”39
Th e fi nal and most spectacular visit of Alexander III to Moscow took place 
aft er his death, when his coffi  n was borne along its streets on the way from 
Yalta to Petersburg. Th e elaborate and emotional celebration appealed to the 
national taste for mourning. Lowe wrote, “If a poetic or artistic genius depicted 
the incarnation of death on earth, he could create nothing more artistic or 
harmonious than what was presented in the days of mourning.”40 Th rongs 
watched in grief and awe as the funeral procession passed through Moscow to 
the tolling of its many bells, beating of drums, and the strains of the funeral 
march. Th e whole people, like a  single person, bared their heads as the holy 
dust of the deceased Emperor approached,” the Vsemirnaia Illiustratsiia 
correspondent wrote. “Th e picture was majestic. From all sides one heard 
sobbing and weeping.”
38 Lowe, Alexander III, 70, 74-75; V. S. Krivenko, ed., Koronatsionnyi sbornik 
(St. Petersburg: Ekspeditsiia Zagotovleniia Gosudarstvennykh Bumag, 1899), 151. 
39 E. Poselianin, Iasnye dni; 17 oktiabria; 29 aprelia, 28 oktiabria (Moscow: Obshchestvo 
rasprostraneniia poleznykh knig , 1892), 18.
40 Lowe, Alexander III, 247-49. 
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Most signifi cant was the presence of the tsar’s body in the old capital. 
He lay in state, not in the Winter Palace, as had his predecessors, but in the 
Archangel Cathedral near the princes and tsars of Moscow. Courtiers and 
common people fi led by and paid their last respects to the tsar, whose coffi  n 
was held in a  “gorgeous catafalque all glittering with gold.” Th e conservative 
and offi  cial accounts emphasized the national character of the devotion of 
all classes of the population to their tsar. “And in this mixing of tears, shed 
over the grave of the deceased tsar, the great mysterious unity of the Russian 
people was consummated with its great beloved tsar, which is inaccessible to 
the ordinary mind.”41
Constantine Pobedonostsev, not usually given to emotional transports, 
was inspired by the sight of the tsar close to his pre-Petrine forebears. Th e 
coffi  n lay “in the heart of Russia” near “the early leaders of the Russian land.” 
Th e “orphaned people” mourned them all. Th ey also mourned “the most 
tranquil tsar, Alexei.” Pobedonostsev took the comparison further with his last 
respects to his pupil. “Farewell, Pious, Kind to the people, most tranquil, Tsar 
Alexander Aleksandrovich!”42
Th e body of the tsar had to be removed to Petersburg for burial. It was 
done with some haste, for the embalming had been performed poorly and 
decomposition had begun. By the time it had reached Petersburg, the body 
had been covered with powder, making the tsar’s face almost unrecognizable. 
Th e stench became so acute that the guards at the Peter-Paul Cathedral had 
diffi  culty completing their duty.43
Th e St. Petersburg procession, though joined by an impressive array of 
notables and members of the imperial family, lacked the spirit of Moscow’s. 
Few people appeared on the street and the procession moved fi tfully and 
irregularly.44 Th e gloomy Petersburg October day depressed feelings: “a line of 
route lugubrious with the hangings of undertakers’ woe, and dismal with slush 
and mud, and a drizzle from a sullen, leaden-hued sky.” A correspondent from 
Moscow took the murky weather as a  sign of Petersburgs “rottenness,” borne 
on a  western wind. Th e onlookers, respectful and reverent, did not display 
41 Petrovskii, Pamiati, 86-88. 
42 Ibid., 88-89.
43 A. V. Bogdanovich, Tri poslednikh samoderzhtsa (Moscow-Petrograd: L. D. Frenkel’, 
1924), 182-83. 
44 Ibid.
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the feelings of devotion evident in Moscow. Uncertainties about the shift  of 
superiors under the new tsar made offi  cial concerns paramount and diminished 
the eff ect of the bereavement.45
Th e Petersburg ceremonies featured the westernized elite of the court 
and European royalty. Alexander III was laid to rest amidst the neoclassical 
magnifi cence of the capital, mourned by the imperial family, the highest 
offi  cers and offi  cials of St. Petersburg, foreign princes, and heads of state. Lowe 
described the eff ect. “A thousand glimmering candles were refl ected in the 
silver wreaths, the majestic brocade of the canopy, and the star-spangled breasts 
of the uniforms, producing a  scene of such splendor as is seldom witnessed.” 
Aft er Nicholas and the dowager, Maria Fedorovna, paid their last respects, 
the cathedral was fi lled with sobbing. “Many gray-bearded heads bent in silent 
grief, in many eyes unaccustomed to tears, great tears glistened. Many knees 
were bent and many of those praying, in the uniforms of the highest ranks, 
covered their faces with their hands so that their neighbors would not be 
witnesses to their grief.”46 Played to a  foreign audience, the fi nal obsequies 
blessed the all-Russian emperor, the representative of international royalty, the 
tsar’s European self. Th e French lavished attention on their new ally, sending 
more than 5,000 memorial wreaths, many of them in silver. Th e French 
delegation brought 10,000 bouquets of artifi cial fl owers, tied with the tricolor, 
affi  xed to which were pictures of Alexander III and President Carnot with the 
legend, “united in sentiments and death.”47
Moscow was to be the site for a  monument to Alexander built from 
donations from the population. “Of course, only the heart of the Russian landis 
the place for an all-national [vsenarodnyi] monument. In the focal point of 
Russia should stand the monument to the One Who in his ideal image tied 
our past with the future, Who resurrected the ancient precepts of the Moscow 
gatherers and organizers of Sacred Rus'.” Moscow contained the shrines of the 
great tsars of the past. “Where but among them should the monument of the 
greatest of their descendants and successors stand resplendent—a monument 
that should become a  new symbol of Holy Russia, a  new Russian shrine?”48 
45 F. Dukhovetskii, Dve nedeli v  Peterburge; Vospominaniia torzhestva pereneseniia 
i pogrebeniia tela Imperatora Aleksandra III i svetlogo dnia brakosochetaniia (Moscow: 
n.p., 1894), 6, 23-24, 60; Lowe, Alexander III, 296-98. 
46 Lowe, Alexander III, 301; Dukhovetskii, Dve nedeli, 38-39. 
47 Lowe, Alexander III, 300 n; Korol'kov, Tsar' mirotvorets, 57. 
48 Petrovskii, Alexander III, 375. 
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Th e  statue, fi nally placed before the Redeemer Cathedral in 1909, showed 
Alexander III, huge and austere, on his coronation throne, wearing a  crown 
and holding orb and scepter. It was the only statue of a  Russian emperor as 
the anointed of God.
* * *
For Nicholas II, Moscow symbolized pure autocracy, free from the 
constraints that had accompanied the development of a  bureaucracy and 
educated public opinion. It represented, in his mind, a  historical alternative 
to the institutions and offi  cials that thwarted his will in the capital. It was 
medieval Moscow that he envisioned, the Moscow of churches, monasteries, 
tolling bells, and religious processions. Modern Moscow of course would 
intrude on these images: the strike movement in Moscow, Th e Khodynskoe 
fi eld disaster aft er the coronation, the gruesome assassination of his uncle, 
Grand Duke Sergei, gover nor-general of Moscow, provided menacing 
reminders of the present. But in Moscow, he could appear as religious leader 
of his people, performing the sacraments that consecrated his authority. 
Nicholas’s visits to Moscow were frequent during the fi rst years of his reign. 
Interrupted by the revolution of 1905, they were resumed once he and his 
advisers regained confi dence in the stability of society in the years preceding 
the First World War.
To emphasize his religious mission, Nicholas began to visit Moscow for 
Easter, the major holiday in the Orthodox calendar. In March 1900 he traveled 
to Moscow to observe Easter, the fi rst imperial visit during Easter since 
Nicholas I’s in 1849. Th e celebration was surrounded by considerable publicity. 
Besides the usual newspaper reports, the government published an account 
that was sent free of charge to the 110,000 subscribers of Sel'skii Vestnik, 
the organ of the Ministry of Interior. Th e volume drew explicit connections 
with seventeenth-century Muscovy. Nicholas had come to Moscow “by sacred 
precept of our native ancient times” to spend Easter “in close union with the 
faithful orthodox people, as if in sacred communion with the distant past . . . 
with that past when Moscow was ‘the capital town,’ when the tsar and Moscow 
Patriarch lived there, when the life of the fi rst capital was an uninterrupted and 
undeviating observance of the Church Statutes, and the example of such a life 
was the Moscow Tsar himself.”49
49 Tsarskoe prebyvanie v Moskve v aprele 1900 goda (St. Petersburg: Panteleev brothers, 
1900), 23-24. 
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Th e offi  cial account described the ceremonies and processions of the 
Lenten and Easter seasons in old Moscow, along with the emperor’s and 
empress’s part in the services. Th e climax was the great Easter night procession 
to the Church of the Savior. At midnight, the emperor, in the uniform of the 
Preobrazhenskii Regiment, and the empress, in a  white Russian dress and 
kokoshnik studded with gems and pearls, followed the leading court ranks from 
the Kremlin Palace to the church. Behind them were members of the tsar’s 
suite, other members of the court, and the ladies of leading Moscow families. 
Th e city was brilliantly lit. Worshipers crowded into the Kremlin cathedrals. 
Th e clock on the Savior Gate struck midnight. A  cannon salvo burst from 
Tainitskii Tower. Th e Ivan the Great tower began to ring, and its sounds were 
echoed by all the “forty times forty” bells of Moscow.50
In a  rescript to the governor-general of Moscow, his uncle Sergei 
Aleksandrovich, Nicholas spoke of the realization of his “intense wish” 
(goriachee zhelanie) to spend Holy Week and Easter in Moscow, “among the 
greatest national shrines, under the canopy of the centuries-old Kremlin.” 
Here, Nicholas declared, he had found his communion with his people, 
“with the true children of our beloved Church, pouring into the temples” and 
a “quiet joy” fi lled his soul. Sharing the Easter holiday with the worshipers gave 
him a spiritual mandate. “In the unity in prayer with My people, I draw new 
strength for serving Russia, for her well-being and glory.”51
Th ese sentiments were not feigned. He announced loudly that he felt at 
home in Moscow, calm and confi dent. In a  letter to his mother he described 
his joy preparing for Holy Communion in the Kremlin cathedrals. He and 
Alexandra had spent their days visiting them and reading about Muscovite 
history. “I never knew I  was able to reach such heights of religious ecstasy as 
this Lent has brought me to. Th is feeling is now much stronger than it was in 
1896, which is only natural. I am so calm and happy now, and everything here 
makes for prayer and peace of the spirit.”52
Nicholas observed Easter in Moscow again in 1903. Moskovskie Vedomosti, 
the conservative nationalist daily, extolled the visit as a  demon stration of 
the unity of the people with the tsar, in contrast with the divisiveness it 
50 Ibid., 53-55.
51 Ibid., 55-56.
52 Zakharova, “Krizis,” 131; Edward J. Bing, ed., Th e Secret Letters of the Last Tsar 
(New York, Nicholson and Watson, 1938), 137. 
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described in Petersburg. An editorial asserted that the tsar encountered not 
the destructive spirit, but the constructive force, “with which Moscow created 
Russia.” Th e Kremlin recalled Moscow’s mission. “Here, among the national 
shrines of the Kremlin, one’s lips involuntarily whisper, ‘Th is is the Th ird 
Rome. Th ere will be no fourth.’”53
In the midst of worker unrest, the newspaper printed reports of the 
workers’ spontaneous enthusiasm for the tsar, which were reprinted in 
a  pamphlet published in 1909. A  series of articles by the worker F. Slepov 
related what were purportedly his and his comrades’ feelings. Th e workers, 
Slepov wrote, brought Nicholas bread and salt. Th ey were so happy that 
“they felt like fl ying.” When the tsar passed them along the boulevard, they 
went delirious with joy. “Th e land, it seemed, shook with joyous enthusiasm. 
And, as if unwilled, a rapturous cry escaped from the heart. Like an electric 
current, it ran through all. Tears wetted many eyes. Many people crossed 
themselves.”54
Moscow was the tsar’s true home. As the crowd dispersed, Slepov 
overheard such remarks. “Look how close by he passed. Why doesn’t he stay 
longer and live in Moscow? What is Petersburg? Moscow is better.” Most 
Muscovites felt the same way. “Moscow is the heart of Russia and therefore 
dreams that the Tsar will bestow upon her the joy of as long a stay as possible 
in the Kremlin, with its Russian shrines so revered by the people.” Th e tsar also 
was happy, like a “father, fi nding himself among his children, seeing them aft er 
a long absence.”55
Not surprisingly, the editors of Moskovskie Vedomosti drew the same 
conclusions. Th ey expressed regret that “our old Moscow cannot, as it did 
in ancient times, surround the tsar on days of his imperial labors, as at the 
times of holiday meetings.” St. Petersburg could not provide “the tranquil, 
clear, national setting for governmental work that exists here in old Moscow, 
within the walls of the sacred Kremlin, in the center of native Russia, which 
can conceive only of age-old Russian foundations [ustoi].”56 Th e conservative 
53 Moskovskie Vedomosti, March 30, 1903, 1. 
54 Ibid.; Moskovskie Vedomosti, March 29, 1903, 1; April 1, 1903, 2-3; Russkii tsar' 
s  tsaritseiu na poklonenii Moskovskim sviatyniam (St. Petersburg: R. Golike and 
A. Vil’borg, 1909), 25. 
55 Moskovskie Vedomosti, April 1, 1903, 2-3; Russkii tsar' . . . 26. 
56 Moskovskie Vedomosti, April 16, 1903, 1. 
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St. Petersburg daily Novoe Vremia contemptuously dismissed these claims 
as another futile appeal to “reduce the work of Peter the Great to nothing.” 
Th e author of the column confi dently observed that “the Petersburg period of 
Russian history has already lasted for two-hundred years.”57
Th e Russo-Japanese War and the revolution of 1905 terminated the 
tsar’s Easter visits to Moscow. Th e bloody events in Moscow, especially the 
December insurrection, made the old capital as forbidding a place for the tsar 
as the new. However, in Moscow the revolutionary events did not have the 
symbolic impact they did in St. Petersburg. Th e Moscow insurrections left  the 
holy places untouched. Moscow might be physically threatening for the tsar, 
but its shrines remained inviolate. Th e events in St. Petersburg, on the other 
hand, discredited and dishonored the sacred space of the autocracy, particularly 
the Winter Palace. Th e fi rst episode took place at the ceremony of the annual 
Blessing of the Waters on January 6, 1905. Th e tsar, joined by members of his 
suite, courtiers, and high-ranking offi  cials, went out to the Neva to watch the 
Metropolitan perform the ceremonies. Th e ladies were watching, as was the 
custom, at the windows of the Winter Palace, when a shot shattered several of 
the panes. An investigation failed to reveal foul play, but the mishap remained 
a mystery and served as an ill omen.
Th ree days later, a  crowd of workers approaching the palace peacefully, 
to ask the tsar for peaceful rectifi cation of their grievances, were massacred. 
“Bloody Sunday” made the offi  cial residence of the tsar a  symbol of brutal 
inhumanity and exploitation, a  sign not of the refi nement but the barbarism 
of Russian autocracy. Finally, the reception of the members of the First 
Duma in the Winter Palace, in April 1906, became a  spectacle of mutual 
incomprehension and rebuff . Th e tsar appeared in a  stiff  formal imperial 
procession, organized, it was said, by the empress herself. Th e deputies of the 
Duma wore everyday clothes to emphasize their distance from the monarchy. 
Th e speech from the throne outraged the deputies. Th e political struggle had 
conquered the ceremonial center of the Russian Empire.
Aft er the revolution, the emperor and empress resided at Tsarskoe Selo 
under heavy guard and did not venture into the capital. Th eir aloofness from 
the social life of Petersburg rankled in high society, Alexandra’s continued 
refusal to give debutant parties arousing especial ill-will. Th e failure to perform 
the  Blessing of the Waters caused consternation among the common people 
57 Novoe Vremia, April 18, 1903, 3. 
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of the capital, who believed that the prayers purifi ed the water. Th ey blamed 
the outbreaks of cholera occurring from 1908 to 1910 on the suspension of 
the ceremony. Th e blessing was resumed in 1911,  the same year Nicholas and 
Alexandra made their fi rst appearance at the Mariinskii Th eater since the 
revolution.58
Nicholas, to be sure, also remained wary of Moscow, which had been 
a  center of the liberal and revolutionary movement in 1905. Only in April 
1912  did he venture into the city, for the unveiling of the monument to 
Alexander III and the opening of the Alexander III Art Museum. Th e mood 
was tense. Expecting trouble, the authorities tightened security measures 
and increased arrests. Th e police interrogated the entire consular corps about 
foreigners in the capital. Th e guard regiments entering the capital were met 
with cries of “butchers, Praetorians, tsarists,” in reference to their bloody 
suppression of the Moscow insurrections. Th e tsar stopped the procession 
to pray at the spot where his uncle, the hated Grand Duke Sergei, had been 
blown to bits. Moscow society was hostile to the empress, who, worried about 
the heir’s health, remained particularly inaccessible, and failed to appear at the 
opening of the museum. Even the meeting with peasant elders, which Nicholas 
usually performed well, was uneasy and strained. A  right-wing journal 
contrasted the visit to Nicholas’s joyous reception in 1903.59
But the atmosphere in Moscow changed quickly. Once the conserva tive 
monarchical forces rallied to his support, Moscow again became the center 
of displays of dedication to the sovereign. It was there that the spiritual bond 
that he sought reappeared. Th at very summer, in August 1912, Nicholas 
entered Moscow to tumultuous ovations, aft er the festivities commemorating 
Borodino. Nicholas himself was inspired by the religious services on Red 
Square. Th en, the Moscow nobility staged a  ceremony of devotion, where 
they, and provincial marshals of the nobility, presented the tsar a  patriotic 
banner. A. D. Samarin, the Moscow marshal, read an impassioned 
declaration pledging to defend him as the nobility had defended Alexander 
58 V. N. Voeikov, S  tsarem, 40; Russian Court Memoirs, 1914-1916 (New York: E. 
P. Dutton, 1916), 41; Meriel Buchanan, Th e Dissolution of an Empire (London: 
J. Murray, 1932), 27-29; Sergei Zavalishin, ed., Gosudar' Imperator Nikolai II 
Aleksandrovich (New York: Vseslavianskoe, 1968), 229-30. 
59 Spiridovitch, Les dernières, 2:230-31; R. H. Bruce Lockhart, British Agent (New 
York: G. P. Putnam, 1933), 73; Bogdanovich, Tri poslednikh samoderzhtsa, 501. 
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I one hundred years before. Th e declaration addressed Nicholas as “absolute” 
monarch. Th e mood in the hall was elated and adoring. Th e empress was 
moved to tears.60
Th e Borodino celebrations and other displays of support in the provinces 
confi rmed Nicholas’s sense that the Russian people persisted in their devotion 
to him. As the Duma became increasingly assertive, despite its conservative 
composition, and his ministers lost his trust, the image of a national autocracy 
became compelling. From 1905, his offi  cial statements frequently used the 
word Rus' instead of Rossiia. Offi  cial literature began to present the seventeenth 
century as the most important period of the foundation of Russian autocracy, 
diminishing the role assigned to Peter the Great. It depicted the seventeenth 
century as an era of national unity, when tsar and people shared common 
goals, and autocracy appeared in its ideal form, of personal spiritual leadership 
of the nation. Th e authors oft en suggested the seductive parallels between 
the two centuries: both began with social and political troubles, and those of 
the twentieth, like the seventeenth, would be resolved by a  renewed, popular 
autocracy. Moscow became the symbol as well as the monument of this image 
of the past—an example of Mikhail Bakhtin’s notion of “chronotope,” as 
Katerina Clark has characterized the Soviet period.61
Th is theme ran through the celebrations of the three-hundredth anni-
versary of the Romanov dynasty in 1913.  Th e tercentenary, the fi rst com-
memoration of the dynasty’s beginning in 1613,  acknowledged its Muscovite 
sources of political legitimacy. Th e celebrations themselves cast signifi cant 
doubts upon the symbolic role of Petersburg. Th e fi rst event of the celebrations, 
marking the election of Michael Romanov, by an Assembly of the Land 
(Zemskii Sobor) took place there in February. It was an incongruous setting 
indeed. A historical celebration meant to affi  rm continuity took place in a city 
symbolizing discontinuity. Th e rectilinear plan of the capital exemplifi ed 
European symmetry and rationality. Th e rather sparse decorations, provided 
by the Petersburg city government, were Venetian in inspiration and clashed 
with the religious, national tenor of the celebration. Th e monarchist press 
60 Spiridovitch, Les dernières, 2: 264-67; Bing, ed., Secret Letters, 272-73; Lockhart, 
British Agent, 74. 
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made caustic comments about the everyday look of the capital, the unrelieved 
impression of its severe barrack style. “We were promised a  spectacle, but we 
got only sadness.” Th e appearance of the city should have been transformed. 
It  should have taken on a  “fantastic, legendary garb. Th en the people would 
be in a  gay mood, would, for a  while, shed their everyday cares and feast on 
spectacle, which in our dull time is needed more than ever.”62
Nicholas and Alexandra’s unconcealed aversion to the capital and its elite 
revealed how little it represented the center of political life for the monarch 
himself. Nicholas remained perfunctory and aloof from the capital elite and 
the estate representatives visiting from the provinces. Th ere were few crowds 
cheering political support, only the somber fi gures of members of the Union 
of Russian People and the Union of the Archangel Michael, organizations 
that had lost most of their popular backing. Many of those devoted to the 
monarchy left  the celebrations disappointed and disgruntled.63
If the February events revealed the capital’s loss of political charisma, the 
second part of the celebration taking place during May in the Volga region 
and Moscow, revealed the tsar in his own element. Following the route of 
Michael’s journey from Kostroma to Moscow in the spring of 1613,  Nicholas 
received an enthusiastic response. Th e Moscow celebrations, commemorating 
Michael’s entry into the city, took place at the site of the events, and evoked 
visions of the past. A Russian observer wrote, “Places sanctifi ed by centuries, 
the golden cupolas of the Kremlin, near which the imperial cortege stopped, 
the harmonious tolling of the Moscow bells and the triumphal meeting of 
the crowned Romanovs at the gates of the Assumption Cathedral amidst the 
glittering vestments of the clergy—everything gave special meaning to the 
celebration I  saw and deepened the general impression.”64 In the Kremlin 
cathedrals and on the Red Porch, Nicholas again joined in the rituals and paid 
homage to the symbols of Muscovite autocracy. He visited the tombs of the 
early Romanovs. At their graves, and before the icons of the Mother-of-God, 
he sought the sources of his authority in the divine grace and popularity of the 
Muscovite tsars, rather than in the spirit of power and transformation that had 
animated Peter and his successors.
62 Novoe Vremia, February 23, 1913, 14; Moskovskie Vedomosti, February 24, 1913, 2. 
63 Spiridovitch, Les dernières, 2: 317; A. N. Naumov, Iz utselevshikh vospominanii 1868-
1917 (New York: A. K. Naumova i O. A. Kusevitskaia, 1955), 2: 234. 
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Th e acclaim of the population contrasted to the apathy of Petersburg. 
“Th e mass emotion this visit engendered was overwhelming,” Bruce Lockhart 
recalled.65 Some observers found the response less spontaneous than that along 
the Volga, but one thought it “deeper and stronger.” It was a “wonderful hymn 
of mutual love,” which showed that “not she, not the citizens of the white-stone 
city were guilty of the disorders of 1905.” Th e receptions, balls, and dinners 
radiated a  warm, cordial spirit. “Th ere is good reason,” he concluded, “for 
Moscow to be called the heart of Russia.”66
Most important, Nicholas and Alexandra were impressed with the 
reception they received during the May celebrations. Th ey believed that the 
enthusiasm was genuine and that the Russian people persisted in their religious 
devotion to the throne. It confi rmed that, despite the passage of time and the 
appearances of change, Russia remained attached to the political principles of 
the seventeenth century. Emboldened by such a vision, Nicholas contemplated 
and proposed a curtailment of the Duma’s prerogatives, in eff ect an abrogation 
of the October Manifesto. But even the reactionary cabinet that he had 
appointed refused to consider such a step.67
Nicholas’s fi nal and perhaps most moving display of attachment to 
Moscow took place in the summer of 1914 as Russia was preparing to 
embark upon war. Both capitals gave the tsar fervent demonstrations 
of support. But the sense of the ceremonies, as well as the nature of the 
sentiments evoked, diff ered markedly. Nicholas’s appearance at the Winter 
Palace in St. Petersburg on July 20 lasted a few hours. He arrived along the 
Neva and was rushed through the crowds to the palace. At the religious 
service, he repeated Alexander I’s famous vow that he would not make 
peace as long as one of the enemy was on the soil of the fatherland. It was 
a  highly formal occasion, limited to important offi  cials, offi  cers, and court 
ranks. Aft er a  priest read the manifesto, Nicholas addressed the assembled 
offi  cers as “the whole army, united in nation and spirit, strong as a  granite 
wall,” and received a  wild roar of approval. Th en he and the empress went 
out onto the  balcony to meet the crowds fi lling the vast palace square. Th e 
65 R. H. Bruce Lockhart, “Preface,” in Bing, ed., Secret Letters, 10. 
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throng fell to their knees and sang the national anthem. Th e emperor crossed 
himself and wept.68
Th e St. Petersburg ceremony, though stirring, was brief and fastidi-
ous. Nicholas visited the city, held a  court ceremony, blessed the army, and 
confronted the people. Th en he returned to Tsarskoe Selo. In Moscow the 
visit was extended and the ceremonies were more inclusive. He entered the 
city on the traditional route along Tver Boulevard, riding in an open carriage 
to popular acclaim. In the Kremlin Palace, he received not only high offi  cials 
but representatives of the estates. He addressed not the army but the nation. 
“In your persons, the people of the fi rst capital, Moscow, I  greet the Russian 
people, loyal to me. I greet them everywhere, in the provinces, the State Duma, 
the State Council, unanimously responding, to rise amicably and cast aside 
discord for the defense of the native land and Slavdom.”69
Th e scene of Nicholas bowing from the Red Porch to the frenzied crowd 
on the Kremlin Square impressed the foreign visitors with the power of 
Russian national sentiment. Th e English ambassador wrote that “the heart of 
Russia voiced the feelings of the whole nation.” His daughter felt that she was 
no longer in the twentieth century. “Th is was the old Moscow of the Tsars. 
Little Mother (matiushka) Moscow, threatened and besieged over and over 
again, and yet always miraculously emerging from her smoking ruins!” Th e 
French ambassador also felt himself transported back beyond the eighteenth 
century and admired “the frantic enthusiasm of the Muscovite people for their 
Tsar.” Th e tsarevich’s tutor, Pierre Gilliard, thought that the people of Moscow 
were “so anxious to keep the tsar as long as possible that they mean to hold him 
here by manifest proofs of their aff ection.”70
On subsequent days, the tsar visited the shrines of Moscow, hospitals, and 
the stores of medical materials provided by the Merchant’s Bureau and the 
zemstvo. He met the assembled mayors of major towns. Finally, he visited the 
Trinity Monastery, where he was blessed by the Miracle Icon of the Visitation 
of the Virgin, which had accompanied Russian campaigns since 1654.71
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Nicholas returned from Moscow inspired by the fervor of the reception. He 
felt a new confi dence and closeness to his people. He believed that the country 
had united behind him and submerged their political diff erences.72 His vision 
confi rmed, he was less likely than ever to bow to political compromise. But the 
quest for legitimacy in the religious culture of Muscovy could hardly bolster 
his political position. Nicholas remained the all-Russian emperor reigning 
over institutions centered in Petersburg. He remained a product of Petersburg 
culture, one who was most at ease in guards’ uniform and among the elite 
regiments of the capital.
Th e two traditions coexisted, integrated neither in ideology nor in 
ceremony, epitomized in their chronotopes, two capitals, each impugning the 
symbolic appeal of the other. St. Petersburg, “the basic symbol” of imperial 
Russia, had lost the favor of the tsar, and with it, its aura of preeminence. 
Moscow radiated the charisma of the political heritage cherished by the tsar, 
but had no tsar. Th e very glorifi cation of Moscow had insurgent implications, 
casting doubt on the institutions in Petersburg that governed the empire. 
Many leading offi  cials felt Nicholas betraying the interests of state for mystical 
delusions that could be exploited by men like Rasputin.73 Upholding values 
and pursuing goals at variance with those of his ruling elite, the tsar himself 
became a force for disorder in the fi nal years of political crisis. His vision of the 
past precluded a unifi ed eff ort by monarchists and conservatives to preserve the 
old regime, leaving the fi eld to the opponents of autocracy.
In a  monarchy, the locus of the monarch is the political center. In early 
twentieth-century Russia, there were two such loci, betraying the autocrat’s 
own ambivalence about the heritage, nature, and goals of the state. If symbolic 
forms can confer the aura of the absolute and command reverence, then 
symbolic confusion can just as well dispel the sacred spirit that surrounds 
power for its loyal adherents. By 1914 ,  not only did the autocracy face 
widespread and vocal political opposition: in the course of the previous decades 
it had become increasingly ambiguous what exactly Russian autocracy meant. 
#
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9. Nicholas II and the Revolution of 1905
$
M ost accounts of 1905 place Nicholas II at the periphery of the revolution, as a fi gure buff eted by events, reacting in a defensive, inconsistent manner 
and exacerbating critical situations by vacillating between indecisiveness 
and obstinacy. Undoubtedly, Nicholas was a  weak authority fi gure who was 
nonplussed by the turmoil that confronted him. Recent research has shown, 
however, that the characterization of him as a passive defender of the status 
quo, a ruler reacting unwittingly to social and political developments beyond 
his control, does not refl ect his true role in the unfolding of the revolution and 
its ultimate defeat. Th is article aims to clarify this role, to show how Nicholas II 
understood the future of Russian society within the framework of a myth that 
both legitimized and exalted his authority, even as it was subject to its greatest 
challenge. 
Nicholas II viewed the world through the prism of a myth that presented 
him as a  national ruler who would restore a  regime of personal patriarchal 
rule. Th e national myth justifying Russian autocracy arose in the 1880s to 
counter the western principles of legality and openness that had been used to 
justify reform policies during the reign of Alexander II. Alexander III held 
westernized educated society and reformist offi  cials in the state administration 
responsible for the laxity that had allowed the revolutionary movement to 
fl ourish and culminated with the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. As 
I have argued in Scenarios of Power, the national myth heralded a break with 
the entire Petrine tradition of emulating the West.1 In the manifestoes and 
ceremonies that followed the accession of Alexander III in 1881, the national 
1 See Scenarios of Power, 2: 196-234. 
PA RT III . NA R R AT I V ES OF MONA RCH A ND NAT ION
 200 
myth evoked a  religious and ethnic bond between the tsar and the Russian 
people, who had, presumably, withstood the processes of westernization and 
safeguarded the basic foundations of the Russian monarchy and state. Th e 
Russian tsar now strove to embody not the existing state, contaminated by 
westernized accretions, the reformed courts, and the zemstva, but an idealized 
vision of pre-Petrine Russian institutions as an organic union of tsar and 
people, like that evoked in the writings of the Slavophiles. 
Th e reign of Alexander III marks the beginning of an eff ort to separate 
the image of the monarch from that of the institutions of the existing state 
structure and to identify him more closely with the Orthodox Church and 
the Russian people, the narod, or, more specifi cally, the Russian peasantry. Th e 
ideal autocratic national state was evoked as an extension of the monarch’s 
personal power, which was centered in the Ministry of Interior, obedient to 
his will and unencumbered by rule and law. For Alexander, as for his mentor 
and advisor, Constantine Pobedonostsev, “a true Russian” (istinnyi russkii 
chelovek) meant a  person who believed in a  strong centralized authority 
capable of enforcing the union between tsar and people. “Russian” (russkii) 
as an adjective justifi ed both the counter reforms and the Russifi cation 
campaigns of Alexander III’s reign. Neither policy achieved its goal of 
fundamentally transforming the government, but the myth introduced 
a  vision of change, prompting further eff orts to strengthen monarchical 
authority and to delegitimate the post-reform state with its concerns for 
legality and autonomy.
Th e ideological turn of the 1880s held great signifi cance for the Jewish 
population of the empire. From the reign of Peter the Great, the Russian 
monarchs had presented themselves as European in culture, ideology, and 
political institutions, which I  have described as the European myth. Th e 
Jews had been treated as one of the subordinate nationalities of the empire 
governed by their own communities and laws, or later, and under Nicholas 
I and Alexander II, the government sought to assimilate them into a Russian 
culture that was European in its values and manners. Under the national 
myth, the Jews represented an alien element, scattered among Russian 
populations and intruding on the union of tsar and people. Th e Jews lacked 
their own territory. Th ey had taken advantage of the liberal measures of 
the reform era to move to cities like Moscow and Petersburg, attend the 
universities, and gain admittance to the Russian bar. Th e national myth’s 
appeal to ethnic identity and its rejection of the western character of the 
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autocracy encouraged an exclusionist image of the Jew not only as alien, 
but an enemy of the Russian nation. Th e pogroms of 1881, though not 
encouraged by the government, were taken as signs of an antagonism shared 
by the Russian people. Th e government sought to reverse the eff ects of the 
reforms, introducing limits on Jewish residence and restricting admissions to 
the universities and the bar.2 Th e monarchy endeavored to cleanse Moscow, 
the symbolic center of the national autocracy, of Jews.3 When Grand Duke 
Sergei Aleksandrovich assumed the offi  ce of governor-general of Moscow in 
1891, he requested, with the tsar’s support, that Jews be removed, leading to 
brutal expulsions of two-thirds of the city’s thirty thousand Jewish residents, 
many of whom were living in the city legally. Sergei was the uncle whose views 
Nicholas II found most congenial. 
Nicholas accepted the pre-Petrine imagery of the myth and the belief that 
the Orthodox religion and the Russian people’s adherence to it expressed the 
true national spirit of Russia. His attitudes toward the state apparatus and his 
religious faith were quite diff erent from his father’s. He distrusted government 
offi  cials, bound by formality and administrative rule, in general, and he was 
especially wary of those who were dynamic and gift ed, as threatening to 
his personal authority. He did not surround himself with a  group of like-
minded offi  cials or friends who could give him counsel. He believed that the 
national sanction for his power entitled him to exert authority as he wished, 
blinding him to constraints, both of institutions and reality. Likewise, he 
distrusted the Orthodox hierarchy. His religious faith was personal, not the 
mediated religion of the Orthodox Church, ministered through prayer and 
sacrament, but a direct, unmediated bond with God, which he and Alexandra 
felt they shared with holy men of the people. He envisioned his rule in terms 
of a  neo-Slavophile image of a  patriarchal tsar, ruling through ministers like 
his Minister of Interior, Dmitrii Sipiagin, who believed that Russia should 
be governed by landlords advancing the well-being of the peasantry. Sipiagin 
also proposed the introduction of a  new system of petitioning the tsar as 
a  way of overcoming the obstructions of the administration and establishing 
a patriarchal form of justice. 
2 On the “selective integration” of Jews in the second half of the nineteenth century 
and the setbacks during the 1880s, see Benjamin Nathans, Beyond the Pale.
3 On the shift  from Petersburg to Moscow as the symbolic center of empire, see 
Article 8 of this volume. 
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Nicholas felt a powerful emotional bond with the Russian people that he 
described in his decrees, diary, and personal correspondence. He wrote about 
his feelings during his coronation in 1896 and the trips he made to Moscow to 
celebrate Easter in 1900 and 1903: he was the fi rst Russian emperor to celebrate 
Easter in Moscow since Nicholas I in 1849. In 1900, Nicholas issued a rescript 
to Grand Duke Sergei, declaring the attainment of his “intense wish,” to spend 
Holy Week in Moscow, “among the greatest national shrines, under the canopy 
of the centuries-old Kremlin.” He declared that he had found his communion 
with his people, “with the true children of our beloved Church, pouring into 
the temples,” and a “quiet joy” fi lled his soul. Sharing the Easter holiday with 
the worshipers gave him a spiritual mandate. “In the unity in prayer with My 
people, I draw new strength for serving Russia, for her well-being and glory.” 
He wrote to his mother, the dowager Maria Fedorovna, aft er the services, 
“I never knew that I  was able to attain such religious ecstasy as I  experienced 
during this Passion Week. Th is feeling is now much stronger than it was in 
1896 . . . . Th is time my soul is so calm, everything here makes for the peace of 
prayer and the spirit.”4
Th e peasant uprisings of the fi rst years of the twentieth century, rather 
than shaking Nicholas’s trust in the unity of people with the tsar, prompted 
him to fi nd confi rmation of it in public meetings with peasants and in visions 
of a resurrected Muscovite assembly of the land. Encouraged by the Minister 
of Interior, Viacheslav Plehve, he visited Kursk, which was near the unrest, 
and held meetings with peasant elders from Kursk and six other provinces. 
When Nicholas arrived, a delegation of eighty-seven volost' elders greeted him 
with bread and salt. With Plehve at his side, the tsar threatened punishment 
for those who disobeyed but promised his own attention to the peasants’ 
well-being.5 Nicholas understood these meetings in terms of his scenario, as 
expressions of his particular personal and spiritual bond with the peasants. In 
a  letter to Alexandra of September 1, 1902, he wrote that the speech to the 
peasants went off  well “because it is much easier to talk to simple people.” On 
October 20, he wrote to Prince Vladimir Meshcherskii that he had returned 
from Kursk “in a very elevated and cheerful frame of mind.” “We ourselves have 
4 Tsarskoe prebyvanie v Moskve v aprele 1900 goda (St. Petersburg: Panteleev brothers, 
1900), 56; “Pis'ma im. Nikolaia II im. Marii Fedorovne, 23 ianv.  1899-22 dekabria 
1900,” GARF, 642-1-2326, 56-57. 
5 Francis William Wcislo, Reforming Rural Russia, 145-46.
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constantly wanted to go to the interior of our Native Land but circumstances 
have prevented it. In the future, I  hope that such trips will follow one aft er 
another.”6
Nicholas’s sense of his national-religious mission grew stronger during 
the next year. In April of 1903, he made another Easter visit to Moscow, 
where he again felt a great spiritual uplift . In July, he traveled to Sarov for the 
highly publicized canonization of Serafi m of Sarov. Serafi m, the abbot of the 
Monastery at Sarov in Tambov Province, was an early nineteenth-century 
elder (starets), known for his holy life, his visions, and his powers of curing 
and prophecy. Th ousands of worshipers gathered for the event. Nicholas 
and the grand dukes carried the remains of Serafi m around the Assumption 
Cathedral before a large crowd of worshipers. “During the entire procession,” 
Nicholas wrote in his diary, “we carried the coffi  n on a  stretcher. It created 
a tremendous impression to see how the people, and especially sick cripples and 
the unfortunate, regarded the procession of the cross. Th e moment when the 
beatifi cation began and then the kissing of the remains were most solemn.” Th e 
next day he wrote, “How touching (umilitelen) the procession of the cross was 
yesterday, but with the coffi  n open. Th e elevation of the spirit (pod’’em dukha) 
was enormous . . . ”7 
Aft er Sarov, A. A. Mosolov recalled, the words “tsar” and “people” 
followed each other directly in many of the tsar’s statements, and Nicholas 
increasingly looked upon them as “half-grown youths.” He felt a desire to come 
close to them, to “show physical aff ection to the people he loved,” but he was 
prevented by the size of the crowds and fears of another Khodynka, the tragic 
massacre that followed his coronation.8 Nicholas regarded the relationship 
between him and the peasantry as a  spiritual bonding between likes, rather 
than an attraction of opposites. Th e mutual veneration of Serafi m exemplifi ed 
a shared faith. 
Instead of rehearsing the complex discussions, concessions and repressions 
that ensued during the revolution itself, I  shall focus on Nicholas’s views of 
the new system and how he reconciled it with his conception of autocracy. 
6 Igor Vinogradoff , “Some Russian Imperial Letters to Prince V. Meshcherskii, (1839-
1914),” Oxford Slavonic Studies, no. 11 (1962): 134. 
7 “Dnevnik Nikolaia II,” (May 19-December 31, 1903), GARF, 601-1-246, 42-47; 
8 A. A. Mosolov, Pri dvore poslednego Rossiiskago Imperatora (Moscow: Ankor, 1993), 
119-21. 
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Th roughout the revolution he clearly demonstrated his belief that he had not 
forsaken his offi  ce as sovereign. Th is was evident in the pre-Petrine imagery 
that he and his advisors invoked that derived sovereignty from God and the 
wishes of the Russian people. It was also manifest in his close watch over his 
ministers, who fulfi lled his dictates, even while they shielded him from open 
responsibility. Th e myth defi ed and excluded contradictory evidence. Neither 
military defeat nor almost universal opposition could shake his conviction; 
quite the contrary. He attributed the widespread violence and demands for 
social and political change to the infl uence of foreigners, revolutionaries, and 
the Jews. Th e ustoi, the foundations of Russia remained impermeable and 
needed only ruthless retribution to be saved. 
In his fi rst meeting with the tsar on August 25, 1904, Petr Sviatopolk-
Mirskii aptly described the situation: “Th e condition of things has become so 
aggravated that one may consider the government to be in a  state of enmity 
with Russia. It is necessary to make peace.” Mirskii accepted the position 
of minister of interior on condition that the tsar announce a  program of 
reforms, including civil liberties and a  limited degree of participation in the 
enactment of legislation. He argued for the need to win the support of society 
(obshchestvo). He tried to show that the participation of elective representatives 
from the zemstva and major city dumas in governmental decisions was 
compatible with autocracy. Th e tsar would retain the right to change the 
administrative order. Th e representatives would help the government formulate 
plans to increase legality in the Senate and other state institutions and to 
reform and democratize the zemstva.9
Nicholas promised him full support, but he conceived political reform 
in the context of his vision of seventeenth-century Rus’. He proposed an 
Assembly of the Land, which could express his direct bond with the people 
and circumvent “society.” Th is remained Nicholas’s idée fi xe during and aft er 
1905. Th e image of a  Zemskii Sobor allowed him to retain absolute power 
while presumably heeding the wishes of the people. He would remain sovereign 
regardless of institutional changes.10 
Under the blows of Bloody Sunday, the concern about foreign loans, and 
the lack of confi dence in the loyalty of the army, Nicholas relented once more, 
accepted the principle of popular participation, but cast in the form of an 
assembly of the land. Th is would be a national assembly that represented the 
9 Andrew M. Verner, Crisis of Russian Autocracy, 124-29.
10 Ibid., 132.
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people without imposing institutional limitations or elevating the leaders of 
society. On January 31, the Minister of Agriculture, Alexei Ermolov, presented 
a report, written in early Russian rhetoric, calling for a Zemskii Sobor. Nicholas 
had to hearken to the people’s voice “before Rus' loses faith in its God-given 
Tsar, in his force and his might.” He would summon elective representatives, 
“from all estates of the Russian land.”11 
In a  rescript of February 18, 1905 to the new Minister of Interior, 
Aleksandr Bulygin, who replaced Sviatopolk-Mirskii, announced his wish 
to assemble “the worthiest people” to head a  commission to draft  plans for 
a  representative institution. He declared his views before a  delegation of 
fourteen zemstvo workers that he received at Peterhof on June 6. Nicholas 
declared, “Let there be, as there was of old, that unity between Tsar and all 
Rus', the meeting between me and the people of the land that forms the basis 
of the system resting on unique [samobytnye] Russian principles.”12 In the 
complex formulation of an election law, Nicholas, the Grand Duke Vladimir, 
and even Pobedonostsev worked to ensure a  substantial representation of the 
peasantry. Th e conference introduced a  provision guaranteeing the peasants 
at least fi ft y-one deputies. For the same reason, another provision eliminated 
a  literacy requirement for Duma deputies. Th is part of the Bulygin project 
would be carried over to the law of December 11, 1905, which would govern 
elections to the State Duma. Most of the urban population, including the 
entire working class, was left  without franchise. Furthermore, the Duma 
would have only a consultative voice: It would pass on all legislation, but the 
government could issue laws without its approval if it gained the consent of the 
State Council, which remained an entirely appointive body. 
Nicholas considered that the new institutions, which would make known 
the needs of the people, did not confl ict with the principle of autocratic power. 
In the manifesto of August 3, 1905, Nicholas expressed the hope that the 
deputies would justify his confi dence and that they would “render to Us useful 
and zealous assistance in Our toils for the sake of Our common Mother Russia, 
to uphold the unity, security, and greatness of the State as well as national order 
and prosperity.”13 He clearly felt confi dent that the project did not jeopardize 
his absolute power. When several offi  cers of the Preobrazhenkii Guards asked 
11 Ibid., 70-73.
12 Polnoe sobranie rechei Imperatora Nikolaia II (St. Petersburg: Drug Naroda, 1906), 
57-58; Verner, Crisis of Russian Autocracy, 195-96.
13 Verner, Crisis of Russian Autocracy, 213-14.
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whether military men could serve as deputies, Nicholas replied, “Military men, 
members of the Duma? On the contrary, they must dissolve the Duma if this 
is required.”14
Th e plan convinced the leaders of the Liberation Movement that they 
could no longer count on major reforms by personal appeals to the tsar. Th ey 
increasingly sought democratic support among the urban workers and the 
peasants. Th e strike movement continued, culminating in the great general 
strike of October 1905. On October 17, 1905, Nicholas II issued the October 
Manifesto, draft ed under the guidance of Sergei Witte, which promised the 
establishment of a State Duma elected by all classes of the population without 
whose agreement no law could take eff ect. Th e manifesto also granted the basic 
civil liberties, personal inviolability, and freedom of religion, speech, assembly 
and association. On the same day, Nicholas appointed a  cabinet headed by 
Witte, Russia’s fi rst Prime Minister, who would be accountable to the tsar. 
Th e manifesto brought general rejoicing at what society regarded as the 
end of absolute monarchy. It brought a  loosening of previous restrictions on 
Jews, who again began to fl ow into the universities and again were admitted to 
the bar in signifi cant numbers. It is clear, however, that Nicholas believed that 
the very issuing of the manifesto was a  confi rmation of autocratic authority. 
His reasoning came out in a  disagreement over the form the announcement 
of the concessions would take. Witte had urged Nicholas merely to declare 
that he had asked him as prime minister to formulate the projects for the new 
institutions and to leave the details for him to work out. In this way, he argued, 
the tsar would not bind himself with promises. However, Andrew Verner has 
persuasively argued, such a measure would make it seem that the reform came 
from state offi  cials, representing a break from the old system of personal rule of 
the tsar. Nicholas insisted on a Manifesto, which made it clear that the reform 
was the tsar’s grant for the benefi t of the people. In this way, he denied a break 
between the autocracy and the new order. He appeared as the founder of the 
new system, and having founded it, clearly felt himself entitled to change it 
when he saw fi t.15 
In April 1906, shortly before the elections, deliberations began on new 
Fundamental Laws to formalize the reforms in the state system introduced 
since October. Th e question arose in terms of the defi nition of the monarch’s 
14 N. A. Epanchin, Na sluzhbe trekh imeratorov (Moscow: Nashe Nasledie, 1996), 324-25.
15 Verner, Crisis of Russian Autocracy, 239-41.
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power in Article One of the Fundamental Laws as “autocratic and unlimited” 
(samoderzhavnyi i neogranichennyi). Both adjectives had been removed in the 
draft  of the Duma charter of February 20, 1906, but Nicholas insisted on 
retention of the word “autocratic.” By the April conference, Nicholas wanted 
the word “unlimited” restored as well. He had been convinced by the ebbing 
of the revolution and the campaign of letters and telegrams organized by 
those opposed to the October manifesto in the government and the far right 
parties. He described “the touching feelings of loyal subjects, together with the 
plea not to limit My power.” Reproach, Nicholas declared at the conference, 
would come from “the so-called educated element, the proletarians, the third 
element (the professionals who staff ed the administration of the zemstva, the 
local institutions of self-government). But I am certain that 80 percent of the 
Russian people will be with me.”16 
Nicholas found additional confi rmation for this belief in the ardent 
entreaties of members of the Union of Russian People, who presented him and 
the tsarevich with membership badges. At the presentation, Nicholas accepted 
the badges with thanks then declared, “Th e burden of power placed on Me 
in the Moscow Kremlin I will bear Myself, and I am certain that the Russian 
people will help Me. I  will be accountable for My authority before God.” 
A member delivered a speech declaring that the tsar should not trust those men 
put forward by Masons and others “who depend on aliens.” Th e Russian word 
was “inorodtsy,” the legal category for Jews at the time. Th e Russian people had 
crossed themselves before the tsar, and the tsar should rely on “Russian people.” 
“No gates of hell will overcome the Russian Tsar, surrounded by his people.” 
Th e tsar replied, “Yes, I believe that with your help, I and the Russian people 
will succeed in defeating the enemies of Russia.”17
Nicholas insisted on the old defi nition of “unlimited and autocratic” 
because he believed that the new representative institutions in no way 
constrained his right to dispense with them if he so wished. Th e offi  cials at the 
special conference thought otherwise, observing that the new institutions did 
limit the tsar's power in some ways. Nicholas relented on the term “unlimited,” 
but “autocratic” remained in the Fundamental Laws issued on April 23, 
1906. However, “autocratic” had one meaning for the leading state offi  cials, 
another for the tsar. For them, it meant that the tsar received his power from 
16 Verner, Crisis of Russian Autocracy, 299-300.
17 Moskovskie vedomosti, January 15, 1906, 2.
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God and his forebears. For him it meant that he remained sovereign, that 
he retained the primary legislative authority that allowed him to issue the 
October Manifesto, that he was the creator of the new institutions, and that 
he alone could change them.18 Th e Fundamental Laws of 1906 tried to ensure 
that the acts of the new state institutions would be governed by law. But the 
contradiction between autocratic and representative government persisted, 
and liberal jurists agreed that the new institutions left  the basic principle of 
autocracy untouched. Th e Fundamental Laws could be changed only at the 
tsar’s initiative; laws would be enacted by the tsar with the participation of the 
Duma. In this sense the tsar remained sovereign, and the new Fundamental 
Laws sustained Nicholas’s belief in his autocratic power, while seeming to 
introduce a limited principle of rule of law.19 
Th e election law of December 11, 1905, worked out by Witte and Sergei 
Kryzhanovskii, an offi  cial in the Ministry of Interior, extended the systems of 
curiae, proposed for the Bulygin Duma, to the workers and urban population. 
Th e workers received their own curia, but no minimum of seats; the peasants 
received a  curia as well as the minimum of seats guaranteed in the August 
rules.20 Although the peasants were underrepresented in terms of their 
numerical weight in the population, their deputies would determine the mood 
of the next Duma. Many offi  cials, including Witte himself, and those close to 
Nicholas, thought this a  good thing, because they believed that the peasants 
remained devoted to the tsar. Th e Grand Duke Constantine Konstantinovich 
also placed his hopes in the peasants. He wrote in his diary on October 26, 
1905, “My companions and I  all maintain our support for autocratic govern-
ment and nurture the hope that if many peasant deputies are elected to the State 
Duma, then it may be possible to return to the autocratic model of government, 
which undoubtedly has the support of our peasant masses.”21 In February 1906. 
a new State Council was created, half-elective from estates and institutions, half-
appointed by the emperor to act as a counterweight to the Duma. 
18 Verner, Crisis of Russian Autocracy, 299.
19 For a  valuable discussion of the juridical principles involved in these changes, see 
Hiroshi Oda, “Th e Emergence of Pravovoe Gosudarstvo (Rechtsstaat) in Russia,” 
Review of Central and East European Law 25, no. 3 (1999): 395-97.
20 For the rules for the Duma elections, see Terence Emmons, Formation of Political 
Parties and the First National Elections in Russia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1982), 12-14.
21 “Dnevnik v. kn. Konstantina Konstantinovicha, 10/8/05-11/6/06,” GARF, 660-1-55, 90.
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But the results of the elections to the fi rst State Duma immediately 
dispelled the illusions of a  conservative, monarchist peasantry. Th e peasants 
voted heavily for the opposition parties—the Constitutional Democrats or 
Kadets and the Laborer (Trudoviki) Party, which promised expropriation of 
the nobles’ estates. Nicholas took advantage of the offi  cial reception of Duma 
deputies to make clear that he remained the sovereign and autocrat. His 
moderate advisors urged him to appear at the Tauride Palace, in the precinct of 
the Duma as a gesture of conciliation. He chose instead to follow the German 
example for the opening of the Reichstag, that is, to address the deputies in 
sovereign precincts amidst the symbols of imperial sovereignty. Th e reception 
took place at the throne room of the Winter Palace. 
Th e ceremony impressed the deputies and the world with the distance 
between the autocracy—comprising the emperor, the imperial family, the 
members of the court and the offi  cials in the State Council—and the elected 
deputies of the Duma. On the right side of the hall stood the members of 
the State Council, courtiers, generals wearing braided uniforms decorated 
with medals, and the ladies of the court in the decolleté‚ “Russian dress” and 
kokoshnik tiaras worn at the highest state occasions. Assistant Minister of 
Interior, V. I. Gurko, wrote, “Naively believing that the people’s representatives, 
many of whom were peasants, would be awed by the splendor of the Imperial 
court, the women of the imperial family were bedecked in jewels.”22 
While the right side was harmonious in its uniformity, the Duma deputies 
standing on the left  presented a  motley picture of the political and national 
diversity of the empire. Some of the liberal deputies dressed simply to make 
clear their identifi cation with the common people. Th e English journalist, 
Henry Nevinson, described a microcosm of the empire, 
Sturdy peasants in homespun cloth, one Little Russian in brilliant purple 
with broad blue breeches, one Lithuanian Catholic bishop in violet 
robes, three Tatar Mullahs with turbans and long grey cassocks, a Balkan 
peasant in white embroidered coat, four Orthodox monks with shaggy 
hair, a few ordinary gentlemen in evening dress, and the vast body of the 
elected in the clothes of every day.23 
22 Abraham Ascher, Th e Revolution of 1905: Authority Restored (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1992), 83-84.
23 Henry W. Nevinson, Th e Dawn in Russia: Or Scenes in the Russian Revolution (New 
York: Harper Brothers, 1906), 322.
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Th e tsar set himself apart from both groups by entering in a  formal 
imperial procession, to the strains of “God Save the Tsar.” Masters of Ceremony 
led with their maces; behind them court offi  cials carried the imperial regalia. 
Following them came twelve Palace Grenadiers, then the emperor, fl anked by 
the two empresses and followed by the members of the imperial family. Aft er 
entering, the tsar kissed the Metropolitan of St. Petersburg, who then held 
a  brief prayer service. He ascended the steps and sat upon the throne, which 
had been draped with the imperial mantle, it was said by the empress herself, 
in artistic folds. Th e imperial crown and other items of regalia were visible on 
stools at his side. Th e scene was caught in photographs published in newspapers 
and leading periodicals and a large painting that was publicly exhibited. 
Th e reception was staged to place the regalia at the focal point of the 
hall. Brought from Moscow for the occasion, the regalia confi rmed the sacred 
sources of the tsar’s authority. Nicholas’s speech to the Duma expressed his 
conviction that the assembly was an extension of the autocratic will and that 
its deputies were obliged to earn his confi dence. Speaking down to the Duma 
representatives from the steps of the throne, he declared that Providence had 
moved him “to summon elected deputies from the people to help in legislation.” 
He expressed his trust in them both to clarify the needs of the peasantry and to 
advance the education and prosperity of the people. He admonished them that 
for these goals, “not only freedom is necessary, but also order on the basis of 
law is necessary.” He declared his “intense desire to see My people happy and to 
bequeath my son a legacy of a strong, well-ordered and enlightened State.” He 
called upon God to bless his labors, “in union with the State Council and State 
Duma,” and asked that the day mark “the renewal of the moral make-up of the 
Russian Land, the day of the rebirth of its best forces.” Nicholas concluded by 
exhorting the deputies to turn to their work with “reverence” (blagogovenie) 
and asked them to justify the trust of tsar and people.24 
Th e speech received loud applause from the right of the hall and hostile 
silence from the left . Not only had Nicholas continued to speak of “his” people, 
but also he had failed to make a gesture of conciliation by issuing an amnesty 
for political prisoners. Th e deputies returned to the Tauride Palace, where 
they draft ed an indignant response. Later that day Nicholas wrote in his diary 
that he had worked for a long time, “but with a light heart aft er the successful 
completion of the ceremony.”25 
24 Novoe Vremia, April 28, 1906, 1.
25 Dnevniki Imperatora Nikolaia II (Moscow: Orbita, 1991), 312.
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Meanwhile, Nicholas made sure that the ministers took brutal and 
eff ective measures of retribution. Under his close supervision, the Minister 
of Interior, Petr Durnovo, reorganized the local administration and sent out 
governors-general to respond to the insurrections. Th e tsar exulted at the 
obliteration of insurgent groups and the execution of insurrectionary workers. 
In a letter to his mother about the bloody suppression of the Bolshevik armed 
uprising in December 1905, Nicholas expressed his relief and his expectation 
that the same tactic would be used elsewhere. “Terror must be answered by 
terror. Now, Witte himself has realized this.” He instructed commanders 
not to negotiate or make concessions but to retaliate and punish, that is, to 
annihilate on the spot. 
At the same time, he remained convinced that the majority of the 
people remained personally loyal to him. Although he played no role in 
sponsoring the pogroms against the Jews, he regarded them approvingly as 
demonstrations that he and the common people shared the same antipathy. 
He wrote to his mother on October 25, 1905 that “nine-tenths of the trouble 
makers are Jews,” and that the people had turned against them violently 
for that reason. “But not only the kikes (zhidy) suff ered; so did the Russian 
agitators, engineers, lawyers, and all kinds of other bad people.”26 For him, 
the pogroms represented another sign of the unity of tsar and people. He 
sympathized with the extreme right wing antisemitic organization, Th e 
Union of Russian People, which had helped to foment the pogroms, and 
he approved all petitions for pardon submitted by members convicted for 
participation in these disturbances.27
Nicholas also pressed Prime Minister Petr Stolypin to take the most 
ruthless and least legal expedients against the oppositional movements. 
Abraham Ascher has shown the tsar’s dominant role in the establishment of 
the fi eld court-martials, and the coup d’état of June 3, 1907, both of which 
have carried Stolypin’s name. On August 12, 1906, a  bomb went off  in 
Stolypin’s suburban villa, leaving twenty-fi ve dead and Stolypin’s son and 
daughter seriously injured. Nicholas instructed the prime minister to fi nd ways 
to realize his “inexorable desire to eradicate sedition and restore order.” Fearing 
that the tsar might choose to establish a  dictatorship, Stolypin submitted 
a proposal for fi eld court-martials to counter terrorism. It was issued on August 
19, 1906, as an emergency decree, under Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws. 
26 Verner, Crisis of Russian Autocracy, 260.
27 A. S. Tager, Tsarskaia Rossiia i delo Beilisa (Moscow: Ogiz, 1934), 39-40.
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Th e “Stolypin court-martials” were in fact an eff ort to satisfy the tsar’s demand 
for violent retribution.
Th e decree assigned governor-generals the power to bring revolutionaries 
before military courts that could issue summary sentences, including death. 
While court-martials had been included in the emergency provisions governing 
most of Russia during the revolution, those tribunals did not forego rules of 
legal procedure and could be appealed. Th e law of August 19, 1906 dispensed 
even with an investigation, when guilt was “so obvious” that one was not 
necessary. Only Stolypin and the Minister of Justice, Ivan Shcheglovitov, 
opposed it. Th e decree turned the countryside into a  battlefi eld. Between 
1906-09, the fi eld court-martials sentenced nearly 2,700 people to execution. 
In those three years, more people lost their lives for political crimes than 
during the entire nineteenth century. In addition, over 22,000 were sent into 
administrative exile. 
While Stolypin defended and supported the fi eld court-martials, his 
goal was the creation of a  new political nation made up of property owners 
who would have a  stake in defending the state and the monarchy. Th is 
grew out of the view embraced by Witte and others in the bureaucracy that 
the government could lead society. It also involved a  transformation of the 
peasantry by dissolving the commune and creating a new class of independent 
peasant proprietors. Provinces with communal land tenure were the sites of 
the most frequent and violent insurrections, convincing many offi  cials and 
noblemen that the commune, rather than a  bulwark of order, had become 
a hotbed of peasant rage. Th e landed nobility supported Stolypin’s program of 
the protection of property and the dissolution of the peasant commune, while 
calling for a narrowing of the electorate for the Duma. 
In November 1906, under Article 87, Stolypin began issuing the laws that 
would permit the breakup of peasant communes and the establishment of 
separate farms, which would be held with individual property rights. Article 
87 required confi rmation of the decrees by the Duma when the next assembly 
resumed sessions. Th e elections to the second Duma, which convened in March 
1907, increased the strength of the left . Th e majority of deputies continued 
to demand expropriation of land and refused to approve the laws. On June 3, 
1907, Nicholas issued a  manifesto announcing the dissolution of the Second 
Duma. A  new electoral law was introduced under Article 87. Th is violated 
the Fundamental Laws, which specifi cally barred the use of the emergency 
provisions to change the electoral law. 
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Th e manifesto of June 3, 1907 is usually termed the Stolypin "coup 
d'état." But, as Ascher has made clear, the prime minister once more had 
acted only under the insistent prodding of the emperor. On June 2, when 
Nicholas signed the law, he wrote to Stolypin that delay in dissolving the 
Duma was “intolerable.” “It is necessary to display decisiveness and fi rmness 
to Russia . . . . Th ere must be no delay, not one minute of hesitation! God 
favors the bold!” In the decree of June 3, announcing the dissolution of the 
Duma, Nicholas declared that he would continue to honor the rights granted 
by the October manifesto but would change only “the means of summoning 
deputies from the people” to the Duma. He insisted that the Duma, 
“created for the strengthening of the Russian State (Gosudarstvo Rossiiskoe), 
must be Russian (russkii) in spirit as well,” and whereas other nationalities 
should have deputies, they should not be allowed to decide “purely Russian” 
questions. Th ese problems could not be decided by legislative means but only 
by the authority giving the fi rst law, “the historical Power of the Russian 
Tsar.” He emphasized, “It is from the Lord, God, that imperial power over 
our people is entrusted to us. Before his throne we shall answer for the fate of 
the Russian state.”28 
Th e call for a  legislature that was “Russian in spirit” meant in practice 
the sharp reduction in the representation of other nationalities such as Poles, 
Tatars, and Armenians and the exclusion of deputies from eastern borderlands 
such as the steppe and Turkestan regions. Th e change also gave substance to 
a  central thrust of the national myth—identifying all those who resisted 
the monarch’s power as not truly Russian, as enemies of the state. Nicholas’s 
telegram to the Union of Russian People, which had campaigned for the 
Duma’s dissolution and for a  restoration of true autocracy, gives a  sense of 
the future reality he envisioned for Russia. “I am confi dent that now all the 
truly faithful and aff ectionate sons of the Russian homeland will unite still 
more closely, and as they continually increase their numbers, they will assist 
Me in bringing about a peaceful renewal of our great and holy Russia and in 
improving the goodly way of life of her people.”29 
Stolypin also desired a  legislature “Russian in spirit,” but his concept 
of  the Russian nation diff ered sharply from Nicholas’s belief in a  unity 
28 Ascher, Th e Revolution of 1905, 351; PSZ, Sobranie 3, no. 29240, June 3, 1907. 
29 Th e telegram was immediately printed in the party newspaper, Russkoe Znamia 
(Ascher, Th e Revolution of 1905, 357-58).
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between tsar and people. Stolypin strove to make the state the focus 
of national unity. Th e state would unite landholders of all classes, including 
peasant proprietors, and merchant and industrial capitalists. Property 
would  ensure a  stake in the regime and break down estate barriers; it 
would  inspire a  state spirit, gosudarstvennost', among all groups in Russia 
that  would fi nd in it a  champion of Russian domination in the empire 
and abroad. 
Th e new electoral law attained Stolypin’s goal of strengthening the 
conservative and nationalist forces in the Th ird Duma, which served its 
full term from 1907 to 1912. Th e Octobrist party, the party of landholders 
and industrialists, held a  plurality, and at least for a  while the prime 
minister was able to develop a  working relationship with their leader, the 
Old Believer industrialist, Alexander Guchkov. Th e Duma approved of 
Stolypin’s land laws providing for the dissolution of the peasant commune. 
Th e Octobrist leadership cooperated with Stolypin to introduce reforms 
of the army and navy and laws for the development of universal primary 
education. 
Stolypin was hobbled by the loss of the support of the tsar, whose trust 
in  him diminished as the revolutionary threat passed. Stolypin’s state 
nationalism presumed the development of a  cultural and historical sense 
that  united a  nation apart from the tsar, a  view that could hardly win the 
tsar’s sympathy. Nicholas’s bonds with the people were personal, displayed in 
fervent expressions of spiritual kinship and mutual devotion, giving him 
almost mystical feelings of exaltation. His family life at Tsarskoe Selo became 
the principal site of his communion with the people. Th ere he gathered 
around him those who shared his views, his symbolic elite, now shrunk to 
those hostile to the institutions of state. Nicholas felt closest to the heads 
of his security corps, the guards offi  cers he knew—the Minister of the Court, 
Count Fredericks, the Palace Commandants, Vladimir Dediulin  and 
Vladimir Voeikov, the chief of the Palace Administration, Mikhail 
Putiatin—men who avoided expressing opinions that might contradict 
the emperor’s.
Th e one person who enjoyed Nicholas’s complete trust was the 
empress. Mark Steinberg has made clear that Alexandra’s political views 
were identical to her husband’s on all signifi cant issues—the importance 
of the assertion of autocratic power, its divine source, and the devotion 
of the people to the  throne. Alexandra brought the Victorian concept 
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of the  wife  as strong and supportive helpmeet into the Russian imperial 
household. Her  impassioned advocacy of these views before the tsar 
reinforced his beliefs and gave him the reassurance that he sought among 
all he trusted.30 
Nicholas and Alexandra found further support for their views among 
the “men of God” who congregated in their chambers at Tsarskoe Selo. Th ey 
met Grigorii Rasputin shortly aft er the issuing of the October Manifesto 
on November 1, 1905 and considered him a  man of the people absolutely 
devoted to his tsar. In addition to his seemingly miraculous power to stop the 
tsarevich’s bleeding, Rasputin shared their distrust of educated and aristocratic 
society. He described both the emperor and empress as defenders of the people 
and religion against the enemies of God. Rasputin addressed Alexandra almost 
as a  saint. She wrote in her notebook a  remark that he uttered in 1907, “She 
is an ascetic (podvizhnitsa), who with experience and intelligence struggles 
skillfully in a holy manner.”31 
Nicholas was also impressed by Rasputin. His concern for the tsarevich 
was as great as Alexandra’s and grew as he began to present his son as the 
hope for Russia’s future. He wrote to Stolypin in October, 1906, “He 
made a  remarkably strong impression both on her Majesty and myself, so 
that instead of fi ve minutes, our conversation went on for more than an 
hour.” He told General Dediulin that Rasputin was “just a  good, religious, 
simple-minded Russian. When in trouble or assailed by doubts, I  like to 
have a  talk with him and invariably feel at peace with myself aft erwards.” 
His diaries mention numerous long conversations with Rasputin, without, 
however, suggesting their content. Stolypin warned Nicholas about keeping 
Rasputin  close to him and, in 1911, banished him from the capital. Th is 
step only confi rmed Nicholas’s beliefs. Th at same year he sent Rasputin as 
a  personal emissary to Nizhnii-Novgorod to determine the qualifi cations 
of the governor of the province, A.  N. Khvostov, to serve as Stolypin’s 
30 For a  convincing analysis of Alexandra’s ideas and their relationship to Nicholas’s, 
see Mark Steinberg, “Nicholas and Alexandra: An Intellectual Portrait,” in Th e Fall 
of the Romanovs: Political Dreams and Personal Struggles in a  Time of Revolution, 
ed. Mark Steinberg and Vladimir M. Khrustalev (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1995), 34-36. 
31 “Zapisnaia knizhka im. Aleksandry Fedorovny s  vyskazyvaniiami Grigoriia 
Rasputina (1907-1916) s darstvennoi nadpis'iu Rasutina,” GARF, 640-1-309, 38-39, 
52-54.
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replacement as minister of interior when the prime minister asked to be 
relieved of that post.32
* * *
Th e revolution of 1905 did not shake the tsar’s confi dence in his vision of 
a  renewed personal autocracy in Russia. Rather, the defeat of the revolution 
proved to him that the Russian monarchy could triumph over adversity; 
that it was his destiny to lead Russia out of a  time of troubles, like the fi rst 
Romanov, Tsar Michael Fedorovich, and create a  restored and powerful 
absolute monarchy supported by the masses of the Russian people. Aft er 1907, 
Nicholas showed the resolve to take whatever steps were necessary to realize 
this vision. Th e Jews, viewed as menacing this archaic vision of Russia, soon 
felt its repercussions—the return of the restrictions on Jews’ matriculating in 
the universities and on admission to the bar.33 It was during 1911 and 1912 
that the central government, with Nicholas’s tacit approval, became involved 
in the ritual murder case of Mendel Beilis in Kiev. Th e case had been pressed 
by the Kiev organization of the Union of Russian People, and right-wing 
deputies of the Duma, when the Duma had begun consideration of proposals 
to eliminate the Pale of Settlement and to extend equal rights to Jews. Despite 
the absence of evidence of ritual murder in the autopsy, or any proofs, local 
authorities supported by the Minister of Justice, Ivan Shcheglovitov decided 
to prosecute Beilis. While there is no indication that Nicholas played a role in 
the case, he received numerous reports on its progress, and clearly believed in 
the possibility of ritual murder.34 
Th e Beilis case made clear the depth of Nicholas’s belief in the survival of 
early Ruś  and his personal identifi cation with the monarchist peasantry. As far 
back as 1817, Alexander I had decreed that ritual murder could not be the basis 
of criminal charges in the empire, “in view of the fact that such accusations 
32 Andrei Maylunas and Sergei Mironenko, A Lifelong Passion: Nicholas and Alexandra, 
Th eir Own Story (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1996), 296-97, 314, 320-22, 
328-30, 341, 343, 350-74, 376; M. V. Rodzianko, Th e Reign of Rasputin: An Empire’s 
Collapse (London: Frederick A. Stokes, 1927), 11; Sir Bernard Pares, Th e Fall of the 
Russian Monarchy (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 143; A. Ia. Avrekh, Tsarizm 
i IV Duma (Moscow: Nauka, 1981), 255. 
33 Nathans, Beyond the Pale, 296-301, 366. 
34 Hans Rogger, “Th e Beilis Case: Anti-Semitism and Politics in the Reign of Nicholas 
II,” Slavic Review 25, no. 4 (December 1966): 615-29.
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have previously been refuted by impartial investigations and royal charters.”35 
But Nicholas regarded the legal experience of the west, which Alexander I had 
followed, as alien to the feelings of the Russian people. Th e belief in ritual 
murder was one that Nicholas could share with the masses, who he believed 
remained devoted to him. Nicholas saw all the reports of the  prosecution 
from the tsar, and let the trial go forward. Th e members of the  Union of 
Russian People who concocted the charges and  the government offi  cials who 
encouraged them were among those he trusted as true Russians. Th e belief or 
non-belief in ritual murder drew a  clear line between those who shared his 
views and those who hoped to set Russian monarchy on a  western course.36 
Th e subversion of the court system, the most successful product of the great 
reforms, was a fi rst step towards a reaffi  rmation of personal power. 
Broad coverage of the trial in the press opened the government to 
widespread ridicule and condemnation. Reports and articles about the 
trial appeared in newspapers nearly every day in the fall of 1913. Nicholas’s 
critics branded the trial a  return to medieval justice based on prejudice and 
superstition. Vladimir Korolenko, in Russkoe Bogatstvo, wrote that the reader 
fi rst looked for the news about the trial. 
Evidently, Russian citizens have understood fi nally, the Jewish question 
is a  Russian question, that wrong and evil exposed at the Beilis trial, 
are a  Russian wrong and evil. Th ey understood that one cannot be an 
indiff erent spectator, that Russian nationalism is a  threat to the entire 
Russian spirit. Th ey understood what kind of arbitrary, savage, dark 
Russia is being created by nationalism for the Russians . . . 37
Th e Beilis trial was the subject causing the greatest number of government 
actions against the press in 1913, resulting in 102 penalties including the 
arrest of three editors and the closing of three newspapers. Abroad the press 
characterized the trial as another example of the backwardness and barbarism 
of Russian autocracy. Appeals to end the trial came from Germany, France, 
England, and the United States. Even the anti-Semitic monarchist and editor of 
Kievlianin, Vasilii Shul’gin, wrote an outraged condemnation of the trial.38 
35 A. S. Tager, Tsarskaia Rossiia i delo Beilisa (Moscow: Ogiz, 1933), 17. 
36 Rogger, “Th e Beilis Case,” 623-26.
37 Tager, Tsarskaia Rossiia i delo Beilisa, 197-99.
38 Ibid., 201, 205-07; Maurice Samuel, Blood Accusation: Th e Strange History of the 
Beilis Case (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1966), 164-65.
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Th e Minister of Justice, Shcheglovitov, crudely meddled in the trial, 
ensuring that the majority of the jurors would be peasants and none would 
be intellectuals. “It is the fate of the simple Russian peasant to show the 
entire world the truth in this case,” declared the Kiev monarchist newspaper, 
Dvuglavyi Orel. But the jury voted to acquit. An offi  cer of the police called the 
case a  “police Tsushima, which never will be forgiven.” Yet neither Nicholas 
nor the far right gave indication that they believed the trial a  mistake. Th e 
presiding judge, F. A. Boldyrev, who gave a  summation strongly biased in 
favor of the prosecution, received a  gold watch and a  secret bonus and was 
promoted to the position of Chairman of the Kiev Judicial Chamber—the 
chief of the magistracy of the entire Southwestern Region. Th e prosecutor, 
G.  G.  Chaplinskii, who had been named procurator of the Kiev Judicial 
Chamber two days aft er the murder, was appointed to the Senate on January 
1, 1914. Nicholas’s faith in his vision hardly faltered. He and the Minister 
of Interior, Nicholas Maklakov, asserted that although Beilis was innocent, 
ritual murder had taken place, and the government took steps to make the 
prosecution of ritual murder a  government policy, supporting his scenario as 
national tsar. A book, prepared under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior, 
endeavored to demonstrate that government had suffi  cient evidence of the 
ritual murder of the victim, Iushchinskii. A portrait of Shcheglovitov was the 
frontispiece for the book, which appeared in 1917. On the eve of the war, the 
government was preparing another ritual murder trial.39
Th e violent confrontations of the early twentieth century must be 
conceived not as the unsuccessful assault of revolutionary groups against 
a beleaguered and obsolete autocracy, but as a collision of two fi ercely opposed 
insurgent forces, a  Russia awakening politically and demanding to be heard 
and a monarch seeking to create a pure autocracy drawing personal authority 
from God and the people, unencumbered by institutions of the state or the 
critical opinion of educated society. 
#
39 Tager, Tsarskaia Rossiia i delo Beilisa, 221-23, 272; Rogger, “Th e Beilis Case,” 628.






10. The Russian Empire and Russian Monarchy: 
The Problem of Russian Nationalism1
$
T he consideration of Russian nationalism and nationality has been obscured both by the vagueness of the concepts and the distinctive character of 
Russian expressions of nation. On one hand, aspects of nationalism—
national pride, patriotism, a  sense of national interests—are prominent 
features throughout Russian history and frequently remarked upon 
by foreign observers. But it has been a  common theme in the scholarly 
literature that a  popular Russian nationalism failed to appear in Russia. 
Th e monarchy’s aversion to representative institutions, Hans Rogger wrote, 
prevented the development of “a nationalism that was capable of reconciling 
important segments of Russian society to one another and to the state.”2 Th e 
monarchical nationalism that evolved in the nineteenth century has been 
regarded with some disdain, giving rise to vivid and even comic metaphors 
such as “Slavophile window dressing” according to Hans Rogger, or Benedict 
Anderson’s “a certain inventive legerdemain” that “was required to permit the 
empire to appear attractive in national drag.”3
During the nineteenth century, nationalism came to mean the aspiration 
of peoples to assume sovereignty over the state, popular sovereignty, through 
1 Th is is a  revised version of the article “Natsionalizm, narodnost’ i  rossiiskoe 
gosudarstvo,” Neprikosnovennyi zapas 17, No. 3 (2001): 100-105.
2 Hans Rogger, “Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma,” Comparative Studies 
in Society and History 4, (1961-1962): 253-56. 
3 Ibid., 261; Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Refl ections on the Origins and 
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1996), 86-87. 
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participatory institutions. Russia did not follow the models of the emergence 
of modern nationalism, such as those advanced by Miroslav Hroch.4 Th e 
evolution of a nation-state in France, England, and Sweden saw a consciousness 
of nation emerge under the aegis of a  monarchy and a  monarchical elite, 
permitting a  continuity between earlier and later forms of national 
consciousness. Hroch’s second model describes the emergence of a  national 
movement in opposition to foreign rule, imperial or colonial, a  situation that 
also does not pertain to Russia. In both models, a  people takes control of 
a state that comes to be considered an expression of the nation.5 
Th e most cogent and compelling explanation for the weakness of popular 
nationalism in Russia belongs to Geoff rey Hosking.6 Hosking attributed 
the absence of this type of nationalism to the existence of the empire, which 
thwarted the formation of a  nation-state in Russia. Russian autocracy “was 
generated by the needs of empire, and had to be reinforced as that empire came 
increasingly into confl ict with nation-building.” His thesis is that “in Russia 
state-building obstructed nation-building,” and autocracy and backwardness 
“were symptoms and not causes: both were generated by the way the building 
of the empire obstructed the formation of a nation.”7 
Hosking’s thesis eff ectively highlights the confl ict between imperial and 
national designs, but omits the agency that apprehended and evaluated “the 
needs of empire” and that pursued the policies that generated that confl ict. 
Presumably the vast expanses of Eurasia accompanied by a  long power 
vacuum thrust upon Russia an imperial destiny. My study of Russian monarchy 
has led me to a diff erent thesis: it was the rulers of Russia who determined to 
build and rule an empire and who gave rise to a political culture governed by 
the imagery and designs of empire. From the reign of Ivan III, who in 1489 
refused the title of king from the Holy Roman Emperor with the declaration 
that he “had never wanted to be made king by anyone,” the rulers of Russia 
4 Miroslav Hroch, “From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: Th e 
Nation Building Process in Europe,” in Geoff  Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds., 
Becoming National, 61-62.
5 Th is is emphasized in John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1982).
6 Geoff rey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 1552-1917, xxiv, xxvi, xvii. 
7 Th is is the point of view set forth by Geoff rey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire, 
1552-1917, xxiv, xxvi.  
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conceived monarchical sovereignty as imperial sovereignty.8 Th e word “empire” 
carried several connotations. First, empire signifi ed dominion or supreme 
power unencumbered by other authority. Second, it implied imperial 
expansion, extensive conquests, encompassing non-Russian lands. Th ird, it 
created equivalents to other empires, the Roman, and the Byzantine, the latter 
as the Christian empire, the defender of Orthodoxy. Th ese meanings were 
confl ated and served to reinforce each other. Th e expansion of empire 
confi rmed the image of supreme power, justifi ed the unlimited authority of the 
Russian emperors, and endowed  the Russian ruler with standing equal to or 
superior to the rulers of the West. In the development of the Russian state, it 
was the supremacy and centrality of the monarchical will that proved the 
principal determinant of state policies and the acquisition and defense of the 
empire numbered among the attributes demonstrating the force and extent of 
its sway. 
Th e expansion of Russia in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth 
centuries brought non-Russian territories under the authority of the Russian 
tsars, emperors, and empresses, leading them to evoke comparisons with the 
empires of antiquity. In the period when Western European kings adopted 
“the imperial idea” and the attendant imagery and ceremonies to consolidate 
their power over their separate realms, the rulers of Russia, unencumbered 
by internal religious wars and feudal rights, promoted the goals and policies 
of an expanding empire centered in the Russian capital.9 As suggested in the 
Introduction, they elevated their authority by assuming the images of western 
ideals of rule, Peter the Great, the absolutism of Louis XIV, Catherine the 
Great, the persona of philosopher king, Alexander I, an enlightenment ideal 
of centralized egalitarian government. 
By the same token, the national narratives and symbols adopted by the 
monarchy represented more than “window-dressing” or “drag.” Rather, they 
expressed new conceptions of the role and destiny of Russian monarchy as 
a symbol of the nation, counterpoised to the popular nationalism of the west, 
8 Dmitrii Stremoukhov, “Moscow the Th ird Rome: Sources of the Doctrine,” in Th e 
Structure of Russian History: Interpretive Essays, ed. Michael Cherniavsky (New 
York: Random House, 1970), 132.
9 On the French and English kings’ use of the imperial idea and symbols to advance 
their particular goals, see Frances A. Yates, Astraea: Th e Imperial Th eme in the 
Sixteenth Century (London: ARK, 1985).
PA RT I V. RUSSI A N MONA RCH Y A ND  THE I MPER I A L STATE
 224 
conceptions that were shared by many educated Russians and members of the 
elite. Nationalism became a  fi eld of contestation between the monarchy 
and educated society, each claiming to represent the people, in its struggle 
to control the state. Th e weakness of democratic nationalism owed not to the 
presence and needs of empire, and not only to their aversion to constitutional 
government, but to the determination of Russian monarchy to assume the 
mantle of nation, and to resist and eliminate challenges to this prerogative. 
Th e monarchy elaborated its own national narratives.10 Aft er the 
failure of the Decembrist revolt, which presumably demonstrated the 
Russian people’s antipathy to western ideas of liberalism and revolution, the 
monarchy appropriated the principle of nationality, presenting the obedience 
and devotion of the people as a  tacit mandate from the Russian people. To 
counter the slogan, “liberty, fraternity, equality,” the regime adopted the triad 
“Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality.”11 Th e offi  cial nationality narrative and 
later the Muscovite narrative of the nationalist myth preempted the concept of 
nation for the autocracy: nationality (narodnost’) was an attribute of supreme 
authority, ruling out a  representative government that could constitute 
a Russian nation. As for the empire, offi  cial writers imagined imperial Russia as 
a nation united in obedience to the Russian emperor. Mikhail Pogodin wrote 
in 1832, “Occupying an expanse that no other monarchy on earth has ever 
occupied, neither the Macedonian, nor the Roman, Arabic, the Frankish or the 
Mongol, [Russia] is settled principally by tribes who speak one language, have, 
consequently, one form of thought (obraz mysli), practice one Faith, and like 
an electronic circuit, quaver at a single contact.”12 Th e empire thus fi gured as 
a simulacrum of the monarchical nation, absorbed into it as a byproduct of the 
ruler’s hold on his Russian subjects.
Th e presumption of the Great Reforms, on the part of the monarchy, 
was that the changes in the government would strengthen the bond of the 
nation with the tsar. In the fi rst years of his reign, Alexander II identifi ed the 
monarchy with the reforms of the 1860s—the emancipation, the court and 
10 See Article 7.
11 On the idealistic and utilitarian grounds of Uvarov’s slogan, see Andrei Zorin, 
“Ideologiia ‘Pravoslaviia-Samoderzhaviia-Narodnosti’: Opyt rekonstruktsii,” Novoe 
literaturnoe obozrenie 26 (1996): 86-87, 92-101.
12 M. P. Pogodin, Istoriko-kriticheskie otryvki, 2. See Article 7 for a  discussion of the 
autocracy’s national narratives.
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zemstvo reforms—which were promoted by government offi  cials. In Novgorod, 
at the Millennium celebrations of the Russian state, Alexander addressed 
the local nobility, calling the celebration “a new sign of the indestructible 
bond of all the estates of the Russian land with the government, with one 
goal, the happiness and well-being of our dear fatherland.”13 Th e eff ort to 
identify monarch and reformed government led to the emergence of a variety 
of monarchical nationalism, seeking a unity between monarch and nation, in 
a reformed and dynamic Russian imperial state. 
Alexander II refused to accept even limited public participation in 
government, alienating much of educated society and creating the conditions 
for an insistent revolutionary movement. Th e result was a  wedge driven 
between the autocrat and those who believed that only representative 
institutions could express the needs of a Russian nation. Th e newspaper, Golos, 
expressed such views in an editorial on the celebration of Peter’s bicentenary in 
1872. Th e Golos columnist condemned the monarchy as an abstract state that 
did not have the capacity “to fuse the population into a single people.” It was 
the “abstract state, isolated from the soil of the people,” that had been crushed 
at Sevastopol. Instead, the author advanced his view of a  nation-state, the 
nation as civic entity: “A state assimilates tribes only by relying on the strength 
of a basic nationality (narodnost'), but a nationality can announce its strength 
only in conditions of public independent action.” Not the powerful leader, but 
an independent people strengthened the state. Russia would become powerful 
when it became a  “Russian state, i. e. when it will rest on the strength of 
a Russian people, acting independently.”14 Th e Russian monarchy purporting 
to embody the state and the nation, allowed little room for “a Russian people, 
acting independently.” 
Th e accession of Alexander III brought the introduction of a  national 
myth, which evoked a religious and ethnic bond with the Russian people, who 
had presumably survived the processes of Westernization and provided the 
basic foundations of Russian monarchy and state. In the rhetoric of the regime, 
the empire was replaced by “Russian land” (russkaia zemlia) evoking the 
seventeenth century and implying that it was, as least in potential, ethnically 
Russian. Th e offi  cial accounts of Alexander III’s trip through the Ukraine 
and the Caucasus in 1888 cast his visits as demonstration of the extent of the 
13 S. S. Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr II, 1: 404.
14 Golos, June 6, 1872, 1-2.
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Russian land. Th e newspaper Pravitel śtvennyi Vestnik concluded, “Th ere is no 
doubt that the visit of His Imperial Majesty to the Caucasus will fuse into one 
all the nationalities living there in general love and devotion to the Tsar and to 
stand for Him and for the whole land, the Russian Land.” Th e Russian Land 
defi ned the new, national character of the Russian empire. Th e subjugation 
of other nationalities elevated Russia to the level of an imperial nation and 
justifi ed the colorful exploits of the Russian forces.15
Monarchical narratives dominated the thinking of many tsarist 
functionaries and conservative writers. In the last decade of Nicholas I’s reign, 
a group of offi  cials and offi  cers, including N. N. Murav’ev, A. P. Balasoglo, and 
P. P. Semenov, working within the framework of Offi  cial Nationality, sought 
to identify the empire with the national goals by expanding the empire in 
the Far East as a  national project—a form of national imperialism.16 In the 
1860s, tsarist offi  cials in the Western Provinces, Mikhail Dolbilov has shown, 
sought to impose a  notion of “Russianness,” presuming that these lands, 
dominated by a  Roman Catholic Polish nobility, were primordial Russian 
territory.17 Writers such as Iurii Samarin and Nicholas Danilevskii emphasized 
the leading role of Russian nationality both within the empire and supporting 
the cause of Slavdom in Eastern Europe. Mikhail Katkov developed the idea 
of multi-national empire one with the Russian nation, a “political nation” that 
included other nationalities in belonging to a tsarist state.18 
Th e incorporation of nation into the regime’s representations compelled 
offi  cials and writers to seek oft en visionary embodiments of the national spirit 
that did not intrude on the presentations of the dominant narrative. Leading 
Slavophiles, like Ivan Aksakov, took their inspiration from an idealized 
15 Cited in Moskovskie Vedomosti, October 18, 1888, 3.
16 Mark Bassin, Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion 
in the Russian Far East, 1840-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
12-13, 94-101. However, Bassin’s notion that this was a liberal project in opposition 
to Nicholas I and the Offi  cial Nationality doctrine is unconvincing, considering that 
it developed very much with encouragement of the emperor.
17 Mikhail Dolbilov, “Russian Nationalism and the Nineteenth-Century Policy 
of Russifi cation in the Russian Empire’s Western Region,” in Imperiology: From 
Empirical Knowledge to Discussing the Russian Empire, ed. Kimitaka Matsuzato 
(Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University), 141-58.
18 Andreas Renner, “Defi ning a Russian Nation: Mikhail Katkov and the ‘Invention’ of 
National Politics,” Th e Slavic and East European Review 81, No. 4 (October 1983): 
676-77, 681.
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image of seventeenth century Ruś  when, they believed, a  Russian tsar ruled 
in harmony with a  Russian land, embodied in an Assembly of the Land 
(Zemskii Sobor) consisting of all estates of the realm. Many writers sought 
manifestations of the nation in the core lands of the Russian center, what 
Alexei Miller described as “the nationalist appropriation of space.”19 At the 
end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, some nurtured 
dreams of the expansion of the lands occupied by ethnic Russians through 
colonization, envisioning Russians migrating across the empire, occupying the 
“empty lands” of Eastern nationalities, and turning the empire into a Russian 
national domain. In 1892, the eminent explorer-geographer P. P. Semenov, 
described Russia’s mission as “part of the great colonizing movement of the 
European race,” comparable to the overseas colonization of Spain, France, 
and England.20 In his popular Course of Russian History, Vasilii Kliuchevskii 
wrote  that colonization was “the basic fact of Russian history” and that “the 
history of Russia is the history of country that colonizes itself.”21 In their 
imagination, these territories occupied by Russians would make the empire 
national—a utopian surrogate for a political nation.22 
19 Alexei Miller, Th e Romanov Empire and Nationalism: Essays in the Methodology 
of Historical Research (Budapest-New York: Central European University Press, 
2008), 161-80. Miller means by “the nationalist appropriation of space,” “a symbolic, 
imagined geography. Th e subject is a  complex web of discursive practices that 
included ideological motivation, symbolic, toponymic, artistic familiarization with 
and appropriation of a particular space in such a way as to make the public conscience 
aware of this space as part of its ‘own’ ‘national’ territory,” 167; for Russians writers’ 
conceptions of “interior Russia,” see Leonid Gorizontov, “Th e ‘Great Circle’ of 
Interior Russia: Representations of the Imperial Center in the Nineteenth and Early 
Twentieth Centuries,” in Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700-1930, 67-93.
20 Cited in Uillard Sanderlend (Willard Sunderland), “Imperiia bez imperializma?” 
in Novaia Imperskaia Istoriia Post-Sovetskogo Prostranstva, ed. I. Gerasimov et al. 
(Kazan: Tsentr Issledovanii Natsionalizma i Imperii, 2004), 463. See also my article, 
“Russian Noble Offi  cers and the Ethos of Exploration,” Russian History/Histoire 
Russe 35, Nos.  1-2 (Spring-Summer 2008), 181-97. Vera Tolz, Russia: Inventing the 
Nation (London: Arnold, 2001), 170-74.
21 Willard Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field: Colonization of Empire on the Russian 
Steppe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 177-220. 
22 On the varieties of imperial nationalism, see Vera Tolz’s chapter on “Imaginative 
geography: Russian empire as a Russian nation-state,” in Russia: Inventing the Nation, 
168-81.
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Discovering a  Russian nation also vexed the leaders of the radical and 
liberal intelligentsia. According to the East European pattern, elaborated by 
Hroch, a nationalist intelligentsia took the lead in building a national culture, 
language, literature, ethnic myths, etc., in opposition to foreign rulers. Th e 
fact that the Russian monarchy was defi ned as national and continued to 
command sentiments of devotion and patriotism left  the Russian intellectual 
divided between a  sense of loyalty and a  search for national identity. Th ose 
envisioning a state that embodied the desires and ideals of the nation fell into 
the classic situation of the “superfl uous man” (lishnii chelovek), one whose 
ideals could not be accommodated within Russian reality and whose abilities 
could not be put to morally justifi able use. For the East European intellectual, 
the struggle was clear between the national self and the foreign enemy. For 
the Russian, the alien enemy was part of the national self. Ivan Turgenev 
described this confl ict most eloquently in his novel On the Eve (Nakanune) 
in the persons of the sympathetic but futile Russians Shubin and Bersenev, 
who lacked inner strength of the stalwart Bulgarian, Insarov, struggling for 
his nation’s freedom. Dobroliubov described the inner confl ict in his review of 
the novel, “When Will the Real Day Come?” Th e Russian man struggled to 
free himself from a milieu that he was bound to by powerful ties. “How can 
you turn this milieu upside down? For that you have to turn yourself upside-
down. Try sitting in an empty box and turning yourself over with yourself in 
it. What eff ort it takes! But if you came to it from the outside, you could turn 
it over with a mere push.”23
Th e obvious response was to step out of the box, to alienate oneself from 
the milieu that constrained the intelligent from action. Th is was the radical 
posture, the posture of revolution, the conceiving of the national state, as well 
as the society that underlay it as the enemy. Th e revolutionary intelligentsia 
took this course based not on a  nationalistic but an anti-national ideology—
that the socialist movement was a universal one based on worldwide conditions 
of subjection and a  historical process that would ultimately lead to universal 
justice. To be sure, there were national elements in populism’s focus on the 
commune, but only in the sense that it would hasten Russia’s path to socialism. 
Th e Russian state with its national history was only an obstacle to progress 
towards a world united in equality and social justice.
23 N. A. Dobroliubov, Sobranie sochenii v  trekh tomakh (Moscow: Khudozhevennaia 
Literatura, 1952), 3: 56.
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Th e constraints on popular nationalism hardly diminished the appeals of 
Russian nationalism. On the contrary, nationalism, far from being a secondary 
factor in the Russian past, has been and remains a powerful force, sometimes 
manifest, sometimes latent, expressing insistent and unresolved demands for 
a  state expressing the identity and will of the Russian people. Unfulfi lled, 
national aspirations have ramifi ed through Russian culture, taking ideological, 
institutional, philosophical, and artistic forms. Th ey have been asserted and 
denied, reemerging as a visionary universalism. Th e nation is everywhere and 
nowhere, in Russian art, literature, religion, in the people, in philosophy, in 
a “Russian idea.” 
* * *
Th e meanings of nation, nationality, and nationalism, as a  result, were 
nebulous and variable, refl ecting an author’s ideological stance. Like many other 
western ideas received by Russian intellectuals, liberalism, law, positivism and 
socialism, the concept metamorphosed to fi t the Russian political and social 
order. Th e issue was complicated by the semantics of a  concept expressed in 
two related words, narod, which also meant people, and natsiia, which referred 
more to a nation-state, but which also could have conservative and even racist 
connotations.24 In the nineteenth century, narod came to be associated with 
the common people, or with the offi  cial ideology of narodnost’, and natsiia 
with a political order of representative government. But for many liberals, like 
socialist intellectuals, nationalism represented the Russian state that claimed 
it, the incarnation of national distinctiveness and despotism and the foe of 
the forces struggling for an outcome that would bring a  universal new order 
that would end Russia’s diff erence from the west and bring civil and political 
rights. For this to happen, Russia’s political past had to be totally repudiated. 
Paul Miliukov’s “Russia and Its Crisis,” published in 1905 on the basis of his 
1903 lectures at the University of Chicago in 1903 imagined the autocracy 
was spent, leaving Russia with no “political tradition.” Autocracy remained 
“a material fact, not a  political principle.” A  tradition may have developed in 
the seventeenth century, but it had been broken by Peter. In Japan, Miliukov 
24 Alexei Miller traces the tortuous evolution of the semantics of these words in Alexei 
Il’ich Miller, “Istoriia poniatiia natsii v Rossii,” in Poniatiia o Rossii: K istoricheskoi 
semantike imperskogo perioda, ed. A. Miller, D. Sdvizhkov, I. Shirle (Moscow: NLO, 
2011), 2: 7-49.
PA RT I V. RUSSI A N MONA RCH Y A ND  THE I MPER I A L STATE
 230 
believed, progress had occurred so quickly that tradition had no time to die 
out. In Russia, no political tradition had survived.25 
In his Studies on the History of Russian Culture (Ocherki po istorii Russkoi 
kul’tury), Miliukov relegated the nationalism that existed in Russia to the 
obsolete political system of the autocracy, responding in this way to the 
national narratives advanced during the nineteenth century. He drew a sharp 
distinction between national self-consciousness and public self-consciousness 
(obshchestvennoe samosoznanie). National self-consciousness glorifi ed the 
existing features of the nation; public self-consciousness took on the task of 
criticizing the existing order. “National” (natsional’nyi) he replied to a  critic, 
meant “relating to a  nation,” and should not be confused with “popular” 
(narodnyi), which meant democratic. “National” indicated something 
“characteristic of a nation.” Th e terms “nationalistic” (natsionalisticheskii) and 
“nationalism” (natsionalizm) referred to doctrines seeking to preserve national 
peculiarities that he expected to give way to a popular movement free from the 
burden of the past.26 
Miliukov’s thinking refl ected views of the liberation movement prevalent 
on the eve of the Revolution of 1905. Th at revolution brought into being 
a  parliamentary institution that could be regarded as expressing a  national 
will apart from the monarchy. With the change in the election laws in 1907, 
Petr Stolypin endeavored to promote a union of propertied interests—landed 
nobility, industrialists, and an individualist land-owning peasantry—which 
would provide a  conservative basis for the Russian state and a  Great Russia, 
Velikaia Rossiia. Th e state administration would foster such a  development 
through the Ministry of Education and Interior. Th e moderate conservative 
bloc that formed around the Octobrists in the Th ird Duma espoused a  new 
sense of a  political nation, of groups hoping through the state to realize 
national, imperial goals.27
25 Paul Miliukov, Russia and Its Crisis (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 400-03. In 
fact much of the Japanese tradition, which had been described by a Professor Ienaga 
at Chicago, had been constructed only in the previous decades. T. Fujitani, Splendid 
Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996); Carol Gluck, Japan's Modern Myths. 
26 P. N. Miliukov, Ocherki po istorii russkoi kul’tury (St. Petersburg: I. N. Skorokhodov, 
1903), 3:13-14, 422n.
27 On the appearance of new expressions of nationalism see Scenarios of Power, 2, 407-
09; Geoff rey A. Hosking, Th e Russian Constitutional Experiment: Government and 
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Leading fi gures in liberal politics and thought then envisioned the 
emergence of a Russian nation resembling the patterns of the western national 
state. Th ey sought to defi ne the meaning of Russian nation, and nationalism. 
In his lectures of 1912, Miliukov set forth a  positive view of nationality 
as a  belief in a  shared history and shared values.28 At the beginning of his 
lectures on Russian history, in September 1907, the historian A. E.  Pres-
niakov distinguished between nationality (narodnost’) and nation (natsiia). 
A  state became a  nation when there developed national self-consciousness 
(natsional’noe samosoznanie) or a  national will (natsional’naia volia). “Th e 
will to a  common political life, therefore, a  product of the collective psyche 
of a given population, is the fundamental characteristic of personal as well as 
public ‘narodnost’ or ‘natsional’nost’ at that stage of historical development, 
when nations take form.”29 Peter Struve called upon Russians to educate 
themselves in politics and to develop a national bond with the state, cherishing 
the illusion that the tsarist state now had accepted participation and could 
continue to embody the nation. He conceived of the state in almost mystical 
terms and nation as a  form of spiritual unity uniting people with a  national 
imperial state. He took British and American experiences as examples for 
an active Russian nationalism that he set against the conservative, offi  cial 
nationality.30
But the very appearance of a  political nation threatened Nicholas II’s 
conviction that he was the divinely-inspired tsar, ruling a  Russian land like 
his pre-Petrine ancestors, and enjoying a  union with the Russian people that 
Duma, 1907-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 215-22. On the 
use of Russian ethnicity as a  political category aft er 1905 see Charles Steinwedel’s 
discussion of Bashkiria, in “To Make a Diff erence the Category of Ethnicity in Late 
Imperial Russian Politics, 1861-1917,” in Hoff man and Kotsonis, Russian Modernity: 
Politics, Knowledge, Practices, ed. David Hoff man and Yanni Kotsonis (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 75-76, and in greater detail in his PhD dissertation, “Local 
Politics of Empire: State Religion, and Ethnicity in Bashkiria, 1865-1917” (Columbia 
University, 1999).
28 On the development of Miliukov’s ideas on nationality, see Melissa Kirschke 
Stockdale, Paul Miliukov and the Quest for a Liberal Russia, 1880-1918 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1996), 187-92.
29 A. E. Presniakov, Lektsii po russkoi istorii (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Sotsial’no-
Ekonomicheskoe Izdatel’stvo 1938), 1: 7-8. 
30 P. B. Struve, Patriotica: politika, kul’tura, religiia, sotsializm (Moscow: Respublika, 
1997), 67-70, 167-72; Hosking, Th e Russian Constitutional Experiment, 218-20. 
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enabled him alone to represent the nation. Th e development of parliamentary 
institutions only confi rmed and strengthened his deep suspicion of the 
institutions of the Russian state, which he felt eluding his control. Neither 
he nor the radical opposition could suff er a  state based on nation, for both 
claimed to represent the people. Th e conception of a Russian nation governing 
through parliamentary institutions was destined to remain a Utopian dream. 
Th e absence of a unifi ed political nation aft er 1914 must be accounted one of 
the factors leading to the political fragmentation that overtook Russia during 
the years of war and revolution. Out of the chaos arose a new more powerful 
state to reunite, defend, and strive to modernize Russia. 
#
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11. The “Integrity” (Tselost ’) 
of the State 
in Imperial Russian Representation1
$
F rom the reign of Peter the Great, statements of the power, extent, and benefi cence of the Russian monarchy also revealed an underlying and 
persistent concern for tselost'—the unity, or integrity of the empire. Th e 
problem  of the integrity of the realm arose intermittently, in response to 
both internal and external threats, but persisted even at the root of scenarios 
that obscured or denied it. It emerged as a central theme in the era of revolutions 
of the fi rst decades of the twentieth century.
Th e word “integrity” in English carries a meaning of completeness— the 
state of being whole and undamaged: “the territorial integrity of the nation.” 
Tselost' was the comparable Russian term during the imperial period, tselostnost' 
aft er the revolution. Tracing the evolution of its usage and variant expressions 
gives us a  glimpse into the thought processes that strove to preserve the 
monarchy, which in the end conditioned its downfall and that persist even 
today in post-Soviet Russia. Th e size and national diversity of the Russian 
empire made its integrity a  frequent cause for apprehension: what would 
happen if it fell apart? 
Th e responses to this problem fi gured largely in the representations of 
monarchical power in imperial Russia. Th e initial and principal response to 
threats to the integrity of the realm justifi ed the exertion of unlimited and 
energetic personal monarchical power. Th e principle was central to Peter 
the Great’s Succession Law of 1722. Peter decreed the right of the reigning 
monarch to choose his successor, that is, he enshrined in law the practice of 
1 Th is article is followed by an exchange with the editors of Ab Imperio concerning my 
assumptions and conclusions.
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designation in eff ect before his accession.2 Rather than regulate the succession 
according to heredity, he openly subordinated the principle of heredity to the 
goal of the utility, the well-being of the realm, determined by the untrammeled 
will of the rational legislator. To avoid the succession of “unworthy heirs,” he 
ordained that the ruling tsar always have the freedom (volia) to designate 
“whom he wishes and to remove the one who has been designated.” He was 
acting in this way because of his “care for the integrity of our state [popechenie 
o tselosti nashego gosudarstva], which with the help of God has now grown in 
extent, as is obvious to all.”3 Th e law thus ascertained the connection between 
the tsar’s unlimited absolute power and the well-being of the realm refl ected 
in the size and territorial unity of the empire.
Peter issued the decree in the context of his scenario of founder, asserting 
the right of conquest to destroy the old order. He assumed the persona of 
western rulers, but rejected the juridical premises of their rule. Th e decree 
made clear the distance between the legal bases of his rule as Russian emperor 
and the emerging legal grounds for hereditary monarchy in the West. Early 
eighteenth century statutes such as England’s Act of Settlement, 1701, 
Sweden’s “On the Form of Rule,” 1719, Philip V of Spain’s testament, 1713, and 
Charles Vl’s Pragmatic Sanction of 1713 for the Habsburg Empire introduced 
permanent, fundamental laws of succession that would provide grounds for 
monarchical stability and continuity.4 In the name of law, Peter’s edict gave 
signal demonstration of the supremacy of the unrestrained imperial will and 
aroused consternation and criticism both in Russia and Europe. In defense 
of  Peter’s decree, his principal ideologist, Feofan Prokopovich, published the 
tract “Th e Law of the Monarch’s Will,” which deployed natural law arguments 
and language in order “to disabuse foreigners of their false opinion of our 
people and to give them reason to think better of us,” “thus the whole civilized 
world is our witness.”5 
2 See Article 2 in this volume.
3 PSZ, Sobranie 1, no. 3893, February 5, 1722.
4 Heinz Mohnhaupt, “Die Lehre von der ‘Lex Fundamentalis’ und die 
Hausgesetzgebung europäischer Dynastien,” Der dynastische Fürstenstaat: Zur 
Bedeuting von Sukzessionordungen für die Entstehung des fr ühmodernen Staates, 
ed. Johannes Kunisch and Helmut Neuhaus (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1982), 
6; Oleg Omel’chenko, “Stanovlenie zakonodatel’nogo regulirovaniia prestolo-
naslediia, 26.
5 Antony Lentin, Peter the Great, 27, 127, 33-34.
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Th e result of the law was to subordinate legal considerations to the 
contingencies of imperial policy taken to preserve the integrity of the state, 
which was oft en in peril due to Russia’s size and state of backwardness. Th is 
point of view was developed by the most prominent Russian historian and 
geographer of the fi rst half of the eighteenth century, Vasilii Tatishchev. 
Tatishchev invoked natural law arguments advanced by Montesquieu to 
connect the monarch’s absolute power to Russia’s size and geopolitical 
situation. “Large states that are not safe from neighbors cannot remain whole 
(v tselosti sokhranit'sia ne mogut) without an absolute monarch.” In his Istoriia 
Rossiiskaia, he stressed the obstacles: “Large regions with open borders, and 
especially where the people are not enlightened by learning and reason and 
fulfi ll their duties from fear rather than their own good conduct,  . . . must 
be monarchies.” Th e size of the empire and its undisciplined and untutored 
population indicated the vulnerability of the state order, which could be 
overcome only by the exercise of the forceful will of the absolute monarch. 
I call this the admonitory mode of the Russian state narrative.6 
Chapter 2 of Catherine the Great’s 1767 Instruction (Nakaz) to her 
“Legislative Commission consists of lapidary statements in admonitory mode. 
Article 9—“Th at sovereign is absolute, for there is no other Authority but that 
which centers in his single Person, that can act with a  Vigor proportionate 
to the Extent of such a vast Dominion.” Th e same point is given even greater 
emphasis in articles 10 and 11. Article 10 contends that “Th e Extent of the 
Dominion requires an absolute Power to be vested in that Person who rules over 
it” for it ensures “the quick Dispatch of aff airs.” Article 11 peremptorily evokes 
the alternative: “Every other Form of Government whatsoever would not only 
have been prejudicial to Russia, but would even have proved its entire Ruin.”7 
Peter’s and Catherine’s legislation also provided early statements of what 
Willard Sunderland has called “territoriality,” the identifi cation of the state 
with the size, cohesiveness, and unity of the territory of the realm. Th is 
interest led to the advance of cartography, explorations, and the deployment of 
6 V. N. Tatishchev, “Razgovor dvukh priatelei o  pol’ze nauki i  uchilishch,” in 
V.  N.  Tatishchev, Izbrannye proizvedeniia (Leningrad: Nauka, 1979), 138-39; 
V. N. Tatishchev, Istoriia Rossiisksaia (Moscow–Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk, 1962), 
1: 362; Cynthia Hyler Whittaker, Russian Monarchy: Eighteenth Century Rulers and 
Writers in Political Dialogue (De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003), 
130-31.
7 W. F. Reddaway, ed., Documents of Catherine the Great (New York: Russell and 
Russell, 1971), 216.
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knowledge as a means of asserting power over territory and the peoples within. 
Knowledge became a  means to take possession of those lands studied and 
mapped; the empire’s great extent became the object of pride, of mastering the 
lands under the monarch’s rule.8 It fed the monarch’s sense of omnipotence: 
the power of knowledge and rhetoric could shape perception of reality and 
unleash the sovereign’s will.
By the same token, the study of the nationalities led to a  reveling 
in the  variety of national groups in the empire. Catherine sponsored 
ethnographic  expeditions and surveys, under the aegis of the Imperial 
Academy of Sciences, to learn about those peoples of the empire so that they 
could be transformed into Russians and would be able to “share in their 
happiness.” Her ideas informed the pioneering ethnographic works of the 
late eighteenth century, particularly Johann Georgi’s landmark four-volume 
account of the nationalities of the empire (Opisanie vsekh obitaiushchikh 
v  Rossiiskom gosudarstve narodov).9 Georgi asserted that the Russian empire 
was the most diverse of empires. “Hardly any other state in the world possesses 
such a  great variety of diff erent nations, survivals of peoples, and colonies 
as the Russian state.”10 Enlightenment promised to erase these indigenous 
traits. Th ose at earlier stages, Georgi wrote, the Tungus, the Chukchi, were 
ignorant, simple, and possessed a beguiling innocence. It was “the uniformity 
of State organization” that could transform all nationalities into educated, 
Europeanized Russians. Th e state, Georgi concluded, was “leading our rude 
Peoples by giant steps toward the common goal of general enlightenment in 
Russia, of a wonderful fusion of all into a single body and soul, and of creating, 
as it were, an unshakable Giant that will stand for hundreds of centuries.”11 
8 Willard Sunderland, “Imperial Space: Territorial Th ought and Practice in the 
Eighteenth Century,” in Burbank et. al, eds., Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 
1700-1930, 37-55.
9 I. G. Georgi, Opisanie vsekh obitaiushchikh v Rossiiskom gosudarstve narodov  . . .  (St. 
Petersburg: Imp. Akademia Nauk, 1779), 3 Vols; Nathaniel Knight, “Constructing 
the Science of Nationality: Ethnography in Mid-Nineteenth Century Russia,” 
Doctoral Dissertation, Columbia University, 1995, 32-40; S. A. Tokarev, Istoriia 
Russkoi Etnografi i (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), 103-110.
10 Tokarev, Istoriia Russkoi Etnografi i, 103.
11 I. G. Georgi, Opisanie vsekh obitaiushchikh v  Rossiiskom gosudarstve narodov, 1: ix; 
Yuri Slezkine, “Naturalists versus Nations: Eighteenth-Century Russian Scholars 
Confront Ethnic Diversity,” in Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 
1800-1917, ed. Daniel R.Brower, and Edward J. Lazzerini (Bloomington: Indiana 
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At the same time, the expansion to the south and the incorporation of 
Crimea and much of the Black Sea littoral into the empire led to grandiose 
designs to create a  “new Russia” and establish a  successor empire to ancient 
Greece and Rome. Now, it is not in the way of warning, not that of the only 
alternative but one of bravado, that the monarch boasts of having successfully 
coped with a  daunting task. I  call this the celebratory-triumphalist mode of 
the state narrative. Catherine rejoiced in the size and diversity of Russia and 
succeeded in increasing both, expanding the already formidable space of 
Russia to the south and the west, and introducing new peoples to the already 
multinational population. Th e inimitable preambles of her legislation do not 
suff er from understatement.
Th e vision of a vast multinational empire became especially important to 
Catherine's image as her reign progressed. Kappeler points out her great pride 
for the complete listing of the empress’s title, which she cited frequently. Th e 
Charter of the Nobility opens with the enumeration of the titles to thirty-eight 
provinces and lands under her rule, including tsaritsa of the new “Kherson-
Tauride” province. By the end of Catherine’s reign, it was important to 
confi rm that Russia was not only an empire, but the most imperial of nations, 
comprising more peoples than any other. Th us the academician Heinrich 
Storch boasted of the ethnographic variety of Russia in 1797, commenting that 
“no other state on earth contains such a variety of inhabitants. Russians, and 
Tatars, Germans, Mongols, Finns and Tungus live in an immense territory in 
the most varied climates . . . ”12 Th is was “a most rare phenomenon” and “one 
seeks in vain another example in the history of the world.” Poets compared the 
Russian empire to ancient Rome.
* * *
Th e defeat of Napoleon’s challenge to Russia’s independence as a sovereign 
state and the Decembrists’ challenge to the monarch’s absolute power resulted 
in reaffi  rmations of both the integrity of the empire and the indispensable role 
of absolute rule in the survival and fl ourishing of the Russian state. Th e survival 
of the Russian state was a central theme of Karamzin’s History of the Russian 
University Press, 1997), 38-39; Nathaniel Knight, “Constructing the Science of 
Nationality,” 36-39.
12 Andreas Kappeler, Russland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall 
(Munich: Beck, 1992), 99, 129. 
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State. Explaining the benefi ts of history, he informed the ordinary citizen why 
he should read history: “it consoles him when the state suff ers calamities, by 
bearing witness that in bygone times similar events—and even more terrible 
ones—occurred and the state did not disintegrate.”13 It was autocracy that 
tided Russia through its calamities. For Karamzin, the decisive moment was 
Ivan  III’s violent subjugation of Novgorod. In a  sentence extending over half 
a page of text, he elaborated, “Although the human heart typically wishes well 
to republics, which are based on basic rights of freedom dear to it  . . .  history 
must glorify the mind of Ivan, for wisdom of state taught him to strengthen 
Russia by the unifi cation of its parts into a whole (tseloe) so that she attained 
independence and greatness.”14 In the memorandum he wrote in criticism of 
Alexander I’s eff orts at reform, he claimed that autocracy was the source of 
both Russia’s state unity and its progress. He decried Alexander’s tolerance 
as weakness and pointed out widespread ineptitude and corruption. But he 
disagreed with those “who, perceiving weakness, expect imminent destruction. 
No! States are sturdy, especially Russia, which is impelled by autocratic power!” 
“Autocracy is the Palladium of Russia,” he affi  rmed, “its integrity (tselost') is 
necessary for her happiness.”15 
Th e rhetoric of Nicholas I’s scenario transmuted Karamzin’s ideas into 
an ideology of autocracy. Th e successes of the fi rst years of his reign, the 
suppression of the Decembrist and the Polish uprisings, the victorious wars 
with Turkey and Persia, fed a triumphalist mentality that celebrated a united 
empire and nation. Th e defeat of the Decembrists showed that the autocracy 
itself enjoyed the support of the Russian people, an incorporation of the 
notion of popular sovereignty into offi  cial rhetoric. Th e Decembrists’ design 
was alien to the Russian people. “Neither in the characteristics nor the ways 
of the Russian is this design to be found. Th e heart of Russia was and will be 
impervious to it.” Th e manifesto went on, “In a state where love for monarchs 
and devotion to the throne are based on the native characteristics of the 
people, where there are laws of the fatherland and fi rmness in administration, 
all eff orts of the evil-intentioned will be in vain and insane.”16 Th e logic that 
13 N. M. Karamzin, Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo (Moscow: Kniga, 1988), 1: ix, 24.
14 Ibid., 2: 86.
15 Nicholas Karamzin, Karamzin’s Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia: 
A Translation and Analysis by Richard Pipes (New York: Atheneum, 1969), 191, 200.
16 N. K. Shil'der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi, 1: 704-06.
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obedience and submission signaled consent was reaffi  rmed aft er the Polish 
revolution of 1830. Nicholas asserted in a memorandum that in 1815, Poland 
“had been given to Russia by right of conquest,” and that Alexander I  had 
sought to ensure the interests of Russia “by recreating Poland as an integral 
part of the empire [partie intégrante de l'empire] though with the title of 
kingdom and with a  separate administration and army.”17 Pushkin’s poems 
of 1831, “To the Slanderers of Russia” and “On the Anniversary of Borodino” 
answered the eff rontery of western, and particularly French, support for the 
Poles and denunciations of Russia as challenges to the unity of the empire. 
“To the Slanderers of Russia” described the uprising as “a family quarrel” 
between Slavs, the Europeans’ protests expressing hatred of Russians. “Won’t 
the Russian land arise,” he warned them. His description of the Russian land 
(russkaia zemlia) evoked the vast reaches of the empire from Perm to Crimea, 
from Finland to Colchis, from the Kremlin to the Chinese border. “So bards 
send us your embittered sons: there is room for them in the fi elds of Russia, 
amongst the graves of their kinsmen.” He asked in “On the Anniversary 
of Borodino,” with irony, where Russia should build fortresses: at the Bug, 
the Vorskla, the Liman? Who would receive Volynia, the legacy of Bogdan 
Khmel’nitskii? Would Lithuania be torn from Russia, Kiev?18 A  reductio ad 
absurdum answered foreign challenges to the unity of the empire.
In the years aft er the Polish uprising, offi  cial nationality writers celebrated 
the solidarity of the peoples of Russia with the monarch. Th e ethnic diversity 
of the empire was now dissolved in an image of a single people, which dispelled 
concerns about the unity and integrity of the empire. All nationalities of 
the empire shared the devotion to the tsar, which overshadowed ethnic 
particularities. Mikhail Pogodin wrote in 1832, “Occupying an expanse that 
no other monarchy on earth has ever occupied, neither the Macedonian, nor 
the Roman, Arabic, the Frankish or the Mongol, [Russia] is settled principally 
by tribes who speak one language, have, consequently, one form of thought 
(obraz mysli), practice one Faith, and like an electronic circuit, quaver at 
a single contact.”19 
17 Ibid., 2: 582-84.
18 A. S. Pushkin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (Leningrad: Akademiia Nauk SSSR, 1948), 
3: 269-70.
19 M. P. Pogodin, Istoriko-kriticheskie otryvki, 2.
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Th e minister of education, Sergei Uvarov, formulated these ideas in the 
doctrine of Offi  cial Nationality. A  student of German idealist philosophy, 
he articulated the doctrine as principles that distinguished Russia from the 
West—“orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality” (pravoslavie, samoderzhavie, 
narodnost'), Russia’s answer to “liberty, equality, and fraternity.”20 In an age 
of idealism, Uvarov sought “the principles comprising the distinctive character 
of Russia that belong exclusively to her.” He elevated Karamzin’s glorifi cation 
of the historical role of autocracy to the level of a  national idea. Autocracy 
represented “the chief condition of Russia’s political existence. Th e Russian 
colossus rests on it as the cornerstone of its greatness. Th is truth is felt by the 
countless majority of Your majesty’s subjects; they feel this in full measure, 
though placed on diff erent levels of civic life. Th e redeeming conviction that 
Russia lives and is preserved by the spirit of a strong, humane, and enlightened 
autocracy, should permeate public education and develop with it.”21 
Defeat in the Crimean War punctured the celebratory rhetoric and 
idealization of autocracy, making clear that the integrity of the state was again 
vulnerable. As Olga Maiorova has shown, the allies’ attack on Crimea was 
understood as an attack on the Russian homeland equivalent to the Napoleonic 
invasion.22 Th e losses in the Crimea, and the fall of Sevastopol in the spring of 
1855, revived the admonitory mode. Alexander Herzen, reproaching Nicholas 
for an unnecessary war, argued that the attack had aroused the Russian 
people’s heroic defense but also caused horrible suff ering to save “the tselost' of 
the state.”23 
Aft er the war, Alexander sought to reinforce the bonds with the Russian 
people by appeals to the feelings of mutual love and the gratitude for the 
Great Reforms. But reform awakened hopes for popular participation in 
government and representative institutions. Alexander gave some rein to the 
noble constitutional ideas, but then rebuked the nobility’s pretentions to 
20 Andrei Zorin, “Ideologiia ‘Pravoslaviia-Samoderzhaviia-Narodnosti’: Opyt rekon-
struktsii,” Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie 26 (1996): 86-87, 92-101.
21 M. O. Gershenzon, Epokha Nikolaia I (Moscow: Obrazovanie, 1910), 115-16.
22 Olga Maiorova, From the Shadow of Empire: Defi ning the Russian Empire through 
Cultural Mythology, 1855-1870 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010), 
30-33.
23 Aleksandr Gertzen, Sobranie sochinennii v  XXX tomakh (Moscow: Akad. Nauk 
SSSR, 1957), 12: 268-69; A. G. Tartakovskii, 1812 god i  russkaia memuaristika 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1980), 230.
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participate in the work of legislation, stating that the right of initiative for 
reform belonged to him exclusively, “and is inseparably connected with the 
autocratic power, entrusted to me by God.” His subjects did not have the right 
to anticipate his “incessant care for Russia’s well-being . . . . No estate has the 
right to speak with the name of other estates. No one can take it upon himself 
to petition me about the general welfare and needs of the state.” He confi ded 
to Bismarck his belief that the Russian peasants believed in a strong personal 
ruler and would not obey a  representative government.24 He also feared 
for the unity of state and, in a  letter of January 1865 to the heir, Nicholas 
Aleksandrovich, expressed the close connection he believed existed between 
autocracy and the unity of the empire. Constitutional demands, he wrote, 
thwarted the initiatives of the government toward “the gradual development 
of the prosperity and power of our Mother Russia. Constitutional forms on 
the model of the West would be the greatest misfortune here and would have 
as their fi rst consequence not the unity of the State but the disintegration 
of the Empire into pieces” (ne edinstvo Gosudarstva a  raspadenie Imperii na 
kuski). Th ese words were underlined. Alexander expressed the same concern in 
a conversation with D. D. Golokhvastov in September 1865.25 
Th e Polish revolution of 1863 brought forth new concerns for the integrity 
of the realm. Once more, the affi  rmation of integrity took the form of an 
ideological and symbolic statement of unity. Words and images produced 
a  sense of a  unifi ed empire that could resist challenges to its borders and 
the power of the sovereign. Th e author of this formulation, accordingly, 
was a  writer, the journalist and publisher, Mikhail Katkov, who in future 
decades would serve as the éminence grise of the monarchy. In the pages of his 
newspaper, Moskovskie Vedomosti, and his journal, Russkii Vestnik, Katkov 
introduced a new narrative in celebratory mode that evoked a unifi ed empire. 
Th e concept of “integrity” (tselost') became his leading idea, a virtual obsession. 
But this was not only territorial integrity: Katkov also elaborated a  concept 
of “national integrity.”26 His national state was not the offi  cial nationality, 
24 See Scenarios of Power, 2: 77, 91. 
25 GARF, 665-1-13, January 30, 1865; Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr II, 1: 534.
26 Andreas Renner, Russischer Nationalismus und Öff entlichkeit im Zarenreich, 1855-
1875 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2000), 314-15; Idem, “Defi ning a Russian Nation: Mikhail 
Katkov and the ‘Invention’ of National Politics,” Th e Slavic and East European 
Review 81, No. 4 (October 1983): 660; V. A. Tvardovskaia, Ideologiia poreformennogo 
samoderzhaviia: M.N. Katkov I ego izdaniia (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 25-26.
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which had stressed the distinctiveness of Russia due to sentimental and 
historical bonds of devotion. Rather, his models were contemporary European 
states, Great Britain, Italy, and later Germany, which united diff erent groups 
in allegiance to a  state.27 Th e nationalism he envisioned was a  political 
nationalism—the peoples of the empire sharing an allegiance to a  unifi ed 
Russian state even if they practiced diff erent religions and ethnic customs.
In April 1863, he wrote, “Th ere is in Russia one dominant nationality, one 
dominant language, which was developed by centuries of historical life.” Th ere 
were many tribes with diff erent languages and customs, but they all felt a sense 
of unity with “the Great Russian world” “in the unity of the state, in the unity 
of the supreme authority in the Tsar, the living, sovereign, the personifi cation 
of this unity.”28 Two years later he asserted that the national party in Russia 
comprised “all the Russian people” (russkii narod). “Th e Russian people 
are confi dent about their honor and their national interests because of the 
certitude that they are completely protected by the supreme authority, which 
they consider completely Russian [russkaia], which they never opposed, and 
which they feel themselves as one organism.”29 He thus confounded Rus’, the 
Russian core of the state, with Rossiia, the empire with the countless ethnic 
groups and indistinct boundaries between them. In February 1867, he wrote, 
“One integral state [tsel'noe gosudarstvo] and one language recognized by 
the state, or, what is the same, one political nationality—this is the crux of 
the issue that should be placed above all doubts, vacillations, customs, social 
formations, the physiology of cities and villages. Th ese villages may diff er, but 
without doubt there must be the unity of a  political nationality, and all the 
closer the bonds linking the two halves of Russia the more vital the contact 
between them.”30
Katkov appealed to nationalists and chauvinists in his writings 
condemning the Poles. He did not consider Poland a part of the empire. But 
neither could he tolerate an independent Polish state, for that state, assisted by 
western allies, would imperil the very survival of Russia. Moreover, a  nation, 
27 Renner, Russischer Nationalismus, 315-17.
28 M. N. Katkov, 1863 god; sobranie statei po Pol’skomu voprosu (Moscow: Moscow 
University Press, 1887), 100-01.
29 M.N. Katkov, Sobranie peredovykh statei Moskovskikh Vedomostei, 1865g. (Moscow: 
Moskovskie Vedomosti, 1897), 350-51.
30 M.N. Katkov, Sobranie peredovykh statei, 1867g., 88.
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he believed, could not abide claims against its territory. He wrote in 1863, 
“Th e nation is not a  dead aggregate of people. As long as the nation lives, it 
has a vital claim to the whole of its territory: it belongs not only to its present 
but its future. If the nation begins to sacrifi ce its territory, it is the beginning 
of its downfall, its disintegration.”31 
Katkov contended that the state, certain of the allegiance of all groups 
in population, had to lead and dominate public opinion, and he saw his 
mission to appeal to public opinion. In this respect too he broke with the 
Offi  cial Nationality, which presumed an abiding devotion of the people to the 
sovereign. Andreas Renner has emphasized the modern character of Katkov’s 
contribution in helping to create and dominate “a community of discourse.” 
Th e unity of the state and empire was to be constructed or maintained by an 
active and forceful policy of the government supported by a  press devoted 
to shaping public opinion on its behalf.32 In 1863, he used his newspaper to 
create an illusion of national “public opinion,” to promote his demand for 
more vigorous suppression of the Polish rebellion. Katkov claimed he was 
expressing the views of the people, which he counterpoised to those of liberal 
society. While other newspapers avoided chauvinistic proclamations during 
the Polish uprising, Moskovskie Vedomosti reported numerous outbursts 
of patriotism among the common people. Katkov wrote that “simple and 
ignorant (temnye) people,” “small people, who are poor and impoverished in 
spirit,” who, “in their dark depths, more than  . . .  people who are enlightened 
and intelligent  . . .  heard the voice of the Fatherland and responded to it.” 
Accounts from Moskovskie Vedomosti of peasant communes declaring their 
wish to die for God and Fatherland were reprinted in Severnaia Pochta, and 
Russkii Invalid, organs of the Ministry of Interior, and the War Ministry. 
Descriptions in the newspaper of meetings of communes near Moscow, it was 
reported, brought tears to the eyes of the empress.33 
Excerpts from the diary describing the heir’s (Nicholas Aleksandrovich’s) 
tour of the empire, written by his mentors Constantine Pobedonostsev and 
Ivan Babst, and printed in Russkii Vestnik during the rebellion, confi rmed 
Katkov’s notion of a unity of the nationalities with the Russian state. As the 
trip proceeded down the Volga, the authors emphasized the theme of imperial 
31 Renner, Russischer Nationalismus, 223.
32 Renner, “Mikhail Katkov . . . ,” 680-82.
33 See Scenarios of Power, 2: 162-63.
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unity around the Russian nation. At the Governor’s house in Astrakhan’, they 
stood next to the heir and beheld a strange motley throng in national costumes, 
among them Greeks, Armenians, Persians, Kalmyks, and Tatars. Th ere were 
few Russian faces in the crowd, but they still felt themselves in Russia, “in 
one of the remote regions of a great tsardom, united by the powerful bond of 
state power and a consciousness of state unity.” Th ere, among the mixture of 
“dress, faces, and tongues,” the basic tone was provided by the “founding and 
gathering element of the Russian tribe.”34 
Katkov acted as a  powerful and acute critic of Alexander II’s reign in 
the 1870s, and when Alexander III came to the throne, exerted considerable 
major infl uence on governmental policy. Although he came to accept 
the  ethnic and religious grounds of autocracy as presented in the national 
myth, his focus remained on state as the expression and the enforcer of 
nationality. When Alexander III visited Moscow in the summer of 1881, 
Katkov described the popular acclaim as a  resounding affi  rmation of state 
power by the people. He welcomed the tsar to Moscow, “to come in contact 
with the Russian Land in the shrine of her past, in her heart, in the very 
source of her strength.” He emphasized that all economic development, 
philanthropy, and freedom in Russia came from the state, that the state was 
the mainstay of the people’s welfare. In Russia, he insisted, no contradiction, 
no antagonism, “not the slightest disagreement” could arise between the 
interests of the people and the interests of the state. Th e various estates of the 
realm, he argued, should assist the state, or more specifi cally the police, in 
fi ghting sedition.35 
Katkov was as insistent on the internal as on the territorial unity 
of the  state. Th e state was a  unifying force, which justifi ed the exercise of 
powerful ruthless force against internal opposition. As early as 1863, he 
called for a  dictatorship to deal with revolutionary ferment in Russia as 
well as Poland. “It is as if we have forgotten that the symbol of the state 
is a  sword, and that the state must when necessary resort to strict, even 
severe measures.”36 Th e assassination of Alexander II led him to appeal for 
more energetic measures to defend state power. Alexander II had been “a 
soft hearted, long suff ering lover of mankind who diminished rather than 
34 Ibid., 2:107.
35 Moskovskie Vedomosti, July 18, 1881: 3. 
36 Tvardovskaia, Ideologiia poreformennogo samoderzhaviia, 37.
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elevated the majesty of his rights.” His kindness had prevented him from 
wielding his power forcefully. “May the supreme power in Rus' observe its 
sacred meaning and all its plenitude and its freedom in vital unity with the 
forces of the people.”37 
Katkov, along with Constantine Pobedonostsev, encouraged the new tsar, 
Alexander III, to be unrelenting in his oppression and assertion of the power 
of the autocratic state, to reject the suggestion of introducing a Zemskii Sobor, 
an Assembly of the Land proposed by Ivan Aksakov and other Slavophiles. 
He encouraged a new, brash confi dence in a regime invigorated by the defeat 
of liberal and revolutionary challenges. He was not troubled by conservative 
fears of the disruptive eff ects of industrialization and, following the example 
of Germany, pressed for government ownership and promotion of railroads. 
“Aft er the bayonet, it is the railroads that consummate political cohesion.” 
He thought that workers' disturbances required greater state involvement to 
regulate owner-worker relations and only in his last days did he recognize the 
political dangers of a  workers’ movement.38 He conveyed his bravura to his 
protégés Ivan Vyshnegradskii and Sergei Witte, who embarked on Russian 
industrialization with the certainty that the Russian state could avoid the 
social confl icts experienced in the West and counter the eff orts of western 
entrepreneurs to turn Russia into colonies. 
Katkov’s ideology of state unity sustained the monarch’s resolve during 
Alexander III’s reign. Th e new tsar did not rely on a unity of the nation around 
the state. Rather, his scenario enacted a national myth that evoked a spiritual 
and emotional unity of the Russian people around an ethnic Russian tsar. 
Declaring triumph over the revolutionary threat, Alexander III’s manifesto 
of April 19, 1881, written by Constantine Pobedonostsev, reaffi  rmed the 
principle of autocracy while elaborating the new goals it sought to attain. It 
evoked a  new founding period of the Russian empire—an idealized version 
of seventeenth-century Moscow. It referred not to the Russian state or 
empire, but to the “Russian land” (zemlia russkaia.) Th e Russian land had 
been disgraced by vile sedition, but “hereditary tsarist power,” continued to 
enjoy the love of its subjects, and this power “in unbreakable . . .  union with 
[Our land]” (v  nerazryvnom soiuze c  neiu) had survived such troubles—
smuty—in the past, recalling the breakdown of authority at the beginning 
37 Moskovskie Vedomosti, March 3, 1881, 1-2, March 5, 1881, 2, March 15, 1881, 3. 
38 Tvardovskaia, Ideologiia poreformennogo samoderzhaviia, 74-78, 100-02.
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of the seventeenth century.39 Th e theme of the unity with the Russian land, 
the pre-Petrine land untainted by western borrowings resonated through 
the rhetoric and imagery of Alexander III’s reign. On his visit to Moscow in 
July 1881, he declared, “Moscow has attested and now attests that in Russia, 
Tsar and people compose one concordant and strong whole [edinodushnoe, 
krepkoe tseloe].”40
Th e national myth introduced a  new celebratory imagery. Th is was not 
the offi  cial nationality of Nicholas I’s reign; the slogan Orthodoxy, Autocracy, 
Nationality, now rarely fi gured in offi  cial pronouncements.41 Th e scenario 
evoked not an empire of diverse peoples united by personal devotion to an 
autocracy, but a  Russian people, united through the Orthodox Church and 
bonds of kinship to their tsar, reviving the dormant traditions of Muscovy. 
Alexander brought a new physiognomy to the imperial image: he distinguished 
himself from his predecessors by appearing ethnically akin to his subjects—
as the most Russian of Russians. Th e full red beard he had grown during his 
command in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) marked him as a  native 
tsar. No Russian ruler since Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich (1645-1676) had worn 
a  beard. Offi  cers were expected to grow beards as well. He introduced new 
uniforms and standards emblazoned with icons of saints, their saints’ days 
coinciding with  their regimental holidays. Eight-pointed Orthodox crosses 
were placed on the fl agstaff s.42 
In place of a  presumed assimilation into a  multiethnic empire, the 
national myth presumed a  preexistent national supremacy and dominance 
inherited from a  distant and glorious past. Alexander III pursued policies 
of cultural Russifi cation in many areas of the empire, imposing an image of 
a pre-Petrine empire ruled by an ethnic Russian nationality. In Ukraine, the 
Western provinces, and Poland, it led to measures encouraging the spread 
of Orthodoxy and the Russian language. Alexander also endeavored to 
eliminate the rights the Grand Duchy of Finland enjoyed to separate laws, 
tariff , postal systems, and coinage. Aft er reading a  memorandum on this 
question, he remarked, “I am astonished as to what it is all about—a part of 
the Russian Empire or about a  foreign state? What is Russia, fi nally? Does 
39 PSZ, Sobranie 3, no. 118, April 29, 1881.
40 Vsemirnaia Illiustratsiia, no. 656 (1881): 102.
41 Olga Maiorova, private communication, October 18, 2011.
42 Scenarios of Power, 2: 204-05, 235-70.
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it belong to or is it a  part of Finland or does the Grand Duchy of Finland 
belong to the Russian Empire?”43 Th e rights enjoyed by Finland impugned 
his belief in the integrity of the Russian Empire and his sense of his own 
autocratic power. Th e 1892 edition of the Fundamental Laws introduced 
an article stating, “Th e Th rones of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand 
Duchy of Finland are inseparable from the Russian throne.” Th e defense of 
the integrity of the state now took the form of a reaffi  rmation of a personal 
bond with the Russian tsar.44
Th e national myth had its counterpart in widespread notions that the 
colonization of the empire by Russians, especially by peasants and Cossacks, 
would in eff ect take possession of the far-fl ung peripheries of the empire, 
and thereby make the empire congruent with a  state Russian nationality.45 
Explorers and nationalist thinkers viewed the southern steppe and the Asian 
borderlands as destined for Russian colonization, as territories virtually empty 
and ready for occupation that could provide an answer to the land hunger 
prevailing in the internal provinces. In 1892, the eminent explorer-geographer 
Petr Semenov described Russia’s mission as “part of the great colonizing 
movement of the European race,” comparable to the overseas colonization 
of Spain, France, and England.46 In literature and history, the Russian land 
became an expression and metaphor for the Russian nation, a kind of surrogate 
for parliamentary bodies representing a political nation. In his popular Course 
of Russian History, Vasilii Kliuchevskii wrote that colonization was “the 
basic fact of Russian history” and that “the history of Russia is the history of 
a country that colonizes itself.”47
43 C. Leonard Lunden, “Finland,” in Russifi cation in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 
1855-1914 ed. Edward C. Th aden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 370-
71.
44 B. E. Nol’de, Ocherki Russkogo Gosudarstvennogo Prava (St. Petersburg: Pravda, 
1911), 227. 
45 Willard Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field, 177-220; Vera Tolz, Russia: Inventing 
the Nation, 170-74.
46 Cited in Uillard Sanderlend (Willard Sunderland), “Imperiia bez imperializma?” 
in Novaia Imperskaia Istoriia Post-Sovetskogo Prostranstva, ed. I. Gerasimov, et al. 
(Kazan: Tsentr Issledovanii Natsionalizma i Imperii, 2004), 463. See also my article, 
“Russian Noble Offi  cers and the Ethos of Exploration,” Russian History/Histoire 
Russe 35, Nos.  1-2 (Spring-Summer 2008): 181-97. Vera Tolz, Russia: Inventing the 
Nation, 170-74.
47 Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field, 208-13.
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* * *
Th e outbreak of revolution in 1905 belied the fi ctions of unity evoked 
in tsarist myth and ceremony as well as the Katkovian confi dence that the 
Russian state disposed of irresistible might and repressive capacities. Th e 
revolution confronted Nicholas II with a  specter of chaos and breakdown, 
convincing him to heed Sergei Witte’s warnings that concessions were 
unavoidable. On October 17, he issued the October Manifesto promising civic 
freedoms and representative institutions. “From the present disturbances, 
there may arise a great national disorder and a threat to the integrity and unity 
of Our State (tselost' i edinstvo Nashei Derzhavy).48 Witte’s memorandum 
regarding the situation stated the same fear. “It cannot be that Russian society 
wants anarchy, which, in addition to all of horrors of battle, threatens the 
disintegration of the state.”49 
In his discussions with Nicholas, Witte had suggested that Nicholas 
entrust the formulation of the reform to a  council of offi  cials chaired by 
Witte himself. Andrew Verner has observed that Witte sought to use the 
conjuncture to separate the institutions of the administration from the direct 
purview of the tsar and to sanction “the ideal of a  ‘legal order,’ in which 
depersonalized, institutionalized bureaucratic authority was separate from that 
of the sovereign.” Nicholas had little use for such a proposal. He regarded the 
new institutions as his own personal grant from the throne and insisted on 
overseeing the process. In this way, he denied a break with the past, preserving 
his powers as autocrat and, having bestowed concessions on the nation, felt 
entitled to rescind them when he saw fi t.50 
As a result, the new legal order emerged as an uneasy composite of rules, 
some governing a  state claiming authority on the basis of a popular mandate 
and others sustaining the absolute and unimpeachable prerogatives of the 
sovereign monarch. Th e opening articles of the new Fundamental Laws of 
the empire, issued on April 23, 1906, make clear the clash of incompatible 
goals.51 Article 1 makes an unequivocal assertion of the integrity of the 
Russian state: “Th e Russian State is one and indivisible” (Gosudarstvo Rossiiskoe 
edino i nerazdel'no). It contrasts with Article 1 of the previous version of the 
48 PSZ, Part 3, no. 26, 803, October 17, 1905.
49 Nol’de, Ocherki Russkogo Gosudarstvennogo Prava, 243.
50 Andrew Verner, Crisis of Russian Autocracy, 245.
51 PSZ, Sobranie 3, 27805, April 23, 1906.
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Fundamental Laws, issued in 1832: “Th e Imperial All Russian Monarch is 
autocratic and unlimited. To obey his supreme power is ordained not only by 
fear but by conscience as well.” Th e integrity of the state for the fi rst time is 
defi ned separately from the powers of the monarch.
Such a  provision was completely new to Russian legislation. Its origins 
were explained by the eminent jurist Boris Nolde, whose father played an 
active role in the formulation of the Fundamental Laws; Nolde himself wrote 
commentaries on the draft s.52 In his Ocherki Russkogo Gosudarstvennogo 
Prava, Nolde traced the origins of Article 1 to the French Constitution of 
1791 and concluded that it expressed the revolutionaries’ determination to 
assert centralized power against the “privileges and rights” of the provinces. 
It opposed a  Rousseauist general will enforced from the capital to lingering 
principles of regional autonomy based on traditional rights. Th e centralized 
character of the new nation was declared on August 4, 1791, “Th e national 
assembly unanimously abolishes feudalism.”53
Th e Fundamental Laws did not borrow directly from the French 
constitution of 1791. Nolde traced the appearance of the proviso in the 
constitutions of several German states, where they were used to counter 
regional pressures and to defend against claims against the princes' 
territories. Th e most likely and signifi cant antecedent was the legislation 
of the Austrian monarchy, which, in the wake of the revolution of 1848, 
issued numerous laws insisting on the “indivisibility” of the empire. Th e 
Manifesto of March 4, 1849, aft er dissolving the Kremsier Reichstag, which 
had proposed  a  federalist system, introduced an imperial constitution 
“for a  united and indivisible Austrian Empire,” and the phrase “unity and 
indivisibility” turned into a slogan of the Habsburg monarchy in its struggle 
with revolution.”54 
52 Peter Holquist, “Th e Dilemmas of a Progressive Administrator: Baron Boris Nolde,” 
Kritika 7, No. 2, (Spring 2006): 243.
53 Nol’de, Ocherki Russkogo Gosudarstvennogo Prava, 227-35; Marc Szeft el suggests that 
it may have derived from projects advanced by the Liberation movement in 1904 and 
1905. Szeft el was unable to determine the authorship of the document in government 
offi  ces, but it clear that regardless of its origins, it was inserted into the document 
by state offi  cials, foremost of whom was Sergei Witte. Marc Szeft el, Th e Russian 
Constitution of April 23, 1906: Political Institutions of the Duma Monarchy (Brussels: 
Editions de la Librarie encylopédique, 1976), 38-39, 84-85, 114.
54 Nol’de, Ocherki Russkogo Gosudarstvennogo Prava, 241-42.
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Article 2 then asserts that the Grand Duchy of Finland “is an inseparable 
part of the Russian State,” but is governed in its internal aff airs by special 
rules on the basis of special legislation. Article 3 establishes that the Russian 
language is the state language, but also that local languages are used 
according to special statutes. Th e opening articles thus defi ne the Russian 
state as a single entity and insist on its unity, mentioning at the same time its 
exceptions. Moving from the fi rst three articles to the next three, we move 
from the state to a  monarch endeavoring to maintain his prerogatives in the 
face of representative institutions. During the deliberations on revision of 
Article 4 of the Fundamental Laws in April 1906, Nicholas fi nally accepted, 
albeit reluctantly, the deletion of the word “unlimited” from the old formula 
defi ning the monarch’s power as “autocratic and unlimited” (samoderzhavnyi 
i  neogranichennyi). But he succeeded in retaining the word “autocratic,” and 
in this way indicated that his power was supreme in ways not subject to 
legal defi nition.55 Article 4 of the 1906 Fundamental Laws reads “Supreme 
Autocratic Power belongs to the All-Russian Emperor. To obey his supreme 
power is ordained not only by fear but by conscience as well.”
Nicholas’s claims to autocratic prerogatives rested on his spiritual and 
symbolic kinship with the Russian people. His determination to defend 
his prerogatives was reinforced by the campaign of letters and telegrams, 
organized by the Union of Russian People and other rightist parties, which 
informed him of “the touching feelings of loyal subjects, together with the 
pleas not to limit My power.”56 Article 5 of the Fundamental Laws, which 
states “Th e person of our Sovereign Emperor is sacred and inviolable,” is also 
an innovation. It also seems a borrowing from the 1791 French Constitution, 
perhaps representing an eff ort of the Assembly to fi nd a modus vivendi with 
the king, to create a constitutional monarchy. It seems to have prompted no 
commentary, perhaps regarded as a  statement of an attribute obvious from 
Nicholas’s scenario of divinely inspired hereditary power. 
* * *
Th e assertion of state integrity in Article 1 of the Fundamental Laws 
would be taken over by moderate liberals in the Constitutional Democratic 
Party, those who, in some respects, envisioned themselves as heirs to the leaders 
55 Verner, Crisis of Russian Autocracy, 299-300.
56 Scenarios of Power, 2: 401.
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of the fi rst years of the French revolution. But the Kadets were striving to 
unite autonomous regional groups in a  constitutional multinational empire, 
not to defeat the survivals of a feudal regime. Th e party’s platform, Alexander 
Semyonov has argued, allowed for a  considerable measure of particularism 
among local social and political groups, preserving in that respect the imperial 
government’s accommodation of diff erence in the administration of the 
national regions of the empire. “Introducing the logic of collective rights into 
the liberal vision of the Russian Empire opened the liberal platform, much as 
the fi rst State Duma, to the fi eld of diverse and particularistic articulations 
of collective rights and exposed it to the rival taxonomy of collective rights as 
being national in their nature.”57 Th e elections to the fi rst two Dumas, which 
advanced the political organization of local ethnic groups, tested the fragile 
unity of the party.58 Semyonov describes “the pluralistic and particularistic 
landscape of the Duma,” with many deputies revealing “manifold allegiances” 
and fully one-third undecided.59 Reconciling the centrifugal elements with the 
central authority, which many leaders of the Kadets hoped would prevail aft er 
the establishment of a constitutional order, proved a daunting task.
In a report written aft er the fall of the monarchy in 1917, the legal expert 
on cultural matters, Fedor Kokoshkin, expressed the frustration of trying to 
attain common goals while contending with myriad local collectivities by 
invoking a metaphor of a house built without structural supports:
Advocates of national autonomies do not propose an exact and detailed 
plan of how to create in Russia a  federation based on the principle of 
nationality. Th ey address the All-Russian parties with a claim: . . . we want 
to have such and such room in the future building of Russia. Th e task of 
57 Alexander Semyonov, “Th e Real and Live Ethnographic Map of Russia: Th e Russian 
Empire in the Mirror of the State Duma,” in Th e Empire Speaks Out: Languages of 
Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire, ed. Ilya Gerasimov, Jan 
Kusber, and Alexander Semyonov (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 223.
58 R. A. Tsiunchuk, “Dumskaia model” parlamentarizma v  Rossiiskoi Imperii: 
Etnokonfessional’noe i regional’noe izmereniia (Kazan: FEN, 2004); Idem, “Peoples, 
Regions, and Electoral Politics: Th e State Dumas and the Constitution of New 
National Elites,” in Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 366-97; Elena Campbell, 
“Th e Muslim Question in Late Imperial Russia,” in ibid., 330-43. Charles Steinwedel, 
“To Make a  Diff erence: Th e Category of Ethnicity in Late Imperial Politics, 1861-
1917,” in Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices, 76-77.
59 Semyonov, “Th e Real and Live Ethnographic Map of Russia,” 215-17.
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erecting the whole of the building is yours. . . . But the construction of the 
entire building turns out to be impossible in view of all these particular 
[italics added, A.S.] demands. Building separate rooms fi rst, according to 
separate plans makes it impossible to erect buttresses and lay main beams 
to secure the roof and the walls.60
Unlike the leaders of the French Revolution, the members of the Kadet 
party themselves were not united on behalf of a  centralized rationalizing 
government. Peter Holquist has shown that Baron Nolde, who joined the 
Kadet party during the war, had expected that the imperial state would be 
able to tolerate local liberties and rights on a federal basis, as had France before 
the revolution, but as a  member of the Judicial Council of the Provisional 
Government and the Cadet Party Central Committee, he fought all federalist 
solutions to the nationality problem.61 Aft er the overthrow of the autocracy, 
many leading members of the party took up the slogan “Russia one and 
indivisible.” During the Civil War, General Anton Denikin, infl uenced by 
the liberals in his government, adopted the slogan in opposing Ukrainian 
independence, which then came to identify the Cadets with the chauvinism 
and excesses of the White armies.62 Th e image of a unifi ed empire, like that of 
the Offi  cial Nationality and Katkov’s “political integrity” of the Russian state, 
proved a mythical fi gment justifying the exertion of central power in the face 
of rising centrifugal forces. 
Th e unity of the empire, or what remained of the empire, was restored only 
with the victories of the Red Army and institutionalized in the Communist 
Party, a new centralized, personalized authority that reproduced the nexus of 
the ideas of autocracy and territorial integrity. In 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
establishment of a  Council of People’s Deputies would spell the doom of 
the Soviet Union, confi rming the prophetic words of Emperor Alexander II. 
Th e ensuing crises in the Caucasus and Chechnya closed the circle. Vladimir 
Putin understood the Chechen rebellion as “a continuation of the breakup 
60 Ibid., 226.
61 Holquist, “Th e Dilemmas of a Progressive Administrator,” 248.
62 William G. Rosenberg, Liberals in the Russian Revolution: Th e Constitutional 
Democratic Party, 1917-1921 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 471; 
Anna Procyk, Russian Nationalism and Ukraine: Th e Nationality Policy of the 
Volunteer Army during the Civil War (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian 
Studies, 1995), 58-59, 82, 172-75. 
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of the Soviet Union.” “Today,” he declared in an interview in 2000, “we 
all recognize, and rightly so, that it is necessary to observe the territorial 
integrity [territorial'naia tselostnost'] of Russia and not support terrorists 
and separatists.”63 Territorial integrity fi gured in his presentation not as 
a justifi cation of autocratic power, but as a unity forged by the Russian people 
and the state of which he was the democratically elected leader. He stated in 
his “Message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian People” of 2003,
Over the length of our history, Russia and its citizens have achieved 
and are achieving a truly heroic feat (podvig): A feat in the name of the 
integrity (tselostnost') of the country, of peace and stability in it. Th e 
maintenance of a  state over a  vast space, the preservation of a  unique 
association (soobshchestvo) of peoples under the strong positions of the 
country in the world—this represents not only an enormous labor. It also 
represents enormous sacrifi ces and tremendous deprivations.64 
On July 13, 2011, Putin held a  meeting to commemorate the 150th 
anniversary of the birth of Petr Stolypin. As prime minister, Stolypin in 1910 
had convinced the Duma and State Council to pass laws to reduce the powers 
of the Finnish Seim and to subject Finland to the laws of the Russian state, in 
eff ect acting to realize the intentions of Alexander III to eliminate the Grand 
Duchy’s liberties.65 Putin declared,
Petr Arkad'evich traveled a  long way in his state career and served 
at the head of Russia’s government during a  complex and, with no 
exaggeration, dramatic time  . . .  a  time of political and social divisions. 
Th e consequences of war, revolutionary upheavals, discord in the economy 
represented a real threat to the territorial integrity [tselost'nost'] of Russia, 
63 Ot pervogo litsa: razgovory s Vladimirom Putinym (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), 133, 136.
64 V. V. Putin, Izbrannye rechi i vystupleniia (Moscow: Knizhnyi Mir, 2008), 161.
65 Edward C. Th aden, “Th e Russian Government” in Russifi cation in the Baltic Provinces 
and Finland, 84-86. In his speech of May 21, 1910 propounding the law, Stolypin 
declared in regard to those who pointed to the opinion of Europe, “to the thousands 
of signatures collected by Finns abroad,” that “not I, but all Russia, as many evidently 
have not understood, replies that under the new order Russia is not falling apart, not 
being dismembered into parts, but is becoming strong and coming to know itself.” 
P. A. Stolypin, Rechi v Gosudarstvennoi dume i Gosudarstvennom Sovete, 1906-1911 
(New York: Teleks, 1990), 262.
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and even to its sovereignty. With all this, it was necessary to give answers 
to the key, principal questions of Russia's development. It required of the 
head of the government not only an unfl inching will but also personal 
courage and readiness to take on the full burden of responsibility for the 
situation in the country, and Petr Arkad'evich manifested these qualities 
in full measure.66 
Postscript: A Short Exchange 
with the Editors of Ab Imperio
Ab Imperio: It seems that your text rests on two implicit juxtapositions, one 
is more evident, the other is less obvious, yet both deserve a  more elaborated 
discussion. On the one hand, the integrity and cohesion (tselost') of the Russian 
empire is frequently opposed to its diversity, ethnic and territorial. Th us, 
integrity appears as something more than a  paranoiac concern of imperial 
rulers, but as a  stable element of the very quality of “empireness,” just as its 
semantic counterpart, the notorious “imperial diversity.” Hence, the fi rst 
question: how would you characterize your application of the concept of tselost' 
as an analytical category, that is, as an instrument of contemporary scholarship, 
rather than some original concept with historically fi xed meanings that would 
evolve over time? Is it an element of legal discourse, a  cultural category, an 
ideological construct that you study? How does this category of analysis by 
a modern-day historian characterize the imperial regime (beyond the obvious 
concern of its rulers with territorial integrity and wholeness)?
On the other hand, the references to tselost' in imperial Russia in your 
text are occasionally opposed to the contemporary usages of similar categories 
in Western Europe, while any possibility of discoursing tselost' in pre-Petrine 
Russia (thus forming a  certain intellectual legacy) is ignored altogether. 
Obviously, a detailed analysis of Muscovite political discourse with its specifi c 
vision of wholeness, and even more so of the diverse and rich European 
traditions of legal and political thinking (where indivisibility was a  sine qua 
non of sovereignty already for Hobbes) requires a  special and voluminous 
study. Still, there is a need to refl ect on the basic characteristics of this second 
usage of tselost' as a  category of historically contextualized practice. What, if 
any, were the infl uences of the historical memory of the Time of Troubles, of 
66 Kommersant, July 14, 2011, 1.
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witnessing political developments in Rzeczpospolita in the eighteenth century, 
and in the post-Ausgleich Habsburg empire? How idiosyncratic was the concern 
of indivisibility and cohesion to the Russian empire?
Th e previous question can be reformulated in a  less analytical and more 
direct way: do you endorse a Sonderweg reading of Russian imperial ideologies? 
Indeed, you explicitly oppose Russian practices to those accepted in “the 
West” (as in the case of Peter’s legislation), which in the context of the early 
eighteenth century is quite a dubious category. So was Great Britain indiff erent 
to its territorial integrity (including Ireland) in the eighteenth century, or 
was France careless about national cohesion in the nineteenth century? On 
the other hand, we can probably identify certain disparities between Russian 
and certain foreign cases in certain periods. For instance, there was a  period 
when it was acceptable to Germans to populate diff erent polities, while during 
the same period Russians were expected to reside within the borders of the 
Russian empire (and when certain peoples were identifi ed as “relatives” of 
the Russians, in the Carpathians or the Balkans, this immediately led to very 
practical steps in foreign policy). Another example is the separation of powers 
in some European countries, with very uneven progress in this direction in 
Russia. What do these specifi c and chronologically localized disparities reveal 
about the imperial regime in Russia—both vis-a-vis the broader international 
context and against the background of internal political dynamics and evolving 
scenarios of power? Was it the same tselost' that concerned diff erent generations 
of Russian rulers—not only in its semantics but also in perceiving the scale of 
the problem and its “format” (a legal question, ideological concern, cultural 
trope, etc.)?
Reply: I would characterize the term “integrity” as I explore its use in this 
paper as a cultural category, a category of representation of the monarchy that 
recurs in offi  cial statements and political writings. It does not, in this usage, 
necessarily assume legal moment, but rather constitutes one element of what 
I  understand as a  political culture of Russian monarchy. It acts to express 
goals considered crucial to the wielding and preservation of absolute power 
and to celebrate successes of the ruler in governing a vast and diverse empire. 
Its recurrence over time and its centrality in offi  cial discourse indicate that 
it is something more than the usual insistence of a government on territorial 
integrity. It appears as a principal symbol of the monarchy, one that can convey, 
at times qualms about the state authority, at others exaltation at its triumphs, 
and oft en a combination of the two. 
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Th e question of comparisons with other political systems of course was 
not within the parameters of my brief article, though I  would welcome such 
studies, and I  give a  few thoughts of my own below. Nor have I  studied pre-
Petrine legislation from this point of view. Although there may have been 
occasions to address the concept before Peter, it was Peter who defi ned in laws 
and manifestos the basic principles that would guide the political ideas and 
representations that were fundamental for imperial Russia. He was the fi rst to 
issue a  succession law, and laws of succession were in general considered the 
central ones for monarchies: Peter’s legislation marks the beginning of what 
was considered the evolution of state law in the imperial period.
First, I  shy from using the term “ideology” because I  treat ideology as 
a  specifi c form of representation, incorporating philosophical and political 
concepts aft er the French revolution. “Offi  cial Nationality” was an ideology 
formulated to provide legitimation for the monarchy, but it operated in the 
context of a  whole system of representations that defi ned how the monarchs 
and their advisers and servitors thought at a  particular time, which I  have 
designated scenarios, to provide the personal and mythological framework 
in which they operated. As Victor Zhivov wrote regarding Catherine’s 
Nakaz, “Th e Nakaz, like the entire state ideology, entered the sphere of myth 
and fulfi lled a  mythological function. It was an attribute of the monarch 
establishing universal justice and creating harmony in the world.”67 
I suppose you might say that I  endorse a  Sonderweg reading of Russian 
imperial political representation. Looking back over Russia’s history in the past 
three centuries, I  fi nd no other understanding credible. To a  certain degree, 
I think every nation has its own distinct institutions, memories, and cultures, 
in addition to commonalities, but I  fi nd the particularities more interesting 
and meaningful than the commonalties. Certainly our history, that is, 
American history, is exceptional—a country that has maintained a republican, 
federalist system over a  large expanse, based on a  unique constitution, an 
advanced economy and society accompanied by the fl ourishing of religious 
fundamentalism, an ideological commitment to freedom and capitalism that 
many Europeans fi nd diffi  cult to understand.
67 V. M. Zhivov, “Gosudarstvennyi mif v epokhu Prosveshcheniia i ego razrushenie v 
Rossii kontsa XVIII veka,” in Vek Prosveshcheniia. Rossiia i Frantsia, Vipperovskie 
chteniia, 22 (Moscow, 1989) 150.
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On every visit to Russia since my fi rst in 1961, I  have been struck by its 
diff erence from our society and from European societies. I felt baffl  ed and yet 
fascinated by the manifestations of diff erence. I  had diffi  culty “fi nding my 
feet” with Russia and my readings on the subject were of limited use. Cliff ord 
Geertz made this point, quoting the words of Ludwig Wittgenstein, “One 
human being can be a  complete enigma to another. We learn this when we 
come to a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, 
even given a mastery of the country’s language. We do not understand [italics 
in original] the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying 
to themselves.) We cannot fi nd our feet with them.”68 
Geertz’s answer to this problem was “thick description,” of trying to 
understand the “webs of signifi cance” through which a  society understands 
itself, and I  believe that this is particularly germane to the study of political 
representation.69 “Our formulations of other peoples’ symbols must be actor-
oriented,” Geertz wrote. Th ese arguments of Geertz, set forth in the 1970s, are 
familiar to us, but their lessons are still worth heeding. Scholarship about the 
Russian empire, its development, expansion, policies, and changes in its nature 
over time as well as about nationalities is important and has yielded important 
results in recent decades. But what is oft en lacking is an understanding of 
agency and intent, the way this representational order was constructed and the 
state of mind of those who were engaged with it. Th e subject of my paper is 
not the concept of tselost' taken alone, but the way that the concept became 
a principal symbol that infused the thinking of the monarch and his state elite.
It is notable that while Peter was following European examples of the early 
eighteenth century in issuing a law of succession, he ignored their example by 
not instituting a fundamental law of hereditary succession, which caused anger 
and consternation both in Russia and abroad. He thereby subordinated the 
principle of law to the will of the ruling of the monarch exerted in a  heroic 
demonstrative act to preserve the integrity of empire. My forthcoming article 
in Kritika (Article 2 in this collection) traces the troubled relationship between 
representation and the law in imperial Russia. 
68 Cliff ford Geertz, “On Th ick Description: Toward an Interpretive Th eory of Culture,” 
in idem, Th e Interpretation of Cultures (New York, Basic Books, 1973), 13.
69 Description, Geertz continued, “must be cast in terms of the interpretations to which 
persons of a particular denomination subject their experience, because that is what 
they profess to be descriptions of,” Ibid., 5, 15.
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Th e integrity of the empire and absolutism formed a  symbolic and 
conceptual nexus. In such a  context, tselost' became more than a  legal term: 
it represented a  good in itself, unchallengeable and lasting, and it precluded 
various options practiced by other monarchies, particularly the possibility of 
compromise. Undoubtedly, then, integrity or some similar concept appears 
in Habsburg legislation and representation, but it did not prevent granting 
considerable autonomy to national areas.70 It did not prevent the emperor 
from conferring authority on a  chancellor. Tselost' took on a  sacral character 
within the symbolic system of Russian monarchy that lent it moment and 
signifi cance, which may not have characterized other systems. In short, in 
following the term’s meaning and historical signifi cance, it does not suffi  ce to 
rely on dictionary defi nitions or translations. Of course, other countries are not 
“indiff erent” to their territorial integrity. But in which others does it arise as 
a principal goal and symbol and persist from era to era?
Th e importance of the concept to offi  cial thinking may derive from 
the continental character and the uncertain relationship between Rossiia, 
the empire, and Russia, its national core. Th e Russian monarch’s claim to 
sovereignty, from the reign of Ivan III, derived from his status as emperor, and 
challenges to that status were taken as indignities. In the nineteenth century, 
the boundaries between the metropolis and the peripheries tended to blur, so 
that any threats to the empire could also be regarded as threats to the nation, 
and even greater threats to the emperor’s absolute power. Territorial integrity 
of course was a  matter of concern to the rulers of the British Empire, but 
challenges to its integrity, such as occurred in 1776, did not jeopardize the 
bases of English sovereignty.
#
70 I do not take seriously the view of Boris Nolde, later elaborated by Leonid  I. 
Strakhovsky, that the extension of rights to some nationalities represented a federalist 
or quasi-federalist solution, since these arrangements fell far short of even minimal 
grants of autonomy.  Leonid I. Strakhovsky, “Constitutional Aspects of the Imperial 
Russian Government's Policy Toward National Minorities,” Journal of Modern 
History, vol. 13, No. 4, December, 1941, 467-92.
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12. The Tsar and Empire: 
Representation of the Monarchy 
and Symbolic Integration in Imperial Russia
$
S ymbolic representation played a  central role in defi ning the concept of monarchical sovereignty in Russia. In the absence of native traditions of 
supreme power, Russian tsars invoked and emulated foreign images of rule to 
elevate themselves and the state elite above the subject population. Th e source 
of  sacrality was distant from Russia, whether it was located beyond the sea 
whence the original Viking princes came, according to the tale of the invitations 
of the Varangians, or fi xed in an image of Byzantium, France, or Germany.1 
Th e centrality of conquest in the representations of Russian rulers contrasts 
with the mythical history of the Hapsburg emperors, which legitimized 
the expansion of imperial dominion through marriage.2 From the fi ft eenth 
century, when Ivan III refused the title of king from the Holy Roman Emperor 
with the declaration that he “had never wanted to be made king by anyone,” 
Russian monarchs affi  rmed and reaffi  rmed the imperial character of their rule, 
evoking the images of Byzantine and later Roman and European imperial 
dominion. Beginning with Ivan IV’s conquests of Kazan and Astrakhan, they 
1 On the symbolic force of foreignness see Ju. M. Lotman and B. A. Uspenskii, “Th e 
Role of Dual Models in the Dynamics of Russian Culture (Up to the End of the 
Eighteenth Century),” in Ju. M. Lotman and B. A. Uspenskii, Th e Semiotics of 
Russian Culture, ed. Ann Shukman (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Contributions, 
1984), 3-35. 
2 See the interesting comparison by Orest Subtelny between Hapsburg and Romanov 
empires in “Th e Hapsburg and Russian Empires: Some Comparisons and Contrasts,” 
in Empire and Society: New Approaches to Russian History, ed. Teruyuki Hara and 
Kimitaka Matzuzato (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokaido University, 1997), 
86-90.
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sought to realize the imperial vision of rule over extensive realms and other 
peoples. 
Of course, European monarchs also borrowed foreign and imperial 
images of rule. Th e distinguishing feature of Russian monarchy was the 
persistence of a pattern of appropriation of symbols and images from abroad 
long aft er it ceased to be the practice in Europe. Th is pattern has befuddled 
eff orts to categorize the Russian state under a single cultural rubric, Mongol, 
Byzantine, or European. Th e devices of identifi cation with foreign sources 
of power were varied—tales of foreign origin, like the “invitation of the 
Varangians,” or analogies with or imitation of foreign rulers. A national sub-
theme runs through Russian political imagery and myths, but until the late 
nineteenth century as an antithesis repeatedly submerged by a  dominant 
foreign motif. 
Th e pattern of representation that emerged in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries identifi ed the ruling monarch and his servitors with 
dominant fi gures of western monarchy. Th e monarch assumed features of 
European absolutist rulers, Baroque, Neo-Classical, Napoleonic, presented in 
scenarios suiting contemporary ideas and tastes. Th e Russian nobility, lacking 
traditions of feudal rights or local autonomy, owed their standing, wealth, 
and infl uence to service to the sovereign. Joining imperial ceremonies, they 
displayed their personal bond with the monarch and shared in his sacral aura. 
Th ey performed his scenarios as cultivated western noblemen and elevated 
them as Russians capable of appearing as Europeans, above and superior to 
their subjects, but nonetheless Russians acting the role of Europeans. As 
Iurii Lotman wrote, it was necessary “not to be a  foreigner” but to retain 
“the outsiders ‘alien’ Russian attitude to them. One did not have to become 
a foreigner, but to behave like one.”3
Th e universalistic westernized forms of representation facilitated the 
integration of national elites into a  multi-ethnic All-Russian nobility, the 
vserossiiskoe dvorianstvo. As the empire expanded to include Baltic provinces, 
Cossacks, Muslim khanates, and Georgia, its members took on the westernized 
culture and manners of the court and participated in its ceremonies.4 In this 
3 Lotman and Uspenskii, “Th e Role of Dual Models,” 232-33.
4 See Andreas Kappeler, Th e Russian Empire: A  Multi-ethnic History (Harlow, UK: 
Longman, 2001), 28-29, and passim; on the processes of repression and co-optation 
in the steppe regions see Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: Th e Making 
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respect, imperial Russia represents an example of what Ernest Gellner called 
an agro-literate society—a traditional society organized horizontally, in which 
the privileged, regardless of ethnic background, sought to separate themselves 
as much as possible from the lower orders, in this case by assuming western 
personas.5 
Th e emperors of Russia elaborated and performed narratives of foreign 
and imperial origin to display the great distance between rulers and ruled 
and to dramatize and perpetuate their claims to absolute, transcendent 
power. Th e exercise of power and the representation of the monarch in 
this way proved reciprocal processes: absolute rule sustained the image 
of a  transcendent monarch, the incarnation of the state, which in turn 
warranted the untrammeled exercise of power. Th e imperative to appear in 
the context of myth instilled an aversion to compromise and delegation of 
authority—to accept intermediaries, such as parliamentary institutions or even 
a  chancellor loyal to the monarch, at times of political crisis. Th e aversion to 
constitutionalism refl ected merely one aspect of a  mentality that knew only 
absolute domination or utter defeat. 
Enlightenment and Integration
Catherine the Great envisioned a  process of enlightenment of native elites, 
which, undertaken by the Russian state, would assimilate the diverse 
nationalities into the secular, westernized culture of the Russian nobility. 
She adopted V. N. Tatishchev’s theory that Russians came from a  mixture 
of various peoples and she expected assimilation to continue by uplift ing 
and instructing native populations. She sponsored ethnographic expeditions 
and surveys, under the aegis of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, to learn 
about those peoples of the empire so that they could be transformed into 
Russians and would be able to “share in their happiness.” Catherine’s 
ideas informed the pioneering ethnographic works of the late eighteenth 
century, particularly Johann Georgi’s landmark four-volume Description of 
All the Peoples Inhabiting the Russian State (Opisanie vsekh obitaiushchikh 
of a  Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 
201-10, 225-26.
5 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1983), 11. 
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v Rossiiskom gosudarstve narodov).6 Georgi asserted that the Russian empire 
was the most diverse of empires. “Hardly any other state in the world 
possesses such a  great variety of diff erent nations, survivals of peoples, and 
colonies as the Russian state.”7 
But enlightenment promised to eff ace their indigenous traits. Th ose 
at earlier stages, Georgi wrote, the Tungus, the Chukchi, were ignorant, 
simple, and possessed a  beguiling innocence. It was “the uniformity of 
State organization” that could transform all nationalities into educated, 
Europeanized Russians. Th e state, Georgi concluded, was “leading our rude 
Peoples by giant steps toward the common goal of general enlightenment 
in Russia, of a  wonderful fusion of all into a  single body and soul, and of 
creating, as it were, an unshakable Giant that will stand for hundreds of 
centuries.” It is indicative that the one national group that Georgi omitted 
from his survey was the Russians: the Russians for him did not represent the 
peoples “inhabiting the Russian state,” who were characterized by a  variety 
of distinctive customs, dress, and religious beliefs, and thereby at a  lower 
level of development than they. When the Russians were introduced in the 
second edition, which was not authored by Georgi, they were characterized 
as a “ruling nation.”8 
Enlightenment also presumed conversion to Orthodoxy, which was 
understood to be the fi rst step in the process.9 Th is faith in the power of 
reason and Orthodoxy to transform backward peoples is suggested by the 
remarks of a young Russian, M. N. Makarov, who observed a Kalmyk deputy 
marching among the noblemen to the Assumption Cathedral for the rites of 
coronation of Alexander I  in 1801. Th e deputy, he observed, crossed himself 
and wept at the sight of the Cathedral. Makarov believed that the Kalmyk was 
on his way to becoming an Orthodox Russian, and he anticipated that “the 
 6 I. G. Georgi, Opisanie vsekh obitaiushchikh v  Rossiiskom gosudarstve narodov 
(St.  Petersburg: Imp. Ak. Nauk, 1776-1777), 3 Vols; Nathaniel Knight, “Const-
ructing the Science of Nationality,” 32-40; S. A. Tokarev, Istoriia Russkoi Etnografi i 
(Moscow, Nauka, 1966), 103-110.
 7 Tokarev, Istoriia Russkoi Etnografi i, 103.
 8 I. G. Georgi, Opisanie vsekh obitaiushchikh v  Rossiiskom gosudarstve narodov 
(St.  Peters burg: Imp. Ak.Nauk, 1799), 1: ix; Yuri Slezkine, “Naturalists versus 
Nations,” 38-39; Nathaniel Knight, “Constructing the Science of Nationality,” 36-39. 
 9 Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Russian and Small Peoples of the North (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1994), 48-49.
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time will come when the light of Christ will dawn upon the wearer of the 
turban and the heathen.”10
Th e conception of a  Russian nation as a  body with its own distinctive 
traits appeared in tsarist imagery and rhetoric with the accession of Nicholas 
I  in 1825 and the propagation of the doctrine that came to known as 
“Offi  cial Nationality.” Th e manifestos of the reign and the accompanying 
doctrinal literature established that the distinguishing feature of the Russian 
people was their monarchical spirit, their obedience to their sovereign, 
attested by the fact Russian people had not joined the rebels on palace square 
in December 1825. Th e decree on sentencing of the Decembrists of July 13, 
1826 referred to Russia as a  “state where love for monarchs and devotion 
to  the throne are based on the native characteristics of the people.”11 It 
was this spirit that had enabled the Russian people to resist revolutionary 
doctrines and had made Russia the strongest state in Europe aft er the 
Napoleonic Wars. 
Th e triumphalist rhetoric of Nicholas I’s reign extolled both the will 
of the tsar and the rapt discipline of his Russian subjects. Th at category 
comprised the mass of Russians without distinction between Little Russians, 
White Russians, Great Russians and others who had been assimilated into 
the offi  cial elite. Th e Ukrainian language was defi ned as a dialect of Russian, 
while Ukrainian folksongs and literature were viewed as expressions of an 
early Slavic culture that had been perfected by the Russians.12 Th e historian 
Mikhail Pogodin wrote, “Occupying an expanse that no other monarchy on 
earth has ever occupied, neither the Macedonian, nor the Roman, Arabic, 
the Frankish or the Mongol, it is settled principally by tribes who speak one 
language, have, consequently, one form of thought (obraz mysli), practice 
one Faith, and like an electronic circuit, quaver at a  single contact.”13 In 
Pogodin’s formulation, the monarchy was identifi ed with a  Great Russian 
nation worshipful of its tsar, the nationalities serving at best as ornaments 
to its power and glory. Th e assimilation that enlightenment would wreak 
10 M. N. Makarov, “Vospominaniia o koronatsii Imperatora Aleksandra I,” Pamiatniki 
novoi russkoi istorii (1871), 1: 64, 75-79. 
11 N. K. Shil’der, Imperator Nikolai Pervyi, 1:459.
12 See David Saunders, Th e Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750-1850 
(Edmonton: Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies, 1985), 144-75.
13 M. P. Pogodin, Istoriko-kriticheskie otryvki, 2.
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was presumed to continue under the rule of the dominant nation responsive 
to its tsar.
When defeats in the Crimean war dispelled the triumphalist certainty 
of Nicholas’s scenario, Alexander II ushered in a  mood of conciliation and 
openness and modifi ed the discourse of offi  cial nationality to evoke the 
imagery of attraction rather than submission. Th e Russian people then were 
said to be bound to their ruler by the force of a  love animated by gratitude 
for eff orts at reform that he had selfl essly enacted for their benefi t. Alexander 
II presented himself as a  popular national leader, incorporating democratic 
sentiments into the mythic narrative of Russian monarchy. Th e trope of love 
portrayed Russian monarchy as a  romance between monarch and Russian 
people, joined willingly by the other nationalities of the empire. 
Th ese feelings were put on display at Alexander’s coronation in 1856, 
which celebrated successes of imperial expansion in previous decades that 
compensated for the humiliating defeats of the Crimean War. In the context 
of a  scenario of love, the nationalities were drawn into the mythical image 
of a  nation adoring the sovereign. Th e emperor’s coronation entry displayed 
the loyalty and submission of the peoples Russian armies had succeeded in 
conquering in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Middle Asia. For the fi rst time, 
their representatives marched in native costumes with members of the Russian 
elite. Accounts of the coronation exulted about the dashing horseman from 
the various Caucasian and Central Asian nationalities. Th e illustrated journal, 
Russkii Khudozhestvennyi Listok, described the deputies of “Asiatic peoples” 
as “tangible proof of the vastness of our state, which some justly call a special 
kind of planet.” Th eir appearance in procession “eloquently convinced everyone 
of the one whose power they recognize, whom they had come from their own 
lands to greet.”14 
Th e love of the Russian people for the sovereign was projected on the 
other peoples of the empire, as well, conjuring the vision of an empire united 
by mutual aff ection. Th e participation of Asian noblemen attested to their 
acceptance of the suzerainty of the Russian element in the empire. For the 
poet Fedor Tiutchev, who attended the ball as a  chamberlain of the court, 
the masquerade expressed the Eastern character of Russia. It allowed him to 
imagine himself in the realm of dream—the dream of Russia’s embracing the 
East. Tiutchev saw old aristocrats in familiar costume beside “quite authentic” 
14 Russkii Khudozhestvennyi Listok, No.29 (October 10, 1856), 1. 
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Mingrelian, Tatar, Imeretian princes in magnifi cent costumes, and two 
Chinese. “And two-hundred steps from these halls resplendent with light and 
fi lled with this crowd that is so contemporary lay the tombs of Ivan III and 
Ivan IV.” He wondered how they would react if they saw this scene. “Ah, how 
much dream there is in what belongs to reality,” he wrote.15 Vasilii Grigor'ev, 
who was serving in Orenburg at the time of the coronation, arranged to have 
several Kirgiz deputies invited. In addition to the eff ect of their colorful 
costumes, he emphasized the “governmental signifi cance” of their presence. 
“I have no doubt that this measure will be ten times more eff ective in instilling 
a  favorable disposition towards and respect for Russia in the members of the 
[Kirgiz] horde than ten military expeditions to the Steppe and all possible 
circulars from the Commission.”16 
Th e metaphor of love thus presumed that displays of reciprocal sentiments 
could dispose the nationalities to the monarchy and induce them to feel 
themselves part of an imperial nation. Aft er Shamil’s capture in August 1859, 
Alexander received him as a  friend in public at balls and parades, as a  living 
and willing trophy of conquest. When he met Shamil at the military camp at 
Chuguev, in Kharkov province, the newspaper, Syn Otechestva, reported that 
he embraced and kissed his captive and invited him to wear his sword during 
the review of troops at his side. Shamil’s biographer wrote, “Th e former Imam, 
astonished by this tenderness, this soft , ineff ably kind greeting, the like of 
which he had never heard, understood at this moment the true majesty of 
the mighty tsars . . . .” Th e ruler of Russia “gave the wild man of the mountains 
a touching example of dealing with one’s foe.” Shamil later recalled the episode 
with tears in his eyes.17 
15 I.S. Aksakov, Biografi ia Fedora Ivanovicha Tiutcheva (Moscow: M. G. Volcha ni-
nov, 1886), 262-63; “Lettres de Th . I. Tjutsheff  a sa seconde epouse née Baronne de 
Pfeff el,” Starina i Novizna, XIX (1915): 160-61.
16 N. I. Veselovskii, V. V. Grigor'ev po ego pis'mam i trudam, 1818-1881 (St. Petersburg: 
A. Transhel’, 1887), 146. I thank Nathaniel Knight for point out this citation.
17 Th omas M. Barrett, “Th e Remaking of the Lion of Dagestan: Shamil in Captivity,” 
Russian Review 53, No.  2 (July 1994): 353-56; M. N. Chichagova, Shamil' na 
Kavkaze i v Rossii (St. Petersburg: S. Muller and I. Bogel’man, 1889), 107. See also 
Austin Jersild, Orientalism and Empire: North Caucasus Mountain People and the 
Georgian Frontier, 1845-1917 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 2002), 110-25.
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Th e most infl uential propagator of the image of a monarchy united with 
a conscious Russian nation was the editor of Moskovskie Vedomosti, Mikhail 
Katkov. In the wake of the Polish uprising, Katkov responded to the feeling 
of sympathy in educated society for the monarchy, by devising a new discourse 
of nationality. Andreas Renner has shown that he invented a  “new method 
of ‘patriotizing’ thoughts and actions” and presented the nation “as an 
already established concept.” He gave a name to a “political nationality” that 
“included other narodnosti with equal (except political) rights with a common 
national state.”18 But the state justifi ed this authority, not through a national 
mandate, but through the ruthless and effi  cacious wielding of power that 
ensured its survival. Katkov urged the Russian armies in Poland to “aggressive 
and merciless action” and “to punish inexorably.” At home, he believed 
in severe measures of state security. He wrote in 1863, “We somehow have 
forgotten that the sword is the symbol of the state, and the state is compelled 
to resort when necessary to strict and even severe measures.” Katkov’s answer 
to challenges to the monarchy was a dictatorship that would temporarily end 
the disturbances in society and even “hold back and slow down the normal 
development of the social and economic interests of the country.”19
Katkov developed the idea of the multi-national empire at one with the 
Russian nation in his articles in Moskovskie Vedomosti. In April 1863, he 
wrote, “Th ere is in Russia one dominant nationality, one dominant language, 
which was developed by centuries of historical life.” Th ere were many tribes 
with diff erent languages and customs, but they all felt a  sense of unity with 
“the Great Russian world”: “in the unity of the state, in the unity of the 
supreme authority in the Tsar, the living, sovereign, the personifi cation of 
this unity.”20 Ivan Babst and Constantine Pobedonostsev, accompanying 
the heir, Nicholas Aleksandrovich, on his tour of the empire, described such 
sentiments in the pages of Moskovskie Vedomosti. At the governor’s house 
in Astrakhan’, Babst, Pobedonostev, and the Grand Duke marveled at the 
strange motley throng in national costumes, including Greeks, Armenians, 
Persians, Kalmyks, and Tatars. Th ere were few Russian faces in the crowd, but 
18 Andreas Renner, “Defi ning a Russian Nation,” 676-77, 681.
19 V. A. Tvardovskaia, Ideologiia poreformennogo samoderzhaviia: M.N. Katkov i  ego 
izdaniia (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 27, 37-38.
20 M. N. Katkov, 1863 god; sobranie statei po Pol’skomu voprosu (Moscow: Moskovskie 
Vedomosti, 1887), 100-01.
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the three still felt themselves in Russia, “in one of the remote regions of a great 
tsardom, united by the powerful bond of state power and a  consciousness 
of state unity.” Th ere, amongst the mixture of “dress, faces, and dialects,” 
the basic tone was provided by the “founding and gathering element of the 
Russian tribe.”21 
Th e precepts of enlightenment that informed the European myth of 
Russian autocracy presumed a  propensity to assimilation among the subject 
peoples. Alexander II’s scenario inspired projects to take advantage of 
this disposition by instilling concepts of citizenship (grazhdanstvennost´) 
in native leaders and intellectuals. Th e blueprint for these eff orts was the 
Bashkir statute of 1865, formulated under the direction of the Minister of 
War Dmitrii Miliutin. Jurists from several Ministries draft ed the legislation, 
which  was extended to Caucasus, Tartarstan, and Turkestan, as well as 
Bashkiria. Offi  cials and generals now sought to spread ideas of citizenship by 
introducing reformed courts, local self-government, schools that would teach 
literacy, and open opera houses, museums and other purveyors of Russian and 
European culture.22
Th e existence of a  propensity to assimilation, however, was belied by the 
realities of local power politics in the national regions. Th e offi  cials who tried 
to impose the new civic order found their principles bent to the advantage 
of native elders who used the newfound autonomy to strengthen their own 
infl uence and promote opportunities for corruption. Th ey sponsored their own 
appointees to local offi  ces, created their own “political machines,” and exacted 
“pay-off s” from local chiefs, which they could use to bribe the administration.23 
Th e policy did produce leaders of the jadid movement, who sought to 
propagate a reformed version of Islam that could be incorporated into Russian 
imperial culture. Th e Tatar Ismail-Bey Gasprinskii, the Azerbeijani Hasan 
Melikov-Zardobi, and Munawwar Qari from Tashkent sought to spread an 
educational system that would create an enlightened, civically minded Islamic 
culture, compatible with Russian rule. But they found their eff orts thwarted by 
21 K. P. Pobedonostsev and I. Babst, Pis'ma o  puteshestvii gosudaria naslednika 
tsesarevicha po Rossii ot Peterburga do Kryma (Moscow: Grachev, 1864), 356-57.
22 Dov Yaroshevskii, “Empire and Citizenship,” in Russia’s Orient, 69-71; Austin Lee 
Jersild, “From Savagery to Citizenship: Caucasian Mountaineers and Muslims in the 
Russian Empire,” in Russia’s Orient, 101-14.
23 Yaroshevskii, “Empire and Citizenship,” 71-73.
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tsarist offi  cials who had little sympathy for local diff erences or autonomy and 
maintained traditional authoritarian practices.24 
In the end, the monarchy remained trapped in its own mythology of 
conquest, which proceeded even as citizenship was touted. Th e Russian 
colonization of lands in the Caucasus and Central Asia, led by detachments 
of Cossacks, resulted in mass expulsions and extermination of native peoples, 
eff orts that were countenanced by Miliutin himself, and opened territories 
for Russian peasants.25 Miliutin’s military reform of 1874, which presumably 
aimed at creating a  citizen army, sought above all to preserve the existing 
system of estates and the subordination of national groups.26 
Th e imagery of conquest and absolute domination could provide a means 
to integrate noble elites whose authority rested on a paternalistic ideology and 
who could share in the benefi ts of rule and a  Western monarchical culture. 
But it could not accommodate native intellectuals who strove for a measure of 
national autonomy and toleration of cultural diff erence. Th e proff ered embrace 
of the monarchy was rebuff ed most powerfully by the Poles in 1863, when the 
milder rule introduced by Alexander resulted in the slaughter of the sleeping 
Russian troops in Warsaw and open rebellion. Th e government’s response was 
violent repression in Poland and the western provinces and the ruthless eff orts 
of the Governor-General M. N. Murav’ev to Russify the western provinces.27 
In Ukraine, the emergence of a  national movement in literature belied the 
24 Jersild, “From Savagery to Citizenship,” 109-11; Edward J. Lazzerini, “Local 
Accommodation and Resistance to Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century Crimea,” 
Russia’s Orient, 169-87; Adeeb Khalid, “Representations of Russia in Central Asian 
Jadid,” Russia’s Orient, 188-202. 
25 Peter Holquist, “To Count, to Extract, to Exterminate: Population Statistics and 
Population Politics in Late Imperial and Soviet Russia,” in A State of Nations: Empire 
and Nation Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin, ed. Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry 
Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 116-21. 
26 John S. Bushnell, “Miliutin and the Balkan War: Military Reform vs. Military 
Performance,” in Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855-1881, 148-49, 154-56.
27 See Th eodore R. Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and 
Russifi cation on the Western Frontier (De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1996); Mikhail Dolbilov, “Russifi cation and the Bureaucratic Mind in the 
Empire’s Northwestern Region in the 1860s,” Kritika, New Series, 5, no. 2 (Spring 
2004): 245-72; idem, “Konstruirovanie obrazov miatezha: Politika M. N. Murav’eva 
v Litovsko-Belorusskom krae v 1863-1865gg kak ob”ekt istoriko-antropologicheskogo 
analiza,” in Actio Nova, ed. A. I. Filiushkin (Moscow: Globus, 2000), 338-408. 
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image of a union of all the Russias obedient to the Tsar of Great Russia. Th e 
eff orts of intellectuals to fi nd a  Ukrainian language threatened the belief in 
the ethnic unity of all the Russias, vital to the concept of a  national empire. 
To Mikhail Katkov these eff orts appeared outlandish. He wrote with disdain 
in 1863, “Th ere have recently appeared in the Ukrainian villages, in sheepskin 
caps, so-called disseminators of Little Russian literacy and organized Little 
Russian schools. Th ere have appeared books in the newly fudged language. 
Finally, one famous professor has solemnly opened a nation-wide fund-raising 
subscription for publishing Little Russian books.”28 
A rift  opened between offi  cials such as Dmitrii Miliutin, who thought 
that punitive steps should be taken in Ukraine, and those sharing in 
Alexander’s scenario, like the Minister of Interior Petr Valuev, who believed 
that assimilation could take place only by winning over public opinion to 
the imperial cause. Valuev was baffl  ed by the dilemma of how to generate 
“centripetal and not centrifugal forces.” He decided on mild measures, “light 
force” that would be assimilationist and civilizing. His circular, which he 
advanced reluctantly, banned religious and popular literature in the Ukrainian 
language. He believed that it would be temporary and could be revoked aft er 
the crisis of the Polish revolution. But it remained in force and brought an 
end to Sunday schools in the Ukrainian language and the attempts to publish 
Ukrainian primers and a  Ukrainian version of the bible.29 Th e movement, 
however, persisted, prompting further repressive measures in the 1870s. 
Th e scenario of love had been meant to obviate a  system of popular 
representation. Alexander envisioned a unity of the estates with the monarchy 
in gratitude for the great reforms and the measure of freedom permitted aft er 
his accession to the throne. Th e fi rst spurning of his embrace had been the 
noble constitutional movements of the early 1860s, which brought forth the 
emperor’s angry reprimand. He declared that the reforms the government had 
introduced “suffi  ciently attest to my constant concern to improve and perfect, 
to the extent of possibility and in the order prescribed by me, the various 
branches of state administration.” He insisted that the right of initiative for 
28 Alexei Miller, Th e Ukrainian Question: Russian Nationalism in the Nineteenth 
Century (New York: Central European Press, 2003), 105.
29 Ibid., 210-12; Olga Andriewsky, “Th e Russian-Ukrainian Discourse and the Failure 
of the ‘Little Russian Solution’,” 1782-1917,” in Culture, Nation, and Identity: Th e 
Ukrainian Russian Encounter (1600-1945), ed. Andreas Kappeler et al. (Edmonton: 
Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 2003), 210-13.
PA RT I V. RUSSI A N MONA RCH Y A ND  THE I MPER I A L STATE
 270 
reform belonged to him exclusively, “and is inseparably connected with the 
autocratic power, entrusted to me by God.” His subjects did not have the right 
to anticipate his “incessant care for Russia’s well-being . . . . No estate has the 
right to speak with the name of other estates. No one can take it upon himself 
to petition me about the general welfare and needs of the state.”30 But rather 
than an upsurge of gratitude, Alexander’s scenario brought forth disappoint-
ment, a sense of betrayal and anger, refl ected in the growth of a revolutionary 
movement and fi nally the turn to terror that resulted in his assassination. 
National Myth and National Monarchy
Alexander II’s scenario of love fostered the presumption that increasing 
education and freedom would lead to increasing sympathy for the monarchy 
and a diminution of support for liberal and national programs. Both Valuev 
and Konstantin Pahlen, the Minister of Justice, clung to these presumptions 
as did many of the reformed offi  cials in the administration. Th e assassination 
of Alexander II and the accession of Alexander III in March 1881 shattered 
these illusions and replaced them with the conviction that defense of the 
autocracy required the show and application of ruthless force. Th e new 
reign opened with the reaffi  rmation of a  motif of conquest that ruled out 
conciliation and eff orts at integration. 
While measures of “Russifi cation” had been taken during Alexander II’s 
reign, they ill fi t the dominant scenario of warm feelings and were pursued 
vigorously only in Poland and the western provinces of Russia. Th e elaboration 
of a “national myth,” which presented the tsar as an ethnically Russian ruler, 
the most Russian of Russians, expressed a  new militancy embodied in the 
fi gure of a burly, bearded, stolid tsar with fi rm resolve to forge an empire that 
was an ethnic Russian state. Th e manifesto of April 29, 1881, written by the 
tsar’s mentor, Constantine Pobedonostsev, announced a  new conception of 
autocracy. Th e bond between tsar and people was to be religious. Th e “Voice of 
God” had summoned the tsar “to turn vigorously to the task of Ruling, with 
hope in Divine Providence” aft er the shameful act of assassination. Th e use of 
the word “vigorously” (bodro) signifi ed a  revitalization of police authority.31 
30 Terence Emmons, Th e Russian Landed Gentry and the Peasant Emancipation of 1861 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 410-11.
31 PSZ, no. 118, April 29, 1881.
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Th e faith in God, the prayers of the people charged him to act with energetic 
and ruthless action from above. “Vigor” became a common term in the rhetoric 
of conservative periodicals calling for unyielding autocratic power. 
Th e manifesto replaced the reign of Peter the Great preceded by “the 
invitation of the Varangians” with a new founding myth of Russian monarchy. 
Pobedonostsev wrote not of the Russian state or empire, but the “Russian 
land” (zemlia russkaia) evoking a  neo-Slavophile picture of seventeenth-
century Russia as a period of harmony between tsar and people. Th e Russian 
land had been disgraced by vile sedition but with “hereditary tsarist power,” 
continued to enjoy the love of its subjects, and this power “in unbreakable  . . . 
union with Our land” had survived such troubles (smuty) in the past. Th e 
historical paradigm now shift s from the Petrine empire, with its westernized 
multinational elite to  a  picture of idealized seventeenth-century polity, 
borrowed from the Slavophiles, when the tsar ruled in union and harmony 
with the Russian land. 
Th e elevation and glorifi cation of the monarch now took place by claiming 
to inhabit another time frame, when the Russian tsar was in contact with 
the nation. Th e synchronic mode was profoundly anti-traditional, expressing 
absolute rejection of the legacies of the recent reigns in the hope of resurrecting 
a distant past. Th e distance between the ruler and the ruled was the distance 
between him and the manifestations of the fallen present that encumbered his 
power. By exalting the seventeenth century, the national myth diminished the 
eighteenth and nineteenth, and delegitimized the legalistic bureaucracy, the 
intelligentsia, and the dynamic of reform that had reached its culmination 
in the previous reign. It looked back to a  timeless heritage, untouched by 
historical change. Th e Russian emperor might live in Western palaces, consort 
with western royalty, and rule institutions with western names, but these 
superfi cial overlays concealed a  national substratum (ustoi) that could be 
recovered through a restoration of the earlier political and spiritual order. 
While Russifying initiatives succeeded only in certain areas of the 
empire, the prevalence of this ideology during the reigns of Alexander III and 
Nicholas II represented a powerful deterrent to the integration of nationalities 
throughout the empire. In place of a presumed assimilation into a multi-ethnic 
empire, the national myth presumed a  preexistent national supremacy and 
dominance inherited from a distant and glorious past. In Ukraine, the western 
provinces, and Poland, it led to measures encouraging the spread of Orthodoxy 
and the Russian language. 
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Th e building of Muscovite style churches in the national regions 
established the image of the empire not as a  multi-national union of elites, 
but as a dominion of the Russian state. Th ey were visual representations of an 
invented tradition of national domination that persisted since the sixteenth 
century that could deliver Russian from western liberal encumbrances by the 
measures introduced by an active and ruthless autocracy. Churches appeared 
as symbols of an empire dominated by ethnic, Orthodox Russians, rather 
than a multi-ethnic empire. Th ey evoked images of a distant past of Orthodox 
religion and Russian rule, suggesting that the reproduction of the visual 
artifacts could restore the imagined unity of the earlier time. 
Imposing orthodox churches displayed imperial rule over Central 
Asia. Th e Cathedral of the Transfi guration, a  large neo-Byzantine church 
completed in 1888, towered over the governor’s house on the principal 
square of Tashkent. It was the most prominent building in the center of the 
new Russian city. Th e buildings of the Teachers’ Seminary in Tashkent were 
constructed in the 1880s in Muscovite style. In 1898, a tall fi ve-cupola tent-
style brick church designed by A. L. Benois was built into the walls of the 
seminary compound, confi rming the particular national and ethnic character 
of the Russian presence in Tashkent.32 
Russian colonists and missionaries in the Caucasus expected “to restore” 
Orthodox Christianity, evoking a time when it was presumably the dominant 
faith in the region. Tent-style churches went up in Baku in the 1880s. Russian 
missionaries and offi  cials in the Caucasus pointed out the importance of the 
physical presence of Orthodox churches for the religious guidance of the 
mountain peoples. Th e Viceroy of the Caucasus, Prince Alexander Dondukov-
Korsakov wrote that the “external” aspects of the faith were most important 
for “Eastern peoples.”33 
32 V. A. Nil'sen, U  istokov sovremennogo gradostroitel'stva Uzbekistana: xix-nachalo 
xx vekov (Tashkent: Gafur Guliam, 1988), 49-52, 64-65; Robert Crews, “Civilization 
in the City: Architecture, Urbanism and the Colonization of Tashkent,” in 
Architectures of Russian Identity: 1500 to the Present, ed. James Cracraft  and Daniel 
Rowland (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 117-32.
33 Austin Jersild, “From Frontier to Empire: Th e Russifi cation of the Caucasus, 
1845-1917,” unpublished manuscript, Chapter 4; A. Platonov, Obzor deiatel'nosti 
obshchestva vozstanovleniia pravoslavnago khristianstva na Kavkaze za 1860-1910 gg. 
(Tifl is: n.p., 1910).
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In the Baltic provinces and Poland, new churches and cathedrals ensured 
that the inhabitants would not forget who ruled their land. Cathedrals in Riga 
and Warsaw carried the name of Alexander Nevskii, Alexander III’s namesake, 
and the traditional defender of Russia against Western Christendom. 
Publications celebrated their construction, providing conspicuous statements 
of domination. A large orthodox cathedral in Russian-Byzantine style had been 
built in the center of Riga from 1876-1884.34
Th e use of ecclesiastical architecture as a  statement of symbolic conquest 
was most apparent in Warsaw, where almost twenty Russian-style Orthodox 
churches were built in the 1890s. In Warsaw, as in Riga, the Moscow-
Byzantine style remained prevalent, signifying imperial domination. Th e 
principal cathedral, Leontii Benois’ immense Alexander Nevskii Cathedral 
(1894-1912), combined the classical Moscow-Byzantine form with abundant 
kokoshniki covering on the roof affi  rming the national character of imperial 
rule. Its 70  meter bell tower made the Russian presence known by dwarfi ng 
surrounding buildings. It became “the most conspicuous accent of the city 
skyline,” prompting lewd comparisons from the city’s residents.35 Initiative 
belonged to the Governor-General, I. V. Gurko, who solicited contributions 
from Russian donors. Th e chancellery of the Governor-General appealed to 
residents of Moscow: “By its very presence  . . .  the Russian Church declares to 
the world  . . .  that in the western terrains along the Vistula, mighty Orthodox 
rule has taken root  . . . . Th e appearance of a  new  . . .  church in Warsaw as 
a  boundary and pillar of Orthodox Russia will animate the hopes of the 
Orthodox Slavs for unifi cation under the Orthodox cross.” Th e journal of the 
Warsaw Eparchy boasted in 1912, “Under the dome of this magic temple, we 
fi nd ourselves as if on Russian soil.”36 
Authorities pressed colonization of land in the Caucasus and Turkestan by 
Russian peasants, regardless of the resistance of native elites. Although Russian 
peasants proved ill-suited to colonization, and local offi  cials preferred farmers 
of other nationalities, such as Armenians, Greeks, Moldavians, and Czechs, 
34 Riga und seine Bauten (Riga: P. Kerkovius, 1903), 181-84.
35 Piotr Paszkiewicz, “Th e Russian Orthodox Cathedral of Saint Alexander Nevsky in 
Warsaw,” Polish Art Studies 14 (1992): 64-65, 67.
36 Ibid., 65-66; for a  more detailed discussion of revival church architecture see my 
article, “‘Th e Russian Style’ in Church Architecture as Imperial Symbol aft er 1881,” 
in Architectures of Russian Identity, 101-116.
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the government endeavored to grant permissions and subsidies only to Russian 
peasants. Th e policy of discrimination in the Caucasus, an offi  cial paper 
argued, “was necessary for the strengthening of the Russian element amid 
the diff erent and not always reliable nationalities in order to raise the prestige 
of Russia [and] its faith, language, and civilization in the region.”37 Th e 
relationship that prevailed at the local level is well illustrated by the inaugural 
ceremony of Governor-General A. N. Kuropatkin held in Ashkabad of the 
Transcaspian Region in 1890. When welcomed by an Armenian merchant, 
he retorted angrily that the delegations should be rearranged. Th e Russians 
from the townspeople estate (meshchane), he declared, should be placed 
in front, then the Turkmen and Kirgiz, then Christians, including the 
Armenians, fi nally the foreigners, Persians, and Afghans. Th e Russian 
townspeople, though representing a lesser estate, had to appear as the leading 
delegation in the local hierarchy.38
Th e national myth framed new policies to exclude Jews from the national 
body, in contrast to the relative tolerance of the previous reign. Th e appeal 
to ethnic identity and rejection of the western character of the autocracy 
encouraged the exclusionist image of the Jew not only as alien, but an enemy 
of the Russian nation. Beginning with the pogroms of 1881, the government 
sought to reverse the eff ects of the reforms, introducing limits on Jewish 
residence, and restrictions of admissions to the universities and the bar.39 Th e 
monarchy endeavored to cleanse Moscow, the symbolic center of the national 
autocracy, of Jews.40 When Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich assumed 
the offi  ce of Governor-General of Moscow in 1891, he asked, with the tsar’s 
support, that the Jews be removed, leading to brutal expulsions of two-thirds 
of the city’s thirty thousand Jewish residents. 
Most fundamentally, the new national symbolic increasingly precluded 
the possibility of national groups, either the religious hopes for conversion or 
the secular visions of enlightenment, which had been confl ated. Despite the 
rhetoric and imagery of Russifi cation, the discourse increasingly emphasized 
37 Jersild, Orientalism and Empire, 126-29, 138-40.
38 Yaroshevskii, “Empire and Citizenship,” 58-59.
39 On the “selective integration” of Jews in the second half of the nineteenth century 
and the setbacks during the 1880s, see Benjamin Nathans, Beyond the Pale.
40 On the shift  from Petersburg to Moscow as the symbolic center of empire see 
article 8. 
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permanent, even racial, attributes of national identity, refl ected in a shift  in 
the terminology for other nationalities, from inovertsy—peoples of other 
religions—to people of other ethnic stock, inorodtsy, or aliens. Russian 
law had included only Jews and nomads in the category inorodtsy, groups 
considered so alien to the Russian social system that they could not be 
assimilated. But in the last decades of the nineteenth century, the term 
began to be applied to all non-Russian nationalities and to express ethnic 
diff erences that implicitly precluded assimilation.41 
Th is shift  that took place in offi  cial discourse also refl ected the emergence 
of a popular Russian national vision of a Russian land that would engulf and 
even extend the empire. Th e line between metropole and periphery is the 
standard term now in use in the literature on empires. Russian explorers and 
nationalist thinkers, like Nicholas Danilevskii, viewed the southern steppe 
and the Asian borderlands as destined for Russian colonization, territories 
virtually empty and ready for occupation that could provide an answer to 
the land hunger prevailing in the Russian interior. In 1892, the eminent 
explorer-geographer Petr Semenov described Russia’s mission as “part of the 
great colonizing movement of the European race,” comparable to the overseas 
colonization of Spain, France, and England.42 Semenov’s fellow explorer 
and geographer, Mikhail Veniukov, who believed that the autocracy was the 
principal deterrent to the formation of a nation state, declared in a speech of 
1873 that the endurance and courage of Russian soldiers not only defeated 
the native peoples, but ensured that “the Caucasus became Russian land.” 
Th ey triumphed in a region where “without the arrival of Russians barbarism 
41 See Paul Werth, “Changing Conceptions of Diff erence, Assimilation, and Faith 
in the Volga-Kama Region, 1740-1870,” in Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 
1700-1930, 171-88; John W. Slocum, “Who, and When, Were the Inorodtsy? 
Th e Evolution of the Category of ‘Aliens’ in Imperial Russia,” Th e Russian Review 
57 (April 1998): 173-90; on the complexities of the usage of the term in Muslim 
regions, see V. O. Bobrovnikov, “Chto vyshlo iz proektov sozdaniia v  Rossii 
inorodtsev? (Otvet Dzhonu Slokumu iz musul’manskikh okrain imperii),” Poniatiia 
o Rossii, 2: 259-91.
42 Cited in Uillard Sanderlend (Willard Sunderland), “Imperiia bez imperializma?” 
in I. Gerasimov, et al., ed. Novaia Imperskaia Istoriia Post-Sovetskogo Prostranstva 
(Kazan: Tsentr Issledovanii Natsionalizma i Imperii, 2004), 463. See also my article, 
“Russian Noble Offi  cers and the Ethos of Exploration,” 181-97; Vera Tolz, Russia: 
Inventing the Nation, 170-74.
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would rule forever.”43 In literature and history the Russian land became 
an expression and metaphor for the Russian nation, a  kind of surrogate for 
parliamentary bodies representing a  political nation. In his popular Course 
of Russian History, Vasilii Kliuchevskii wrote that colonization was “the 
basic fact of Russian history” and that “the history of Russia is the history of 
country that colonizes itself.”44 
Th e erection of daunting Muscovite edifi ces, the evocation of an imagined 
Russian national empire, and the spread of an ethos of colonization, however, 
only revealed the rift  between the imagery and ideology of the monarch and 
its adherents and the subject nationalities of the empire. Th e rift  became 
evident with the established of the State Duma and elections of 1906, which 
led to the formations of native elites who organized political parties seeking 
national rights and autonomy.45 Th e new institutions produced a heightening 
of tensions between Russians and national groups and led to confl ict rather 
than reconciliation or eff orts at integration. In Bashkiria, where Russians 
and Bashkirs had reached a  modus vivendi with local elites, a  “language of 
patriotism began to penetrate local political life” that was expressed in widely-
circulated chauvinistic pamphlets.46 At the same time, those Tatars in Kazan 
who succeeded in assimilating Russian culture or converted to Orthodoxy 
met with aversion from Russians, whose sense of nationality was threatened 
by natives, who did not resemble them.47 
Th e fi rst Duma consisted of only 58.5% Russian delegates (including 
Ukrainians and White Russians), challenging the Russian domination of 
empire.48 S. E. Kryzhanovskii, then an offi  cial in the Minister of Interior who 
was formulating the electoral laws, had foreseen the problems:
43 M. I. Veniukov, Iz vospominanii: kniga pervaia, 1832-1867 (Amsterdam: n.p., 1895), 
336-38. Th e memoirs were written in the 1880s when Veniukov was living abroad. 
44 Willard Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field, 177-220. 
45 Rustem Tsiunchuk, “Peoples, Regions, and Electoral Politics: Th e State Dumas and 
the Constitution of New National Elites,” in Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 
1700-1930, 366-97; Elena Campbell, “Th e Muslim Question in Late Imperial 
Russia,” in ibid., 330-43.
46 Charles Steinwedel, “To Make a Diff erence: Th e Category of Ethnicity in Late Imperial 
Politics, 1861-1917,” in Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices, 76-77.
47 Robert P. Geraci, Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late 
Tsarist Russia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 309-51. 
48 Tsiunchuk, “Peoples, Regions, and Electoral Politics,” 387.
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In Russia, the predominant nationality (natsional’nost’) on which the 
government stands comprises only about 66 percent of the overall 
population, and alien nationalities (chuzhye narodnosti) 34 percent, that 
is a  percentage not seen in a  single Western European power other than 
Austria  . . .  Th erefore the interests of the greatest state importance urgently 
require that the voice of the Russian people, upon whom both the strength 
of state authority and the very throne of the Russian sovereign depend, 
unconditionally prevail in institutions concerned with the preparation of 
legislation  . . .  A strong majority inconvenient for the government may form 
in the Duma on questions touching on the interests of non-Russians.49 
On June 7, 1907, Stolypin perpetrated his coup d’état, a  change in 
the election laws under the tsar’s emergency powers, which curtailed the 
representation of urban populations and enhanced that of the nobility. Th e law 
also assured Russian domination of the Duma by sharply reducing the number 
of deputies elected by Poles, Tatars, and Armenians and excluded representatives 
from Turkestan. Th e rhetoric of the manifesto made clear that tsar and 
government viewed the state as Russian, and the nationalities as alien to the 
body politic. Nicholas declared that the Duma, “created for the strengthening of 
the Russian State (Gosudarstvo Rossiiskoe), must be Russian (russkii) in spirit as 
well.” Other nationalities should have “representatives of their needs in the State 
Duma, but not in numbers allowing them to decide questions that are purely 
Russian.” Elections were temporarily ended in those border regions “where the 
population has not attained a  suffi  cient level of civic development.”50 Of the 
delegates to the Fourth Duma, 83.4 percent were Russians. 
Th e tsar and prime minister agreed on the need to maintain Russian 
national dominance: neither favored compromise or conciliation with the 
nationalities. But they maintained completely irreconcilable conceptions of 
Russia. Th e manifesto confl ated the meanings of “Rossiia” and “Rus’,” but 
whereas Stolypin identifi ed Rossiia with the empire in the form of a  modern 
nation-state, Nicholas looked to a  resurrection of the spirit and traditions of 
ethnic Rus’, which he understood as a bond between himself and the Russian 
people, which predated Peter’s westernized empire and was exemplifi ed in an 
idealized image of the reign of Alexei Mikhailovich. 
49 Cited in Tsiunchuk, “Peoples, Regions, and Electoral Politics,” 369.
50 PSZ, Sobranie 3, no.  29240, June 3, 1907; Tsiunchuk, “Peoples, Regions, and 
Electoral Politics,” 387.
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Th is bond was personal, displayed in ceremonial meetings at the great 
historical celebrations staged from 1909 to 1913, where scenes of mutual 
devotion between Nicholas and the army and Nicholas and the peasantry 
inspired in him a  sense of mystical exaltation. Th e bicentenary of the battle 
of Poltava in 1909, the centenary of the battle of Borodino in 1912, and the 
tercentenary of the election of the fi rst Romanov tsar in 1913, transformed 
these great historical triumphs of early centuries into episodes in Nicholas’s 
scenario. Representatives of the conservative-dominated Duma were either 
excluded or assigned secondary roles. For the tsar, Russia was represented 
by the army—the instrument and symbol of conquest that had crushed the 
revolutionary movement—and the Russian peasants, who he believed remained 
devoted to him despite the peasant uprisings of 1905 and 1906. Th e parades 
at the Poltava and Borodino celebrations provided occasions to display the 
strong, comradely rapport that Nicholas felt with the offi  cers and troops of his 
military. At all three celebrations, he was cheered by masses of peasants. He 
chatted with groups of peasants and claimed to feel bonds of sympathy and 
friendship that he did not experience with the educated and privileged. 
Th e emperor’s and the empress’s trip along the Volga in May, 1913 was 
the culmination of the Tercentenary celebration and a  display that Nicholas 
regarded as amply demonstrating his bond with people. Th eir visits to churches 
and veneration of local icons along the away enhanced their sense of closeness 
to Moscow and distance from the present. Sailboats covered with fl ags greeted 
them. At the prompting of the Ministry of Interior, scenes and ceremonies of 
welcome took place along the river banks. Villages put up triumphal arches 
decorated with plants and the words “God Save the Tsar.” Peasants gathered 
in camps stood on the shore and even ventured into the river up to their waists 
to see the tsar. As the fl otilla approached each town, church bells sounded, and 
priests led processions of the cross from their churches to banks, where they 
blessed the ships. Peasants knelt, crossing themselves, and shouted, many with 
tears, “God protect the little father tsar (batiushka-tsar').” 
In Kostroma, the original Romanov patrimony, Nicholas was blessed 
by the Icon of the Fedorov Mother of God that had been used to bless Tsar 
Michael Fedorovich in 1613. Atop the town pavilion, Nicholas was greeted 
with a  thunderous “hoorah” and an ovation from the crowd. A  regimental 
band gave a  show of marches to tunes from A  Life for the Tsar. When the 
moment came to sing the tsarist anthem, the crowd sank to their knees. As 
Nicholas stood before the thousands of kneeling peasants, his eyes moistened. 
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Th ose present also felt moved, convinced that this was a  signifi cant show of 
popular devotion for the tsar. In Moscow, a similar scene was enacted on Red 
Square, before mass of shouting peasants. While political confl icts marred 
Nicholas’s visits to both Kostroma and Moscow, Nicholas returned to Tsarskoe 
Selo convinced that he made contact with the Russian nation. He declared that 
his trip to the Volga and old Russian towns “has proved once more that the 
bond between Tsar and people that distinguished our Mother Russia in olden 
times exists indestructibly now as well.”51 
Th e historical celebrations were accompanied by a  campaign of mass 
publicity, which reached its culmination during the Tercentenary events that 
sought to popularize Nicholas’s image and sustain the impression that he 
enjoyed mass support. Pictures of the tsar and the imperial family appeared 
on new postage stamps, commemorative coins, and kitsch, the souvenirs of 
celebrations. Films acquainted a mass public with scenes of the imperial family 
at ceremonies and episodes from Russia’s past. Articles in the press and a widely 
circulated offi  cial account of Nicholas’s life acquainted a  growing reading 
public with his habits, tastes, and ostensibly democratic predilections.52 
At the same time, Nicholas sought to embody the image of a  Muscovite 
tsar, inhabiting an imaginary landscape of seventeenth-century Ruś , where the 
tsar enjoyed absolute power and lived in harmony with his subjects. At Tsarskoe 
Selo, he and Alexandra created a  replica of an early Russian town, the 
Fedorovskii gorodok, built for the tsar’s personal convoy and his sharpshooter 
regiment. Th e centerpiece was the Fedorov Cathedral, (1908-1912) dedicated 
to the Fedorov Mother-of-God—the protectress of the dynasty. Th e offi  cial 
name of the church, Fedorovskii Gosudarev Sobor, Th e Sovereigns’ Fedorov 
Cathedral, made it clear that it was the domain of the tsar and tsaritsa. 
Th e architect, Vladimir Pokrovskii, designed the cathedral in the spirit 
of the neo-Russian school, which sought sources of inspiration for a  reborn 
national architecture in all periods of early Russian architecture. Pokrovskii 
took the model of the fi ft eenth-century Annunciation Cathedral in the 
Kremlin, which had served as the private chapel of the Moscow tsar’s family, 
but attached tent-shaped roofs over the main entrance and the covered 
51 Moskovskie Vedomosti, May 26, 1913, 2.
52 See my article, “Publicizing the Imperial Image in 1913,” in Laura Engelstein and 
Stephanie Sandler, eds., Self and Story in Russian History (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2000), 94-119.
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vestibules adding fl amboyant elements recalling seventeenth-century churches. 
He also drew on Novgorod motifs for the bell tower. In this respect, the church 
created its own esthetic that erased the historical and stylistic distinctions of 
early Russian architecture and strove for a  contemporary esthetic true to the 
past rooted in a popular spirit. 
Th e town was to represent a spiritual model of a reborn nation, taken from 
Russia’s distant past. Stepan Krichinskii designed a  Kremlin with walls and 
towers of elaborately decorated white Staritskii limestone. Krichinskii and 
other architects of neo-Russian style favored the form of Kremlin walls, which 
emphasized the separation of the church and the town from the outside world. 
If the models for Alexander III’s offi  cial Russian style were urban churches 
in popular style like Vasilii the Blessed and Moscow-Iaroslavl churches, the 
models for Nicholas II’s were old Russian monasteries, sequestered by walls 
from intrusion. Th e purpose was not admonitory but exemplary, showing the 
survival and revival of old Russian piety by those foreswearing the contestation 
and distractions of modern society. 
Nicholas’s historical imaginings lent his scenario an aspect of fantasy 
and make-believe alien to previous imperial presentations. But he clearly 
believed that the roles refl ected his national self, and he came away from these 
appearances with a heightened sense of mission and determination to restore 
pure autocracy. As a  result, in the opening years of the twentieth century 
we witness the collision of two violently opposed insurgent forces, a  Russia 
awakening politically and demanding to be heard and a  monarch seeking, 
through the punitive means at his disposal, to create a  pure autocracy where 
a  tsar drew personal authority from God and the people, unencumbered by 
institutions of state. 
It is clear that, in this epic struggle for Russia’s political destiny, neither 
side sympathized with the cause of the integration of the nationalities into the 
empire. Both the leaders of the non-socialist parties and the monarch looked 
to the emergence of a nation state dominated by ethnic Russians. Meanwhile, 
national movements emerged that strove for autonomy within the empire. In 
the political circumstances and culture of the time, these aspirations could be 
resolved only in the spirit of confl ict, with the clash of the antinomies, rebellion 
and submission, taking precedence over hopes for integration and acceptance.
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Richard S. Wortman: A Bibliography (1962-2013) 
by Ernest A. Zitser
$
T his bibliography of the works of Professor Richard S. Wortman (b.  1938) lists his publications from 1962 until 2013. It is based on the 2011 version 
of his cur riculum vitae as well as items identifi ed by examining reference works, 
peri odicals, subscription databases, and web search engines.1 Under each year, 
his original works are listed before reviews, which are in alphabetical order of 
the author’s or editor’s name. I have decided to include reprints and Russian 
translations in the bibliography, primarily because doing so provides a glimpse 
of the circulation and diff usion of his ideas, as well as the gradual formation of 
the “Wortman School” of Russian Imperial historiography.2 Th is explains, for 
example, why the bibliography includes two diff erent entries for Stsenarii vlasti, 
a translation of his magnum opus, which appeared in Russia over the course of two 
years with two diff erent translators. Similarly, his Development of a Russian Legal 
Consciousness is mentioned three times: once as the original English-language 
monograph; again as a Russian translation; and fi nally, as an ACLS Humanities 
e-book. However, mention of his advisory role in such works as the Encyclopedia 
of Social History3 and his involvement on the editorial boards of such publications 
as American Historical Review are not included.
1 ABSEES, Historical Abstracts, ISI Web of Knowledge, Zhurnal’nyi zal, Yandex.
ru, Google Scholar. See also [Aleksandr Semenov], “Bibliografi ia rabot Richarda 
Uortmana na russkom iazyke i v rossiiskikh izdaniiakh,” Ab Imperio: teoriia i istoriia 
natsional’nostei i natsionalizma v postsovetskom prostranstve 2 (2000): 59. I also 
gratefully acknowledge the advice and suggestions of Molly Molloy, Reference and 
Instruction Librarian, Stanford University; and Robert H. Davis, Jr., Librarian for 
Russian, Eurasian & East European Studies, Columbia University.
2 Andrei Zorin, “Po napravleniiu k…?” Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 50, No. 4 (2001): 
408-414, here 412. 
3 Peter N. Stearns, Encyclopedia of Social History [Garland reference library of social 
science, v. 780] (New York: Garland, 1994).
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ABBREVIATIONS
AI — Ab Imperio: teoriia i istoriia natsional’nostei i natsionalizma v postsovetskom 
 prostranstve
AHR — American Historical Review 
Biblion — Biblion: Th e Bulletin of the New York Public Library 
JfGO — Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge 
JMH — Journal of Modern History
Kritika — Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, New Series 
NLO — Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 
RH — Russian History/Histoire russe 
RR — Russian Review
SR — Slavic Review
1962
1. “Koshelev, Samarin, and Cherkassky and the Fate of Liberal Slavophilism.” 
SR 21, no. 2 (Summer 1962): 261-279. [Article based on “Koshelev, Samarin, 
and Cherkasskii: Th ree Views of Russia’s Political Future” (A.M. Th esis, 
University of Chicago, 1960)].
1965
2. Review: A. Buzek, How the Communist Press Works [Praeger publications in 
Russian history and world communism, no. 147] New York: Praeger, 1964). 
JMH 37, no. 2 (1965): 281-282.
1967
3. Th e Crisis of Russian Populism. London: Cambridge University Press, 1967. 
[Monograph based on “Th e Crisis of Russian Populism” (Ph.D. diss., University 
of Chicago, 1964)].
1968
4. “Th e New Soviet Intelligentsia and Russia’s Past.” Midway 8, No. 3 (Winter 
1968): 21-37.
5. Review: Edward J. Brown, Stankevich and His Moscow Circle, 1830-1840 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1966). JMH 40, No. 4 (December 
1968): 679-681.
1969
6. “Judicial Personnel and the Court Reform of 1864,” Canadian Slavic Studies, 3, 
No. 2 (Summer 1969): 224-234.
7. Review: Petr Lavrov, Historical Letters. Translated, with introduction and notes 
by James P. Scanlan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967) and Klaus 
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von Beyme, Politische Soziologie im Zaristischen Russland [Osteuropastudien 
der Hochschulen des Lande Hessen. Reihe 4: Frankfurter Abhadlungen zur 
osteuropäische Geschichte, Bd. 1] (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1965). JMH 41, 
No. 2 ( June 1969): 285-288.
8. Review: Leonard Schapiro, Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-
Century Political Th ought [Yale Russian and East European studies, 4] (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). JMH 41, No. 3 (September 1969): 409-
411; “Erratum [to review of Schapiro].” JMH 41, No. 4 (December 1969): 660.
1970
9. Review: Terence Emmons, Th e Russian Landed Gentry and the Peasant 
Emancipation of 1861 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968) and Wayne 
S. Vucinich, Th e Peasant in Nineteenth-Century Russia (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1968). JMH 3, No. 3 (Spring 1970): 295-302.
10. Review: A. Walicki, Th e Controversy over Capitalism: Studies in the Social 
Philosophy of the Russian Populists (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969). JMH 42, 
No. 4 (1970): 673-676.
11. Review: Anna M. Bourguina, Russian Social Democracy—Th e Menshevik 
Movement: A Bibliography [Hoover Institution bibliographical series, XXXVI] 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968). Th e Library Quarterly 40, No. 3 
( July 1970): 353-354.
1971
12. Review: S. S. Dmitriev, ed., Granovskii, Timofei Nikolaevich: Bibliografi ia 
(1828-1967) (Moskva: Izd. Mosk. un-ta, 1969). SR 30, No. 2 ( June 1971): 
389-390.
1972
13. Review: Richard Pipes, Struve: Liberal on Left , 1870-1905 [Russian Research 
Center studies, 64] (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970). JMH 44, 
No. 4 (1972): 620-622.
1973
14. “Gavrila Romanovich Derzhavin and his Zapiski.” in G. R. Derzhavin, 
Perepiska (1794-1816) i “Zapiski.” Facsimile reprint of Sochineniia Derzhavina, 
s obiasnitel’nymi primechaniiami I.A. Grota. Tom 6 (Sankt-Peterburg: Izd. 
Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1871) [Oriental Research Partners memoir 
series], 1-8. Cambridge, UK: Oriental Research Partners, 1973. 
15. Review: William F. Woehrlin, Chernyshevskii: Th e Man and the Journalist 
[Russian Research Center studies, 67] (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1971). JMH 45, No. 1 (March 1973): 148-150.
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1974
16. “Peter the Great and Court Procedure.” Canadian-American Slavic Studies 8, 
No. 2 (Summer 1974): 303-310.
1975
17. Review: Boris Petrovich Baluev, Politicheskaia reaktsiia 80-kh godov XIX veka 
i russkaia zhurnalistika ([Moskva]: Izd-vo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1971). 
JfGO, Bd. 23, H. 2 (1975): 245-246.
1976
18. Th e Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1976. 
19. “Power and Responsibility in the Upbringing of the Nineteenth-Century 
Tsars.” Group for the Use of Psychology in History Newsletter 4, No. 4 (Spring 
1976): 18-27.
1977
20. “Remarks on the Service State Interpretation.” Russian History 4, No. 1 (1977): 
39-41.
21. “Th e Politics of Court Reform.” In Don Karl Rowney and G. Edward Orchard, 
eds., Russian and Slavic History [International Slavic Conference (1st: 1974: 
Banff , Alta)], 10-25. Columbus, OH: Slavica Publishers, 1977.
1978
22.  “Th e Russian Empress as Mother” In David L. Ransel, ed., Family in Imperial 
Russia: New Lines of Historical Research, 60-74. Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1978.
23. Review: Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A Parting of Ways: Government and the 
Educated Public in Russia, 1801-1855 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976). 
JMH 50, No. 1 (March 1978): 176-178.
24. Review: Peter A. Zaionchkovsky, Th e Russian Autocracy under Alexander III, 
edited and translated by David R. Jones [Th e Russian series, v. 22] (Gulf Breeze, 
FL: Academic International Press, 1976). SR 37, No. 1 (March 1978): 127.
1979
25. Review: W. Bruce Lincoln, Nicholas I: Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978). RR 38, No. 2 (April 1979): 
226-227.
1980
26. “Tolstoj and the Perception of Poverty: Tolstoj’s What Th en Must We Do?” Rossija 
= Russia. Studi e Ricerche a Cura di Vittorio Strada Torino 4 (1980): 119-131.
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27. “A Monarch with Talent: Peter.” Review of P. D. Jonge, Fire and Water: A Life 
of Peter the Great (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghan, 1980). New York 
Times Book Review 85, No. 26 (29 June 1980): 11.
28. Review: Manfred Hildermeier, Die Sozialrevolutionare Partei Russlands: 
Agrarsozialismus und Modernisierung im Zarenreich (1900-1914) [Beiträ ge zur 
Geschichte Osteuropas, 11] (Kö ln: Bö hlau, 1976). JMH 52, No. 4 (December 
1980): 739-741.
29. Review: V. A. Tvardovskaia, Ideologiia poreformennogo samoderzhaviia 
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